



SUPPLEMENT

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN 25TH NOVEMBER 1936 TO 16TH JANUARY, 1937. (1st Phase.)

I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE OPERATIONS.

1. During April 1936, there was some unrest amongst the Daur tribe of the Tochi valley in connection with a lawsuit in Bannu concerning the abduction and the alleged conversion to Mohammadanism by a Muslim student of a young Hindu girl. The Chief Agitator amongst the Daur was a priest, the Faqir of Ipi, whose efforts culminated in the raising of a Daur lashkar, which was dispersed by a blockade of the villages concerned, carried out by Tochi Scouts supported by troops. The offending Daur were punished, and the incident was thought to be closed, the Faqir taking refuge in the Khaisora valley.

2. Between April and November 1936 the Faqir, however, continued his anti-Government propaganda amongst the Wazirs in the Khaisora valley and also amongst the Mahsuds. With the latter he had little success, but with the former his insidious propaganda began to bear fruit, and certain elements of the Tori Khel Wazirs became unruly. He thus collected a following of Tori Khel irresponsibles and a few Mahsud malcontents, and by November 1936 there was evidence of his influence spreading.

3. Efforts were made to persuade the Tori Khel Malikis to expel the Faqir from their limits or to put an end to his anti-government activities. It was pointed out to them that the tribe had only recently concluded an agreement with the Government whereby they had contracted not to afford shelter in the Lower Khaisora valley to any persons hostile to Government, and whereby Government forces were at liberty to move in the Khaisora valley. Whilst the jirgah admitted their responsibilities, they professed themselves unable to control the activities of the Faqir and his supporters unless Government gave some indication of their intention and ability to avail themselves of the rights guaranteed to them by the agreement. The Government of India therefore decided to send a force into the Khaisora valley in the hope that this would stiffen the pro-government party, and put an end to the Faqir's activities. No punitive or offensive measures were contemplated, the march being intended as a peaceful demonstration. This decision was announced to the Malikis who raised no objections to the proposed march but stated that they were unable to guarantee that it would be unopposed.

PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

4. The plan was that the Razmak column (Razcol) and the Tochi column (Tocol) should concentrate at Damdil and Mir Ali respectively by the evening of 24th November, and

that both columns should march into the Khaisora valley on 25th November. Razcol, consisting of four battalions and three mountain batteries, was to move via Asad Khel and thence East into the Khaisora valley; Tocol, consisting of two battalions and one squadron of cavalry, was to move South-West along the track from Mir Ali; the rendezvous of the two columns was Biche Kashkai. The Tochi Scouts were to co-operate in the advance, and both columns were to withdraw by the same routes on the 27th November.

II. THE ADVANCE INTO THE KHAISORA. 25th November to 27th November, 1936.

5. On the 24th November Razcol and Tocol were concentrated ready to carry out the flag march into the Khaisora valley. Up to the evening of 24th November, information from political sources pointed to the improbability of any serious opposition, though long range sniping was regarded as a possibility. Reports brought in on the evening of 24th November, however, indicated that tribal lashkars were forming, but competent opinion envisaged no serious tribal opposition.

6. In view of this late information about the formation of lashkars, the Commander, Waziristan District requested that the one flight, Royal Air Force, at Miranshah, which was to co-operate with the columns on the 25th November, should be augmented by a second flight. The latter arrived in Miranshah from Kohat by 8 a.m. on 25th November, and was available to co-operate with the columns during their march.

7. On the morning of 25th November, the two columns marched from Damdil and Mir Ali respectively according to plan.

RAZCOL OPERATIONS.

8. The advance of Razcol was unopposed for the first five miles, but at 10 a.m. in the neighbourhood of Zerpezai, fire was opened on the Scouts and advance guard, and the Royal Air Force reported considerable movement of small parties of enemy in the hills around the village. The route follows a valley of which the sides are covered with scrub and contain many caves. The enemy displayed great courage and determination, lying concealed till the leading troops were at short range and slipping away at the last moment into further cover. The enemy resistance stiffened as the advance progressed, and the rearguard of the column did not reach Biche Kashkai until 8.15 p.m. Our casualties during the day were 14 killed and 43 wounded. The enemy strength in this area was estimated at 300.

TOCOL OPERATIONS.

