

was laid in Skjelfjord early in the proceedings for the protection of the *PENELOPE*. The A/T Boom lay had been started in Harstad Northern Entrance but not completed. At the evacuation all nets were sunk and all traces were removed.

9. The A/S Air Patrols, when the necessary Walrus Aircraft were available, were carried out outside a circle 27 miles radius centred about the points 68 35 N 17 10 E. The various outer surface A/S Patrols being situated on the circumference of this circle. The sectors, centred in Harstad Harbour being:—

X. Between 060° and 300° to a depth of 40 miles.

Y. Between 300° and 245° to a depth of 50 miles.

Z. Between 245° and 225° to a depth of 100 miles.

Q. Between 225° and 190° to a depth of 80 miles.

10. After the sinking of U.49 on 15th April, no contacts with enemy submarines were made throughout the remainder of the operations, though many reports of them being sighted in the vicinity were received. An Irish Guardsman fishing at Bogen landed a used Escape Apparatus belonging to U.64.

11. Five enemy aircraft were seen on the 29th May, apparently laying mines in Tjeldsundet South Channel, and in the subsequent sweeping operations 4 mines were exploded, 2 by non-magnetic sweep and 2, later, by magnetic.

#### SECTION V.

##### A SUMMARY OF THE EVENTS IN THE MOSJOEN—MO—BODO AREA.

1. On the 29th April, I received a message from C.I.G.S. informing me that it was essential that the Head of Saltfjord should be occupied to ensure that there should be no chance of Germans arriving by parachute. The telegram indicated that a force to occupy the area would be leaving U.K. immediately. A destroyer was sent forthwith and was followed by a detachment of the Scots Guards, 150 strong. The destroyer reported no Germans or shipping of any sort in the vicinity.

2. On the 1st May an order was received from the Admiralty to send a destroyer to Mo to prevent an enemy landing and the excellent proposal was made by the Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that a Division of Destroyers should be established to patrol the coast from Namsos North to prevent the movement of every troopship/s by sea. This unfortunately never materialised.

3. Preparations for the embarkation in U.K. of Independent Companies of troops for Mo and Mosjoen were made known to me by signal, and I also received information that 2 Flying-Boats were coming out to reconnoitre aerodromes in the Bodo area. Their life was short. They were caught and put out of action on the water by enemy aircraft on the 4th May.

4. On May 4th, I came to the conclusion that it was time that policy and responsibility in the Bodo area was defined and I accordingly addressed the following message to the Admiralty:

“ Request I may be informed of the general policy regarding Bodo, Mo and Mosjoen. It

seems most important to hold in force the Mo road leading north. From Admiralty messages it appears the forces being sent are hardly adequate for this purpose and with such weak detachments in the air another naval commitment comes into being. These areas do not, I presume, come under Narvik. Are there any other allied forces to the south of me.”

5. The Admiralty reply received next day was to the effect that it was not possible to maintain large forces in face of enemy air superiority well in advance of established fighter aerodromes and that Bodo was the only place south of Narvik where such could be established. That small parties only would be maintained at Mo and Mosjoen with the object of obstructing enemy advance and to prevent landings by sea and air. On the 7th May I learned that all Independent Companies operating in Northern Norway would come under Narvik Command and I was given details of their disposition under Colonel Gubbins. Anxiety was expressed by the Norwegian Commander-in-Chief as to the potential aerodromes in Bodo, Mosjoen area.

6. On the 7th and 8th the enemy advance north began to make itself felt. A French detachment at Mosjoen first reported the enemy 100 miles to the south and on the 8th I heard that Mosjoen was about to be evacuated. On the 9th the Germans were 10 miles off Mosjoen and Brigadier Gubbins reported that there was great concern amongst the Norwegians about the continued enemy advance and that he would withdraw gradually to Mo and eventually to Bodo.

7. I suggested to the Admiralty on the 7th that, if the Division of Destroyers they had originally proposed could not be provided, 2 Destroyers might be added to my force and I would manage the patrol, but on the 10th the Admiralty required me to reduce my Destroyer force by 4 vessels on account of the need for concentration in the southern part of the North Sea. On the same day, the Admiralty informed me it was essential to hold Bodo for the present.

8. On the evening of the 10th May, the enemy were successful in landing a force of 650 men at Hemnes near Mo partly from a coasting steamer which came north with aerial escort. Intelligence concerning the movements of this vessel reached me unfortunately too late for her to be intercepted by *CALCUTTA* and *ZULU* who were sent for the purpose. *CALCUTTA* sank the steamer at Hemnes an hour and a half after she had got alongside. Reinforcements with light A.A. guns were embarked in *ENTERPRISE* for passage to Mo.

9. Wing-Commander Atcherley who had visited the area reported to Air Ministry and Admiralty by W/T on the advanced state of preparedness of the aerodrome at Mo and its great value to the enemy should it fall into their hands.

10. Mosjoen was evacuated, equipment being abandoned, on the 12th May. *ENTERPRISE* accompanied by *CAIRO* landed reinforcements at Mo on the 12th and other reinforcements had reached Bodo on the 11th. The enemy was now subjecting Mo to heavy air attacks and at the same time I was informed that while no fighter or A.A. reinforcements beyond those already authorised could be expected, forces at Bodo must be supplied from the Narvik area.