



SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette
Of TUESDAY, the 26th of FEBRUARY, 1924.

Published by Authority.

The Gazette is registered at the General Post Office for transmission by Inland Post as a newspaper. The postage rate to places within the United Kingdom, for each copy, is one penny for the first 6 ozs., and an additional halfpenny for each subsequent 6 ozs. or part thereof. For places abroad the rate is a halfpenny for every 2 ounces, except in the case of Canada, to which the Canadian Magazine Postage rate applies.

WEDNESDAY, 27 FEBRUARY, 1924.

*Army Headquarters, India,
Simla, the 25th July, 1923.*

From His Excellency General Lord Rawlinson
of Trent, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief in India,

To the Secretary to the Government of India,
Army Department.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a report on the operations in Waziristan for the period 1st January, 1922 to the 20th April, 1923.

From the beginning of 1922 after the withdrawal of the Wana Column we were in military occupation of the Takhi Zam line up to Ladha, as well as of the Tochi line. On the Wana line no regular troops were beyond Jandola, the former place being held by Khassadars maintained by the Gomal route. The Sarwakai route, which was that by which the Wana Column had formerly been maintained, had been given up altogether. Work on the mechanical transport road up the Takhi Zam was in progress and our general policy followed the lines of the previous year.

Early in September, the Government of India obtained sanction to a scheme for the permanent control of Waziristan. The salient features of this scheme included the completion of the mechanical transport road from

Idak via Razmak, Dwa Toi and Sorarogha to Jandola; the construction of a mechanical transport road from Jandola to Sarwakai, and the improvement of the cis-Border road from Draband to Ghazni Khel so as to make it fit for mechanical transport. A force, based on the Tochi, was to be located permanently at Razmak, and Ladha was to be abandoned. When Razmak was occupied, all regular troops, with the exception of those at Razmak and on the Razmak-Tochi line of communications, were to be withdrawn, law and order being maintained by a system of Scout and Khassadar posts.

In the second half of October persistent rumours became current among the Mahsuds that the Razmak project was to be abandoned and that we were about to evacuate the country.

It was not until the end of February, 1923, that the Mahsuds realised that Government were determined to execute the policy of continuing the construction of roads and occupying Razmak.

The situation then became easier and normal conditions began once more to prevail.

Summary of Events.

2. My last despatch described the operations which concluded with the withdrawal and dispersal of the Wana Column. By the end of 1921, the responsibilities of the General Officer

Commanding the Waziristan Force were limited to the Takhi Zam line up to Ladha, on which the 9th, 10th and 21st Brigades were disposed as shown in Appendix 1. The Khassadars had in December taken over their duties between Sorarogha and Ladha, and they also held Wana and the posts on the Gomal line.

3. The general situation in Waziristan remained good from the beginning of 1922 up to the middle of October. During this period only a few incidents of minor importance occurred, and such hostility as was evidenced by these incidents was easily and quickly suppressed.

4. Thus—to take the Mahsuds first—as a reprisal for several minor attacks on our troops by Jalal Khel gangs during January and February, the encampments of this section near Saruna were bombed by aeroplanes on the 12th March; in retaliation for a raid on a convoy in the Takhi Zam on the 1st July, a settlement of the same section at Gurgura Punja was destroyed by Khassadars, and punitive fines were levied for complicity and territorial responsibility on the Nazari and Shaman Khel; and an attack on one of the Ladha piquets by the Abdur Rahman Khel on the 29th July was followed by bombing operations against their villages, in the Upper Baddar Toi, the result being full compliance with the punitive terms imposed by Government.

Apart from such occurrences as these, our relations with the Mahsuds, as a whole, showed considerable improvement during the spring and summer, and at a jirga held at Ladha in the middle of July, all the Mahsud sections, except the Jalal Khel, Abdur Rahman Khel, and Abdullai, accepted responsibility for their past offences and consented to the location of Khassadar posts in their territory; in return, Mr. S. E. Pears, C.I.E., I.C.S., who in January had succeeded Mr. J. A. O. Fitzpatrick, C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S., as Resident in Waziristan, announced the new allowances sanctioned by Government.

5. To turn to the Wazirs. On the 11th March the Zilli Khel attacked and captured a Khassadar convoy near Kajuri Kach. This success led to a recrudescence of activity on the part of the hostile elements among the Wana Wazirs, who assembled a lashkar and on the 4th April surrounded the Khassadars in Wana Fort. Bombing operations carried out by the Royal Air Force on the 7th, 8th, and 11th dispersed the lashkar, inflicted considerable damage on hostile villages near Wana and restored the situation; but, to minimize the possibility of future trouble in that area, it was decided to reinforce the Wana Khassadars with a detachment of South Waziristan Scouts. 500 Scouts were accordingly moved to Wana at the beginning of May, and soon proved their value by successfully rounding up, on the 12th May, four villages near Spin, the attitude of whose inhabitants had been markedly hostile.

6. On the Tochi side the Wazirs gave no trouble. At the end of April the Resident summoned a jirga at which he announced that regular troops would not evacuate the Ladha line before Razmak was occupied, and that if the Ladha line were then evacuated it would be held by Khassadars. The result was that

by the 12th May the Tochi Wazirs submitted a petition asking that the Idak-Razmak road might be built through their country, and that Government forces might permanently occupy the Razmak plateau.

7. In the meantime work continued satisfactorily on the Kotkai-Sorarogha road, and it was completed by the 1st August, though spates prevented its use by mechanical transport until the middle of September.

8. Early in September as already noted, the Government of India obtained sanction to the scheme for the permanent control of Waziristan. An outline of this scheme has been given in paragraph 1 above.

Shortly afterwards orders were issued that Razmak should be occupied by the 14th January, 1923, and that the evacuation of the Takhi Zam line should be completed by the 1st February.

9. Consequent on these orders, the work of backloading all surplus supplies and stores on the Ladha line, amounting to some 4,000 tons, commenced, the undertaking being rendered especially difficult by the length of the line of communications, the shortage of transport, and the liability of interruption by spates. The tactical problems involved in withdrawing the troops through forty miles of difficult country necessitated also the preparation of an intricate plan of operations, scheduled to extend over a fortnight.

10. As has already been mentioned, the Mahsud situation, which was distinctly promising in the early autumn, began rapidly to deteriorate in the second half of October. The reason for this change is mentioned elsewhere in this despatch; its effects were manifested in the increased frequency of attacks on our troops, in the opposition offered by the Abdullai to the establishment of a Khassadar post at Tauda China, and by the Michi and Salimi Khel to the establishment of posts at Sarwakai and Haidari Kach, and finally in the death of Lieutenant Dickson, R.E., near Tamre Oba, on the 12th December, at the hands of Abdullai irreconcilables, in circumstances which are still under investigation.

