



## SECOND SUPPLEMENT

TO

# The London Gazette

Of TUESDAY, the 15th of FEBRUARY 1938

**Published by Authority**

---

*Registered as a newspaper*

---

FRIDAY, 18 FEBRUARY, 1938

### *India Office.*

#### REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN, 16TH JANUARY, 1937 TO 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1937.

(SECOND PHASE.)

##### I. THE SITUATION AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASE.

1. During the latter half of January, after a settlement had been concluded with the Tori Khel Wazirs, conditions in Waziristan were gradually returning to normal. On the 1st of February, political control in the North and South Waziristan Agencies and in tribal areas of the Bannu District which, since December 1936 had been vested in the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, reverted to His Excellency the Governor, North-West Frontier Province. Reinforcements which had been sent to Waziristan from other districts were withdrawn, and by the 5th of February apart from the normal garrisons the Bannu Brigade only remained in the theatre of operations.

##### II. PERIOD OF INCREASING UNREST—1ST OF FEBRUARY TO THE 22ND OF APRIL.

2. Encouraged by the withdrawal of troops, the Faqir of Ipi renewed his hostile propaganda, receiving active assistance from recalcitrant and irresponsible elements throughout Waziristan. The Tori Khel section of the

Wazir tribe failed to carry out the terms of their settlement and expel the Faqir of Ipi from Arsal Kot in the Shaktu valley where he had made his headquarters. Hostile lashkars and gangs began to collect in the area south of the Tochi valley. On the 6th of February an officer of the South Waziristan Scouts was murdered in Mahsud country, and the next day the Assistant Political Agent, North Waziristan, was murdered by Madda Khel tribesmen in the Tochi valley. These events caused an increase in tribal unrest, and a series of further outrages took place. There were numerous raids into administered and protected areas, British subjects being kidnapped and life and property destroyed, and tribesmen in increasing numbers arrived from all quarters to join the Faqir. In these circumstances it was decided to reinforce Waziristan District, and the 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade (Brigadier R. D. Inskip, D.S.O., M.C.) was concentrated at Mir Ali on the 1st of March. On the same day the Bannu Brigade (Brigadier F. H. Maynard, C.B., M.C.) moved to Miranshah.

3. Meanwhile political pressure was brought to bear on the various tribes to induce them to carry out their responsibilities, and these efforts were reinforced by air action on a limited scale.

Tribal jirgas (representative assemblies) of the Mahsuds and Madda Khel were interviewed and orders of Government announced in connection with the murders of the two officers.

The attitude of the Mahsud elders was satisfactory, but the vacillations of the Madda Khel necessitated air action, after due warning, against three villages in which the murderers were being harboured.

On the 9th of March a proclamation by the Governor was issued throughout Waziristan in which the origins of the present unrest were traced and the tribes invited to co-operate in the restoration of normal conditions. On the same day representatives of the Tori Khel Wazirs were interviewed and warned to control their tribe and carry out their agreements under pain of drastic action by Government. The tribal elders were submissive but admitted their inability to control their hostile sections. In the meantime the attitude of members of the Mahsud tribes of the Shaktu valley became more threatening and many joined the following of the Faqir.

4. The situation was obviously unsatisfactory and deteriorating. Accordingly, Headquarters of the 1st (Indian) Division (Major-General E. de Burgh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.) together with the 3rd Infantry Brigade (Brigadier A. N. Floyer Acland, D.S.O., M.C.) were ordered to Waziristan. The latter completed its concentration at Mir Ali on the 14th of March and troops then assumed responsibility for the protection of the road from Bannu to the Nariwela Narai, north of Damdil, and the construction of permanent piquets was commenced.

5. During the latter half of March further political negotiations were carried on with tribal representatives, but these negotiations, far from resulting in an improvement in the situation, were used by the Faqir to gain time and enhance his prestige. Outrages on roads continued, and on the 21st of March a camp piquet of the 1st Infantry Brigade near Damdil was heavily attacked by tribesmen. This series of incidents culminated on the 29th of March in a serious attack on troops of the 1st Infantry Brigade near Damdil.

6. On the 29th of March two infantry battalions, supported by a battery of mountain artillery left Damdil camp to open the road south of Damdil for the passage of a convoy. The initial road protection piquets were established without incident, but later the leading troops were subjected to heavy attacks by tribesmen, who increased in numbers as the day progressed. The original attacks were repulsed with the aid of armoured cars, and later in the day reinforcements from Damdil turned the enemy's flank and inflicted heavy casualties, the approach of darkness preventing the complete envelopment of the enemy who fought with great courage and resolution. Throughout the day aircraft of the Royal Air Force ably supported the troops.

7. In spite of heavy tribal casualties, this action had little effect on the general situation, and by the 5th of April, which marked the expiration of the period of grace allowed to the Tori Khel for compliance with Government terms, no settlement had been reached. Measures to bring pressure to bear on the whole Tori Khel tribe were accordingly taken. These measures included political pressure in the form of forfeiture of allowances, exclusion of the tribe from certain settled districts, and the evacuation of villages located within three miles of the Bannu-Razmak road. In addition, inhabitants were ordered to evacuate

within a specified period an area round Arsal Kot, the Faqir of Ipi's headquarters, and a belt of country in the Lower Khaisora valley, under threat of air action should they fail to do so. The areas in which inhabitants are so warned to evacuate are described hereinafter as "proscribed areas", and in all cases, before air action is commenced, ample time is allowed to enable inhabitants to comply with Government orders and leave the area.

