

47. Owing to the troop carriers sailing for the Clyde a few hours after our return to Scapa it has not been possible for me to obtain details of the military operation with sufficient accuracy to make any but the most general reference to them in this report. It has, however, been arranged for copies of Brigadier Haydon's report to be forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, as soon as it has been prepared.

48 I should like to record with pleasure that throughout the planning and execution of this operation Brigadier Haydon co-operated wholeheartedly and at no time did we have the slightest difficulty in reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions. His presence on board SOMALI, with his staff, was most welcome in every way.

(Signed) C. CASLON,  
Captain (D),  
Sixth Destroyer Flotilla.

#### APPENDIX

#### REPORT ON OPERATION "CLAYMORE"

by Brigadier J. C. Haydon, D.S.O., O.B.E.,  
Commanding Special Service Brigade.

13th March, 1941.

#### Objects of the operation.

1. (a) The Military objects of the operation were to destroy the facilities for producing herring and cod oil in the Ports of Stamsund, Henningsvaer, Svolvaer and Brettesnes, all of which are situated in the Lofoten Islands; to arrest local supporters of the Quisling party; to capture any enemy personnel found in the ports, and to enlist recruits for the Free Norwegian Forces.

(b) The Naval objective at the ports was the destruction or capture of enemy ships and of Norwegian vessels found to be working for the Germans.

#### Forces taking part in the operation.

##### 2. Naval.

(a) The 6th Destroyer Flotilla, under the command of Captain C. Caslon, R.N., and composed of:

H.M.S. SOMALI,  
H.M.S. BEDOUIN,  
H.M.S. TARTAR,  
H.M.S. ESKIMO,  
H.M.S. LEGION,

formed the Naval escort and were responsible for the safety of the military forces during the approach to and return from the Lofoten Islands and for the provision of close support while the operations on shore were in progress.

(b) H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA (Commander C. A. Kershaw, R.N.) carrying the troops destined for Svolvaer and Brettesnes.

(c) H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX (Commander T. B. Brunton, R.N.) carrying the troops destined for Stamsund and Henningsvaer.

(d) Naval demolition parties carried in H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA and H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX.

3. *Military.*—The Military forces taking part in the raid were:—

(a) Operational Headquarters Special Service Brigade in H.M.S. SOMALI.

(b) 250 all ranks of No. 4 Commando under the command of Lieut.-Colonel D. S. Lister, M.C. (The Buffs) in H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA.

(c) 250 all ranks of No. 3 Commando under the command of Major J. F. Durnford-Slater (Royal Artillery) in H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX.

(d) One Section No. 55 Field Company Royal Engineers (2nd Lieut. H. M. Turner, Royal Engineers).

(e) 4 officers and 48 other ranks of the Norwegian Forces, under the command of Captain Martin Linge.

The detachments of Royal Engineers and of Norwegian troops were divided between H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA and H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX in accordance with the tasks to be carried out in each port.

#### Concentration of the force and preparatory work.

4. Operational Headquarters Special Service Brigade, Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos, the Royal Engineers detachment and the Norwegian troops embarked at Gourock in H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA and H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX during the afternoon of Friday, 21st February, 1941, and left for Scapa Flow on the evening of that day.

Scapa was reached at 1430 hours on the 22nd February and the ships were anchored between H.M.S. NELSON and H.M.S. KING GEORGE V.

The troops remained at Scapa until the force sailed for the Lofoten Islands at 0001 hours on Saturday, 1st March, 1941. Thus, there intervened a period of almost a week during which all the final arrangements, plans and orders could be prepared, published and explained and during which those who were to operate together during the operation could meet and get to know one another.

There can be no doubt whatsoever regarding the essential nature of this comparatively short time of preparation.

Though the nature of the raid precluded meticulous rehearsals of the tasks allotted to each troop or detachment, the week at Scapa was invaluable from the military point of view, in that it gave both officers and men time to accustom themselves to the ships from which they were to work; to get to know the officers and crews of the landing craft which were to take them inshore, and, in general, to make the personal contacts which are so essential a preliminary to an enterprise of this kind.

5. So far as the Naval and Military Commanders were concerned, the period at Scapa was filled by a series of conferences, at which all details and difficulties were examined and solutions reached.

Several points of major importance emerged during these meetings. The first concerned the problem of supporting fire from the destroyers.

Captain C. Caslon, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer, having studied the charts of the area of operations, reached the conclusion that, owing to navigational difficulties, the escorting destroyers would not be able to lie closer than approximately 1 mile from each port.

This distance, taking into account the somewhat tortuous nature of the approaches, and the half-lights of early morning, made it unlikely that the destroyers would be in a position