



SUPPLEMENT  
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FRIDAY, 20 NOVEMBER, 1925.

India Office,  
30th October, 1925.

FROM HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL SIR CLAUD JACOB, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA, DATED SIMLA, THE 29TH JUNE 1925, TO THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ARMY DEPARTMENT.

I have the honour to submit herewith for the information of the Government of India an account of the recent operations by the Royal Air Force against certain recalcitrant sections of the Mahsuds in March, April and May, 1925.

2. In submitting the report, I wish to bring to notice the excellent work performed by all ranks engaged in these operations. This is the first occasion on which the Royal Air Force in India has carried out an operation of this magnitude, and in view of the great difficulty of terrain and the unsuitability of the targets engaged, both of which are clearly set forth in Sir Edward Ellington's report, it is obvious that the results obtained were most satisfactory.

3. While, as the Air Officer Commanding points out, it is too early to judge what the permanent effect of the operations will be, we can say with confidence that threats of air action will be more effective in the future than they have been up to the present:

4. Satisfactory though the results of these operations have been, I am of opinion that a combination of land and air action would have brought about the desired result in a shorter space of time, and next time action has to be taken, I trust that it will be possible to employ the two forces in combination. That they were not so employed this time was due to our desire to give the Royal Air Force the opportunity they have long wished for of testing the effectiveness of their unsupported action.

FROM AIR VICE-MARSHAL SIR EDWARD ELLINGTON, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., COMMANDING ROYAL AIR FORCE IN INDIA, TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL SIR CLAUD WILLIAM JACOB, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA, DATED THE 23RD JUNE 1925.

I have the honour to submit herewith a report on the Royal Air Force operations in WAZIRISTAN for the period 9th March 1925 to 1st May 1925.

1. *Events Prior to the Operations.*—The MAHSUDS have always been a source of trouble to the Government of India, mainly by reason of the inaccessibility of their country. Prior to 1919, this country had not been visited

since 1902, when full submission was exacted. The situation had remained normal until the outbreak of the 3rd Afghan War in 1919, when our retirements from the TOCHI and WANA produced serious consequences, over 100 raids and offences being registered against the MAHSUDS during this period. In consequence it was necessary to undertake Military operations against all the MAHSUD tribes. These operations with varying intensity lasted throughout 1919, 1922 and the beginning of 1923 and resulted in a settlement with the majority of the tribes. No complete settlement, however, was effected with the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL.

2. The ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, therefore, was the chief section against whom the Royal Air Force operations were directed. They are a section of the NANA KHEL BAHLOLZAI and contain many hostile elements who are naturally not included in the list of recipients of allowances and Khassadars. Many of these hostiles, together with a number of "hamsayas," or dependents, of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, own lands in AFGHANISTAN, to which they migrate in the summer. On December 27th a full BAHLOLZAI jirga was held at TANK for obtaining reparation for offences committed and for the exaction of promises to prevent further offences. Following this jirga, a deputation of hostile ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL was interviewed on January 16th. The deputation demanded an amnesty for past offences, an increase of allowances to the tribe from Rs. 3,000-6,000 and their own admission to their tribal share. These demands were both dismissed. From now onwards the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL hostiles abetted by the GURI KHEL, MARESAI and FARIDAI sections of the MANZAI MAHSUDS committed further offences:—

(a) On the night January 24th-25th four Hindus were kidnapped from MANZAI, followed on the night of February 1st-2nd by two more from the coolie camp at SPLI TOI.

(b) On the night February 20th-21st, GOMAL POST was raided by a gang containing members of the hostile sections already mentioned. 27 S. M. L. E. rifles belonging to the police were stolen and taken to the SPLI TOI.

3. On December 16th, 1924, the Resident, WAZIRISTAN, asked the Government of India to sanction the employment of air action against the recalcitrant sections. By the end of this month it appeared probable that operations would be necessary; a plan was therefore drawn up by No. 1 Wing, and the force to be employed was decided on. Jirgas from the friendly sections of the tribes concerned were seen, but despite demonstrations carried out by Royal Air Force units on November 30th, 1924, February 7th and 24th, 1925, outrages continued, and the hostile factions still tried to obtain impossible demands.