11. On the 23rd November, Government ordered the suspension of work on the Sorarogha-Razmak and Jandola-Sarwakai roads, and on the 1st December directed that the survey of the former should not be continued beyond Dwa Toi. These decisions undoubtedly increased the belief, already widespread among the Mahsuds, that the occupation of Razmak would not take place.

12. The use of aeroplanes at this period might have been of great assistance, but unfortunately they were not available, for various reasons, until the 17th December. In the meantime it had been found necessary to postpone the advance of the Razmak Force, from Asad Khel, from the 1st to the 15th December, and it was decided to bomb heavily all hostile sections of the Mahsuds for one month prior to the commencement of the advance.

13. On the 17th December, intensive bombing operations commenced against the hostile Mahsud sections, a squadron of Heavy Bombers and one of Bristol Fighters being placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Waziristan Force for the purpose, and were carried on almost continuously, in spite of bad flying weather, for the next six

weeks. On two occasions aeroplanes came down in hostile territory, and the airmen fell into enemy hands. Their capture caused much embarrassment to the General Officer Commanding the Waziristan Force in his conduct of the operations, but political negotiations secured their comparatively early release.

14. By the beginning of the new year the general Mahsud situation had become so grave that it was imperative to stabilize matters before carrying out the plans as originally formulated.

It was decided, therefore, to deal a heavy blow at the Abdullai stronghold of Makin before commencing the withdrawal of the Takhi Zam line. Orders were accordingly issued for combined operations against Makin by the 9th Brigade of the Waziristan Force, and the 7th Brigade of the Razmak Force, the latter Brigade to come under the command of the General Officer Commanding the Waziristan Force for the operations; but, owing to the fact that all supplies and stores had been backloaded, it was impossible to commence these operations before the end of January. In the meantime the villages in the Makin area were shelled by 6-inch and 3·7-inch howitzers from Ladha, and considerable damage was inflicted.

15. By the 30th January, Advanced Waziristan Force Headquarters opened at Piazha and the following special dispositions had been made for the advance against Makin:—

Ladha ...	<div> <div>9th Brigade Head-quarters.</div> <div>5 battalions of Infantry.</div> <div>2 pack batteries.</div> </div>
Piaza ...	<div> <div>Advanced Waziristan Force Headquarters.</div> <div>3 battalions of Infantry.</div> <div>1½ pack batteries.</div> <div>1 section of 6-inch howitzers.</div> </div>
Sorarogha ...	<div> <div>21st Brigade Head-quarters.</div> <div>2 battalions of Infantry.</div> <div>1 section of 4·5-inch howitzers.</div> <div>400 Scouts.</div> </div>
Kotkai ...	<div> <div>2 battalions of Infantry.</div> <div>1 section, pack battery.</div> </div>

16. On the 1st February, Ladha was evacuated and the 9th Brigade group withdrew to Piazha in a heavy snowstorm which continued all day.

On the 3rd, Advanced Waziristan Force Headquarters moved to Marobi with the 9th Brigade column, meeting with some opposition during the march, and the next day junction was effected at Tauda China with the 7th Brigade group of the Razmak Force.

Operations of the Razmak Force.

17. The narrative having reached the point at which junction between the two Forces was effected, it is now convenient to describe the operations of the Razmak Force leading up to this event.

18. The main object of the Razmak Force was to establish a force of all arms on the Razmak plateau, and, as the Force was dependent for its line of communication on

the Isha-Razmak road, its movements were largely regulated by the progress made in the construction of that road.

19. Work on the road was commenced on the 11th July, and progress was at first slow, owing to the difficulty in obtaining civil labour and to the inadvisability, for political reasons, of employing technical troops. As time went on, however, the necessity for expediting the work was allowed to over-rule other considerations, and by the middle of November, five companies of Sappers and Miners and two battalions of Pioneers had been sent up to the Razmak Force and were engaged on the construction of the road at, and forward of, Tal. By the 15th December, Ford vans were running from Tal to Asad Khel; by the 30th December the road was fit for heavy mechanical transport as far as Damdil; and by the 5th January it was in use by Ford vans up to within a mile of Razani. The rapidity and skill with which this road was constructed reflects very great credit on all those concerned with the enterprise.

20. The composition of the Razmak Force is given in Appendix 2. The operations of this Force, up to the occupation of Razmak, were briefly as follows.

21. By the 12th December, 15 days' supplies for the whole Force had been collected at Tal. The 5th Infantry Brigade, which had concentrated at Idak on the 13th, moved to Tal on the 15th, and to Asad Khel on the 16th, the 8th Infantry Brigade being responsible for the protection of the road from Bannu to Damdil. By the 31st the 5th Brigade had, without encountering any hostile opposition, established permanent piquets as far as Tamre Oba camp.

Meanwhile the 7th Brigade, with two pack batteries and a company of Sappers and Miners, had concentrated at Asad Khel, and on the 1st January this Brigade marched through the 5th Brigade and encamped at Tamre Oba. On the 4th the advance was continued, without incident, to Razani.

22. From the 5th to the 10th January the 5th Brigade was employed in establishing piquets along the road forward towards Razmak, and, in particular, in securing the high ridge east of the track, known as Alexandra Ridge, and immediately overlooking Razmak Narai. The piquetting of this ridge was undertaken by the 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles, who were opposed by a gang of Mahsuds, but succeeded in driving them off after a fight in which both sides suffered casualties.

23. By the 22nd January the route from Razani to Razmak was firmly secured and the track had been made passable for laden camels. On the following day the 7th Brigade marched to Razmak. The advance up the track, which had a gradient of 1 in 9 and a width of only 6 feet, took place in a blinding snowstorm, and the passage over the Narai of some 1,500 camels and 1,100 mules, which accompanied the column, was a fine performance. The march commenced at dawn, and, though the distance to be covered was only 6 miles, the last camel did not reach camp till 10.45 p.m. Fortunately, the enemy opposition was slight, and was easily brushed aside by the advanced troops.

24. The 7th Brigade now proceeded to make itself secure at Razmak, and the next few days

were spent in establishing permanent piquets, reconnoitring towards Makin, and building up a reserve of supplies. The distribution of the Razmak Force at this time was as follows:—

Saidgi	1	battalion (less 2 platoons)
Shinki	1	platoon.
Khajuri	1	platoon.
Idak	1	battalion (less 1 company).
Isha	1	platoon.
Tal	2	companies.
Damdil	1	battalion (less 1 company).
Asad Khel ...	5th Brigade	Head-quarters.	
		1 pack battery.	
		2 battalions (less 2 companies).	
Tamre Oba ...	1 battalion (less 1 company).		
Razani to Kupiri Algad	} 3 companies.		
Kupiri Algad (exclusive) to Razmak camp			
	} 7th Brigade Group.		

