



SUPPLEMENT

TO

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MONDAY, 4 DECEMBER, 1922.

Army Headquarters, India.

Simla, 24th May, 1922.

From His Excellency General Lord Rawlinson of Trent, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a report on the operations of the Waziristan Force for the period 1st April to 31st December, 1921.

1. The period under review is of particular interest in reference to the general results of our policy in Waziristan. During this time southern Waziristan has been occupied continuously by regular troops. The summary of events recorded shows that during the last five months of the year 1921 there was a complete absence of hostile action on a large scale within Waziristan, and raids across our own administrative border showed a very marked reduction. The construction of roads has been steadily pushed on, and when completed they have been protected by our regular troops. There is no doubt but that the tribesmen generally have become alive to the fact that

their raids are both more dangerous to carry out and less productive in the shape of looted arms and supplies. The result has been to curb their energy in this direction, to improve their attitude towards us, and to render them more amenable to negotiation and discussion through the medium of the jirgas. Altogether our continued occupation of their country has brought about a distinct improvement in the situation in Waziristan generally, though certain irreconcilables are still implacable and have so far refused to agree to our terms.

2. The distribution of troops on the 1st April was as given in Appendix I.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS.

3. During the month of April the tribes, who had been anxiously awaiting the result of the Kabul negotiations, resumed aggressive action. The surrender of rifles by the Wana Wazirs had practically ceased, the hot weather was approaching, and the decision to remain in occupation of Wazir country for a further period necessitated the despatch up the line of hot weather requirements in face of considerable enemy activity.

4. On the Wana line the enemy's activity consisted chiefly of sniping of convoys at long range with the apparent object of interfering

with our supply arrangements. This development in enemy tactics was difficult to deal with on a long line of communication, and the passage of convoys became a difficulty owing to heavy casualties among camels. Encouraged by early successes, the enemy became bolder and his numbers increased. On several occasions the enemy were only dispersed after hand to hand fighting, and losses on both sides were considerable. It was during one of these actions that Sepoy Shar Singh, 28th Punjabis, earned the Victoria Cross. By the end of April the punishment they had received began to have its effect on the enemy, and the sniping of convoys ceased.

Bombing of Makin.

5. On the Ladha Line considerable activity was also evinced by the enemy, and convoys were continually sniped. Makin was bombed twice daily for a week as a reprisal for enemy attacks. Little material damage was done, but the moral effect was good, and the enemy evacuated the place temporarily.

Action near Janjal.

On the 24th April a carefully organised enemy attack was made near Janjal on the up and down convoys by about 300-400 Abdullai Mahsuds, led by Musa Khan. Heavy and accurate fire was suddenly opened from the scrub-covered hills on the convoys as they were passing. All three British officers with the convoy fell, either killed or wounded, and considerable confusion resulted. Reinforcements were sent up from Sorarogha and Ladha, the enemy were driven off, and the convoys collected, and the withdrawal was carried out without opposition. Our casualties were:—

	British officers.	Indian officers.	Indian other ranks.
Killed	1	..	10
Wounded	4	2	37

A large number of camels were killed and their loads lost. The arrival of 2 battalions Infantry which had come in relief of the 82nd Punjabis and 2-113th Infantry, and were retained, enabled the post of Piaza Razha to be re-established and made this portion of the line safe.

6. In the Tochi also the enemy began to be active, and 5 separate attacks on watering parties or pickets took place.

7. During May enemy activity continued on all the lines. On the 10th May a drive and round up of the area, Bannu, Kurramgarhi Baran post took place, the whole of the Bannu troops; constabulary and police, co-operating. Troops and police moved out by night, and by morning the 21st and 27th Cavalry had blocked egress to the North, the Frontier Constabulary blocked the escape to the West and North-west, and the 36th Sikhs and 1-4th Rajputs closed the southern portion of the net. The Infantry then began to drive North, and the operation was a complete success. 1,900 men were arrested, of whom 88 were confined and sent to Bannu Jail. Several notorious characters were captured, as well as a quantity of arms and ammunition. Our casualties were 1 killed and 1 wounded. This action had a most salutary effect on the district, which had lately afforded refuge and help to trans-border raiders. For the rest of the month this line was quiet except for a few minor skirmishes.

8. On the Wana Line the enemy changed

his tactics. The shooting down of camels at long range ceased and sniping and attacks on pickets took its place.

On the 22nd May a raid took place on Spin Warsak, where a collection of hamlets existed about 6 miles south-west of Wana, which were suspected of harbouring enemy.