4. *Terms to Tribes.*—On February 1st the Resident applied for permission to warn the GURI KHELs that, unless terms to be stated were complied with, air action would be taken to enforce them. This request was granted, and following two further outrages, the Government sanctioned, on February 25th, the issue of a final warning to all the sections

implicated. The terms given below were issued on March 5th: a warning was also issued that long delay action bombs would be used, and the tribes were advised to remove the women and children from the danger zone should operations be begun.

5. *Terms for ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL.*—The complete jirga of ABDUR RAHMAN KHELs, friendlies and hostiles, including the JALAL KHELs and others who live with the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL was to come in at JANDOLA by 12 noon on Saturday, March 7th, bringing the two Hindus who had been captured. In case of non-compliance, punitive measures would be adopted after sun-rise on Monday, March 9th.

6. *Terms for GURI KHEL.*—GURI KHELs were required to comply with the terms already announced to them, *vis.*:—

*FOR KARIM KHEL.*

1,600 rupees.

2 Government rifles.

Return of three bullocks and seven camels.

Deposit of 8 country rifles as security.

*FOR BILAND KHEL.*

3 Government rifles.

Deposit of 4 country rifles as security.

Compliance was demanded by 12 noon on Saturday, March 7th. In case of non-compliance, punitive measures would be adopted after sunrise on Monday, March 9th.

7. *Terms for FARIDAI.*—The complete jirga of FARIDAI'S was ordered to come in by 12 noon on Saturday, March 7th, at JANDOLA. In case of non-compliance, punitive measures would be adopted after sun-rise on Monday, March 9th.

8. *Terms for MARESAI.*—The complete jirga of MARESAI'S was ordered to come in by 12 noon on Saturday, March 7th, at JANDOLA. In case of non-compliance, punitive measures would be adopted after sun-rise on Monday, March 9th.

9. *Decision to begin operations.*—As no reply was received from the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, and the FARIDAI, MARESAI and GURI KHEL merely attempted to bargain, it was decided on Sunday, March 8th, to begin air action against all the sections concerned at dawn on Monday, March 9th.

10. *Preparations.*—On February 12th, judging that hostilities were now inevitable, Headquarters, Royal Air Force, approved a plan of operations, allotted the force to be employed, appointed Wing Commander R. C. M. Pink, C.B.E., to command, and authorised certain preparations to be made, such as the forwarding of supplies and bombs to the operating stations at MIRAMSHAH and TANK. These arrangements were made by Headquarters, Waziristan District, in consultation with the Royal Air Force, and a method of supply settled.

11. Explosives were forwarded from the Ordnance Depot, RAWALPINDI; petrol, oil and other supplies came from the Depots at PESHAWAR, KOHAT, RAWALPINDI and LAHORE. All supplies for both MIRAMSHAH and TANK were delivered at MARI.

INDUS, transported across the river INDUS to KALABAGH and forwarded by rail either to TANK direct, or to BANNU for MIRAMSHAH. The average time taken for the delivery of supplies by this route was 14 days for TANK and 21 days for MIRAMSHAH. Most valuable assistance in loading and unloading supplies and other works of this nature, was done by detachments from the 2/17th Dogra Regiment at TANK and the 2/19th Hyderabad Regiment at MIRAMSHAH.

12. *Selection of operating Stations.*—On March 2nd the advance parties went to TANK and MIRAMSHAH. Although the 60 miles which separated MIRAMSHAH from TANK caused certain administrative difficulties, it was necessary to use two stations as there was not room for three squadrons at either place. The squadrons concerned moved to their operating stations on March 3rd, and on the 5th Operational Headquarters was established at TANK.

13. *Force employed.*—The force allotted for these operations consisted of a Headquarters and 3 squadrons—1 Bristol Fighter and 2 D. H. 9a's. This force was located as follows:—

Headquarters. TANK.  
(5 officers and 20 airmen).

No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron—Bristol Fighter—TANK.

(10 aeroplanes—14 officers—69 airmen).

No. 27 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a—MIRAMSHAH.

(8 aeroplanes—15 officers—58 airmen).

No. 60 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a—MIRAMSHAH.

(8 aeroplanes—13 officers—67 airmen).

Total force—26 aeroplanes—47 officers—214 airmen.

