

reception doubtful and transmission on any adequate aerial impossible. This resulted in some unreliability in naval communications which finally caused use to be made of an Army Marconi W/T set working to Cairo. This was subsequently proved to be unnecessary since my immediate signals 1103/26 and 1151/26 were, in fact, received by V.A.L.F. about 1400/26.

On departure from Myli, one W/T set and books were embarked in the caique and subsequently in the destroyer HAVOCK, but due to the darkness, confusion with Army personnel and equipment, and the limited and varied means of water transport, an essential box of spares was lost overboard, and the set itself suffered some damage.

33. At 0900 news was received that the Corinth Canal, together with the road and rail bridge, had been attacked and was probably held by German parachute troops, following on an intense aerial bombardment. This necessitated a further alteration of plan, as it was then evident that the only place from which the rear-guard could be withdrawn with reasonable safety was from the embarkation points in the area to the east of Athens. A fresh plan was made and signalled, and this was adhered to for the remainder of the evacuation. It was very fortunate that this signal could be passed to Brigadiers Charrington and Puttock at this time.

34. At sunset we abandoned our H.Q. and the whole party proceeded to Myli pier. On arrival at the pier it was found that the flying boat had arrived, but there was no sign of the destroyer. The more important passengers were embarked in the flying boat. My arrangements were for my Chief Staff Officer, Commander Fearn, to accompany General Wilson to Suda that night with the object of co-operation with S.N.O. Suda Bay and V.A.L.F. in the directing of movements of escorts and shipping at Suda Bay, in case W/T communications from the Morea should fail in the later stages. Commander Fearn was, of course, fully conversant with the situation so far as it was known. General Wilson suggested that I should leave with him that night, but I decided to remain until the N.Z. Brigade under General Freyberg had been evacuated, and to proceed to their beaches at Monemvasia myself, taking with me my signal staff, W/T set, beachmasters, etc. It appeared to me at the time that if the L.C.T. failed to arrive, this might be a difficult operation and lengthy, and I preferred to be on the spot myself.

35. The local situation in the Morea was that at midnight, our covering forces 15 miles to the north of Myli were being withdrawn through Myli to Tripolis, and it was anticipated that by next morning the enemy would be in Myli and Nauplia, by which time the large embarkation, which was in the process of being carried out at the latter place, should be completed. The enemy air superiority made it necessary for us to get to Monemvasia, 56 miles distant, before daylight. As an alternative method of proceeding, in the event of a destroyer not being available, the Crown Prince of Greece's motor yacht had been placed at my disposal, with Lieut. Harrison, R.N.R. in command, but this yacht had been bombed and put out of action during the course of the afternoon. The only other alternative was a caique chartered by Colonel Smith-Dorrien; and, in the absence of the

destroyer, we proceeded to board her—later the destroyer HAVOCK arrived and took us off the caique, and enabled us to reach Monemvasia before daylight.

*Sunday, 27th April. Near Monemvasia.*

36. Off Monemvasia we unexpectedly came up with ten L.C.A. belonging to GLENEARN, who had been bombed on Saturday. We landed in these and lay in a small bay four miles north of Monemvasia, scattering the L.C.A. amongst the beaches about half a mile apart. It was most fortunate that these were not spotted by enemy aircraft which were constantly overhead for the next two days.

37. Heavy bombing was heard to the northward during the morning, which later proved to have been the attack on the Dutch transport SLAMAT which resulted in her loss, together with that of the destroyers DIAMOND and WRYNECK.

38. In the forenoon, Commander James, the Principal Beachmaster at Monemvasia, and other officers, reconnoitred the beaches in preparation for the coming night's embarkation. I ordered him to try to get into telephonic communication with Kalamata, but this he was unable to do. Brigadier Galloway also got into touch with General Freyberg and found the retirement on Monemvasia was going according to plan. After dark I sent three L.C.A. further north to increase their dispersion.

39. On arrival at Monemvasia, the W/T set and the few ratings and cypher officers were landed and communication was established with Malta and Alexandria on 8260 kc/s. and with Malta and ship detailed by V.A.L.F. on 465 kc/s. Communication from Monemvasia was not perfect throughout, as even after all the spares carried with the W/T set had been used, one of the remaining transmitting valves was found to be soft and lost its emission as soon as it heated up. Despite this handicap, all messages vital to the operation were cleared and similar messages from V.A.L.F. and Suda were received.

*Embarkations.*

40. On the night 26th/27th April, a total of approximately 18,000 troops were evacuated, and all areas were used except the Megara area. Owing to a heavy ground swell off Raphena (C beach) difficulty was experienced in transferring troops from landing craft alongside the GLENGYLE. The Commanding Officer therefore issued instructions that the last landing craft were to be clear of the beach by 0215, in order that craft could be hoisted in time for GLENGYLE to sail at 0300. About 700 men were left ashore and were brought off the next night.

41. The numbers embarked from Nauplia were greatly reduced owing to the stranding of ULSTER PRINCE preventing the use of wharves by destroyers, and also to the non-arrival of GLENEARN landing craft, due to the ship having been disabled by bombing attack on 26th April. The numbers actually embarked from this area (Beaches S and T) were approximately 5,500 instead of the 8,000 planned.

42. On the night 27th/28th April, approximately 4,700 embarked from the area to the east of Athens. This party included the rear-guard formed by the 4th N.Z. Brigade, whom