9. Tocol left Mir Ali at 7 a.m. and after crossing the Tochi River moved southwards via Imarki Qila. One squadron of cavalry and one battalion formed the advanced guard, four platoons Tochi Scouts operating on the right flank and two mounted infantry troops of the Tochi Scouts moving on the left flank. No opposition was encountered until the column crossed the Katira River at about 10 a.m. Heavy and accurate sniping then broke out from the hills on both sides of the

track, and by 12 noon the advanced guard was held up about one and a half miles south of the Katira, and had sustained some 20 casualties. Close support was provided by a Royal Air Force sortie; and an attack on the hills on the right of the track was launched by the one remaining battalion. This attack was brought to a standstill for a time, until a spirited mounted attack carried out over very difficult ground by the cavalry squadron, with machine gun support, directed against the enemy left, enabled an advance to be made to the South bank of the Jaler Algad.

10. It was now 6.35 p.m. The enemy had made a determined resistance and the column had suffered casualties. The column Commander, nevertheless, considered that it was essential to reach Biche Kashkai that day, and he decided, therefore, to continue his advance after dark.

11. At 7.30 p.m. the column moved forward in the moonlight from Jaler Algad. Almost at once the head and rear of the column were fired into at close range, the fire causing a stampede of animals which temporarily disorganized the column. At 8.30 p.m. the advance was resumed, the advanced guard being engaged by tribesmen again at point blank range. Casualties also occurred in the main body, and there was another stampede of animals. It was then decided to halt for the night about one mile South of the Jaler Algad and three and a half miles from Biche Kashkai. The casualties during the day were:—

11 killed.
3 died of wounds.
41 wounded.

12. On 26th November, two battalions and one mountain battery from Razcol moved out to assist Tocol to reach Biche Kashkai. The operation was completed without casualties. The next day, both columns moved to Mir Ali, which was reached at 6.30 p.m. 27th November, with the loss of ten wounded. The withdrawal was closely pressed by the enemy who were in considerable strength.

13. The spirit and morale of the troops during these operations were excellent and although the columns suffered considerable casualties, those they inflicted upon the enemy have proved to have been much more serious. Two flights Royal Air Force, increased by a third flight to assist in the withdrawal on 27th November, co-operated with the columns and gave then invaluable assistance.

Co-operation was not limited to offensive action and reconnaissance, but included the dropping of ammunition and supplies.

III. DECISION TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER OPERATIONS.

14. Political information now showed that there was a danger of the disaffection spreading to the Mahsuds, the Madda Khel Wazirs, and to other parts of Waziristan. The Government of India therefore decided to undertake further military operations with the object—

(a) of punishing and obtaining the submission of the tribal sections which had opposed the march of the two columns on and after 25th November, 1936;

(b) of making a road from Mir Ali to the Khaisora valley;

(c) of preventing the spread of disaffection to other parts of Waziristan.

Command and control of the land and air operations, and political control in the North and South Waziristan Agencies and in tribal areas of the Bannu District, were vested in the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command.

15. A Tori Khel jirgah held on the 2nd December was informed of Government's decision that punishment was to be inflicted and that a road was to be built into the lower Khaisora valley. In addition, jirgahs of the Madda Khel and of the Shaktu Mahsuds were held on 3rd December. The former denied the complicity of any of their tribesmen in the recent hostilities, and the latter, undertaking to prevent organized bodies moving to the Khaisora, produced 22 British magazine rifles as a surety.

IV. ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMENTS AND RE-ORGANIZATION OF WAZIRISTAN DISTRICT.

16. In order to implement the policy of the Government of India the forces in the Waziristan District were reinforced by troops detailed in the margin, which were concentrated in the area of operations by 5th December. It was decided also

<i>From Rawalpindi.</i>	2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade and attached troops.
	H.Q. 25th Mountain Brigade R.A.
	One Light Battery R.A.
	One Mountain Battery R.A.
<i>From Kohat.</i>	One Indian Infantry Battalion.
	One Mountain Battery R.A.
<i>From Peshawar.</i>	One Light Tank Company R.T.C.
<i>From Delhi.</i>	One Light Tank Company (Armd. Cs.) R.T.C.
<i>From Abbottabad.</i>	One Gurkha Rifle Battalion.

that Waziristan District should be organized into Wazirforce and the Waziristan area. The former comprised all troops in the defined area of operations and was placed under the command of Major-General D. E. Robertson, C. B., D. S. O. The latter comprised all the remaining troops in the Waziristan district

under Brigadier F. H. Maynard, M.C.