25. On the 4th February, as already recorded, the 7th Brigade advanced to Tauda China and came under the command of the General Officer Commanding the Waziristan Force. As it was still supplied by the Razmak Force, it became necessary to bring up an additional battalion from Kohat, and to employ two Pioneer battalions temporarily as Infantry to secure the lengthened line of communications.

26. It may appear from the above narrative that there was very little opposition to the advance of the Razmak Force and that the operations presented little tactical difficulty. This, however, was not the case. Several large raiding gangs of Mahsuds and Wazirs were in the neighbourhood, and the fact that so little fighting occurred was due to the admirable protective dispositions and to the vigilance of the troops.

Operations against Makin.

27. The advance of the two columns to Tauda China on the 4th February came as a surprise to the Mahsuds, but they energetically opposed the establishment of piquets during the afternoon, and, while apparently suffering heavily themselves, inflicted some 30 casualties on our troops.

28. The next day was spent in consolidating defences and establishing two forward piquets required for supporting subsequent operations from the south. During the day the Royal Welch Fusiliers became heavily engaged and lost 14 killed and wounded.

29. The destruction of Makin commenced on the 6th. Both Brigades took part in the operation and three villages were successfully destroyed, but the enemy vigorously pressed the retirement to camp, and our casualties amounted to 28, of which the majority were in the 1-9th Gurkha Rifles.

30. On the 7th and 8th heavy snow confined the troops to camp, but operations were resumed on the 9th, several more villages being burnt and a large quantity of grain and fodder removed. The retirement was again followed up and some Tochi Scouts, becoming engaged, counterattacked with success, killing several of the enemy. During the afternoon a section of 6-inch howitzers, which had been brought up to Tauda China with great difficulty, came into action.

31. The work of destruction was continued on the 10th. The village of Tora Tiza was demolished, but, taking advantage of the broken and scrub-covered hills surrounding it, several parties of the enemy were able to approach unseen, and delivered determined assaults on the 2-39th Royal Garhwal Rifles; they were, however, beaten off with considerable loss. During the day the 6-inch howitzers, with aeroplane observation, shelled the almost inaccessible Abdullai refuge at Mandesh.

32. The next day the troops were given a rest, while the artillery bombarded hostile villages within range. The only portion of Makin now remaining to be destroyed lay within the difficult defile of the Darra Toi, an advance into which would probably have entailed severe casualties. It was therefore decided to deal with it by means of artillery fire and aerial bombing. This was successfully accomplished on the 12th, three pack batteries, the 6-inch howitzers, and the squadron of Heavy Bombers all operating in conjunction.

This completed the devastation of the Makin area, and, in addition to the material damage inflicted, the enemy are known to have suffered over 60 casualties in the course of the operations.

The Abdullai expressed their desire to make peace, and on the 22nd February met the General Officer Commanding the Waziristan Force in jirga and accepted the terms offered. These terms are given in full in Appendix 3.

33. The Government of India had meanwhile been reconsidering the question of the construction of the Sorarogha—Razmak and Jandola—Sarwakai roads. On the 23rd February it was decided that the work was to be continued and that regular troops were to be left on the former road, to protect the work, for a period of nine months. Orders were consequently issued regarding the dispositions and allotment of command to cover the construction of the roads, and, as a result, the 7th Brigade on the 12th March returned to Razmak and reverted to the command of the General Officer Commanding the Razmak Force.

34. The Makin Column then ceased to exist as such. It had carried out its difficult task under the most trying climatic conditions with conspicuous success, and had suffered 137 casualties of whom 42 were killed. The good effect of the operations was soon brought out by the attendance of about 1,500 representatives of practically all sections of the Mahsuds at a jirga which was ordered to assemble at Tauda China on the 12th March. During the next ten days various details of Government policy were explained to the Mahsuds, and on the 23rd the General Officer Commanding, Waziristan Force, read out the Government terms to the whole jirga who accepted them in full. The complete terms are given in Appendix 4.

The Wana situation and the withdrawal of the scouts.

35. It had long been apparent that the retention of the detachment of Scouts at Wana was inadvisable, in view of the impossibility of affording it immediate support in case of trouble. The comparative advantages of the Gomal route and the Jandola—Sarwakai line, as localities from which the Scouts could exercise a stabilizing influence and support the Khassadars, had been considered; at the end of January the Government of India had decided in favour of the latter. Orders were therefore issued for the eventual withdrawal of the Scouts from Wana and the establishment of posts on the Jandola-Sarwakai line.

36. During the latter half of February the situation in the Wana area was adversely affected by the activities of anti-British elements; a hostile lashkar assembled and the Scouts were twice attacked, on the second occasion suffering 11 casualties. In retaliation, three bombing raids were carried out over the area west of Wana and two over the settlements of the Shakai Wazirs, and on the 9th March the Scouts moved out of Wana and destroyed the village of Payo Khan Kot.

37. In spite of the effect produced by these reprisals, it was recognised that the withdrawal of the Scouts from Wana might prove unduly hazardous, unless supported by regular troops. Consequently, at the conclusion of the Makin operations, the 9th Brigade and attached troops moved back to Jandola, where a column consisting of 6 Infantry battalions, 2 pack batteries and a proportion of other services was formed, under the command of Colonel Commandant F. P. C. Keily, C.M.G., D.S.O., for the purpose of supporting the withdrawal in case of need and of establishing Scout posts from Jandola to Sarwakai.

38. The column, accompanied by 700 South Waziristan Scouts, left Jandola on the 2nd April, and, after halting at Sarwaki for four days to build up a reserve of supplies, moved forward again and on the 12th reached Rogha Kot. On the 13th the Scouts evacuated Wana, without opposition, and by the 17th the column was back at Jandola, leaving Scout posts established at Sarwakai, Haidari Kach, and Chagmalai.

Conclusion.

