



**SUPPLEMENT**

TO

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WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE, 1948

**RAID ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES IN THE LOFOTEN ISLANDS.**

*The following Despatch was submitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the 4th April, 1941, by Admiral Sir JOHN C. TOVEY, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet*

**H.M.S. KING GEORGE V.**  
4th April, 1941.

**OPERATION "CLAYMORE"**

Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships the enclosed report of Operation "Claymore"\* prepared by the Captain (D), 6th Destroyer Flotilla, H.M.S. SOMALI, in command of the operation. I concur fully in the report and in the remarks of the Rear Admiral (D), Home Fleet, in his Minute II, particularly in paragraph 2.

2. Among the factors which contributed to the success of this small combined operation I would draw attention to the following:—

(a) The excellent co-operation between all ranks and ratings of the Navy and Army taking part. Each single phase required a joint decision to be taken, and in each phase Naval units and Army units were working side by side in complete agreement and harmony. It is appropriate to record the appreciation of the Naval officers and ratings who took part for the qualities of their soldier opposite numbers.

(b) The weather. It had not been practicable to carry out more than elementary drills in the short time at Scapa, and it was a great relief to me that the landing craft did not have to contend with swell, strong

wind or tide. I would stress moreover that any less time than was allowed for rehearsal and planning, and it was two days less than originally planned, would have been quite unacceptable.

3. I would mention the valuable part played by the submarine SUNFISH in her role as a D/F beacon.\* This scheme worked well, and although in the event the force was able to fix by sights, had this not been possible they would have been in an uncomfortable position without the SUNFISH'S aid

4. With reference to paragraph 29 of Captain D.6's report, I had laid particular emphasis in my verbal instructions on the importance of punctuality in withdrawing all forces at the end of the agreed time, and I endorse the opinion that it was necessary to sink the HAMBURG rather than to attempt to steam her down the Vestfjord and then some 750 miles to the Faroes with the resources available, but she should first have been boarded and searched for papers or other material likely to be useful.

(Signed) JACK C. TOVEY,  
*Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-Chief,*  
*Home Fleet.*

**MINUTE II**

**H.M.S. TYNE.**  
15th March, 1941.

Forwarded.

2. Great credit is due to Captain C. Caslon, Royal Navy, for his part in the efficient planning and execution of this operation.

3. It was fortunate that the conditions were ideal. The weather throughout the passage could not have been better, and the opposition was negligible.

*Admiralty footnote —*  
\* D/F beacon—an aid to navigation.