At the same time the Commander, No. 1 (Indian) Group, Royal Air Force, established Headquarters No. 3 (Indian) Wing Royal Air Force with Headquarters Wazirforce at Mir Ali and concentrated two flights No. 5 (Army Co-operation) Squadron and two flights No. 20 (Army Co-operation) Squadron at Miranshah. Leaflets were dropped by the Royal Air Force notifying a prescribed zone in which offensive land and air action would be taken against parties of ten or more tribesmen. The tribesmen were urged in their own interests to remove all women and children from the zone, and aircraft crews were instructed that under no circumstances were villages to be attacked.

V. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, 5TH DECEMBER TO 19TH DECEMBER, 1936.

17. On the 5th December the advance of Wazirforce commenced. The striking column known as "Khaicol," composed of Razcol and two extra battalions, moved forward and

occupied a camp on the Katira Algad on the South bank of the Tochi river. The opposition was negligible.

From the 6th December to the 18th December, Wazirforce continued the advance to the Khaisora valley, at a pace concurrent with the rate of road construction. Opposition was confined to long range sniping.

From the 9th to 12th December heavy rain made the new road from Mir Ali at times impassable for mechanical transport and difficult for animal transport, but assistance in the maintenance of the troops was afforded by units of the Royal Air Force which dropped about four tons of supplies during these days. Rain naturally hindered road construction but Khaicol reached the Khaisora river on 18th December.

18. During this period very few hostile tribesmen were seen by the troops or aircraft, but the destruction was carried out of certain selected fortified buildings belonging to tribesmen proved to have been actively hostile during the period 25th to 27th November.

VI. OPERATIONS 19TH DECEMBER TO 22ND DECEMBER.

19. On 19th December it was decided that the road already constructed from Mir Ali to the Khaisora valley should be extended down the valley, through the Sein Gorge to Dreghundari on the main Bannu-Razmak road. The object of this extension was:—

(a) To provide a direct route from Bannu to the Biche Kashkai area.

(b) To enable troops to be moved quickly to the Biche Kashkai area from Bannu, in combination with a move from the North or the West.

(c) To act as a deterrent to future hostile action by tribes of the Sein area who have been a potential source of trouble in the past.

(d) To provide a means of egress for the inhabitants of the Shaktu and Khaisora Valleys.

(e) To provide a means of lateral movement for the Frontier Constabulary, and thus enable them to deal rapidly with raids in that area.

20. On the 21st December, the 2nd Infantry Brigade joined Khaicol in the Khaisora. On the following day Khaicol resumed the name of Razcol and shed its two extra battalions which were transferred to the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

21. On the 22nd December Tocol moved from Tochi camp to Jaler camp to protect the line of communication. The 2nd Infantry Brigade moved from Khaisora camp to Dakai Kalai to destroy certain selected towers in that area. Razcol passing through 2nd Infantry Brigade, moved up the Khaisora valley to Damdil, destroying several towers en route. Only slight opposition was encountered by Razcol, but the 2nd Infantry Brigade met strong opposition when their pre-arranged retirement to Khaisora camp commenced, and a counter attack had to be delivered to cover the removal of casualties. This counter attack was ably executed by the 2nd Royal Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment and one company, 2nd Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment, supported by mountain artillery. Anticipating that he would be unable to reach the Khaisora camp during the hours of daylight, the Commander, 2nd Infantry Brigade decided to halt at Biche Kashkai for

the night and withdraw to Khaisora camp next day. The Royal Air Force co-operated closely and efficiently with the troops throughout the 22nd December. Our casualties on this day amounted to 16 killed and wounded, while the enemy are believed to have had 20 killed and 21 seriously wounded.

22. The period 19th to 30th December was devoted to the general improvement of the road and its extension eastwards towards the Sein Gorge. At the same time road construction was commenced from Draghundari with civilian labour. Hostile action was confined to desultory sniping.

During this period the Faqir of Ipi, who had moved to Arsal Kot in the Shaktu valley on the 24th December, announced that tribesmen from outside were flocking to his banner and that a Mahsud lashkar was collecting on his behalf. Though the latter was untrue, the former statement was verified on 27th December when bodies of hostile tribesmen from other tribes were reported in the Khaisora Valley. Owing to the presence of the Faqir and his immediate supporters at Arsal Kot, offensive air action was taken against the Kot on 31st December and 1st January, after due warning had been given. The Faqir and his following, taking advantage of this warning, resorted to some adjacent caves.