39. During the period under review there are certain features in the sequence of events that are of the first importance as guides to our future policy in Waziristan. The most striking feature is the difference in the effect of the actual withdrawal of regular troops from Wana compared with that of the rumour of withdrawal of our forces from Mahsud country proper. The former led to no fighting, while the mere suggestion of the latter led to hostilities which indicate, in no uncertain manner, how the evacuation of Mahsud country would once again combine the Mahsud sections of the tribes against us. After the cessation of the strenuous fighting in 1919-20 there had always been hostile elements in Waziristan. By degrees the influence and power of these elements had diminished, and the comparative peace of the country during the earlier months of 1922 is evidence of the extent to which the hostile elements had become discredited. Even the rumour of the reversal of policy was, however, at once seized upon by the hostiles, and

the speed at which their influence for evil increased leaves no reasonable doubt that they would rapidly regain supreme control should we not be in a position to dominate the heart of their country. Our withdrawal from the more distant Wana area gave the hostiles no such opening, and had little, if any, effect on their influence or prestige. This bears out the views that have rightly been held regarding the larger Waziristan problem, namely, that control of Waziristan rests on control of the Mahsuds, and that as long as we dominate the Mahsuds by holding Razmak the Tochi Wazirs and the Wana Wazirs are of minor importance and do not necessarily require the permanent location of troops within their territory. Other important deductions may be drawn from this phase of the Waziristan situation. According to the rumours that were current in Mahsul country, our reversal of policy involved the cessation of road making up the Takhi Zam and the withdrawal of regular troops, leaving the safety of our interests in the hands of Scouts and Khassadars. From the sequence of events that subsequently occurred it is clear that the Mahsuds will not at present accept control by Scouts and Khassadars, unless they are closely supported by regulars which are therefore essential to the preservation of peace. A force of regular troops must for the present therefore be retained at Razmak. Another noticeable feature is that the gradual and judicious substitution of irregulars for regulars on the line of communication has worked satisfactorily. Already the irregulars carry out a considerable portion of the normal protective duties with reasonable safety to our communications, and this proportion may well be increased by degrees, without undue risk, as long as an adequate backing of regular troops is close at hand. The operations under review show clearly that there are two conditions essential to the maintenance of peace in Waziristan: the first is the location of a strong force dominating the heart of the Mahsud country, and the second is the mobility of a sufficient regular force to guarantee the immediate support of the irregulars distributed in isolated posts throughout the country. The first essential is satisfactorily met by the location of a force at Razmak which is situated within striking distance of the most populated and influential centres of the Mahsuds; whilst the second demands the roads for mechanical transport (now under construction) to give this force its necessary freedom of action.

The period under review has afforded opportunities of gaining further experience in the employment of aeroplanes on the frontier. In addition to their value when working in co-operation with ground troops, aeroplanes have been used for independent action on several occasions, notably in dispersing the hostile Wazir lashkars surrounding Wana Fort, and in operating against certain small but troublesome sub-sections of the Mahsud tribes in connection with minor outrages in the spring and summer of 1922. It should be observed, however, that results accruing from the threats against Wana Fort were more moral than material, and that the sub-sections of the Mahsuds were not backed by the support of their own main tribal sections. On the other hand, in spite of the Khassadar garrison of Wana Fort having been reinforced by 500 Scouts, it was found necessary to withdraw the

garrison owing to the impossibility of ensuring adequate support by air action whilst, to ensure the successful withdrawal of the garrison, a regular force of some strength had to be sent to Wana. Again, independent action by aeroplanes against the hostile Mahsud sections prior to the ground operations in the Makin area failed to bring about a settlement with the sections concerned.

The experiences are in no way conclusive; the available strength in aircraft was inadequate to deal effectively with so wide an area and at the same time undertake close co-operation with the troops. No definite deductions can therefore be drawn. As far as our limited experiences go, however, they indicate that in the light of our present knowledge it would be unwise to withdraw ground troops and trust only to air control until we have a larger number of aeroplanes available and further proof of their efficiency in controlling the wild tribes of the frontier.

40. The operations have been in the extreme arduous and the troops have throughout experienced great hardships from the rigours of the climate. The intense heat of a Waziristan summer was followed by a bitterly cold winter, while the frequent spates during the rainy season caused serious interruptions of communications by the destruction of the bridges, and a consequent scarcity of supplies at the front.

41. The spirit of the infantry, on whom the greatest strain has always fallen, has been worthy of the highest praise and they have at all times willingly responded to the calls made upon them.

42. The work of the artillery has been most effective. In particular, the accurate and sustained bombardment of the Makin area by 6-inch and other howitzers undoubtedly hastened the submission of the enemy.

43. The engineer services have performed invaluable work. They have contributed largely towards the welfare of the troops by the efficient performance of their many important duties. In the Makin operations the Sapper and Miner companies and the Pioneers displayed great gallantry and expedition in the destruction of hostile villages, while their work on the roads has throughout been of the highest order and in every respect admirable.

44. The signal service has constantly maintained excellent communication in spite of adverse climatic conditions and continual interruptions in telegraph lines caused by enemy action. Great use has been made of wireless which has worked satisfactorily all through.

45. The work done by the administrative services has been excellent.

The Supply and Transport Corps have had to work long hours continuously to maintain the troops in the field and have ungrudgingly given of their best.

The Ordnance service has been extremely well organized and has maintained the ordnance supply without a break.

The Medical authorities have performed invaluable work and by their preventive measures have ensured an exceedingly low rate of sickness, while no epidemics have occurred.

The Veterinary service has been most effective in reducing animal casualties to a

minimum and has been largely responsible for the high state of efficiency of the mule and camel transport on which the success of the operations has largely depended.

46. I wish to pay a special tribute to the admirable work of the Royal Air Force. They have been continuously employed whenever weather conditions rendered flying possible and have cheerfully accepted the serious risks of flying over a mountainous and savage country. Both officers and mechanics have throughout displayed a very gallant spirit and a fine devotion to duty worthy of the highest praise.

47. In conclusion, I desire to draw special attention to the excellent work of the Staff. Their tireless devotion to duty in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and discomfort has contributed largely to the success which has been achieved by the operations in Waziristan.

48. I desire to draw particular attention to the services of the following distinguished officers.

Major-General Sir T. G. Matheson, K.C.B., C.M.G., has been in command of the Waziristan Force throughout the whole of the period and has shown consummate tact and determination in overcoming innumerable difficulties, political, administrative and military. He has carried out his duties to my entire satisfaction and has once again given proof of his sterling qualities as a commander.

Major-General A. LeG. Jacob, C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., has commanded the Razmak Force from the 4th November, 1922. He has displayed untiring energy and organizing capacity, and it has been largely due to his skill and knowledge of the frontier that the operations on the Tochi side were completed practically according to programme and at so infinitesimal a cost.

Mr. S. E. Pears, C.I.E., I.C.S., Resident in Waziristan, has invariably rendered whole-hearted and most valuable assistance. The skill and determination which he has displayed in the handling of our negotiations with the recalcitrant tribesmen is very largely responsible for the success of the operations as a whole and I am deeply indebted to him for his able and untiring devotion to duty.

49. A list of names of those whose services have been of particular value will follow.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

RAWLINSON,

Commander-in-Chief in India.

APPENDIX I.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMBATANT TROOPS UNDER THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, WAZIRISTAN FORCE, ON THE 31ST DECEMBER, 1921.

LADHA—

Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade.

1 Section, No. 13 Medium Howitzer Battery, R.G.A.

No. 12 Pack Battery, R.G.A. (less 1 Section).