14. *Area of the Operations.*—The operations took place in S.E. WAZIRISTAN. The area covered by them was some 50—60 square miles in extent, including about 40 targets varying in height from 3,000 to 6,000 feet above sea level, the tops of the hills rising to 7,000 feet. These targets varied from the good sized villages, vulnerable to bomb attacks, of the FARIDAI and MARESAI, to the purely cave dwellings of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, and the scattered huts and enclosures of the GURI KHEL. Practically all the villages, however, possessed a protective cave system. All the tribes possessed some cattle; these were mostly driven into the caves during the day and watered and fed at night. Emergency landing grounds were available at RAZMAK, SORAROGHA, SARWEKAI and KHIRGI.

15. *Meteorological conditions.*—Except in the early morning and evening, the air was very bumpy, making accurate bombing difficult. MIRAMSHAH is 3,000 feet high and is surrounded by hills. It is liable to very sudden and severe storms, which, when accompanied by hail, made flying both difficult and dangerous. These storms usually came up about 12 noon and lasted until 3 p.m. The aerodrome was rendered unserviceable for a

long or short period after such storms according to their intensity and endurance. TANK was not affected by these storms, but was very much hotter than MIRAMSHAH, recording shade temperatures of over 100 degrees during part of March and April. Operations were interfered with on 6 occasions by rain and hail storms. Atmospherics interfered considerably with the W/t communications between MIRAMSHAH and TANK.

16. *Tactics.*—The tactical unit employed was a flight of 3 machines, bombing normally at a height of 3,000 feet over the target. The tactics employed may be roughly divided as follows:—

(i) Intensive Air Attack.

(ii) Air Blockade.

(iii) Night Bombing.

Every effort was made to avoid routine in order to keep the tribes on the "qui vive" and in a constant state of uncertainty as to when and how they were going to be attacked.

17. *Intensive Air Attack.*—Intensive air attack was carried out by a series of flight raids, the hours of daylight being divided into periods and the periods being allotted to squadrons in rotation. This form of attack was varied by concentrating more than one squadron on a selected target during a short period, and thus increasing the intensity of the attack. By varying the times and order of attack on targets, attempts were made to effect a surprise.

18. *Air Blockade.*—Air Blockade consisted in sending machines over the area at irregular intervals during the day to attack certain definite targets, or to bomb any targets which might present themselves. The object of this method was to harass the tribes continuously, to give them a general feeling of insecurity, uncertainty and discomfort, and to prevent the pursuit of their normal activities. Continuous air patrols were also employed with the same object.

19. *Night Bombing.*—Night bombing was carried out by individual machines by moonlight, either against definite targets which were seen, or on localities where it was desirable to maintain the blockade. Reconnaissance flares were used to assist the pilots in such work. No great material damage can be expected from this night bombing, but it prolongs the blockade into the night, and thus further disorganises the normal life of the tribesmen.

20. *Variation in tactics.*—Certain variations of these tactics were introduced in order to keep the tribes in a state of uncertainty. For example:—

(a) Desultory bombing was carried out for 3 days, followed by intensive attack for 2 days, the series being repeated with varying periods of attack.

(b) Orders were given to stop all raids at 3 p.m., in order to give the impression that attacks for the day had ceased. Heavy attacks were then launched just before dusk.

(c) The times of attack were continually varied, as were also the type of bombs dropped, the time of delay action fuse used and the number of machines employed.

(d) The night bombers were ordered to attain their maximum height over the aerodrome and then to throttle down their engines and appear over the target as silently as possible.

(e) A sufficient reserve was always kept in hand to enable a heavy attack to be launched, should any suitable target, such as a concentration of tribesmen, be located.

21. *Forced Landings.*—It was of the utmost importance to avoid any pilot having to make a forced landing in hostile territory. Raids were therefore carried out at a sufficient height to give pilots a reasonable chance of being able to reach one of the emergency landing grounds in case of engine failure. These were the only places where a forced landing could be made without damage.

22. *Operations.*—The operations opened on March 9th 1925 with attacks on all the sections concerned; the main concentration during the first 4 days being directed against the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL. The hours flown and flights made are given in the Appendix. Several villages in DRE ALGAD were set on fire, a tower was demolished in the SPLI TOI. On the 13th bombing operation ceased as various hostile sections had promised to comply with Government demands. Nothing occurred, however, and action was begun again on March 14th.