8. Despite these measures the general situation did not improve and there were no signs that the tribal leaders would be able to regain control over their irresponsible elements. Frequent raids were carried out into the settled districts, camps and piquets were sniped and bridges, culverts and telephone lines on the roads were damaged by tribal gangs. As a result of the heavy sniping of posts in the Shinki defile between Mir Ali and Bannu, an area of three miles on each side of the road through the defile was proscribed from the 12th of April. A general warning was also given that in the event of any attack on troops or posts, all tribesmen within a two mile radius of such troops or posts would be liable to attack from the air or by troops after a sufficient lapse of time to enable non-hostiles to withdraw.

In the middle of April the Scouts Post at Spinwam, north of Mir Ali, was attacked by tribesmen and culverts and bridges in that area were damaged, while attacks on piquets occurred in the Razmak area where the water supply pipe line was damaged. In the Spinwam area air action against a village known to be the refuge of hostile gangs, followed by threats of further air action against hostile concentrations, caused a local improvement in the situation.

9. Meanwhile, in South Waziristan the Mahsud situation gave rise to anxiety, although the attitude of the tribal elders was generally satisfactory. Outwardly, the tribes appeared steady, and motor transport convoys continued to run between Manzai and Razmak, and Manzai and Wana, the road being policed in the usual way by tribal khassadars.

On the 9th of April, a convoy from Manzai to Wana was attacked in the Shahur Tangi, a defile a few miles west of Jandola by a party of mixed Mahsuds and Bhitannis. The convoy, consisting of about fifty lorries, was escorted by four armoured cars, with an infantry escort and a detachment of Sappers and Miners in lorries. One aircraft provided continuous tactical reconnaissance over the convoy. The Shahur Tangi is a long and narrow gorge commanded on both sides by precipitous hills, which, in accordance with normal practice, it was the duty of khassadars (tribal police) to occupy. Although local information had indicated that attacks on convoys were unlikely, actually the majority of the khassadars had left their posts, and it is probable, therefore, that they were aware that an attack on the convoy was impending.

10. The convoy was attacked throughout its length by hostile tribesmen from positions in broken ground close to the road. Heavy casualties among the personnel of the convoy were incurred early in the action, and the majority of the lorries were blocked in the defile. Armoured cars and the infantry escort fought gallantly and were successful in preventing the

overrunning of the convoy. On news of the attack being received at Manzai, reinforcements comprising detachments of Infantry and South Waziristan Scouts with one section of armoured cars were despatched to the scene. An infantry battalion was also immediately despatched in lorries from Bannu, but the crisis was over before it arrived. Aircraft gave great assistance, one aeroplane being shot down whilst engaged on close support duties.

11. This outrage further encouraged unrest amongst the Mahsuds, and on the 15th and 16th of April a gang of members of this tribe unsuccessfully attacked Tiarza Scouts Post 17 miles from Wana. Air action was taken against the village responsible for this attack, and the gang dispersed. Subsequently, in order to bring pressure to bear on the Jalal Khel Mahsuds, who were chiefly responsible for the attack on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi, their grazing grounds were proscribed from the 28th April to the 30th of May, by which date the bulk of the tribal section had submitted.

12. The organisation of the lines of communication and the arrangements for supply of Razmak and Wana at this stage are of interest. After the attack on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi on the 9th of April the movement of Government convoys ceased, except on roads which were protected by posts and piquets held by regular troops. Arrangements were made for supplies to be delivered to Razmak and Wana in privately owned lorries with tribal drivers, running under their own tribal protection, while full use was made of bomber transport aircraft, including a flight loaned by His Majesty's Government from the Royal Air Force command in Iraq. The protection of the forty-six miles of road from Bannu to Damdil was carried out by the 1st Division, and the permanent piquets thereon were supplemented by the daily patrolling of the road by infantry and armoured cars, supported by artillery and aircraft. The system worked smoothly and efficiently but reduced the number of troops available for active operations.

13. As the result of the continued deterioration of the situation, the spread of unrest, the gathering of hostile gangs and the attacks on Government forces and communications throughout Waziristan it became necessary to send further reinforcements to the area. On the 12th of April, the 3rd (Jhelum) Infantry Brigade was concentrated at Mir Ali, and on the 15th of April the 2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade (Brigadier C. D. Noyes, M.C.) reached Waziristan. On the 21st of April, the 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade (Brigadier C. M. S. Manners, D.S.O., M.C.) was placed at 48 hours notice to move from its home station as an additional reinforcement. No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron relieved No. 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron at Miranshah and No. 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron was moved from Ambala to Manzai.

14. Towards the middle of April it became clear that all attempts to effect a settlement by political pressure combined with limited air action had failed, and on the 22nd of April the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command (General Sir John F. S. D. Coleridge, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.), was vested with full political control in Waziristan and in the tribal areas on the border of

British territory. Command and control of air operations in Waziristan were also vested in General Coleridge, who was instructed by the Government of India "to restore peaceful conditions throughout the area".

The operations undertaken to carry out this task are described in the paragraphs which follow.