The 4-3rd Gurkha Rifles moved out towards Tanai at dusk, and returned after dusk with the idea of making the enemy think Spin was the objective. By dawn of the 22nd the 58th Rifles were holding Spin Warsak from one mile North of Wana Toi on the North to the direct track from Zirghwaza to Kasha Punga on the South. The 35th Pack Battery was in position to enfilade Spin Warsak ridge from the North. A squadron of cavalry had lined up North and South through Dotanni Kot village and began driving west. The 58th Rifles gained their final position at the point of the bayonet, killed several of the enemy, and captured 20 with 6 Government rifles. The drive resulted in the capture of 48 Wazirs, including, amongst others who were wanted, an *ex-Jemadar* of the South Waziristan Militia, who had deserted, and had since become an instructor in the Afghan Army.

On the night of the 29-30th May the 2-41st Dogras ambushed a party of Wazirs near Dargai Oba, and the enemy withdrew under heavy fire, but casualties were unknown.

9. On the Ladha Line there was considerable sniping during the first week of May whilst Piaza Post was being re-established. On the 15th May railhead was advanced to Khirgi.

Division of Command.

10. It had become obvious that with increased enemy activity, control of operations on the three separate lines of Wana, Ladha and the Tochi could not be efficiently exercised by Headquarters, Wazirforce. It was, therefore, decided to place the Tochi Line with the 7th and 8th Brigades under the command of General Officer Commanding Kohat District from midnight of the 31st May-1st June.

11. The necessity for having some guns at each post for the immediate support of Infantry also caused a redistribution of the artillery. Distribution of troops on 1st June is shown in Appendix 2.

12. April and May had been critical months, but with the addition of 3 extra battalions, 2 pack batteries and a section of 6 howitzers the situation was again in hand and counter measures became possible.

Bombing of Makin.

13. Makin and the neighbouring villages have always formed the centre and stronghold of the Mahsuds. Its position amongst wooded slopes and gorges makes any operations for its reduction very difficult. Bombardment from the air had ceased to be effective owing to each house in the district being provided with caves and dug-outs, and it was decided to try and secure the submission of the neighbourhood by means of constant and intermittent shelling of the fields and grazing grounds of Makin. This was carried out by the 6-in. howitzers on the 20th June after notice had been given that women and children were to be removed from the area. Shelling was continued daily and at odd times and wherever movement was observed.

14. During June there was considerable

enemy activity in the way of attacking pickets and watering parties. On the Tochi Line four, on the Ladha Line nineteen, and on the Wana Line twelve such minor attacks took place.

15. In the vicinity of Wana the 17th Cavalry operated with marked success and carried out some very successful reconnaissances.

16. On the Ladha Line a successful reconnaissance on Warza, 3 miles south of Piaza, was carried out on the 13th June with the 2-6th Gurkha Rifles, supported by a section of No. 6 Pack Battery, and punishment was inflicted on the enemy who had been responsible for attacks on our troops.

17. On the 29th June 3 companies of the 2-21st Punjabis, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. S. Sherlock, with an armoured car, moved out in support of a line-repairing party of the 110th Mahrattas, who had been attacked and had suffered some casualties near Jandola. The force became involved in an action with about 120 Jalal Khel Mahsuds, who had taken up a skilfully chosen position on high ground, and in trying to dislodge them Lieutenant-Colonel Sherlock was killed, in addition to 1 British officer killed and 1 British officer and 1 Indian officer wounded, and 16 Indian other ranks killed and 35 Indian other ranks wounded.

Action of the Shahur Tangi.

18. In July a great decrease of enemy activity was apparent, only a few cases of sniping occurring on the Tochi, Ladha and Wana lines. A cleverly executed attack, however, was made on the 16th July on a convoy whilst passing through the Shahur Tangi. The Shahur Tangi is a winding gorge about 3 miles long and 1,500 feet deep, with rough, precipitous sides, and, even with heights picketed, it is impossible to obtain immunity from attack. The enemy took up their positions by night, and no hostile movement was detected. Just as the head of the convoy reached the narrowest part of the Tangi bombs were dropped on it from the cliffs above and a heavy fire opened from both sides, the fire being directed markedly at personnel. A large number of details were marching up with the convoy, and Lieutenant T. B. Vickers, I.A.R.O., attached 14th Company 2nd Sappers and Miners, had with him 40 of these as an advance guard. Nine of these fell at the first outburst of fire, but this officer, with great gallantry and initiative, at once collected all available men and succeeded in climbing up the precipitous left bank and joining the protection troops of the 2-102nd Grenadiers, who were working below the permanent pickets and above the Tangi. Lieutenant Vickers was killed later in trying to press home the attack, and but for his action the situation might have been much worse. Protective troops from Chagmalai, and Haidari Kach with the 28th Punjabis, a section 21st Pack Battery and Stokes Mortars arrived, and after several combined attacks the enemy were gradually driven off, and all opposition ceased.

19. The intermittent shelling of Makin continued throughout the month, registration of targets being carried out with the assistance of aeroplanes.