On March 15th the two captured Hindus were brought into SPLI TOI Post, and on March 17th the whole hostile and friendly ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL jirga arrived at JANDOLA; operations against this section were in consequence again suspended. The Resident announced the terms to the hostiles, and an agreement was in sight when internal dissensions caused a breakdown of negotiations. Operations were resumed against the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL and continued against the remainder. During the renewed operations some damage was caused to the caves. It was found at this time that various friendly villages were giving shelter to the hostiles and their flocks: these villages were promptly warned by the Resident.

The friendly section of the ABDUR RUHMAN KHEL left the SPLI TOI area altogether at this period, compelling various hostile sections to return to their own areas. Our action had by this time forced the majority of the hostile sections underground and completely upset their normal life.

One flight from No. 20 (A.C.) squadron was sent up to TANK on March 18th to reinforce No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron.

23. *Settlement with GURI KHEL.*—On March 21st Flying Officers N. C. HAYTER-HAMES and E. J. DASHWOOD, while carrying out a bomb raid, were forced to come down in hostile territory from some cause unknown, their machine being completely wrecked. Flying Officer HAYTER-HAMES was killed instantaneously, and Flying Officer DASHWOOD, who fell into the hands of GURI KHEL friendlies, died shortly afterwards. Flying Officer DASHWOOD's body was brought into SORAROGHA on March 22nd in face of considerable opposition from the KARIM KHEL, although the BILAND

KHEL hostiles helped the friendlies, and KARIM KHEL, after haggling, brought Flying Officer HAYTER-HAMES's body in on March 25th together with the rifles demanded. The jirga was interviewed at JANDOLA by the Political Agent, when they surrendered their leading Malik (DANGAR) as security for the payment of the money fine.

24. About this time it became obvious that the operations were likely to be protracted, and it became essential to restrict their intensity in case any other operations became necessary, or the present operations had to be continued indefinitely. The attack on the tribes now developed into an Air Blockade carried out with a diminished force, chief attention being paid to the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL who were reported to be collecting prior to migrating to AFGHANISTAN. These operations were successful. A tower was destroyed in a MARESAI village. On March 30th bombing of the MARESAI was suspended for one day to allow their jirga to appear at JANDOLA. Nothing however came of these overtures.

25. *Night Flying.*—On March 30th one night flying Bristol Fighter from No. 31 Squadron, AMBALA, arrived at TANK to carry out night bombing raids over the hostile area. Parties were despatched to the landing grounds at SORAROGHA and KHIRGI, with searchlights and landing flares. The first flight was successfully carried out on the night of April 4th and produced a most excellent result. The tribesmen had, hitherto, considered themselves perfectly safe after dark, and the discovery that we could operate at night proved disconcerting. It was arranged, therefore, to reinforce this machine with two more from AMBALA. The arrival of these machines on April 6th necessitated some re-organisation of forces, which were re-distributed as follows:—

Operational Headquarters	TANK.
1 Flight—No. 31 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter (for night flying)	TANK.
1 Flight—No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter	... .. MIRAMSHAH.
1 Flight—No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter	... .. MIRAMSHAH.
2 Flights—No. 27 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a	... .. MIRAMSHAH.
2. Flights—No. 60 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a	... .. MIRAMSHAH.
Searchlight Party	... .. SORAROGHA.
Searchlight Party	... .. KHIRGI.

It was decided to launch a big offensive on April 4th immediately before the first night raid, and accordingly 38 machine raids were carried out, giving a total of 52½ hours flying. This action caused casualties and the night raid succeeded in killing a notorious FARIDAI, TORMARCHAI. A friendly ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL jirga appeared at TANK on this day with various irrelevant suggestions which were rejected.

26. On April 9th an afternoon patrol sighted a big collection of FARIDAI personnel moving up the DRE ALGAD. This exceptional target was at once engaged, and additional machines called for from MIRAMSHAH to drive home the attack. Considerable casualties had already been inflicted, when the weather, which had been threatening all day, broke completely, thus making it impossible to press home the attack on the only concentration of hostiles encountered in the open during the whole course of the operations.