14th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.) S. and M. (less 2½ Sections).

1st Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers.

LADHA—continued.

- 2-39th Royal Garhwal Rifles.
- 1-69th Punjabis.
- 1 Company, 121st Pioneers.
- 2-6th Gurkha Rifles.
- No. 6 Machine Gun Company (less 2 Sections).

PIAZHA RAGHZA—

- 1 Section, No. 12 Pack Battery, R.G.A.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Section, 14th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.) S. and M.
- 1 Company, 121st Pioneers.
- 129th Baluchis.
- 3-11th Gurkha Rifles.
- 2 Sections, No. 6 Machine Gun Company.

SORAROGHA—

- Headquarters, 21st Indian Infantry Brigade.
- 106th Pack Battery.
- 1 Section, 128 Howitzer Battery, R.F.A.
- 2 Sections, 14th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.) S. and M.
- 1-26th Punjabis.
- 2-50th Kumaon Rifles.
- 121st Pioneers (less 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Companies).
- 1-4th Gurkha Rifles.

KOTKAI—

- 1 Section, 101st Pack Battery.
- 1-6th Royal Jats.
- 48th Pioneers (less 1 Company).
- 1-91st Punjabis.

Under 10th Brigade.

JANDOLA—

- 101st Pack Battery (less 1 Section).
- 1 Company, 48th Pioneers.
- 110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 2 Companies, 119th Infantry.
- 1 Platoon, 121st Pioneers.
- 1 Section, No. 10 Armoured Car Company, Tank Corps.

KHIRGI—

- Two 10-Pounder Guns.
- 37th Dogras.
- 119th Infantry (less 2 Companies).

MANZAI—

- Headquarters, 10th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- Two 10-Pounder Guns.
- 28th Punjabis.
- No. 10 Armoured Car Company (less Detachment).

KAUR—

- 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Companies, 58th Rifles, Frontier Force.

TANK—

- 2 Squadrons, 28th Light Cavalry.
- 58th Rifles, Frontier Force (less 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Companies).

DERA ISMAIL KHAN—

- Headquarters, Waziristan Force.
- 28th Light Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).
- Headquarters, 25th Pack Artillery Brigade.

Under General Officer Commanding, Kohat District.

MARI INDUS—

- 1 Company, 1-30th Baluchis.

BANNU—

- Headquarters, 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- 27th Light Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).
- 1 Section, 6.3" R.M.L. Howitzers.
- 1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.
- 8 Post Machine Guns (Fort armament).
- Detachment, F.G.A. (Headquarters).
- 130th Baluchis (less 1 Company).
- 101st Grenadiers.

SAIDGI—

- 1 Post Stokes Mortar.
- 1 Section, 4.5" Howitzers.
- 36th Sikhs (less 2 Platoons).
- No. 2 Section, 7th Armoured Car Company.

SHINKI—

- 2 Platoons, 36th Sikhs.

KHAJURI—

- 1 Platoon, 1-4th Rajputs.
- 2 Troops, 27th Light Cavalry.

IDAK—

- 1 Troop, 27th Light Cavalry.
- 1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.
- 1 Post Stokes Mortar.
- 1 Section, 4.5" Howitzers.
- 1-4th Rajputs (less 5 Platoons).
- 1 Section, No. 10 Armoured Car Company.

DARDONI—

- 1 Squadron, 27th Light Cavalry.
- 15-Pounder, Section F.G.A.
- 113th Pack Battery (details).
- 13th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.) Sappers and Miners (details).
- 1 Section, Armoured Car Company.
- 1-73rd Carnatic Infantry.
- 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles (details).
- 2-69th Punjabis (details).
- 1 Company, 1-4th Rajputs.

MOHAMED KHEL—

- 2-69th Punjabis.
- 53rd Sikhs.
- 2 Armoured Cars.
- Detachment, North Waziristan Militia.

DATTA KHEL—

- Headquarters, 7th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- 1 Troop, 27th Light Cavalry.
- 13th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.) Sappers and Miners.
- 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
- 1-9th Gurkhas.
- North Waziristan Militia.

APPENDIX 2.

RAZMAK FIELD FORCE ORDER OF BATTLE.

Royal Air Force—

- No. 27 Squadron (Bombers).
- No. 28 Squadron (Bristol Fighters).

Cavalry—

- 16th Light Cavalry.

Artillery—

Headquarters, 23rd Pack Artillery Brigade.
103rd (Peshawar) Pack Battery.
108th (Lahore) Pack Battery.
121st Indian Pack Battery.
11th Pack Artillery Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
1 Section, 47th Howitzer Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
Improved Divisional Ammunition Column.

Engineers—

Headquarters, Divisional Engineers.
13th Company, Sappers and Miners.
20th Company, Sappers and Miners.
21st Company, Sappers and Miners.
Survey Section.

Pioneers—

32nd Sikh Pioneers.
34th Royal Sikh Pioneers.

Armoured Car Companies—

2 Sections 7th Armoured Car Company.

Signal Units—

Detachment, "G" Divisional Signals Company.
Detachment, No. I Company "B" Corps Signals.
Detachment, No. II Company "B" Corps Signals.
1 Signal Expense Store at Idak.

Infantry—

5th Indian Infantry Brigade—

Headquarters, 5th Indian Infantry Brigade.
1-5th Royal Gurkha Rifles.
56th Rifles, Frontier Force.
101st Grenadiers.

7th Indian Infantry Brigade—

Headquarters, 7th Indian Infantry Brigade.
1st The Border Regiment.
2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
1-9th Gurkha Rifles.
Tochi Scouts.

8th Indian Infantry Brigade—

Headquarters, 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.
73rd Carnatic Infantry at Dardoni.
4th Rajputs.
36th Sikhs.
130th K. G. O. Baluchis.

Reserve—

1-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
2-8th Gurkha Rifles.

Administrative Services—

Supply Units—

No. 11 District Supply and Transport Headquarters.
No. 11 Divisional Supply Park.
Nos. 34, 35, 37, 61, 107 and 124 Brigade Supply Sections.
Nos. 63, 64, $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 78 and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 395 Bakery Sections.
Nos. 63, 64 and 367 Butchery Sections.
No. 23 Supply Depot Headquarters.
Nos. 162, 163, 164, 276, 185, 186, and 187 Supply Depot Sections.
Nos. 77 and 78 Supply Tally Sections.

$\frac{1}{2}$ No. 22 and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 40 Supply Workshop Sections.

Nos. 1, 2 and 4 Mineral Water Sections.
No. 13 Cattle Depot.

Officers' Clothing Shops—(Part of an Ordnance Company).

One at Bannu.

Officers' Messes—

One at Bannu.
One at Idak.
One at Tal.
One at Asad Khel.
One at Razani.