20. During August there was heavy rain and the consequent spates seriously damaged communications throughout Waziristan and made the maintenance of troops in the forward

area very difficult. On the 1st August the new iron bridge above Jandola was washed away and great damage was done to roads and railways. As a consequence the troops had for a time to be put on reduced rations. The floods in the Indus prevented the steamer working the flats for several days at a time, and all railways, roads and signal communications in the area were continually out of action. Above Jandola only pack transport could be used, and the progress of the new road was delayed. By the middle of September the question of supplies became less acute and communications were again in good order.

21. Cholera broke out at the end of June, and by the end of July 31 cases had occurred, with 91 deaths. In August cases decreased, and the disease was finally stamped out in November.

Submission of tribes.

22. During August and September the enemy resistance had been weakening, and by the 10th September the Wana Wazirs had practically complied with our terms, and the blockade was raised on the 14th September. The Gangi Khel of the Dhana Valley and the Wazirs of Shakai were not included in the settlement.

23. During August the resistance of the Abdullais weakened, and in spite of the efforts of Musa Khan, the leader of the hostile party, a small sub-section came in and surrendered the Government rifles in its possession. Musa Khan and his followers then left for Kabul on the 5th September.

24. The shelling of Makin was now having its effect. The Abdullai has been given little opportunity to sow and look after their maize crops, and on the 14th September they asked for peace and a cessation of shelling to enable them to collect rifles due. They were given a truce of 10 days and a jirga was summoned for the 27th September to hear our terms. These terms were accepted, and, having been complied with for the most part, the blockade was removed from the 13th October.

25. On the 5th November the announcement of our future policy in Waziristan was made to fully representative jirgas of 1,000 Mahsuds at Tank and to 350 Wana Wazirs at Wana on the 10th November. The announcements as made to the Mahsuds and Wana Wazirs are given in Appendices 3 and 4.

26. The Gangi Khel Wazirs now desired to come to terms, and were included in the amnesty announced to the Wana Wazirs, and by the 13th November it was further extended to the Shakai Wazirs, who by then had fulfilled our terms.

Advance to Datta Khel.

27. During this month it was decided to send the Political Agent, Tochi, into Datta Khel to arrange a settlement with certain tribes in the Upper Tochi and to re-establish a militia post at Datta Khel.

The force, commanded by Brevet Colonel H. E. Herdon, C.I.E., and consisting of—

- 1 troop, 27th Cavalry,
- 113 Pack Battery,
- 13th Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners,
- 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles,
- 2-69th Punjabis,
- 360 North Waziristan Militia,

moved out from Dardoni on the 26th November. They were heavily sniped on the night

27th-28th November at Muhammed Khel and reached Datta Khel on the 30th November, having established a forward base at Muhammed Khel with a garrison of 2 companies, 1-4th Rajputs, from the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade, replaced later by 2 companies of the 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.

A reserve of supplies was then laid in at Datta Khel and work was commenced on the strong post to be held by the Militia on the withdrawal of regular troops. The behaviour of the local tribes was satisfactory, but rumours of large bands of Ahmadzai Waziris, Militia deserters and Khost outlaws under ex-Jemadar Tarin were received daily. On December 9th the 1-9th Gurkhas, less 1 company at Muhammed Khel, arrived in relief of the 2-69th Punjabis due for demobilization.

Action of Spinichilla Pass.

On the 11th December an empty convoy left Datta Khel for Muhammed Khel, escorted by Headquarters and 3 companies 2-69th Punjabis and 2 guns from Datta Khel—the foot hills on the Muhammed Khel side of the Spinichilla Pass being picketed by 1 company 2-3rd Gurkhas. The country from Datta Khel to Muhammed Khel is very difficult, especially the part between the Pass and Muhammed Khel, which is a plain covered with thick scrub and intersected with numerous nullahs.

On leaving the Pass the escort of the convoy was heavily attacked by large numbers of the enemy. The convoy reached camp safely, but the escort had to fight a severe rear guard action for the last 3½ miles into Muhammed Khel. The 2-3rd Gurkhas and the 2-69th Punjabis became separated in the difficult country and the enemy offered few good targets to the guns. The strength of the enemy was estimated at between 400 and 500, and they took full advantage of the nullahs, which afforded them covered lines of approach. Our casualties were:—

	British officers.	Indian officers.	Indian other ranks.
Killed ...	2	1	39
Wounded .	3	—	37

besides 2 Vickers guns, 1 Lewis gun, 42 rifles, 21 mules and 17 camels lost. The enemy suffered considerably and ex-Jemadar Tarin, their leader, was killed.

News now arrived of the concentration of a large hostile gathering north of the Tochi, and it was considered advisable to retain the 2-69th Punjabis and to send up the 53rd Sikhs from Kohat.

The increased strength enabled Colonel Herdon to establish several permanent pickets on the Spinichilla and also gave him a small striking force capable of dealing with hostile raiding parties. The situation remained quiet up to the end of December and considerable progress was made on the strong post for the Militia at Datta Khel.

Khassadar System.