27. *Extension of Areas.*—As a result of information received, warnings were issued to the following "friendly villages" which were giving sanctuary to hostiles and their flocks:—

GALLI PUNGA, PASTI KHAN, JUL-LAMDAR PARI KHEL, JEMADAR DIDAI's village, SHINKAI, WAZIRGAI. It was also definitely established that a large number of hostile ABDUR RAHMAN KHELs were sheltering with friendlies in the SARELA, and a warning was issued to this district on April 12th. A successful attack was carried out on this date. About this time information was received that hostile families were sheltering in the BARWAND area, and the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL were likely to move to the BADDAR ALGAD *en route* to AFGHANISTAN. Permission to extend the operations to these areas was therefore asked for: this was received on April 20th for the BADDAR area only.

28. *Further Negotiations.*—Representatives of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL hostiles arrived on April 12th with definite peace proposals. These proposals were considered to be so important by the Resident, that bombing of the SPLI TOI area was stopped from 14-00 hours on April 13th until midnight on April 14th. The jirga duly appeared, but no useful results were obtained, and operations were resumed on April 15th, when 57½ hours flying were accomplished. During these raids chappar encampments in the SARELA were set on fire. Two more night raids were also sent out during the night.

29. *Settlement with FARIDAI and MARESAI.*—About this time very conflicting reports were being received in regard to the intentions of the FARIDAI and MARESAI, and the Political Authorities despatched an emissary to AHMEDWAM to collect their jirga. A message was received in consequence, on April 15th, that the jirga would appear under certain conditions which were at once refused. However, on the morning of the 18th the fine of 7 Government rifles was handed in, followed by the 3 GOMAL rifles, whereupon operations ceased as far as these sections were concerned.

30. *Conclusion of Operations against ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL.*—Meanwhile a constant reconnaissance was maintained over the BADDAR area in order to get information of any migration of hostile sections. Bombing of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL hostiles was continued, patrols being kept constantly over their area. On the 17th a further deputation of intermediaries for the hostiles arrived, but their proposals were not accepted. They returned on the night of April 20th, this time

with definite promises of security, and they were accordingly granted 24 hours' respite. It was now discovered that the hostiles had actually left the SPLI TOI for BADDAR, but had been turned back by sections living *en route* who were afraid of being bombed. This forced them to return either to SPLI TOI or BARWAND, and it was reported that, if peace was not concluded, they intended to go direct to AFGHANISTAN *via* KHAISORA, to avoid further bombing. The three security rifles were not produced by the time allotted, and bombing was begun again, only to be suspended the same evening on the receipt of the rifles. After a preliminary meeting with hostiles and friendlies at Sarwekai on April 23rd, a representative jirga was met on Tuesday 28th at JANDOLA. After three days of strenuous discussion, due to the conflicting interests of the hostiles and friendlies, terms were agreed to on Friday May 1st. The full fine of 16 rifles was accepted and guarantees for payment within a considerable time given.

31. The operations which had lasted 54 days were thus brought to an end. The ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, the GURI KHEL, including the BILAND KHEL sub-section who have been stubborn in the past, the FARIDAI and MARESAI have all accepted the terms originally laid down, except for one rifle which was remitted to the BILAND KHEL as a reward for their assistance in recovering Flying Officer DASHWOOD's body. The moral effect of the bombing on tribesmen not included in the actual area of operations has also been considerable: various fines which were imposed before and during the present operation have been paid up, and the decisions of the Political Authorities have been carried out with exemplary promptitude. The following shows the nature of these results and, although they were not all due to the moral effect of air action, this undoubtedly influenced the decision of some of the tribes to settle their debts:—

(a) A section of the MALIKDINAI, led by a famous badmash SHAMDAL, who were the instigators of the raid on GOMAL Police Station, were so impressed by the bombing of their neighbours, that they handed over the 13 rifles in their possession and paid the necessary fine. This result was a complete surprise and cleared up what might have proved a difficult situation.

(b) The BAHADUR KHEL tribe came in and paid up in full a long outstanding fine.

(c) The SHABI KHEL tribe paid up a fine of over Rs. 7,000 for their share in the MAROBI case last August.

#### COMMENTS.

32. *Damage Inflicted.*—It is difficult to obtain information as to the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy. The tribesman is reluctant to admit that the fighting strength of his tribe has been reduced by the killing of his young men, so his losses are usually concealed. It is not likely that the actual casualties were many, nor is it desirable that they should be, provided that the enemy can be brought to terms without.