### III. OPERATIONS IN THE KHAISORA VALLEY, 23RD OF APRIL TO THE 3RD OF MAY.

15. By the middle of April tribesmen had assembled in large numbers between the Khaisora and the Shaktu valleys, with parties in close proximity to the Tochi River and Mir Ali. It was decided therefore that initial operations should be undertaken in the Lower Khaisora valley, where the enemy might oppose the troops on ground favourable to the employment of all arms. As it was now clear that all sections of the Tori Khel south of the Tochi River were involved, the proscribed area of the Lower Khaisora River was further extended to include an area roughly from the Tochi River to the Khaisora River and between the Razmak road on the west and the Khara-ghora range on the east.

16. A column, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades, under the Command of the 1st Division (Major General E. de Burgh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.), accordingly advanced southwards from Mir Ali on the 23rd of April. Little opposition was encountered and the troops reached the Khaisora River on the 25th of April. It became apparent at this stage that the enemy could not be brought to battle on ground of our own choosing, and a further advance was necessary. On the 27th of April, the 2nd Infantry Brigade accordingly moved westwards up the Khaisora valley to a camp at Biche Kashkai. After dark, sniping of the camp began and very heavy and determined attacks were made on piquets throughout the night. Unsuccessful attempts were also made to rush the camp perimeter.

17. The advance was resumed on the 29th of April towards the hills overlooking the Dakai Algad where the enemy were collecting in large numbers. The ensuing engagement was very successful in its results, and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy by troops and aircraft at little cost to ourselves. During the remainder of this phase of the operations the tribesmen, having learnt their lesson, exposed themselves but rarely and sniping practically ceased. On the 1st of May the 2nd Infantry Brigade withdrew from Biche Kashkai and the column returned to Mir Ali on the 3rd of May.

18. Although these operations had achieved their immediate purpose in that the enemy had received heavy punishment, they had not been decisive. The Faqir of Ipi was still at Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu valley where the main lashkar continued to increase in strength, in spite of increased pressure in the proscribed area around it.

### IV. FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TORI KHEL—THE ADVANCE TO THE SHAKTU—6TH OF MAY TO THE 30TH MAY.

19. The operations in the Lower Khaisora valley had driven the bulk of the enemy southwards towards the Upper Shaktu valley. It was necessary to strike a decisive blow at these concentrations before they could fully

recover from the effects of their reverses. Operations were, therefore, begun to crush the resistance of the Tori Khel Wazirs and either capture the Faqir of Ipi or evict him from his headquarters at Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu valley. With the approach of the hot weather an advance into the higher altitude of the Sham Plain and Upper Shaktu valley had additional advantages in that it penetrated the summer grazing grounds of the Tori Khel and at the same time transferred operations to an area which was more favourable to the general health of the troops. The operations which were now undertaken were under the Commander of the Waziristan Division (Major General A. F. Hartley, C.B., D.S.O.) which consisted of the Headquarters and troops of the normal Waziristan District, reinforced by certain formations and units of the 1st (Indian) Division.

20. The Faqir of Ipi had by this time collected a large body of hostile tribesmen in the area of the Sham and Shaktu Rivers, disposed so as to resist any advance into that area by the main route from Dosalli. Having regard to the nature of the country and the hostile dispositions, it was decided to obtain a footing on the Sham Plain by outmanœuvring and surprising the enemy. The operations began from Dosalli on the night of the 11th/12th of May, when the Bannu Brigade, assisted by the Tochi Scouts, carried out a most successful night advance over the difficult Iblanke Pass, the 1st Infantry Brigade cooperating by a converging advance by daylight. This well-conceived and carefully prepared operation outflanked and surprised the tribesmen and enabled a footing to be secured on the Sham Plain with little loss. The enemy were driven from their positions and suffered heavy losses during their retirement. Continuous close support was provided throughout the day's operations by the Royal Air Force. The result of this operation was to break the morale of the hostile tribesmen in this area, and within a few days their numbers were reduced by over fifty per cent.

21. On the 18th day of May the Bannu Brigade advanced with relatively slight opposition to Gharlom Camp at the head of the Sham Algad, where it was joined later by the 1st Infantry Brigade. The next stage of the operations was an advance from Gharlom to Aarsal Kot, in the Shaktu Valley, in order to engage the Faqir's immediate following, evict him from his headquarters, and, if possible, apprehend him. This advance was combined with a converging movement of the 2nd Infantry Brigade southwards from Mir Ali and across the hill country between the Khaisora and Shaktu Rivers. The operations were carried out between the 27th and 29th of May by which date all troops engaged had returned to the Gharlom-Sham Plain area. Comparatively little opposition was encountered, but the Faqir evaded capture and fled with a few followers to the Mahsud-Bhitanni border.

22. The operations in this quarter had now achieved their object. The resistance of the Tori Khel was broken, and they sued for peace; the tribesmen had largely dispersed after suffering heavy punishment; raiding into the settled districts had practically ceased; and finally, the Faqir of Ipi, had been driven from

his headquarters and had received a severe blow to his prestige.

On the 5th and 6th of June, representatives of the Tori Khel were interviewed, and certain securities were taken to ensure their good behaviour pending the announcement of final terms of settlement by Government. At the same time, certain restrictions which had been imposed on the tribe were relaxed, and air action over the proscribed areas ceased.