VII. PRELIMINARY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

23. On the 28th December a Tori Khel jirgah was interviewed by the General Officer Commanding, Wazir force and the Resident in Waziristan, at which the Tori Khel were ordered to hand in 100 rifles and 100 hostages, as an earnest of good faith, and to expel the intruding tribesmen from their limits. At this jirgah they explained their inability to expel the intruders, the number of whom had increased to about 800 by 1st January.

24. On the 5th January, 1937, another Tori Khel jirgah was interviewed, and the requisite rifles and hostages were produced; but the Tori Khel were informed that until the intruding tribesmen had been ejected from their limits, they could not return to their homes.

VIII. OPERATIONS TO EJECT INTRUDING TRIBESMEN FROM KHAISORA VALLEY—7TH TO 14TH JANUARY, 1937.

25. By the 7th January, although the number of hostile intruders was reported to have fallen from 800 to 500, it was considered necessary to undertake operations to eject them. A combined air and land operation was, therefore, carried out on the 8th January by Razcol, Tocol and the Royal Air Force. Razcol advanced eastwards from Damdil, and Tocol westwards from Jaler, along the high ground north of the Khaisora stream. In conjunction with these movements, the Royal Air Force carried out offensive action in the valley and the hills to the South, and a section of 6-inch Howitzers stationed at Damdil Camp registered targets in the valley, with the help of air observation.

26. On the night 8th/9th January, the 6-inch Howitzers carried out harassing fire on the registered targets, where it was reliably reported that the hostile tribesmen collected at night.

On the 9th January, Razcol moved to Zerpezai and camped there, meeting very little opposition. On the same day Tocol moved to Dakai Kalai unopposed, but on reaching its objective, a piquet of the 2nd Battalion 13th Frontier Force Rifles was heavily attacked. On the 10th January both columns met encountering no opposition. On the same day 5,400 lbs. of supplies were dropped from aircraft on the Khaisora camps. Next day, Tocol withdrew to Khaisora camp, Razcol remaining in Zerpezai. During this period further offensive air action was taken against Arsal Kot to prevent its re-occupation by the Faqir and his supporters.

27. On the 14th January Razcol withdrew to Damdil encountering only slight opposition.

The intruding tribesmen, who began to leave the valley in considerable numbers on the 9th January, had disappeared entirely by the 14th January. The Tori Khel were accordingly summoned to a jirgah on the 15th January.

28. Two factors which contributed in no small measure to the temporary submission of the Tori Khel and their allies were the destruction of the Faqir's headquarters at Arsal Kot by the Royal Air Force and the long-range harassing fire of the medium artillery. The former had an immediate restraining effect on the Shaktu Mahsuds and restricted the subversive activities of the Faqir and his immediate followers; the latter caused a panic amongst the hostile tribesmen in the Khaisora, as a result of which the majority returned to their own country.

IX. SUBMISSION OF THE TORI KHEL.

29. On the 15th January a fully representative jirgah of the Tori Khel was held at Mir Ali, at which the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Northern Command, presided. The terms announced enforced:—

- (a) the forfeiture of certain allowances;
- (b) the return of Government property looted or captured;
- (c) the acceptance of responsibility for the good behaviour of hostile elements of their own tribe and of strangers within their limits;
- (d) the adoption by them of measures to ensure the good behaviour of the Faqir of Ipi if he remained in Tori Khel territory.

The attitude of the jirgah was submissive and satisfactory and all sections accepted the terms.

X. DISPERSAL OF TROOPS.

30. From midnight 15-16th January the normal peace organization of Waziristan District was re-established; the ban on movement within the prescribed zone was lifted; and the Tori Khel were permitted to return to their homes.

31. On the 16th January, the dispersal of troops began, the 2nd Infantry Brigade and Tocol remaining in the Khaisora valley to complete road work, clear an emergency landing ground, and build a Scout Post near the site of Khaisora camp. Work on the road was completed on 2nd February, and by the 5th February all troops which had been specially drafted into Waziristan District for the operations, had left for their peace stations.