28. It was decided to start the Khassadar scheme on the 1st December. There were to be two distinct bodies, with different duties and responsibilities. One body of 306 foot and 51 mounted men was to be raised to hold Wana, Spin, Kajuri and Nili Kach in the

Gomal after the withdrawal of the regular troops from Wana. The other was to be raised for road protection duties on the Ladha line in order to relieve regulars of escort duties, who would, however, still garrison the posts and permanent pickets on the Lines of Communication. Thus the Wana Khassadars were to work independently, whilst the Mahsud Khassadars would work in close co-operation with regulars and only relieve them of certain duties in connection with road protection.

29. In order to give the system a trial, 460 footmen were raised during November and took over their duties between Sorarogha and Ladha on the 2nd December, and Wana was taken over from the regulars on December 2nd and Khajuri and Nili Kach on the 7th December.

Withdrawal from Wana.

30. In November it was decided to withdraw from Wana and the 1st December was fixed for the commencement of the withdrawal. The withdrawal was carried out in two stages—

(1) From Wana to Sarwekai, the latter being reached on the 5th December.

(2) From Sarwekai to Jandola, Sarwekai being evacuated on the 17th December and Jandola reached on the 20th December.

All Government property was evacuated to Jandola before the withdrawal commenced. The withdrawal, though watched and followed by numbers of the enemy, varying from 100 to 400, was carried out practically without opposition; only on two occasions did the enemy come within striking distance. On the first occasion the left flank company of the 4-3rd Queen Alexandra's Own Ghurka Rifles came on a party of 40 or 50 enemy, who were lying up to snipe the column. A sharp action took place before the Gurkhas drove the enemy off with a loss of 2 killed and 6 wounded, among the latter being the leader, our losses being 1 killed and 1 wounded.

On the second occasion the transport had been safely withdrawn to Chagmalai, when a party of about 200 enemy, who were following up the column, attacked the rear party of the 16th Rajputs, who were acting as rear guard, and inflicted 1 casualty on them. During the last 60 hours of the withdrawal there was continuous rain, which led to spates in the valley and increased considerably the difficulty of the withdrawal. The success of the operation and the immunity from enemy were due to the careful preparations made beforehand by Colonel Commandant O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., and to his excellent tactical dispositions during the withdrawal.

31. The surplus troops of the Wana column returned to India before the end of the year and a certain number of reliefs took place. The disposition of troops on the 31st December is shown in Appendix V.

32. The total casualties sustained from the 1st April to the 31st December, 1921, amount to:—

Casualties.

Killed and missing ...	261
Wounded ...	370
Died of disease ...	467

These were distributed as follows:—

	Killed.		Wounded.		Died of
					disease.
British officers ...	7	...	9	...	6
British other ranks	6	...	10	...	2
Indian officers ...	4	...	6	...	4
Indian other ranks	242	...	342	...	234
Followers ...	2	...	3	...	221
Total ...	261		370		467

Conclusions.

33. The general impression gained of the operations of our troops in Waziristan is that as time goes on the tribesmen have become less and less irreconcilable in their attitude towards us. A certain number of definite hostile actions against our troops have taken place, such as the attack on the convoy in the Spinchilla Pass, which was carried out largely by outlaws from over the Afghan border, but as regards the inhabitants of Waziristan itself, enemy action has become confined to sporadic sniping by a few malcontents and occasional small raids and murders of a comparatively minor nature. The country is still far from settled, and although the tribal leaders freely come in for conferences when summoned, yet it is still dangerous for individuals or troops in small parties to move beyond the limits of our protected posts or lines of communication. As time goes on, and particularly as the roads through the country near completion, it may confidently be hoped that the attitude of the tribesmen towards the authority of British India will steadily improve. Everything depends in this mountainous region on facilities of communication, and unless we can extend our road system so as to be able rapidly to reinforce our local levies and Khassadars by regular troops in case of trouble, we shall always be in danger of their deserting our cause when strong local and religious pressure is brought to bear upon them. It was our inability to afford protection and support to our friends which caused so many to go over to the enemy in the war of 1919, and the same result may be expected in the future unless we are in a position to support quickly our friendly tribesmen when the next crisis supervenes.

34. Whilst the greatest strain has fallen on the Infantry, who have had to carry out their duties in a very trying climate, the dominating factor in the whole situation, I consider, was the additional artillery provided for the force.

35. The 6-inch Howitzers at Ladha were mainly instrumental in forcing the submission of the Abdullai, and the provision of adequate artillery support throughout the posts on the Lines of Communication increased their security to a large extent.

36. The British Armoured Car Company did good work in spite of adverse climatic conditions.

37. The signal communications have been maintained at a very high standard, and the efficiency of the way in which the air line and ground cable was rolled up during the withdrawal from Wana reflects great credit on "F" Divisional Signals.

38. The 20th Squadron, Royal Air Force, rendered effective assistance during the operations, especially during the bombing of Makin in April.