#### V. OPERATIONS IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN—4TH OF JUNE TO THE 6TH OF JULY.

23. Since the commencement of the operations in November 1936, the attitude of the Mahsuds had been a source of considerable anxiety. Although as a tribe they had refrained from declaring openly against the Government, many individuals had taken part in hostilities, either assisting the Tori Khel or taking part in raids into the settled districts. The Mahsud maliks, while professing friendship, had declared their inability to control the irresponsible younger elements of their tribe and had failed to prevent them from joining the Faqir of Ipi. It was therefore necessary to carry out operations in Mahsud territory to clear up the situation. The command of the operations was delegated to the Commander, Waziristan Division, in which was included the Wana Brigade which had hitherto been under the direct command of Headquarters, Wazir-force.

24. In the first stage of these operations, the Bannu Brigade marched from the Shaktu valley to Sorarogha and thence to Razmak, with no opposition except for some sniping at night. In the meantime the situation between Razmak and the Shaktu again became unsatisfactory, and the tribesmen collected in the area of the upper Shaktu valley. Operations were therefore carried out between the 15th and 17th of June by the 1st Infantry Brigade from Gharlom and the Bannu Brigade from Razmak, resulting in the dispersal of these parties. In addition, a very successful operation, which had an excellent effect, was carried out by the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts, supported by troops of the 1st Division, who, on the night of the 20th of June, surrounded the area of Baramand near Aarsal Kot in the Shaktu valley, capturing some hostile ringleaders, and at the same time, releasing from captivity two kidnapped Hindus.

25. A series of operations was now undertaken against hostile gangs south of Razmak. These operations were carried out by the Razmak (Major-General J. S. Marshall, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.), Bannu and Wana (Brigadier L. M. Heath, C.I.E., D.S.O.) Brigades between the 22nd of June and the 1st of July. Strong enemy parties, who put up very stiff opposition, were encountered and dispersed, and the main hostile gatherings were broken up. Aircraft of the Royal Air Force cooperated from Manzai. Subsequently, the Bannu Brigade returned to Razmak and the Wana Brigade to Wana, leaving the Razmak Brigade at Asman Manza, near Kaniguram the chief village of the Mahsuds. As a result of these operations contact with Wana was regained, and the object, namely the restoration of the situation in South Waziristan by the dispersal of hostile parties, was attained.

VI. THE PERIOD FROM THE 1ST OF JULY TO THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER INCLUDING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PEACE TERMS TO THE TRIBES.

26. Land and air operations carried out since the end of April had resulted in the submission of the Tori Khel and the improvement of the situation in South Waziristan, but conditions in Waziristan were not yet normal, nor had the maliks regained control of the irresponsible elements. The Faqir of Ipi was still at large and continuing his hostile propaganda. Although no formed bodies of tribesmen remained in the field, several small gangs of irreconcilables continued minor hostilities, such as the sniping of camps and piquets at night and outrages on roads.

27. Since large scale opposition had ceased, it was now possible to commence a programme of new road construction as a measure of effecting the ultimate pacification of the country. The area enclosed by the Central Waziristan road has always been largely inaccessible owing to lack of communications, and has seldom been visited by columns. The tribal sections of that area, both Wazir and Mahsud, are intractable and have been seriously implicated in the present disturbances. Thus the construction of roads in their country was considered desirable in order to render control simpler and to provide channels for economic development. With these ends in view it was decided to construct four roads into the Shaktu Valley; from Dosalli in the North, the lower Khaisora valley in the East, Ahmedwam (near Sorarogha) on the South and Razmak in the West, all of them connecting in the neighbourhood of Ghariom. The total length of these roads is approximately ninety miles and they are being constructed by troops, by contract labour from local and extraneous tribes and by four road construction battalions which were specially enlisted.

28. The construction of these roads led to some local dissension among certain tribal sections and also to an undercurrent of opposition amongst the younger members of the tribes who were opposed to any penetration of their country. These feelings were exploited by the Faqir of Ipi, the sniping of camps and piquets continued in all areas, and towards the end of July his followers began to increase. On the 30th of July, therefore, an area was proscribed round the locality where he had established his headquarters, on the borders of Mahsud and Bhitanni country. As a result, the Faqir moved westwards to Shawal, an area which lies between Razmak and the Durand Line. Here he held numerous tribal meetings and exhorted the tribesmen to continue hostilities. This anti-Government propaganda led to some excitement and uneasiness, but at this juncture Government announced to the Mahsuds the terms of the peace settlement. These terms were received with submission and served to allay, to a great extent, feelings of suspicion and uncertainty.

29. At the beginning of September, however, the situation in South Waziristan again became disturbed owing to the renewed activity displayed by Mullah Sher Ali, a supporter of the Faqir of Ipi. Although his efforts to attract support from the Ahmedzai Wazirs met with little response, he was joined by bad characters from various Mahsud sections.

Attacks were made on khassadar posts in the area south of Kaniguram and a gang of Mahsuds raided a village in British territory. In consequence of these offences, action was taken against the village which Sher Ali was using as a base, and areas were proscribed in the Upper Baddar and Main Toi valleys where he was recruiting his gangs. Action was also taken by the Razmak and Bannu Brigades against selected hostile villages adjacent to the proscribed areas. No opposition was met, the hostile elements dispersed and the tribesmen in the proscribed areas made their submission. Later certain other offending sections of the Mahsud tribe were warned that, unless their members were immediately withdrawn from hostile gangs, action would be taken against them. This warning had the effect of bringing about their submission, and Government terms were complied with by the 21st of September.