Transport Units—

Pack Mule Corps—

7th Pack Mule Corps.
12th Pack Mule Corps.
21st Pack Mule Corps.

Camel Corps—

No. 54 Silladar Camel Corps.
No. 50 Silladar Camel Corps.
No. 45 Government Camel Cadre.

Mechanical Transport—

No. 7 Ford Van Coy. (Headquarters and 4 Sections).
Headquarters and 1 Section 22nd Indian Mechanical Transport Coy.
Headquarters and 2 Sections 16th Mechanical Transport Coy.
Headquarters and 1 Section 1 Mechanical Transport Coy.
Detachment Khyber Ropeway.

Medical Units—

No. 25 C. F. A. (less 2 Indian Sections).
No. 60 C. F. A.
No. 27 C. F. A.
11 British Staging Section.
81 Indian Staging Section.
96 Indian Staging Section.
97 Indian Staging Section.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ 39 Sanitary Section.
8 Sanitary Section (expanded for extra duty with road labour gangs).
11 Indian General Hospital.
17 Indian General Hospital (2 Sections).
2 Bleach Centre.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 3 M. A. C. (14th Mechanical Transport Company).
No. 27 Indian Mechanical Transport Company (15 Ford Ambulances).
Headquarters and 1 Section 14 Mechanical Transport Company.
No. 22 X-Ray Section.
No. 45 Government Camel Cadre fitted with 160 pairs of kajawahs for sick, etc.

Veterinary Units—

No. 5 Field Veterinary Hospital.
One Mobile Veterinary Section.

Labour Units—

3 Detachments 112 Labour Company.
150 Additional labourers.

Postal Services—

One Field Post Office for each Brigade in addition to one already at Idak and one already at Dardoni.

Line of Communication—

Military Forwarding Office—

1 Section Military Forwarding Establishment at Bannu.

Engineer Dumps—

Idak.
Asad Khel.
Razani.

Ordnance Dumps—

Bannu.
Idak.
Asad Khel.
Razmak.
1 Ordnance Ammunition Section.

Rest Camps—

One Railhead Reinforcement Camp at
Bannu:
Idak.
Tal.
Asad Khel.
Razani.

Royal Air Force Ground Establishments—

Camps for Nos. 27 and 28 Squadrons,
Royal Air Force at Dardoni and Tank, each
Camp sufficient for 2 Squadrons.

APPENDIX 3.

REPLY OF THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
WAZIRISTAN FORCE TO THE PETITION OF THE
ABDULLAI SECTION AT A JIRGA AT MAKIN ON
THE 22ND FEBRUARY 1923.

I have heard the petition which you signed and presented to the Resident yesterday. It has again been explained to you in Pushto and you have endorsed it.

I wish to remind you that you are liable by your own tribal custom to suffer for the misdeeds of your fellow tribesmen if you fail to surrender them for trial and punishment. There can be no question that the whole of Makin is liable to be punished for the crimes of Musa Khan and his associates who murdered Lieutenant Dickson. I have, however, taken all possible steps, hitherto, to confine the punishment to the guilty and to save the innocent from suffering. I realise, moreover, that in the case of Musa Khan and his party there are certain facts which make it difficult for you to exercise control over him according to your tribal custom; it is well known as you say, that he has received much support from outside the tribe. This may make it difficult for you at first to exclude him and his associates from your limits, but I warn you that it is your duty to keep him away from Makin. Government is prepared to assist you in carrying out this duty by engaging your Khassadars; it is also the intention of Government, as you know, to locate its forces on the Razmak plateau, whence they will be in a position to inflict serious damage on any village which is known to be sheltering these offenders. The roads connecting the Makin Khassadar post with Razmak and Piaza are also necessary, and their construction will be taken in hand as soon as Government thinks fit. In view of the difficulties caused by Mahsud contractors in the past, I cannot promise that the road will be built solely by Mahsud contractors, and I propose to construct a considerable part of it by means of the troops under my command. But if I find I can get the work satisfactorily and cheaply done by Mahsud contractors I am quite ready to consider your request on the subject.

Your Khassadars will be enlisted in a few days, and a post will be built on a spot which

I will select. As regards allowances, you will receive them as from the date of this settlement, on the same scale as the other Mahsuds and on the same conditions of full sectional and territorial responsibility. You will in future be held strictly responsible for the acts of all outlaws from British Territory residing with you. You will receive an amnesty for all past offences on condition that you return all Government rifles known to be in your possession.

APPENDIX 4.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING, WAZIRISTAN FORCE, TO THE MAHSUD JIRGA AT TAUDA CHINA CAMP, MAKIN, ON 23RD MARCH 1923.

1. On 5th November 1921, at Tank I announced through the Resident in Waziristan the orders of Government regarding their future policy in Mahsud country to you, the representatives of the three Mahsud sections. You remember the terms which were then announced. In pursuance of that policy you were granted increased Maliki allowances and a scheme was drawn up for affording you generous employment in a Khassadar force for the purpose of enabling you to carry out your responsibilities for controlling your country.

2. In July last, a further jirga of your representatives was held in Ladha in which the details of the distribution of the allowances and of the Khassadar scheme was worked out. You also accepted your full sectional and territorial responsibilities and these are now re-affirmed.

3. Since July last, unfortunately, some of your sections behaved in a manner which necessitated the use of force against them, both by land and from air. I am glad, however, that the Abdullais and Band Khels of Makin have now made a settlement with Government, and I hope they will do their best to carry it out. The Jalal Khels have also made a settlement and I hope to see their representative jirga at Sorarogha in a day or two. The Garrera and Guri Khel sub-sections of the Manzais, whose representatives are here to-day, have made amends for their recent offences. A few sections, however, of the Bahlolzais and Manzais are not represented here now, but I hope to go shortly to Sarwakai where it may be possible to effect a settlement with them also.

4. During the last ten days you have been here and discussed in detail with the Resident the arrangements required for carrying into effect the policy of Government as now defined. That policy, as you have been informed is intended to enable you to organise your tribe in such a manner that you may be able to carry out responsibilities which you owe to Government and especially to control the bad characters of your tribe.

Your duties to Government include your assistance in the construction and protection of the roads which are now being undertaken from the plateau of Razmak to Sorarogha and from Jandola to Sarwakai. Owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the work done by certain Mahsud contractors in the past, Government has decided to exercise their right to construct as much of the road as they think fit by military labour and by outside contractors. But as you have presented many applications

to be granted contracts on the road work, I am authorizing the Resident to arrange for the employment of such Mahsud contractors as may be considered likely to execute their contracts satisfactorily and cheaply. The Resident will also arrange with you for the allotment of contracts in certain areas to each of the main sections and for the protection of the work by the sections concerned.

