

(c) of preventing the spread of disaffection to other parts of Waziristan.

Command and control of the land and air operations, and political control in the North and South Waziristan Agencies and in tribal areas of the Bannu District, were vested in the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command.

15. A Tori Khel jirgah held on the 2nd December was informed of Government's decision that punishment was to be inflicted and that a road was to be built into the lower Khaisora valley. In addition, jirgahs of the Madda Khel and of the Shaktu Mahsuds were held on 3rd December. The former denied the complicity of any of their tribesmen in the recent hostilities, and the latter, undertaking to prevent organized bodies moving to the Khaisora, produced 22 British magazine rifles as a surety.

IV. ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS AND REORGANIZATION OF WAZIRISTAN DISTRICT.

16. In order to implement the policy of the Government of India the forces in the Waziristan District were reinforced by troops detailed in the margin, which were concentrated in the area of operations by 5th December. It was decided also

<i>From Rawalpindi.</i>	2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade and attached troops.
	H.Q. 25th Mountain Brigade R.A.
	One Light Battery R.A.
	One Mountain Battery R.A.
<i>From Kohat.</i>	One Indian Infantry Battalion.
	One Mountain Battery R.A.
<i>From Peshawar.</i>	One Light Tank Company R.T.C.
<i>From Delhi.</i>	One Light Tank Company (Armd. Cs.) R.T.C.
<i>From Abbottabad.</i>	One Gurkha Rifle Battalion.

that Waziristan District should be organized into Wazirforce and the Waziristan area. The former comprised all troops in the defined area of operations and was placed under the command of Major-General D. E. Robertson, C. B., D. S. O. The latter comprised all the remaining troops in the Waziristan district

under Brigadier F. H. Maynard, M.C.

At the same time the Commander, No. 1 (Indian) Group, Royal Air Force, established Headquarters No. 3 (Indian) Wing Royal Air Force with Headquarters Wazirforce at Mir Ali and concentrated two flights No. 5 (Army Co-operation) Squadron and two flights No. 20 (Army Co-operation) Squadron at Miranshah. Leaflets were dropped by the Royal Air Force notifying a prescribed zone in which offensive land and air action would be taken against parties of ten or more tribesmen. The tribesmen were urged in their own interests to remove all women and children from the zone, and aircraft crews were instructed that under no circumstances were villages to be attacked.

V. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, 5TH DECEMBER TO 19TH DECEMBER, 1936.

17. On the 5th December the advance of Wazirforce commenced. The striking column known as "Khaicol," composed of Razcol and two extra battalions, moved forward and

occupied a camp on the Katira Algad on the South bank of the Tochi river. The opposition was negligible.

From the 6th December to the 18th December, Wazirforce continued the advance to the Khaisora valley, at a pace concurrent with the rate of road construction. Opposition was confined to long range sniping.

From the 9th to 12th December heavy rain made the new road from Mir Ali at times impassable for mechanical transport and difficult for animal transport, but assistance in the maintenance of the troops was afforded by units of the Royal Air Force which dropped about four tons of supplies during these days. Rain naturally hindered road construction but Khaicol reached the Khaisora river on 18th December.

18. During this period very few hostile tribesmen were seen by the troops or aircraft, but the destruction was carried out of certain selected fortified buildings belonging to tribesmen proved to have been actively hostile during the period 25th to 27th November.

VI. OPERATIONS 19TH DECEMBER TO 22ND DECEMBER.

19. On 19th December it was decided that the road already constructed from Mir Ali to the Khaisora valley should be extended down the valley, through the Sein Gorge to Dreghundari on the main Bannu-Razmak road. The object of this extension was:—

(a) To provide a direct route from Bannu to the Biche Kashkai area.

(b) To enable troops to be moved quickly to the Biche Kashkai area from Bannu, in combination with a move from the North or the West.

(c) To act as a deterrent to future hostile action by tribes of the Sein area who have been a potential source of trouble in the past.

(d) To provide a means of egress for the inhabitants of the Shaktu and Khaisora Valleys.

(e) To provide a means of lateral movement for the Frontier Constabulary, and thus enable them to deal rapidly with raids in that area.

20. On the 21st December, the 2nd Infantry Brigade joined Khaicol in the Khaisora. On the following day Khaicol resumed the name of Razcol and shed its two extra battalions which were transferred to the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

21. On the 22nd December Tocol moved from Tochi camp to Jaler camp to protect the line of communication. The 2nd Infantry Brigade moved from Khaisora camp to Dakai Kalai to destroy certain selected towers in that area. Razcol passing through 2nd Infantry Brigade, moved up the Khaisora valley to Damdil, destroying several towers en route. Only slight opposition was encountered by Razcol, but the 2nd Infantry Brigade met strong opposition when their pre-arranged retirement to Khaisora camp commenced, and a counter attack had to be delivered to cover the removal of casualties. This counter attack was ably executed by the 2nd Royal Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment and one company, 2nd Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment, supported by mountain artillery. Anticipating that he would be unable to reach the Khaisora camp during the hours of daylight, the Commander, 2nd Infantry Brigade decided to halt at Biche Kashkai for