30. On the 10th of September, Government terms were announced to the Tori Khel Wazirs. The orders given were accepted by the representative assembly with submission and the fine of rifles imposed was paid in full.

VII. ACTION AGAINST THE BHITANNIS.

31. The Bhitanni tribe inhabit the area east of the Mahsud country on both sides of the administrative border. Throughout these operations the Bhitannis had contributed contingents to the hostile forces; they had been prominent in raiding into the settled districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan and they had allowed free passage through their territory to raiding gangs composed of Mahsuds and other tribes. At the end of April a Bhitanni jirga was informed that unless they produced certain hostages as security for future good behaviour, their country would be proscribed. This warning proved entirely effective, and by the 3rd of May all hostages had been surrendered except for those of one section, whose khassadars were suspended. At the beginning of June, air action was taken against three Bhitanni villages as a punishment for their complicity in raiding into the settled districts, and against a fourth village to secure the surrender of three kidnapped Hindu girls who were subsequently released. In July the raiding had lessened owing to the energetic action of military and civil forces engaged in patrolling and policing the large and scattered areas of the Derajat, but there was a recrudescence of these outrages in August owing to the renewal of anti-Government propaganda by a certain Din Faqir, Bhitanni. Accordingly on the 20th of August a warning was issued to the tribe that unless all kidnapped persons were returned by the 27th of August, an area north of the Shuza River, excluding a strip of some five miles in width immediately west of the administrative border would be proscribed. The warning had no effect, and air action commenced on the 30th of August, and was still being carried out on the 15th of September when this despatch closes.

VIII. OPERATIONS BY THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.

32. During the period covered by this despatch operations of the following types were carried out by the Royal Air Force:—against tribal forces closely and actively engaged with our troops; against hostile fortified villages; and against proscribed areas. In the two latter

types of air operations, ample warning was, on every occasion, given to enable inhabitants to evacuate the areas involved before air action was taken.

33. The continuous pressure of air action by day and night played an important part in obtaining the submission of the tribes. It secured the surrender of hostages and kidnapped persons, and, on occasions, the mere threat of such action proved wholly effective.

Columns were invariably accompanied by close support aircraft, whose co-operation was of the highest tactical value.

In addition, bomber transport aircraft were used extensively for the transportation of military personnel and stores and for the evacuation of casualties, thereby saving long and trying journeys by ambulance transport.

34. The tasks assigned to the air forces entailed very long flights and patrols, often carried out under very trying flying conditions. Eleven thousand hours of operational flying, representing a distance of over one million miles, were carried out, and the negligible number of forced landings which occurred indicates that aircraft maintenance was of a very high order.

The operations marked the first occasion on which a flight of the newly formed Indian Air Force was employed on active service.

#### IX. CASUALTIES.

35. The casualties to Army, Air Force and Scouts personnel during the period covered by this despatch amounted to one hundred and eighty-three killed and four hundred and forty-nine wounded. The enemy casualties are reliably estimated at nearly seven hundred killed and over three hundred and fifty seriously (as distinct from slightly) wounded.

Details are given in Appendices 3 and 4.

#### X. CONCLUSION.

36. I desire to record my appreciation of the able manner in which the operations were conducted by General Sir John F. S. D. Coleridge, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, who, in the exercise of his political functions, was afforded very valuable assistance by His Excellency Sir George Cunningham, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., O.B.E., Governor of the North-West Frontier Province, and by the Resident in Waziristan, Major H. H. Johnson, C.I.E., M.M., and his staff.

The execution of the plan of operations was ably carried out by the two Divisional Commanders, Major-General E. de Burgh, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., and Major-General A. F. Hartley, C.B., D.S.O.

I wish to record also the excellent work done by the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts under the command of Major A. Felix-Williams, M.C., and Major P. R. H. Skrine, who played an important part in the success of the operations. The arduous and difficult task of guarding the settled districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan from the incursions of tribal raiding gangs was ably performed by the military and civil forces, while the co-operation of the Deputy Commissioners and District Officers, Frontier Constabulary, and of the Civil Defence Officers, deserves special mention.

I desire to bring to notice the work and bearing of the troops of the Waziristan Force which was of a very high standard throughout. The exemplary manner in which they have undertaken not only operations but the arduous and often monotonous task of road construction is most praiseworthy. In this connection also I would specially mention the ancillary Services which have carried out their duties most efficiently under very trying and arduous conditions.

Finally I cannot speak too highly of the work of the Royal Air Force during these operations. The close and cordial relations between the land and air forces were a marked feature of the campaign and were in great measure due to the high example and unfailing co-operation of Group Captain N. H. Bottomley, C.I.E., A.F.C., and to his successor, Group Captain A. Lees, A.F.C.

R. A. CASSELS, General,  
Commander-in-Chief in India.

#### APPENDIX I.

##### WAZIRFORCE ORDER OF BATTLE.

15th of September, 1937.

##### HEADQUARTERS—

Headquarters Wazirforce.  
Rear Headquarters Wazirforce.  
Headquarters Waziristan Division.  
Headquarters 1st Indian Division.  
Headquarters Bannu sub area.  
Headquarters Manzai sub area.  
Headquarters Wana Brigade.  
Headquarters Razmak Brigade.  
Headquarters Bannu Brigade.  
Headquarters 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade.  
Headquarters 2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade.  
Headquarters 3rd (Jhelum) Infantry Brigade.  
Headquarters 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade.  
Headquarters 2nd Echelon.