5. Later on, when the work on constructing permanent posts for the Scouts located at Sorarogha, Kotkai, the Shahur Tangi and Sarwakai can be taken in hand, it will be seen whether your work as contractors on the road will justify your being given the contracts for the construction of the posts also.

6. When the roads and posts have been constructed, you will be allowed to assist in protecting them and for this purpose the scheme of Khassadar posts has been reconsidered with you by the Resident, and you have agreed to the scheme as now recorded by him.

The scheme is intended, as you are well aware, to ensure that each section and sub-section of the Mahsud tribe shall receive a fair share of the benefits offered by Government. It is the intention of Government that you should be given every opportunity of carrying out your duties by means of your own tribal organization with as little interference by Government as possible. But Government reserves the right at all times to take all necessary steps for the enforcement of order in tribal territory and it reserves its right to seize offenders wherever they may be found and to punish them in any way that it thinks fit.

7. Finally, I wish to announce to you that I intend shortly to withdraw this force in order that I may concentrate my military labour on the Sorarogha-Dwa Toi portion of the road. I hope your contractors who will be offered contracts on the Dwa Toi-Tauda China portion will carry out their work so efficiently that it may not be necessary for me to bring a force back to this camp in order to have the road completed by military labour.

APPENDIX 5.

DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS ON THE TAKHI ZAM LINE ON 20TH APRIL 1923.

PIAZHA—

- 9th Brigade Headquarters.
- 106th Pack Battery.
- 19th Field Company S. and M.
- 21st Field Company S. and M.
- No. 1 Brigade Signal Section.
- No. 1 Pack Cable Section ("B" Divisional Signals).
- 1 Pack W/T Set.
- 1 Pigeon loft.
- 3 R. 3rd Sikh Pioneers. (34th R. Sikh Pioneers).
- 4/10th Baluch Regiment D. C. O. [120th (D. C. O.) Baluchis].
- 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles. (Wilde's) (57th Wilde's Rifles. F. F.)
- 36th Brigade Supply Section (less dett. Aka Khel).
- 182 Supply Depot Section.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ 71st Bakery and Butchery Section.
- 19th Mineral Water Section.
- Dett. Camel Depot.
- Dett. "A" Pack Mule Corps.
- $\frac{1}{2}$ Government Camel Corps.

PIAZHA—continued.

- 54th Indian Staging Section.
- 64th Field Ambulance (less 3 sections).
- Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
- 144th Field Post Office.

AKA KHEL—

- 5th Field Company S. and M.
- Dett. "B" Divisional Signals.
- 1/4th Hazara Pioneers. (106th Hazara Pioneers.)
- 2/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles. (2-39th R. Garhwal Rifles.)
- Dett. 36th Brigade Supply Section.
- Dett. "A" Pack Mule Corps.
- 1 Section 64th Field Ambulance.
- Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
- 156th Field Post Office.

SORAROGHA—

- 21st Brigade Headquarters.
 - 101st Pack Battery.
 - Section 4-5" Howitzers.
 - 1 Sub-Section 9th Armoured Car Company.
 - 3rd Field Company Sappers and Miners.
 - 12th Field Company Sappers and Miners.
 - No. 2 Brigade Section ("B" Divisional Signals).
 - No. 2 Pack Cable Section.
 - 1 Pack W/T Set.
 - 1 Pack W/T Set (Mobile).
 - 1 Pigeon Loft.
 - 1-3rd Sikh Pioneers. (1-23rd Sikh Pioneers).
 - 2/6th Rajputana Rifles (P.W.O.) [120th (P.W.O.) Rajputana Infantry].
 - 2/2nd Punjab Regiment. (69th Punjabis).
 - Dett. No. 5 M.A.C.
 - 63rd Brigade Supply Section (less Dett. Kotkai).
 - 175th Supply Depot Section.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ 72nd Bakery and Butchery Section.
 - 16th Mineral Water Section.
 - Headquarters 14th Cattle Depot.
 - Headquarters and Dett. "A" Pack Mule Corps.
 - Dett. "B" Pack Mule Corps.
 - 1 Government Camel Corps.
 - 27th Casualty Clearing Station (less 2 Sections).
 - 2 Sections, 64th Field Ambulance.
 - Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
 - 21st Mobile Veterinary Section.
 - 158th Field Post Office.
 - 1 Rest Camp.
 - 1 B. O. Mess.
 - 1 B. O. R. Mess.
 - Ordnance Dump.
- ##### KOTKAI—
- 1 Sub-Section 9th Armoured Car Coy.
 - Dett. "B" Div. Signals.
 - 1/1st Madras Pioneers (less 2 platoons).
 - [61st (K.G.O.) Pioneers].
 - 3/8th Punjab Regt. (91st Punjabis, L.I.)
 - 5/6th Rajputana Rifles (Napier's). (125th Napier's Rifles).
 - Dett. 63rd Bde. Supply Section.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ 178th Supply Depot Section.
 - $\frac{1}{2}$ 72nd Bakery and Butchery Section.
 - Dett. Cattle Depot.
 - 18th Mineral Water Section.
 - Dett. "B" Pack Mule Corps.
 - 2 Sects. 27th C. C. S.
 - Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
 - 155th Field Post Office.

JANDOLA—

114th Pack Battery.
1 Sect. 9th Armoured Car Coy.
Dett. L. of C. Signals.
H.Q. No. 2 Coy. " B " Div. Signals.
1 Pack W/T Set.
1 Pigeon Loft.
2 Platoons 1/1st Madras Pioneers. [61st (K.G.O.) Pioneers].
2/9th Jat. Regt. (Multan Bn.) (119th Infantry).
2 Coys. 3/5th Mahratta L.I. (110th Mahratta L.I.)
Dett. S. W. Scouts.
Dett. 33rd Bde. Supply Section.
168th Supply Depot Section.
1/77th Bakery & Butchery Section
14th Mineral Water Section.
Dett. Cattle Depot.
H.Q. and Dett. " B " Pack Mule Corps.
1/2 Government Camel Corps.
4th Indian Field Ambulance (less 2 Sections).
99th Indian Staging Section.
Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Rest Camp.
B. Os. Mess.
B. O. Rs. Mess.

KHIRGI—

Dett. L. of C. Signals.
3/5th Mahratta L.I. (less 2 Coys) (110th Mahratta L.I.)
1/17th Dogra Regt. (P. W. O.) [37th (P. W. O.) Dogras.]
33rd Bde. Supply Section (less Dett. Jandola & Manzai).
206th & 313th Supply Depot Sections.
1/71st Bakery & Butchery Section.
83rd Supply Tally Section.
45th Supply Workshop Section.
Dett. Cattle Depot.
Dett. 82nd Transport Corps.
2 Headquarters & 5 Sections, Heavy M.T.
2 Sections, 4th I. F. A.
55th Indian Staging Section.
Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Dett. 112th Labour Corps.
R. T. O. Establishment.
Rest Camp.
B. Os. Mess.
B. O. Rs. Mess.
Ordnance Dump.