33. *Period of Operations Unfavourable.*—The final sanction of the Government of India was received on February 25th: this late date was disadvantageous from a purely military point of view for several reasons.

By March 9th the best of the cold weather was over, and flying had to be done when the increasing heat and seasonal storms added considerably to the strain on the pilots and ground personnel. Delay also rendered the blockade less unpleasant to the enemy than would have been the case in the more rigorous climatic conditions obtaining earlier in the year. As the passes were open an opportunity was afforded to those tribes who owned land in AFGHANISTAN to slip away.

34. *Shortage of Aeroplanes and Pilots.*—At the time when the operations began the R.A.F. in India were approaching the end of an exceptionally busy training season which had made considerable demands on pilots and greater demands on the reserves of machines, engines, and technical stores. This, combined with an under-estimate of the financial requirements of the R.A.F. in India for the year 1924-25, resulted in a shortage in the necessary number of serviceable aeroplanes and engines: on the eve of the operations this amounted, for the R.A.F. as a whole, to 27 aeroplanes and 40 engines, the former being due to the latter. In spite of this, some 2,000 hours flying took place over the actual area of the operations during the 54 days they lasted, a result which reflects great credit on the officers and men of the squadrons engaged, and on those of the Aircraft Depot who worked overtime to maintain the squadrons in the Field. At the end of the operations the shortage had increased to 35 aeroplanes and 44 engines.

Another disadvantage lay in the fact that all the experienced pilots due for relief in the trooping season 1924-25 had left, and those who had replaced them were not available to take part as pilots in the operations, since they had not had time to complete their training under Indian conditions, which differ from those at Home on account of the low density of the air and the height of the landing grounds.

35. *Duration of the Operations.*—The operations themselves lasted for 54 days, and on 42 of the first 45 days, bombing was carried out on some part of the area proclaimed. This, I believe, to have been the longest continuous operations carried out by aircraft since the end of the Great War. Some 2,070 hours of war flying was done, and in addition some 650 hours flying was carried out by the squadrons in connection with the operations, a total of over 2,700 hours. There was only one fatal accident which was probably due to the machine being shot down. This was the only occasion where a machine or a man fell into the hands of the enemy, but I regret to say the accident caused the loss of the lives of two valuable pilots. However much the loss of two such good officers and gallant pilots as Flying Officers DASHWOOD and HAYTER-HAMES must be regretted, previous experience of frontier fighting shows that this is a small price to pay for enforcing our will on such hardy mountaineers as the tribes concerned, living in the difficult county of WAZIRISTAN. Nor do

I believe that the cost would have been less had any other method of coercion been employed, indeed I think it must have been much more.

36. *Respite to the enemy.*—On several occasions during the operations bombing was stopped to enable jirgas to be assembled or property to be collected as security. In some of these instances the sections did not comply with the conditions on which the respite was given within the time laid down. The disadvantages of such respites are obvious; they enable the enemy to recover from the strain which the bombing attacks inflict, they facilitate the removal of valuable property, they give the tribesmen the impression that our resolution is weakening and provide opportunities for those who wish to do so, to slip away out of reach of further attacks. On more than one occasion the tribes came to terms without any preliminary respite or after bombing had been resumed on the expiration of a respite; for instance, between April 15th and April 18th the FARIDAI and MARESAI come in without any cessation of operations against them, and the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL surrendered the three rifles required as a guarantee of good faith on April 21st after bombing had begun again against them. This shows that a respite is not always necessary, and whenever possible the operations should continue without check, until the terms laid down at the beginning have been complied with, or adequate security for the fulfilment of the conditions given.

37. *Hostiles and Friendlies.*—It is unnecessary to deal at length with the difficulties which are created for the Air Force by the division of the MAHSUD tribes into hostile and so-called friendlies. All are agreed that such differentiation is undesirable, and that full tribal responsibility should be enforced. It is hoped that such a policy will prove practicable in future.

38. *Health.*—The health of the officers and men has been uniformly good, and the medical returns compare favourably with those for the corresponding period of last year in spite of an unusually hot April.