39. The Royal Engineer Services have been fully occupied in adding to and maintaining defences, improving the water supply, in the electrification of Khirgi and Jandola, and in the construction of the factories. The most important work has been on the road beyond Jandola, which has progressed well in spite of great difficulties. The rapidity with which the damage done by floods was made good greatly facilitated the difficult question of supply.

40. The difficulties of the Supply and Transport Corps in a country such as Waziristan are great. The transit of food by rail, motor transport and pack transport renders the question of supply doubly difficult. Supply officers have worked hard, and, though for the most part inexperienced, the results have on the whole been satisfactory.

41. The Mechanical Transport have had to work long hours, and, in spite of their worn-out condition, have done their work efficiently and well.

42. The Bullock Corps, despite adverse conditions, have done good work.

43. Much arduous and dangerous duty has fallen on the pack transport in the forward areas, and the fact that there were 558 casualties in mules and camels from enemy action shows that the mule drivers and sarwans have had to bear their fair share in the danger zone.

44. The greatest credit is due to the Medical Services for their work, especially during the cholera epidemic, when the immediate and effective measures taken by them kept the disease within bounds and prevented a serious outbreak.

45. The Ordnance Service has proved efficient, and the supply of Ordnance equipment and ammunition was carried out expeditiously. The difficult problem of the supply of the Wana column and its withdrawal was dealt with most satisfactorily.

46. The work of the Veterinary Service was very heavy owing to the nature of the ground over which the animals had to work and to the inclemency of the climate.

47. The transit of mails throughout the area has been carried out expeditiously and well.

48. The payment of the personnel of the Force has been placed on a sound footing, and acceleration of the settlement of accounts has contributed much towards the contentment of the Force.

49. Considerable strain has been thrown on the Railway Transport personnel, but all ranks did their utmost and succeeded in overcoming all difficulties.

50. The North-Western Railway rendered every assistance. The average daily lift of supplies on the Kalabagh Broad Gauge Railway, from Kalabagh into Bannu, Tank and Khirgi, was 370 tons, and on the 2 feet gauge Decauville Railway 85 tons.

51. The British clerks, despite the heat and consequent sickness, have carried out their work in a praiseworthy manner.

52. Major-General T. G. Matheson, C.B., C.M.G., who has been in command during the whole period, has carried out his arduous and responsible duties to my entire satisfaction. He has had many difficulties to overcome, both military and political, and he has shown marked tact and ability in overcoming them.

Temporary Colonel Commandant O. C. Borrett, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.-D.-C., deserves high praise for his handling of the Wana Column, not only during the advance and occupation of Wana, but especially in its withdrawal, where a tactical error might have cost us many lives.

Brevet Major P. C. S. Hobart, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., Royal Engineers, has shown himself a capable and resourceful staff officer, well above the average.

53. A list of the names of those whose services have been of particular value will follow.

I have the honour to be,
SIR,
Your obedient servant,
RAWLINSON,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

APPENDIX No. 1.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMBATANT TROOPS, 1ST APRIL, 1921.

LADHA—

Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 6 Pack Battery (British).
94th Company, 2nd S. and M. (less 1 Section).

2nd Queen's Royal Regiment.

2-25th Punjabis.

1-109th Infantry.

2 Companies, 121st Pioneers.

2-6th Gurkha Rifles.

Headquarters and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 6 Company, Machine Gun Corps.

SORAROGHA—

Headquarters, 21st Indian Infantry Brigade.

1 Section, No. 27 Pack Battery.

1 Section, No. 128 Howitzer Battery, R.F.A.

1 Section, 94th Company, 2nd S. and M. 1-69th Punjabis.

121st Pioneers (less 2 Companies).

2-1st Gurkha Rifles (less 1 Company).

3-11th Gurkha Rifles (less 1 Company).

KOTKAI—

26th Punjabis.

4-39th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

48th Pioneers (less 1 Company).

JANDOLA—

2-21st Punjabis.

1 Company, 48th Pioneers.

1 Company, 2-113th Infantry.

No. 7 Armoured Motor Battery.

KHIRGI—

104th Wellesley's Rifles.

MANZAI—

Headquarters, 10th Indian Infantry Brigade.

16th Rajputs.

Headquarters, South Waziristan Militia.

No. 16 Armoured Motor Battery.

KAUR BRIDGE—

1 Troop, 16th Cavalry.

2 Companies, 2-102nd Grenadiers.

TANK—

No. 20 Squadron, R.A.F.

2 Squadrons, 16th Cavalry (less 1 Troop).

Advanced Engineer Park.

2-113th Infantry (less 1 Company).

DERA ISMAIL KHAN—

Headquarters, Waziristan Force.

16th Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).

Headquarters, 11th Pack Artillery Brigade.

Headquarters, 10th Armoured Motor Brigade.

Wana Column.

CHAGMALAI—

1-4th Gurkha Rifles.