XI. CASUALTIES.

32. Our total casualties during the operations were:—

	Died of			
	Killed.	wounds.	Wounded.	Total.
British				
Officers	2	1	5	= 8
Indian				
Officers	1	—	4	= 5
British				
other ranks	1	—	17	= 18
Indian				
other ranks	20	2	82	= 104
Gurkha				
other ranks	—	1	8	= 9
Tochi Scouts	7	—	16	= 23
Total ...	31	4	132	= 167

33. It is estimated that the casualties sustained in action against our troops and aircraft by the hostile tribesmen were:—

Killed 119.
Severely wounded 186.

It is impossible accurately to state the number of less seriously wounded casualties but they undoubtedly outnumbered the severely wounded cases.

XII. ROYAL AIR FORCE.

34. The hours flown by the Royal Air Force during the period of operations were as follows:—

	Hrs.	Mins.
Tactical reconnaissance	535	—
Distant reconnaissance	162	5
Close support ...	147	30
Photography ...	65	5
Supply dropping ...	34	30
*Other operational flying	270	5
Bombing flights ...	66	20
Total ...	1,260	35

* Includes Artillery co-operation, reconnaissance by military and political officers, "postal" flying, picking up and dropping orders, dropping pamphlets, travel flights, etc.

XIII. CONCLUSION.

35. The operations achieved the objects for which they had been undertaken. The Tori Khel made their submission; the Mir Ali-Dreghundari motor road (36 miles in length) was constructed; and the spread of disaffection into other tribal areas was prevented.

The operations were ably conducted by General Sir John F. S. D. Coleridge, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command. In the exercise of his political functions, General Coleridge enjoyed the invaluable co-operation and unsparing help of His Excellency Sir Ralph Griffith, Governor of the North West Frontier Province, and of the political officers under his control.

The morale, spirit and efficiency of the fighting troops was of a very high order, and the work of the ancillary services was consistently good and is deserving of special praise.

The close and cordial relations which were maintained between the Royal Air Force and

the Land Forces were a marked feature of these operations. This satisfactory result was due, in great measure, to the high example and ready co-operation of Group Captain N. R. Bottomley, C.I.E., A.F.C., under whose direction the units of the Royal Air Force played a prominent part in bringing the operations to a successful conclusion.

Finally, the good work performed by all ranks of the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts, the former under the able command of Major A. Felix Williams, M.C., deserves special mention.

(Sgd.) R. A. CASSELS, General,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

OPERATIONS IN WAZIRISTAN 1936-37.
WAZIRFORCE.

HEADQUARTERS.

- Headquarters, Waziristan District (up to the 5th December 1936).
- *Headquarters, Wazirforce.
- *Headquarters, R.E. Wazirforce.
- *Headquarters, R.I.A.S.C. Wazirforce.
- *D.A.D.O.S., Wazirforce.

FORCE TROOPS.

- Probyn's Horse (K.E. VII's O. Lancers) (less one squadron).
- Headquarters, 22nd Mountain Brigade R.A.
- Headquarters, 25th Mountain Brigade R.A. (less detachment).
- 3rd Light Battery R.A.
- 9th Light Battery R.A.
- 4th (Hazara) Mountain Battery R.A.
- 7th (Bengal) Mountain Battery R.A.
- 12th (Poonch) Mountain Battery R.A.
- 13th (Dardoni) Mountain Battery R.A.
- Detachment, 25th Mountain Brigade Ammunition Column.
- Section 20/21st Medium Battery R.A.
- No. 15 Field Company, Q.V.O., Madras Sappers & Miners.
- No. 4 Field Company, K.G.O., Bengal Sappers & Miners.
- No. 18 Field Company, Royal Bombay Sappers & Miners (less one section).
- No. 22 Field Company, Royal Bombay Sappers & Miners.
- Waziristan District Signals (less Brigade Signal Section and Detachment).
- Detachments "A" Corps Signals.
- Detachments 1st Indian Divisional Signals.
- Detachment, Kohat District Signals.
- Detachments 2nd Cavalry Brigade Signal Troop.
- 1st Light Tank Company, R.T.C.
- 11th Light Tank Company, R.T.C.
- 6th Royal Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles (Scinde).
- 2nd Bn., 5th Royal Gurkha Rifles F.F.
- Detachment, Tochi Scouts.
- Detachment, South Waziristan Scouts.

ROYAL AIR FORCE.

- Headquarters, No. 1 (Indian) Group.
- Headquarters, No. 1 (Indian) Wing.
- Headquarters, No. 3 (Indian) Wing (advanced section).

