

INDUS, transported across the river INDUS to KALABAGH and forwarded by rail either to TANK direct, or to BANNU for MIRAMSHAH. The average time taken for the delivery of supplies by this route was 14 days for TANK and 21 days for MIRAMSHAH. Most valuable assistance in loading and unloading supplies and other works of this nature, was done by detachments from the 2/17th Dogra Regiment at TANK and the 2/19th Hyderabad Regiment at MIRAMSHAH.

12. *Selection of operating Stations.*—On March 2nd the advance parties went to TANK and MIRAMSHAH. Although the 60 miles which separated MIRAMSHAH from TANK caused certain administrative difficulties, it was necessary to use two stations as there was not room for three squadrons at either place. The squadrons concerned moved to their operating stations on March 3rd, and on the 5th Operational Headquarters was established at TANK.

13. *Force employed.*—The force allotted for these operations consisted of a Headquarters and 3 squadrons—1 Bristol Fighter and 2 D. H. 9a's. This force was located as follows:—

Headquarters. TANK.
(5 officers and 20 airmen).

No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron—Bristol Fighter—TANK.

(10 aeroplanes—14 officers—69 airmen).

No. 27 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a—MIRAMSHAH.

(8 aeroplanes—15 officers—58 airmen).

No. 60 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a—MIRAMSHAH.

(8 aeroplanes—13 officers—67 airmen).

Total force—26 aeroplanes—47 officers—214 airmen.

14. *Area of the Operations.*—The operations took place in S.E. WAZIRISTAN. The area covered by them was some 50—60 square miles in extent, including about 40 targets varying in height from 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level, the tops of the hills rising to 7,000 feet. These targets varied from the good sized villages, vulnerable to bomb attacks, of the FARIDAI and MARESAI, to the purely cave dwellings of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, and the scattered huts and enclosures of the GURI KHEL. Practically all the villages, however, possessed a protective cave system. All the tribes possessed some cattle; these were mostly driven into the caves during the day and watered and fed at night. Emergency landing grounds were available at RAZMAK, SORAROGHA, SARWEKAI and KHIRGI.

15. *Meteorological conditions.*—Except in the early morning and evening, the air was very bumpy, making accurate bombing difficult. MIRAMSHAH is 3,000 feet high and is surrounded by hills. It is liable to very sudden and severe storms, which, when accompanied by hail, made flying both difficult and dangerous. These storms usually came up about 12 noon and lasted until 3 p.m. The aerodrome was rendered unserviceable for a

long or short period after such storms according to their intensity and endurance. TANK was not affected by these storms, but was very much hotter than MIRAMSHAH, recording shade temperatures of over 100 degrees during part of March and April. Operations were interfered with on 6 occasions by rain and hail storms. Atmospherics interfered considerably with the W/t communications between MIRAMSHAH and TANK.

16. *Tactics.*—The tactical unit employed was a flight of 3 machines, bombing normally at a height of 3,000 feet over the target. The tactics employed may be roughly divided as follows:—

- (i) Intensive Air Attack.
- (ii) Air Blockade.
- (iii) Night Bombing.

Every effort was made to avoid routine in order to keep the tribes on the "qui vive" and in a constant state of uncertainty as to when and how they were going to be attacked.

17. *Intensive Air Attack.*—Intensive air attack was carried out by a series of flight raids, the hours of daylight being divided into periods and the periods being allotted to squadrons in rotation. This form of attack was varied by concentrating more than one squadron on a selected target during a short period, and thus increasing the intensity of the attack. By varying the times and order of attack on targets, attempts were made to effect a surprise.

18. *Air Blockade.*—Air Blockade consisted in sending machines over the area at irregular intervals during the day to attack certain definite targets, or to bomb any targets which might present themselves. The object of this method was to harass the tribes continuously, to give them a general feeling of insecurity, uncertainty and discomfort, and to prevent the pursuit of their normal activities. Continuous air patrols were also employed with the same object.

19. *Night Bombing.*—Night bombing was carried out by individual machines by moonlight, either against definite targets which were seen, or on localities where it was desirable to maintain the blockade. Reconnaissance flares were used to assist the pilots in such work. No great material damage can be expected from this night bombing, but it prolongs the blockade into the night, and thus further disorganises the normal life of the tribesmen.

20. *Variation in tactics.*—Certain variations of these tactics were introduced in order to keep the tribes in a state of uncertainty. For example:—

(a) Desultory bombing was carried out for 3 days, followed by intensive attack for 2 days, the series being repeated with varying periods of attack.

(b) Orders were given to stop all raids at 3 p.m., in order to give the impression that attacks for the day had ceased. Heavy attacks were then launched just before dusk.

(c) The times of attack were continually varied, as were also the type of bombs dropped, the time of delay action fuse used and the number of machines employed.