

overrunning of the convoy. On news of the attack being received at Manzai, reinforcements comprising detachments of Infantry and South Waziristan Scouts with one section of armoured cars were despatched to the scene. An infantry battalion was also immediately despatched in lorries from Bannu, but the crisis was over before it arrived. Aircraft gave great assistance, one aeroplane being shot down whilst engaged on close support duties.

11. This outrage further encouraged unrest amongst the Mahsuds, and on the 15th and 16th of April a gang of members of this tribe unsuccessfully attacked Tiarza Scouts Post 17 miles from Wana. Air action was taken against the village responsible for this attack, and the gang dispersed. Subsequently, in order to bring pressure to bear on the Jalal Khel Mahsuds, who were chiefly responsible for the attack on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi, their grazing grounds were proscribed from the 28th April to the 30th of May, by which date the bulk of the tribal section had submitted.

12. The organisation of the lines of communication and the arrangements for supply of Razmak and Wana at this stage are of interest. After the attack on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi on the 9th of April the movement of Government convoys ceased, except on roads which were protected by posts and piquets held by regular troops. Arrangements were made for supplies to be delivered to Razmak and Wana in privately owned lorries with tribal drivers, running under their own tribal protection, while full use was made of bomber transport aircraft, including a flight loaned by His Majesty's Government from the Royal Air Force command in Iraq. The protection of the forty-six miles of road from Bannu to Damdil was carried out by the 1st Division, and the permanent piquets thereon were supplemented by the daily patrolling of the road by infantry and armoured cars, supported by artillery and aircraft. The system worked smoothly and efficiently but reduced the number of troops available for active operations.

13. As the result of the continued deterioration of the situation, the spread of unrest, the gathering of hostile gangs and the attacks on Government forces and communications throughout Waziristan it became necessary to send further reinforcements to the area. On the 12th of April, the 3rd (Jhelum) Infantry Brigade was concentrated at Mir Ali, and on the 15th of April the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade (Brigadier C. D. Noyes, M.C.) reached Waziristan. On the 21st of April, the 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade (Brigadier C. M. S. Manners, D.S.O., M.C.) was placed at 48 hours notice to move from its home station as an additional reinforcement. No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron relieved No. 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron at Miranshah and No. 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron was moved from Ambala to Manzai.

14. Towards the middle of April it became clear that all attempts to effect a settlement by political pressure combined with limited air action had failed, and on the 22nd of April the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command (General Sir John F. S. D. Coleridge, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.), was vested with full political control in Waziristan and in the tribal areas on the border of

British territory. Command and control of air operations in Waziristan were also vested in General Coleridge, who was instructed by the Government of India "to restore peaceful conditions throughout the area".

The operations undertaken to carry out this task are described in the paragraphs which follow.

III. OPERATIONS IN THE KHAISORA VALLEY, 23RD OF APRIL TO THE 3RD OF MAY.

15. By the middle of April tribesmen had assembled in large numbers between the Khaisora and the Shaktu valleys, with parties in close proximity to the Tochi River and Mir Ali. It was decided therefore that initial operations should be undertaken in the Lower Khaisora valley, where the enemy might oppose the troops on ground favourable to the employment of all arms. As it was now clear that all sections of the Tori Khel south of the Tochi River were involved, the proscribed area of the Lower Khaisora River was further extended to include an area roughly from the Tochi River to the Khaisora River and between the Razmak road on the west and the Khara-ghora range on the east.

16. A column, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, under the Command of the 1st Division (Major General E. de Burgh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.), accordingly advanced southwards from Mir Ali on the 23rd of April. Little opposition was encountered and the troops reached the Khaisora River on the 25th of April. It became apparent at this stage that the enemy could not be brought to battle on ground of our own choosing, and a further advance was necessary. On the 27th of April, the 2nd Infantry Brigade accordingly moved westwards up the Khaisora valley to a camp at Biche Kashkai. After dark, sniping of the camp began and very heavy and determined attacks were made on piquets throughout the night. Unsuccessful attempts were also made to rush the camp perimeter.

17. The advance was resumed on the 29th of April towards the hills overlooking the Dakai Algad where the enemy were collecting in large numbers. The ensuing engagement was very successful in its results, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy by troops and aircraft at little cost to ourselves. During the remainder of this phase of the operations the tribesmen, having learnt their lesson, exposed themselves but rarely and sniping practically ceased. On the 1st of May the 2nd Infantry Brigade withdrew from Biche Kashkai and the column returned to Mir Ali on the 3rd of May.

18. Although these operations had achieved their immediate purpose in that the enemy had received heavy punishment, they had not been decisive. The Faqir of Ipi was still at Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu valley where the main lashkar continued to increase in strength, in spite of increased pressure in the proscribed area around it.

IV. FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TORI KHEL—THE ADVANCE TO THE SHAKTU—6TH OF MAY TO THE 30TH MAY.

19. The operations in the Lower Khaisora valley had driven the bulk of the enemy southwards towards the Upper Shaktu valley. It was necessary to strike a decisive blow at these concentrations before they could fully