No. 5 (Army Co-operation) Squadron.
 No. 20 (Army Co-operation) Squadron.
 No. 27 (Bomber) Squadron.
 No. 60 (Bomber) Squadron.

SERVICES.

No. 10 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 15 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 19 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 25 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 35 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 3 Supply Issue Section.
 No. 4 Field Ambulance.
 No. 7 Field Ambulance.
 No. 8 Field Ambulance.
 *One Sub-Section, No. 3 Sanitary Section.
 Detachment, Mobile Veterinary Section.
 *No. 10 Field Post Office.
 *No. 5 Field Post Office.
 *No. 9 L. Camp Post Office.
 *No. 29 Supply Issue Section (Razcol).
 *No. 28 Supply Issue Section (Tocol).
 *No. 22 Supply Depot Section (detachment).
 *No. 35 Supply Depot Section.
 No. 17 A.T. Coy. (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 *One Sub-Section, No. 5 Sanitary Section.
 *Field & Assistant Field Engineers (Mirali).
 *Detachment, M.E.S.

WAZIRISTAN AREA PROTECTIVE
 TROOPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
 LOCATED AT MIR ALI BUT UNDER
 WAZIRFORCE FOR LOCAL ADMINIS-
 TRATION.

Post Group, R.A., Mir Ali.
 6 Light Tank Company, R.T.C.
 No. 1 A.T. Company (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 Detachment No. 21 A.T. Coy. (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 30 A.T. Coy. (M) R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 1 Supply Issue Section.
 *Station Transport Officer, Mir Ali.
 *Field Supply Depot (consisting of Nos. 17
 & 18 Field Supply Depot Sections and
 No. 9 P.O.L. Section).
 No. 40 A.T. Company (C) (S) R.I.A.S.C.
 Detachment, No. 5 Motor Ambulance Unit.
 No. 14 Independent M.T. Section, R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 15 Independent M.T. Section, R.I.A.S.C.

No. 20 M.T. Coy. R.I.A.S.C. (Workshop &
 Breakdown Sections).
 No. 39 Independent M.T. Section, R.I.A.S.C.
 No. 40 Independent M.T. Section, R.I.A.S.C.
 *L. of C. Field Workshops (M.T.) R.I.A.S.C.
 C.I.M.H. Mir Ali.
 *Veterinary Aid Post.
 *Combined R.O.Os. and R.A.D. Detachment,
 I.A.O.C.
 *Oil Cooker Repair Unit, I.A.O.C.
 *Det. 1st Divisional Provost Company.
 *Rest Camp (British & Indian).
 *Military Forwarding Office.
 35 Independent M.T. Section, R.I.A.S.C.
 One Sub-Section, No. 5 Sanitary Section.

HEADQUARTERS, RAZMAK BRIGADE.

Headquarters, Razcol.
 Razcol Signal Section.
 † 1st Bn. The Northamptonshire Regt.
 † 5th Bn. 12th Frontier Force Regt. (Q.V.O.
 Corps of Guides).
 1st Bn. 9th Gurkha Rifles.
 2nd Bn. 13th Frontier Force Rifles.
 14th Bn. 8th Punjab Regiment (P.W.O.).
 † 1st Bn. 3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles.

HEADQUARTERS, BANNU BRIGADE.

Headquarters, Tocol.
 Tocol Signal Section.
 3rd Bn. 7th Rajput Regiment (D.C.O.).
 1st Bn. 10th Baluch Regiment (D.C.O.).
 1st Bn. 17th Dogra Regiment (P.W.O.).
 2nd Royal Bn. 11th Sikh Regiment (Ludhiana
 Sikhs).

HEADQUARTERS, 2ND (RAWALPINDI) INFANTRY
BRIGADE.

Headquarters, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry
 Brigade.
 2nd (Rawalpindi) Infantry Brigade Signal
 Section.
 1st Bn. The Hampshire Regiment.
 2nd Bn. 2nd Punjab Regiment.
 2nd Bn. 4th Bombay Grenadiers
 (K.E. VIIs O.).
 2nd Bn. 8th Punjab Regiment.

* Does not exist in peace but specially raised
 for the operations.

† Departed for Peace Stations ex Damdil
 on 23/12/1936.

‡ Joined the Force on 26/12/1936.

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