##### CAVALRY.

Probyn's Horse (5th King Edward VII's Own Lancers).  
Detachment The Scinde Horse. (14th Prince of Wales's Own Cavalry).

##### ROYAL ARTILLERY—

Section 20/21st Medium Battery (Howitzer).  
Headquarters Frontier Post Group, Royal Artillery, Waziristan.  
Post Group Royal Artillery 4.5" (Howitzer), (Mir Ali).  
Post Group Royal Artillery 2.75" guns (Manzai).  
Post Group Royal Artillery 18-pounder guns (Wana).  
Post Group Royal Artillery 4.5" (Howitzer) (Wana).  
Headquarters 4th Field Brigade, Royal Artillery.  
4th Field Brigade Signal Section.  
4th Field Battery (Howitzer).  
7th Field Battery.

63rd Field Battery (Howitzer). (a)  
 66th Field Battery (Howitzer).  
 81st Field Battery (Howitzer). (a)  
 Headquarters 22nd Mountain Brigade.  
 Headquarters 23rd Mountain Brigade.  
 Headquarters 25th Mountain Brigade.  
 Headquarters 22nd Mountain Brigade  
 Signal Section.  
 Headquarters 23rd Mountain Brigade  
 Signal Section.  
 Headquarters 25th Mountain Brigade  
 Signal Section.  
 2nd Mountain Battery.  
 2nd Light Battery. (b)  
 3rd Mountain Battery.  
 4th Mountain Battery.  
 5th Mountain Battery.  
 7th Mountain Battery.  
 8th Mountain Battery.  
 12th Mountain Battery.  
 13th Mountain Battery.  
 15th Mountain Battery.  
 19th Mountain Battery.  
 Detachment 23rd Mountain Brigade  
 Ammunition Column.  
 Detachment 25th Mountain Brigade  
 Ammunition Column.

#### ROYAL ENGINEERS—

Base Engineer Park Bannu.  
 Base Engineer Park Mir Ali.  
 Base Engineer Park Mari Indus.  
 No. 2 Field Company King George V's  
 Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 3 Field Company King George V's  
 Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 4 Field Company King George V's  
 Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 5 Field Company King George V's  
 Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 12 Field Company Queen Victoria's  
 Own Madras Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 14 Field Company Queen Victoria's  
 Own Madras Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 15 Field Company Queen Victoria's  
 Own Madras Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 19 Field Company Royal Bombay  
 Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 22 Field Company Royal Bombay  
 Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 43 Divisional Headquarters Company  
 King George V's Own Bengal Sappers and  
 Miners.  
 No. 6 Army Troops Company King  
 George V's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 No. 8 Army Troops Company King  
 George V's Own Bengal Sappers and Miners.  
 Wazirforce Field Survey Section.  
 No. 1 Road Construction Battalion.  
 No. 2 Road Construction Battalion.  
 No. 4 Road Construction Battalion.  
 No. 5 Road Construction Battalion.  
 Military Engineer Services personnel.  
 Military Engineer Services Depot, Bannu.

#### INDIAN SIGNAL CORPS—

"A" Corps Signals.  
 Detachment "B" Corps Signals (Operat-  
 ing Section and Wireless Telegraphy Section).  
 Waziristan District Signals.  
 1st Indian Divisional Signals.  
 Detachment 2nd Indian Cavalry Brigade  
 Signal Troop.

Detachment 3rd Indian Divisional Signals  
 (9th Infantry Brigade Signal Section Wire-  
 less Telegraphy Section).

Detachment Kohat District Signals.

#### INFANTRY BATTALIONS (British)—

1st Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment.  
 1st Battalion The South Wales Borderers.  
 1st Battalion The Northamptonshire  
 Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion The Argyll and Sutherland  
 Highlanders.

#### ROYAL TANK CORPS—

6th Light Tank Company.  
 7th Light Tank Company.  
 8th Light Tank Company.  
 9th Light Tank Company.  
 1st Light Tank Company.  
 11th Light Tank Company.

#### INFANTRY BATTALIONS (Indian)—

2nd Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment.  
 3rd Battalion 1st Punjab Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion (King Edward VII's Own)  
 4th Bombay Grenadiers.  
 2nd Battalion (Prince of Wales's Own)  
 6th Rajputana Rifles.  
 3rd Battalion 6th Rajputana Rifles.  
 4th Battalion (Outram's) 6th Rajputana  
 Rifles.  
 3rd Battalion (Duke of Connaught's Own)  
 7th Rajput Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion 8th Punjab Regiment.  
 4th Battalion (Prince of Wales's Own)  
 8th Punjab Regiment.  
 3rd Battalion 9th Jat Regiment.  
 1st Battalion (Duchess of Connaught's  
 Own) 10th Baluch Regiment.  
 1st Battalion (King George V's Own)  
 (Ferozepore Sikhs) 11th Sikh Regiment.  
 2nd Royal Battalion (Ludhiana Sikhs) 11th  
 Sikh Regiment.  
 3rd Royal Battalion (Sikhs) 12th Frontier  
 Force Regiment.  
 5th Battalion (Queen Victoria's Own Corps  
 of Guides) 12th Frontier Force Regiment.  
 1st Battalion (Coke's) 13th Frontier Force  
 Rifles.  
 6th Royal Battalion (Scinde) 13th Frontier  
 Force Rifles.  
 1st Battalion 14th Punjab Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion (Duke of Cambridge's Own)  
 (Brownlow's) 14th Punjab Regiment.  
 3rd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment.  
 3rd Battalion 16th Punjab Regiment.  
 4th Battalion (Bhopal) 16th Punjab  
 Regiment.  
 1st Battalion (Prince of Wales's Own) 17th  
 Dogra Regiment.  
 2nd Battalion 17th Dogra Regiment.  
 1st Battalion 2nd King Edward VII's Own  
 Gurkha Rifles. (The Sirmoor Rifles.)  
 1st Battalion 3rd Queen Alexandra's Own  
 Gurkha Rifles.  
 2nd Battalion 4th (Prince of Wales's Own)  
 Gurkha Rifles.  
 2nd Battalion 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles  
 (Frontier Force).  
 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles.  
 2nd Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles.  
 1st Battalion 9th Gurkha Rifles.