Haidari Kach—

28th Punjabis.

SARWEKAI—

2 Troops, 17th Cavalry.

1 Section, 35th Pack Battery.

No. 14 Company, 2nd S. and M.

2-30th Punjabis.

2-61st Pioneers Headquarters and detachment).

4-3rd Gurkha Rifles and 1 Company, 3-11th Gurkha Rifles attached.

Detachment, South Waziristan Militia.

2 Sections, No. 6 Machine Gun Company.

TANAI—

27th Pack Battery (less 1 Section).

2-41st Dogras.

1 Company, 2-1st Gurkha Rifles.

WANA—

2 Troops, 17th Cavalry.

35th Pack Battery (less 1 Section).

50th Rifles, F.F.

Tochi line.

MARI-INDUS.

1 Company, 1-4th Rajputs.

KALABAGH—

Advanced Engineer Park.

2 Platoons, 1-4th Rajputs.

BANNU—

Headquarters, 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.

21st Cavalry (less 1 Squadron).

1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.

1 Section, 6.3 R. M. L. Howitzers.

1-4th Rajputs (less 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ Companies).

2-4th Rajputs.

No. 5 Armoured Motor Battery.

SAIDGI—

36th Sikhs (less 1 Company).

SHINKI—

2 Platoons, 36th Sikhs.

KHAJURI—

1 Company, 36th Sikhs (less 2 Platoons).

IDAK—

2 Troops, 21st Cavalry.

1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.

Detachment, 96th Field Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.), S. and M.

130th Baluchis.

DARDONI—

Headquarters, 7th Indian Infantry Brigade.
1 Squadron, 21st Cavalry (less 2 Troops).
33rd Pack Battery.
1 Section, 15-Pounder I.F.A.
96th Field Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.), S. and M.
2-69th Punjabis.
Headquarters and 2 Companies, 2-102nd Grenadiers.
2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.

APPENDIX No. 2.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMBATANT TROOPS,
1ST JUNE, 1921.

*Under General Officer Commanding,
Waziristan Force.*

LADHA—

Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade.
1 Section, No. 10 Medium Battery, R.G.A. (6 in. Howitzers).
No. 6 Pack Battery (British) (less 1 Section).
94th Company, 2nd S. and M. (less 2 Sections).
2nd Battalion, The Queen's Royal Regiment.
2-25th Punjabis.
1-109th Infantry.
1 Company, 21st Pioneers.
3-11th Gurkha Rifles.
Headquarters and $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 6 Machine Gun Company.

PIAZHA RAGHA—

1 Section, No. 6 Pack Battery, R.G.A.
1 Section, 94th Company, 2nd S. and M.
1-69th Punjabis.
2-6th Gurkha Rifles.
1 Company, 121st Pioneers.

21st Indian Infantry Brigade.

SORAROGHA—

Headquarters, 21st Indian Infantry Brigade.
26th Pack Battery.
1 Section, 128th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A.
One 10-Pounder Gun.
1 Section, 94th Field Company, 2nd S. and M.
82nd Punjabis.
1-26th Punjabis.
2-1st K.G.O. Gurkha Rifles.
121st Pioneers (less 2 Companies).

KOTKAI—

Headquarters and 1 Section, 27th Pack Battery.
48th Pioneers (less 2 Companies).
2-50th Kumaon Rifles.
129th Baluchis.

10th Indian Infantry Brigade.

JANDOLA—

2-21st Punjabis (Force Reserve).
110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
No. 7 Armoured Motor Battery.

KHIRGI—

One 10-Pounder Gun.
104th Wellesley's Rifles.
2 Companies, 2-113th Infantry.

MANZAI—

Headquarters, 10th Indian Infantry Brigade.
One 10-Pounder Gun.
16th Rajputs.
No. 16 Armoured Mountain Battery.

KAUR BRIDGE—

2 Companies, 73rd Carnatic Infantry.

TANK—

1 Squadron, 17th Cavalry.
2-113th Infantry (less 2 Companies).

Wana Column.

WANA—

1 Squadron, 17th Cavalry (less 1 Troop)
35th Pack Battery (less 1 Section).
58th Vaughan's Rifles, F.F.

ROGHA KOT—

1 Section, 35th Pack Battery.
4-3rd Gurkha Rifles.

DARGAI OBA—

2-41st Dogras.
1 Company, 48th Pioneers.

SARWEKAI—

Headquarters, Wana Column.
1 Troop, 17th Cavalry.
21st Pack Battery.
14th Field Company, 2nd S. and M.
2-30th Punjabis.
1-4th Gurkha Rifles.
2 Sections, No. 6 Machine Gun Company.

HAIDARI KACH—

1 Section, 27th Pack Battery.
28th Punjabis.

CHAGMALAI—

2-102nd Grenadiers.

