

effect on the morale of the troops and civil population, however, was considerable.

22. In spite of arrangements made for co-operation with local military and civil authorities by Major-General Mackesy and his staff prior to my arrival, the relations between the Allied Forces in Norway and the Norwegian authorities, civil and military, had never been regularised through the proper diplomatic channels, and co-operation with such Norwegian forces as remained in being was not made easier by this omission to place matters on a proper political footing. On the 16th May, however, I had a cordial and satisfactory interview at my Headquarters with General Rugé, Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian army, and General Fleischer, Commander 6th Norwegian Division, acting in close co-operation with the French forces to the North of the Rombaks Fjord.

The Norwegian Generals were insistent on the need for preventing Mo and Bodo falling into the hands of the enemy and stressed their desire to pass from the defensive to the offensive and recapture Mosjoen. I explained the Allied situation to them fully.

On 15th May Colonel R. C. G. Pollock, M.C., Head of a Military Mission sent out to assist my Headquarters to maintain close relations with the Norwegian Government, reported to me and was informed of the situation before he left for Tromso.

Sir Cecil Dormer, British Minister in Norway, also arrived from the United Kingdom and discussed the situation with Lord Cork and myself before proceeding to take up his post with the King and Government of Norway. The opportunity was taken of impressing on him the urgent need of a closer control of the civil population in militarily occupied areas.

On 23rd May Lord Cork flew to Tromso and discussed the general situation with the King and members of the Government. As a result of these activities relations with the Norwegian authorities began to assume a more businesslike and realistic aspect, particularly in respect of the necessary provision of facilities for the establishment of a base at Tromso. These the Norwegians were reluctant to concede on the grounds that our presence there would expose the town to enemy air attack; in fact, they went so far as to stipulate that unless we provided adequate anti-aircraft artillery protection in the area, base facilities could not be provided.

With the help of Colonel Pollock these objections were eventually overcome, but part of my already inadequate allotment of anti-aircraft artillery had to be diverted to Tromso as the War Office could not spare any for this purpose.

23. On the 16th May I completed and despatched the Report to the Chiefs of Staff called for in my original Instructions from the Secretary of State for War. The Report was to the effect that provided the situation generally remained unchanged it should be possible to maintain the integrity of Northern Norway with the forces outlined below, and, as well, develop a limited offensive so as to deny the landing ground at Mosjoen to the enemy.

#### FORCES REQUIRED.

##### (a) *Sea.*

Four cruisers.  
Six destroyers.  
Four escort vessels.

Twelve anti-submarine trawlers.  
Two submarines.  
Auxiliary vessels as at present.

##### (b) *Land.*

One Divisional Cavalry Regt.  
One Squadron Armoured Cars.  
One Mounted Infantry Unit (Lovat's Scouts).  
Five Batteries Field Artillery.  
Two Batteries Medium Howitzers.  
Thirteen Batteries (104 guns) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery.  
Eight Batteries (96 guns) Light Anti-Aircraft Artillery.  
Five Companies Engineers.  
Seventeen Infantry Battalions.  
One Machine Gun Battalion.

##### (c) *Air.*

Two Squadrons Hurricane Fighters.  
One Bomber Squadron.  
One Army-Co-operation Squadron.

I also pointed out, that the first object, namely, the denial of iron ore to Germany through Narvik, seemed already to have been achieved by the destruction of the facilities at the port, partly by the Germans themselves and partly by naval bombardment; secondly, that the interference with the supply of ore to Germany through Lulea did not seem to be a practical proposition unless the active and full co-operation of the Swedish armed forces could be assured; and that therefore the third object, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of Northern Norway seemed to be the only one of the three that required immediate consideration.

The need for Tromso as a base port in addition to Harstad was also indicated, as was the urgency of arriving at some adequate arrangement with the Norwegian Government so as to ensure the efficient control of the civil population in the theatre of operations and the desirability of placing all the armed forces in Norway under a single Commander-in-Chief.

The interdependence from a strategical point of view of Bodo, Narvik and Tromso, and the impossibility of treating the defence of any one of them as an isolated problem was also pointed out, as was the potential threat involved in the present defenceless state of the landing grounds in Northern Norway at Laxelvn and elsewhere.

24. Throughout the period I was in constant touch with Lord Cork from whom as Commander-in-Chief I received my general instructions. On 16th May Lord Cork established his Headquarters ashore, and a joint Navy and Army Operational Office was set up at Force Headquarters in Harstad. Co-operation was greatly facilitated by these measures.

25. During this period General Bethouart perfected his plans for the achievement of the objects assigned to him by me, and his troops, assisted by the Norwegians under the Command of General Fleischer on the eastern flank, continued steadily to press back the Germans North of the Rombaks Fjord and South of the Beis Fjord in circumstances of considerable difficulty of terrain and maintenance.

26. On 17th May a telegram was received from the Chiefs of Staff to the effect that, owing to events in France and Belgium, my Force would be limited to 12 French and 3 British Battalions, with ten independent companies with proportionate artillery, engineers and services,