MANZAI.—

10th Brigade Headquarters.
9th Armoured Car Coy. (less 2 Sections).
No. 3 Bde. Section " B " Div. Signals.
Dett. L. of C. Signals.
3/9th Jat Regt. (less 1 Coy.) (10th Jats).
Dett. No. 5 Motor Ambulance Coy.
Dett. 33rd Bde. Supply Section.
1/165th Supply Depot Section.
1/77th Butchery and Bakery Section.
Dett. Cattle Depot.
Dett. 82nd Transport Corps.
Headquarters No. 8 Ford Van Company.
6th Indian General Hospital (less 1 Section).
43rd British Staging Section.
19th X-Ray Section.
No. 3 Sanitary Section (less dett.).
B. O. Rs. Mess.

KAUR—

Dett. L. of C. Signals.
1 Coy. 3/9th Jat Regt. (10th Jats).

TANK—

1 Squadron, 7th Light Cavalry (28th Light Cavalry).
Dett. L. of C. Signals.
Headquarters, W/T Company.
Permanent W/T Station.
1 Pack W/T Set.
1/9th Jat. Regt. (less 1 Coy.) (1-6th R. Jat L. I.).
133rd Bde. Supply Section (less Dett. D. I. K.).
167th Supply Depot Section.
1/157th Butchery and Bakery Section.
136th Supply Tally Section.
1/44th Supply Workshop Section.
Dett. 82nd Transport Corps.
Advanced Transport Depot.
1 Section 6th I. G. H.
13th Adv. Depot Medical Stores.
Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Field Postal Sorting Office.
R. T. O. Establishment.
Rest Camp.
B. Os. Mess.
B. O. Rs. Mess.

D. I. KHAN—

Headquarters, Waziristan Force.
Headquarters, 21st Indian Pack Artillery Brigade.
7th Light Cavalry (less 1 Squadron) (28th Light Cavalry).
Headquarters, " B " Divisional Signals.
No. 1 Company " B " Div. Signals (less Dett.).
Headquarters, L. of C. Signal Company.
1 Wagon W/T Set.
1 Coy. 1/9th Jat Regt. (1-6th R. Jat L. I.).
Dett. 133rd Bde. Supply Section.
Headquarters, 21st Div. Supply Column.
Headquarters, " M " Supply Depot Company.
1/157th Butchery and Bakery Section.
Headquarters, and Dett. 82nd Transport Corps.
Reserve Camel Corps.
No. 5 M. A. C. (less Dett. Manzai and Sorarogha).
Headquarters, " B " M. T. Column.
Dett. No. 8 Ford Van Company.
No. 18 Mobile Repair Unit.
Headquarters, Decauville Railway.
Headquarters, D. A. D. R. T.
M. F. O., Establishment (Distributed).
7th Indian General Hospital.
Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Bleaching Powder Laboratory.
26th (Camel) Field Veterinary Section, with Remount Section attached.
B. O. Rs. Mess.

KALABAGH—

(Garrison found by Kohat District).
Dett. L. of C. Signals.
1/165th Supply Depot Section.
1/78th Butchery and Bakery Section.
1/79th Supply Tally Section.
18th British Staging Section.
79th Indian Staging Section.
4th Combined Staging Section.
Dett. No. 3 Sanitary Section.
Narrow Gauge Ambulance Train.
Rest Camp.
B. Os. Mess.
B. O. Rs. Mess.
R. T. O. Establishment.

MARI INDUS—

Dett. L. of C. Signals.
Advance Ordnance Depôt.
Ordnance Mobile Workshop.
Tent Repair Unit.

Officers Shop.

Kajawah Repair Unit.
Dett. 112th. Labour Corps.
Railway Reinforcement Camp.
R. T. O. Establishment.

APPENDIX 6.

THE STATE OF WORK ON THE CIRCULAR ROAD DERA ISMAIL KHAN - TANK - KAUR - JANDOLA - SORAROGHA - RAZMAK - ISHA - BANNU - DERA ISMAIL KHAN AT THE END OF APRIL 1923, AND ITS CAPACITY FOR TRAFFIC AT THAT DATE.

Section of Road.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN-TANK—
(42 miles).

TANK-KAUR—
(11½ miles).

KAUR-JANDOLA—
(19½ miles).

JANDOLA-SORAROGHA—
(18 miles).

SORAROGHA-RAZMAK—
(24 miles).

RAZMAK-ISHA—
(41 miles).

ISHA-IDAK-BANNU—
(34 miles).

BANNU-DERA ISMAIL KHAN—
(89 miles).

Condition of Road.

Section completed with metalling 9' in width throughout.

Fit for M. T.

Improvement of this section to a metalled width of 12' well in hand. Embanked portions completed and about one quarter of the work on bridges and culverts finished.

Fit for M. T.

Section completed with a metalled width of 16'. Bridges across the Takhi Zam at Kiriwam and Hinnis Tangi, respectively 435' and 419' in length, completed.

Fit for M. T.

NOTE.—This section will in future be maintained to a width of 12' only.

Construction of section to metalled width of 12' practically completed, but reconstruction of bridge at Jandola necessary owing to damage from floods. Crossings required over the Takhi Zam and Inzar Algad at Kotkai.

Fit for M. T. but subject to serious interruptions at Kotkai and Jandola on account of frequent spates.

NOTE.—Experiments are being made with rail pile bridges for the Kotkai crossings.

Construction of section to a metalled width of 9' commenced. The difficult rock cuttings between Sorarogha and Dwa Toi about half completed.

Not fit for any wheeled traffic, but should be able to carry M. T. by autumn 1923.

NOTE.—Arrangements being made for the execution of the work on the Marobi-Tauda China section by the Abdullai.

Being constructed to a metalled width of 12'. Razmak-Razmak Narai section about half completed. Razmak Narai-Razani section nearly finished and metalling well in hand. Razani-Isha section, practically completed with exception of bridge across Tochi river at Tal, 660 feet in length, of which foundations already commenced.

In regular use by M. T. between Razani and Isha. Should be fit for M. T. throughout by end of July 1923.

Metalled to width of 16' and fit for M. T.

Metalled to width of 9' and fit for M. T.

LONDON:

PRINTED & PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE
at the following addresses: Imperial House, Kingsway, London; W.C.2, and
28 Abingdon Street, London, S.W.1; York Street, Manchester;
1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; or 120 George Street, Edinburgh.

Wednesday, 27 February, 1924.

Price Sixpence Net.