DERA ISMAIL KHAN—

Headquarters, Waziristan Force.
17th Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).
Detachment, North Waziristan Militia.
Headquarters No. 11 Pack Artillery Brigade.
Headquarters No. 10 Armoured Motor Brigade.

DARYA KHAN—

Detachment, North Waziristan Militia.
2 Platoons, 36th Sikhs (lent from Kohat District).

MARI INDUS—

Headquarters Defences and 36th Sikhs (lent from Kohat District).

Under General Officer Commanding, Kohat District.

DARDONI—

Headquarters, 7th Indian Infantry Brigade.

- 1 Squadron (less 2 Troops) 27th Light Cavalry.
- 33rd Pack Battery.
- 15-Pounder Section, I.M.A.
- 1 Section, 96th (Field) Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.), S. and M.
- 1-73rd Carnatic Infantry.
- 2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
- 2-69th Punjabis.

IDAK—

- 2 Troops, 27th Light Cavalry.
- 1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.
- 1 Post Stokes Mortar.
- 2-4th Rajputs (less 2 platoons).

KHAJURI—

- 2 platoons, 2-4th Rajputs.

SHUNKI—

- 2 platoons (less 2 rifle sections), 130th Baluchis.

SAIDGI—

- 1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.
- 1 Post Stokes Mortar.
- 130th Baluchis (less detachments).

BANNU—

- Headquarters, 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.
- 27th Light Cavalry (less 1 squadron).
- 1 Section, 3" R.M.L. Howitzers.
- 6 Post Machine Guns.
- 36th Sikhs (less 1½ companies).
- 1-4th Rajputs (less detachments).
- No. 5 Armoured Motor Battery.

MARI INDUS—

- 1½ companies, 36th Sikhs.

APPENDIX No. 3.

Announcement made to the Mahsuds on 5th November, 1921.

Preamble. Owing to their sincere desire for peace and the betterment and free development of the tribes on the lines of their cherished institutions, the Government of India have decided to announce the following generous lines of policy by which they propose to be guided in the future in regard to the occupation and administration of Mahsud country.

(1) Though it is the intention of Government to remain for so long as it pleases in occupation of the Mahsud country, it has no intention of introducing into that country the regular administration of a settled district, but it will administer it on tribal lines in accordance with tribal customs and usage.

(2) Allowances and other privileges will be granted as Government may deem proper, having due regard to services rendered, and especially to the degree in which the co-operation of Maliks and tribesmen is forthcoming for the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

(3) The conditions for the payment of allowances will be—

(a) to the Maliks for their services in actively helping the Khassadar scheme.

(b) to the Maliks for the maintaining of order in their section.

These sections which have cleared their account and such individuals as have rendered conspicuous service will be permitted to count their allowances from the date of this announcement.

(4) Proprietary rights of Mahsuds in all produce will be respected, but the Government reserves to itself the right to levy after the next five years as the due of the Supreme Government a light toll in kind, whether on flocks or otherwise.

(5) No land revenue whatever will be demanded for the next twenty years, the matter to be further considered on the expiry of that period.

(6) There will be no interference in women cases, which shall be settled by Mahsud Jirga when Mahsuds only are concerned; and when Mahsuds and another tribe are concerned by joint Jirga of Mahsuds and that tribe.

(7) No court fees whatever will be levied for the next five years, thereafter for the succeeding years an eight anna court fee will be levied: The matter to be further considered on expiry of that period.

(8) No forced enlistment will be imposed.

(9) All cases will be dealt with by Jirga except offences committed against the Government or Government servants or in the Government settlements.

APPENDIX No. 4.

Announcement made to the Wana Wazirs on 10th November, 1921.

Preamble. Owing to their sincere desire for peace and the betterment and free development of the tribes on the lines of their cherished institutions, the Government of India have decided to announce the following generous lines of policy by which they propose to be guided in the future in regard to the occupation and administration of Wana Wazirs Country.

(1) Though it is the intention of Government to remain for so long as it pleases in occupation of the Wana Wazirs Country, it has no intention of introducing into that country the regular administration of a settled district, but it will administer it on tribal lines in accordance with tribal customs and usage.

(2) Allowances and other privileges will be granted as Government may deem proper, having due regard to services rendered, and especially to the degree in which the co-operation of Maliks and tribesmen is forthcoming for the restoration and maintenance of law and order.

(3) The conditions for the payment of allowances will be—

(a) to the Maliks for their services in actively helping the Khassadar scheme,

(b) to the Maliks for the maintaining of order in their Sections. These Sections which have cleared their account and such individuals as have rendered conspicuous service will be permitted to count their allowances from the date of this announcement. Amnesty will be granted to all Wana Wazirs, including Militia deserters, who return to their homes, Government reserving the right

to recover Government rifles by whatever means they choose.

(4) Proprietary rights of Wana Wazirs in all produce will be respected, but the Government reserves to itself the right to levy after the next five years as the due of the Supreme Government a light toll in kind, whether on flocks or otherwise.