(a) Left the force on 25th August, 1937.

(b) Left the force on 26th August, 1937.



## ROYAL INDIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS UNITS—

Headquarters Wazirforce Royal Indian Army Service Corps.

Headquarters Waziristan Division Royal Indian Army Service Corps.

Headquarters 1st Indian Division Royal Indian Army Service Corps.

Rear Headquarters Wazirforce Royal Indian Army Service Corps.

Headquarters No. 14 District Supply Company.

No. 1 Temporary Royal Indian Army Service Corps Personnel Depot.

Headquarters No. 3 Supply Personnel Company.

Station Transport Officers, Manzai, Dera Ismail Khan, Mir Ali, Wana, Dosalli.

Advance Base Supply Depots, Bannu and Manzai.

Field Supply Depots.

## SUPPLY UNITS—

No. 1 Supply Issue Section.

No. 2 Supply Issue Section.

No. 3 Supply Issue Section.

No. 4 Supply Issue Section.

No. 10 Supply Issue Section.

No. 12 Supply Issue Section.

No. 21 Supply Issue Section.

No. 27 Supply Issue Section.

No. 28 Supply Issue Section.

No. 29 Supply Issue Section.

No. 30 Supply Issue Section.

Detachment No. 1 Field Bakery.

No. 105 Independent Bakery Sub-Section.

No. 106 Independent Bakery Sub-Section.

No. 107 Independent Bakery Sub-Section.

Detachment No. 1 Field Butchery.

No. 105 Independent Butchery Sub-Section.

No. 106 Independent Butchery Sub-Section.

No. 107 Independent Butchery Sub-Section.

No. 1 Railhead Supply Detachment.

No. 2 Railhead Supply Detachment.

No. 15 Supply Depot Section.

No. 16 Supply Depot Section.

No. 17 Supply Depot Section.

No. 18 Supply Depot Section.

No. 19 Supply Depot Section.

No. 20 Supply Depot Section.

No. 21 Supply Depot Section.

No. 22 Supply Depot Section.

No. 23 Supply Depot Section.

No. 24 Supply Depot Section.

No. 35 Supply Depot Section.

No. 36 Supply Depot Section.

No. 37 Supply Depot Section.

No. 38 Supply Depot Section.

No. 58 Supply Depot Section.

No. 59 Supply Depot Section.

No. 8 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 9 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 10 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 11 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 12 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 13 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 19 Petrol Oil Lubricants Section.

No. 7 Cattle Supply Section Class II.

No. 8 Cattle Supply Section Class II.

Improvised Cattle Section.

## ANIMAL TRANSPORT UNITS—

No. 1 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 2 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 7 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 10 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 15 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 18 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 19 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 22 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 25 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 30 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 32 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 33 Animal Transport Company (Mule) (less one pack troop).

No. 35 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 36 Animal Transport Company (Mule) (less one pack troop).

No. 39 Animal Transport Company (Mule) (less one pack troop).

Detachment No. 6 Animal Transport Company (Mule).

No. 37 Animal Transport Company (Camel) (Silladar) (4 troops only).

Detachment No. 38 Animal Transport Company (Camel) (Silladar).

No. 40 Animal Transport Company (Camel) (Silladar).

## MECHANICAL TRANSPORT UNITS—

No. 5 Motor Ambulance Unit.

No. 13 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (30 cwt.).

No. 14 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (30 cwt.).

No. 15 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 29 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 30 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 33 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 35 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 39 Independent Mechanical Transport Section (3 ton).

No. 14 Mechanical Transport Company (30 cwt.).

No. 27 Mechanical Transport Company (less two Sections).

Detachment No. 28 Mechanical Transport Company. (d)

Detachment No. 51 Section No. 27 Mechanical Transport Company attached to 63rd Field Battery (Howitzer) Royal Artillery.

Detachment No. 18 Independent Mechanical Transport Company attached to 81st Field Battery (Howitzer) Royal Artillery.

Technical Inspector Mechanical Transport Waziristan Circle.

Heavy Repair Shops Mechanical Transport, Class III.

1st Indian Division Mechanical Transport Workshops. (c)

Field Mechanical Transport Workshops.

No. 1 Line of Communication Workshop Section.

No. 2 Line of Communication Workshop Section.

(d) left Force on 27th July, 1937.

(c) ceased to exist 15th August, 1937.



