

remain in close order and will be manoeuvred as a unit until action is joined. When the signal "Act independently" is made or at discretion of Commanding Officer, REPULSE will assume freedom of manoeuvre remaining in tactical support but engaging from a wide enough angle to facilitate fall of shot.

5. Intend to operate at 25 knots unless a chase develops and subsequently to retire at maximum speed endurance will allow.

6. Capital ships should attempt to close below 20,000 yards until fire is effective but should avoid offering an end on target. Ships must be prepared to change from delay to non-delay fuzes according to target.

7. PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE are each to have one aircraft fuelled and ready to fly off if required. If flown off aircraft must return to land base. Kota Bharu aerodrome is understood to be out of action.

8. TENEDOS will be detached before dark to return independently to Singapore.

9. Remaining destroyers may be detached during the night 9th/10th should enemy information require a high speed of advance. In such case these destroyers are to retire towards Anamba Island at 10 knots until a rendezvous is ordered by W/T.

TO: PRINCE OF WALES, REPULSE

FROM: C.-in-C., E.F

Inform Ships' Companies as follows: Begins—
"The enemy has made several landings on the north coast of Malaya and has made local progress. Our Army is not large and is hard pressed in places. Our Air Force has had to destroy and abandon one or more aerodromes. Meanwhile fast transports lie off the coast.

This is our opportunity before the enemy can establish himself. We have made a wide circuit to avoid air reconnaissance and hope to surprise the enemy shortly after sunrise tomorrow Wednesday. We may have the luck to try our metal against the old Japanese battle-cruiser KONGO or against some Japanese cruisers and destroyers which are reported in the Gulf of Siam. We are sure to get some useful practice with the H.A. armament.

Whatever we meet I want to finish quickly and so get well clear to the eastward before the Japanese can mass too formidable a scale of an attack against us. So shoot to sink."—
Ends.

APPENDIX III.

Signals made by Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet, to Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet.

TO: C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet. FROM: Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet.

IMMEDIATE.

R.A.F. reconnaissance to depth of 100 miles to the north-westward of you will be provided by 1 Catalina from 0800 onwards tomorrow 9th.

(ii) It is hoped that a dawn reconnaissance of coast near Singgora can be carried out on Wednesday, 10th.

(iii) Fighter protection on Wednesday, 10th will not, repeat not, be possible.

(iv) Japanese have large bomber forces based Southern Indo-China and possibly also in Thailand. C.-in-C., Far East, has requested General MacArthur to carry out attack with his long-range bombers on Indo-China aerodromes as soon as possible.

(v) Kota Bharu aerodrome has been evacuated and we seem to be losing grip on other northern aerodromes due to enemy action.

(vi) Military position near Kota Bharu does not seem good, but details are not available.

T.O.O. 2253GH/8.

TO: C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet. FROM: Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

One battleship, "M" class cruiser, 11 destroyers and a number of transports reported close to coast between Kota Bharu and Perhentian Island by air reconnaissance this afternoon.

T.O.O. 1125Z/9.

Correct my 1125/9. Force was sighted at 0900Z/9 (1630GH/9).

T.O.O. 1155Z/9.

TO: C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet. FROM: Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet.

IMMEDIATE.

Only significant enemy report is contained in my 1125Z/9th. Enemy apparently continuing landing in Kota Bharu area which should be fruitful as well as Singgora.

2. On the other hand enemy bombers on South Indo-China aerodromes are in force and undisturbed. They could attack you five hours after sighting and much depends on whether you have been seen today.

Two carriers may be in Saigon area.

3. Military situation at Kota Bharu appears difficult. Aerodrome is in enemy hands.

4. All our northern aerodromes are becoming untenable due to enemy air action. C.-in-C., Far East, hints he is considering concentrating all air efforts on defence of Singapore area.

5. Extremely difficult to give you clearer picture because air reconnaissance communications are so slow due partly to damage to aerodromes.

T.O.O. 1415Z/9 (2145GH/9).

TO: C.-in-C., Eastern Fleet. FROM: Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet.

IMMEDIATE.

Enemy reported landing Kuantan, latitude 03° 50' North.

T.O.O. 1505Z/9.