(5) No land revenue whatever will be demanded for the next twenty years, the matter to be further considered on the expiry of that period.

(6) There will be no interference in women cases, which shall be settled by Wana Wazir Jirga when Wana Wazirs only are concerned, and when Wana Wazirs and another tribe are concerned by joint Jirga of Wana Wazirs and that tribe.

(7) No court fees whatever will be levied for the next five years, thereafter for the succeeding years an eight anna court fee will be levied: The matter to be further considered on expiry of that period.

(8) No forced enlistment will be imposed.

(9) All cases will be dealt with by Jirga except offences committed against the Government or Government servants, or in the Government settlements.

APPENDIX No. 5.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMBATANT TROOPS, 31ST DECEMBER, 1921.

*Under General Officer Commanding,
Wazir Force.*

LADHA—

Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade.

1 Section, No. 13, Medium Howitzer Battery, R.G.A.

No. 12, Pack Battery, R.G.A. (less 1 Section).

14th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.), S. and M. (less 2½ Sections).

1st Battalion, Royal Welch Fusiliers.

2-39th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

1-69th Punjabis.

1 Company, 121st Pioneers.

2-6th Gurkha Rifles.

No. 6, Machine Gun Company (less 2 Sections).

PIAZHA RAGHA—

1 Section, No. 12 Pack Battery, R.G.A.

½ Section, 14th Company, 2nd (Q.V.O.), S. and M.

1 Company, 121st Pioneers.

129th Baluchis.

3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

2 Sections, No. 6 Machine Gun Company.

SORAROGHA—

Headquarters, 21st Indian Infantry Brigade.

106th Pack Battery.

1 Section, No. 128 Howitzer Battery, R.F.A.

2 Sections, 14th Company, S. and M.

1-26th Punjabis.

2-50th Kumaon Rifles.

121st Pioneers (less 2¼ Companies).

1-4th Gurkha Rifles.

KOTKAI—

1 Section, 101st Pack Battery.

1-6th Royal Jats.

48th Pioneers (less 1 Company).

1-91st Punjabis.

Under 10th Brigade.

JANDOLA—

101st Pack Battery (less 1 Section).

1 Company, 48th Pioneers.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

2 Companies, 119th Infantry.

1 Platoon, 121st Pioneers.

1 Section, No. 10, Armoured Car Company, Tank Corps.

KHIRGI—

Two 10-Pounder Guns.

37th Dogras.

119th Infantry (less 2 Companies).

MANZAR—

Headquarters, 10th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Two 10-Pounder Guns.

28th Punjabis.

No. 10, Armoured Car Company (less Detachment).

KAUR—

1½ Companies, 58th Rifles, Frontier Force.

TANK—

2 Squadrons, 28th Light Cavalry.

58th Rifles, Frontier Force (less 1½ Companies).

DERA ISMAIL KHAN—

Headquarters, Waziristan Force.

28th Light Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).

Headquarters, 25th Pack Artillery Brigade.

*Under General Officer Commanding,
Kohat District.*

MARI INDUS—

1 Company, 1-30th Baluchis.

BANNU—

Headquarters, 8th Indian Infantry Brigade.

27th Light Cavalry (less 2 Squadrons).

1 Section, 6.3 in. R.M.L. Howitzers.

1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.

8 Post Machine Guns (Fort armament).

Detachment, F.G.A. (Headquarters).

130th Baluchis (less 1 Company).

101st Grenadiers.

SAIDGI—

1 Post Stokes Mortar.

1 Section, 4.5 in. Howitzers.

36th Sikhs (less 2 Platoons).

No. 2 Section, 7th Armoured Car Company.

SHINKI—

2 Platoons, 36th Sikhs.

KHAJURI—

1 Platoon, 1-4th Rajputs.

2 Troops, 27th Light Cavalry.

IDAK—

1 Troop, 27th Light Cavalry.
1 Section, 15-Pounder F.G.A.
1 Post Stokes Mortar.
1 Section 4.5 Howitzers.
1-4th Rajputs (less 5 platoons).
1 Section, No. 10, Armoured Car Company.

DARDONI—

1 Squadron, 27th Light Cavalry.
15-Pounder, Section F.G.A.
113th Pack Battery (details).
13th Company, 2nd (Queen Victoria's Own), Sappers and Miners (details).
1 Section, Armoured Car Company.
1-73rd Carnatic Infantry.
2-3rd Gurkha Rifles (details).

2-69th Punjabis (details).
1 Company, 1-4th Rajputs.

MOHAMED KHEL—

2-69th Punjabis.
53rd Sikhs.
2 Armoured Cars.
Detachment, North Waziristan Militia.

DATTA KHEL—

Headquarters, 7th Indian Infantry Brigade.
1 Troop, 27th Light Cavalry.
13th Company, Sappers and Miners.
2-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
1-9th Gurkhas.
North Waziristan Militia.

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