**MEDICAL—**

Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Bannu.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Dera Ismail Khan.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Wana.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Mir Ali.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Manzai.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Mari Indus.  
 Indian Military Hospital, with British Wing, Razmak.  
 Convalescent Depot, Razmak.  
 No. 4 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 7 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 8 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 10 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 11 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 16 Field Ambulance.  
 No. 18 Field Ambulance.  
 Depot No. 8 Field Ambulance, Bannu.  
 No. 3 Sanitary Section.  
 No. 14 Sanitary Section.  
 No. 2 Depot Medical Stores.  
 Military Dispensary, Miranshah.  
 Brigade Laboratory, Bannu.  
 District Laboratory, Razmak.  
 Army Dental Centre, Razmak.  
 No. 1 Motor Ambulance Section (Motor Ambulance cars only).  
 No. 5 Motor Ambulance Section.

**VETERINARY—**

Deputy Assistant Director of Veterinary Services.  
 Military Veterinary Hospital, Class I, Razmak.  
 Military Veterinary Hospital, Class II, Bannu.  
 Military Veterinary Hospital, Class II, Wana.  
 Branch Military Veterinary Hospital, Mir Ali.  
 Branch Military Veterinary Hospital, Manzai.  
 No. 3 Mobile Veterinary Section.  
 No. 4 Mobile Veterinary Section.  
 Veterinary Aid Posts.  
 Advance Remount Section.  
 Nucleus Field Remount Section.  
 Railhead Remount Detachment.

**ORDNANCE—**

No. 2 Ordnance Field Company.  
 Ordnance Field Depot, Bannu.  
 Ordnance Field Depot, Razmak.  
 Ordnance Field Depot, Dosalli.  
 Tent Repair Unit.  
 Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Bannu.

**POSTAL—**

No. 5 Field Post Office.  
 No. 8 Field Post Office.  
 No. 9 Field Post Office.  
 No. 10 Field Post Office.  
 No. 11 Field Post Office.  
 No. 13 Field Post Office.  
 No. 25 Field Post Office.

**REST CAMPS—**

No. 3 Rest Camp.  
 Rest Camp, Bannu.  
 Rest Camp, Manzai.  
 Rest Camp, Mari Indus.  
 Rest Camp, Mir Ali.

**PROVOST—**

Waziristan Divisional Provost Company.  
 1st Divisional Provost Company.

**MILITARY ACCOUNTS—**

Field Cashier.

**WORKS—**

No. 9 Labour Company.  
 No. 10 Labour Company.  
 No. 26 Labour Company.

**CANTEENS—**

Canteen Depot, Bannu.

**TRANSPORTATION—**

Military Forwarding Officers, Bannu, Mir Ali, Manzai, Dosalli.

**MILITARY GRASS FARMS—**

Headquarters, Grass Farm, Bannu.  
 Grass Farm, Dera Ismail Khan.  
 Grass Farm, Manzai.  
 Grass Farm, Razmak.  
 Branch Grass Farm, Wana.

**MILITARY DAIRIES—**

Headquarters, Dairy Farm, Bannu.  
 Dairy Farm, Dera Ismail Khan.  
 Dairy Farm, Manzai.  
 Dairy Farm, Razmak.  
 Dairy Farm, Wana.  
 Dairy Farm, Dosalli.

**CIVIL ARMED FORCES—**

Tochi Scouts.  
 South Waziristan Scouts.  
 Frontier Constabulary.

**APPENDIX 2.****WAZIRFORCE ORDER OF BATTLE.****ROYAL AIR FORCE UNITS.**

15th September 1937.

Headquarters No. 1 (Indian) Group (Peshawar).

Headquarters No. 1 (Indian) Wing (Kohat).  
 No. 27 (Bomber) Squadron.(a)  
 No. 60 (Bomber) Squadron.(a)  
 Bomber Transport Flight (India).

Headquarters No. 2 (Indian) Wing (Risalpur).  
 No. 11 (Bomber) Squadron.  
 No. 39 (Bomber) Squadron.  
 Flight No. 70 (Bomber Transport) Squadron.(b)

Headquarters No. 3 (Indian) Wing (Miranshah).  
 No. 5 (Army Co-operation) Squadron.  
 No. 20 (Army Co-operation) Squadron.  
 No. 28 (Army Co-operation) Squadron (Manzai).  
 A Flight, No. 1 Squadron, Indian Air Force.

(a) With detached flights at Manzai and Miranshah.

(b) Arrived from Iraq 31st May, left India 31st August, 1937.

## APPENDIX 3.

## SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES.

16th of January 1937 to 15th of  
September 1937.

	<i>Killed or Died of Wounds.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
British Officers... ..	11	16	27
Viceroy's Commissioned Officers.	5	11	16
British other ranks ...	23	51	74
Indian and Gurkha other ranks.	141	368	509
Total ...	180	446	626

## APPENDIX 4.

## ROYAL AIR FORCE CASUALTIES.

16th January 1937 to 15th September 1937.

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Injured.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Officers ... ..	2	2	4
Other ranks ... ..	1	1	2
Total ...			6

These casualties occurred as a result of accidents to aircraft whilst engaged on operational flying.

## LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:

Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120 George Street, Edinburgh 2;

26 York Street, Manchester 1; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;

80 Chichester Street, Belfast;

or through any bookseller

1938

Price Sixpence net

S.O. Code No. 65-34484