39. *General.*—This is the first occasion in INDIA that the R.A.F. has been used independently of the Army for dealing with a situation which has got beyond the resources of the political officers. It is at present too early to judge how lasting will be the effect or how permanent will be the impression of this display of air power on the stubborn tribesmen of the North-West Frontier, but it is claimed that the operations prove that in the R.A.F. the Government of INDIA have a weapon which is more economical in men and money and more merciful in its action than other forms of armed force for dealing with the majority of problems which arise beyond the administrative frontier. That they have not been without effect on sections of the MAHSUDS who were not included in the area of operations is shown by a number of settlements which have been effected during the progress of the operations, notably the case of the surrender of the rifles looted from the GOMAL Police Post.

40. *Recommendations.*—I wish to bring to notice the services of Wing Commander R. C. M. Pink, C.B.E., who was in command in WAZIRISTAN. He has shown a fine example to his command in taking part personally in a number of raids. He has shown great resource, determination and energy, and it is due to the same qualities that Nos. 27 and 60 Squadrons, which were under his orders for 14 months previous to the operations, were fit to perform the arduous work required of them. I have forwarded separately the names of the officers and airmen which I wish especially to bring to notice. In doing so, I wish to place on record my appreciation of the devotion to duty, keenness and resource shown by all ranks and the courage and determination of the crews of aircraft to whose efforts the success of the operations is entirely due. I have forwarded under separate cover my recommendations as to the concessions to be granted to the personnel serving in WAZIRISTAN during the dates covered by this despatch.

41. In conclusion I wish to thank the members of the Military and Political services

for their whole-hearted assistance, and loyal co-operation during the operations, and the generous interest they took in their progress.

APPENDIX I.

*Statistics.*

Squadron.	Total hrs. flown inc. plus 1 hr. to operating stations.	War flying inc. travelling flights.	Machine flights.
5	hrs. mins. 671 5	hrs. mins. 463 20	No. 363
20	558 35	405 55	139
31 (night flying)	97 0	46 20	29
27	661 45	554 50	333
60	724 45	600 30	353
Totals ...	2713 10	2070 55	1222

*Air Ministry,*  
20th November, 1925.

ROYAL AIR FORCE.

The KING has been graciously pleased to approve of the undermentioned rewards in recognition of gallant and distinguished service in connection with the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Waziristan, 9th March, 1925, to 1st May, 1925:—

*Awarded the Distinguished Service Order.*

Squadron Leader Arthur John CAPEL, D.F.C.

*Awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.*

Flight Lieutenant John Wakeling BAKER, M.C.

Flight Lieutenant William Neville CUMMING.

Flying Officer Reginald PYNNE.

*Awarded the Distinguished Flying Medal.*

90741 Sergeant (Pilot) George Edwin CAMPBELL.

84631 Sergeant (Pilot) Ralph England HAWKINS.

7392 Sergeant Arthur Dixon RUTHERFORD.

86779 Corporal Reginald William Richard ROBINS.

327082 Leading Aircraftman Alfred William WALMSLEY.

*Air Ministry,*  
20th November, 1925.

The names of the undermentioned have been brought to notice for distinguished service rendered during the operations carried out by the Royal Air Force in Waziristan, 9th March, 1925, to 1st May, 1925, by His Excellency General Sir Claud W. Jacob, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief in India, in the Despatch dated 23rd June, 1925:—

ROYAL AIR FORCE.

CHASE, Flying Officer Wilfred Arthur.

DASHWOOD, Flying Officer Edward John (killed).

DOLLERY, Flying Officer Charles.

GARRAWAY, Flying Officer Frederick Frank.

HASLAM, Flight Lieutenant James Alexander Gordon, M.C., D.F.C.

HAYTER-HAMES, Flying Officer Noel Cecil (killed).

PINK, Wing Commander Richard Charles Montagu, C.B.E.

SAVERY, Flight Lieutenant Robert Churton, D.F.C.

STEVENS, Flight Lieutenant Cecil Alfred, M.C.

BROWN, No. 159387 Cpl. William Joshua Leslie.

BUTCHER, No. 314957 F/Sgt. William George Henry.

JONES, No. 345362 L.A.C. Albert John.

REEVE, No. 337185 Cpl. Sidney Lancelot.

SMALL, No. 334124 Cpl. (A/Sgt.) George Robert, M.M.

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