

command of Admiral the Hon. Sir S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O., passed through the Dardanelles, led by the British flagship (H.M.S. "Superb").

This fleet anchored next morning off Constantinople, and General Wilson landed and assumed command.

On 14th November Admiral the Hon. Sir S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O., who had been appointed British High Commissioner, made his official landing at Galata.

A considerable number of German and Austrian troops were found in the town. The Turkish Government was instructed to complete the evacuation of these troops from Pera and Stamboul within forty-eight hours and to collect them in a concentration camp in the vicinity of Scutari. These orders were carried out satisfactorily.

On the arrival of the French troops one battalion occupied the forts on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, while another relieved a British battalion in those on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The forts on the European side of the Bosphorus were occupied by a British battalion.

On arrival in Constantinople the enemy's wireless telegraph stations close to the town were at once occupied, and a cable censorship was established; orders were issued that all Turkish troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula were to be withdrawn to the north of the Bulair lines; demobilisation was to be commenced at once and arms collected at selected centres under Allied supervision.

The Turkish Chief of Staff now lodged a complaint on behalf of the Minister for War that Allied troops had landed at Constantinople, and that such action was not justified by the terms of the Armistice. It was pointed out that the troops were there for the purpose of supplying the usual guards to Allied headquarters and depôts.

Meanwhile British prisoners of war were filtering into Constantinople from all parts of Asiatic Turkey. They were embarked for home with the least possible delay.

(2) *The Reduction of the Turkish Army.*

At the time of the Armistice with Turkey there were probably 400,000 Ottoman troops under arms. Apart from garrison and line-of-communication troops these were grouped into three armies, the Ninth Army in the Caucasus, the Sixth about Mosul and Jezre, and the Yilderim Group (so-called) on the western border of Cilicia. (The 6th Ottoman Army and the Yilderim Group were facing the British Armies of Mesopotamia and Egypt.)

I therefore considered it my first duty, while keeping within the terms of the Armistice, to take such measures as would result in the rapid reduction of the Ottoman military power. To achieve this end three stages were necessary:—

(a) The return of units to their territorial centres and the evacuation of such theatres as the Caucasus.

(b) The demobilisation of the personnel.

(c) The collection of all munitions of war.

In practice these processes overlapped, but all movements were completed reasonably early.

Demobilisation went on slowly long after the armies had withdrawn. Except in the district round Erzeroum, the process of surrender-

ing armament was beginning to work quite well, when the events which took place at Smyrna in May, 1919, brought it to an end.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Armistice the 9th Turkish Army in the Caucasus consisted of some seven divisions, the Ottoman Government appearing to be under the impression that it might ultimately be allowed to retain the ancient Ottoman Sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum, which had been allotted to Turkey under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. By the beginning of February I was in a position to report that in spite of the winter, the inefficient railways and the Turkish obstruction and delay, only a few Turkish detachments remained on the wrong side of the frontier.

By the terms of the Armistice the Ottoman Government was entitled to be consulted as to the number of troops to be left under arms on completion of demobilisation. As can be imagined, some little difficulty arose in coming to an agreement on this point. The Turkish Minister of War pointed out, and with some reason, that apart from the minor task of watching the frontier the main necessity for an army was the maintenance of internal security. As the strength of the gendarmerie had fallen to one-quarter of its establishment of 52,000, the retention of some disciplined force in the country was an absolute necessity in order to prevent the complete cessation of ordered government in Anatolia.

It was finally decided that the army should consist of twenty divisions, each with an establishment of 1,500 infantry, and a small proportion of artillery and machine gunners. Except in the vicinity of Constantinople no two divisions were to be located in the same town.

The demobilisation of personnel was, on the whole, carried out in good faith by the Ottoman Government. Such difficulties as occurred were due to obstruction by local commanders, as, for example, at Erzeroum, where the divisions of the 15th Army Corps were never reduced to the authorised limit, a situation rendered possible only by the independent attitude of the commander with the connivance of the Turkish Government.

The task of disarming the Ottoman Army presented peculiar difficulties. The main Turkish armies were many hundreds of miles away, and were sullenly withdrawing into the great tangle of mountains which forms the massif of Asia Minor. One of these armies had never been beaten at all; but, on the contrary, had recently carried out a victorious advance into the coveted Moslem territories of the Caucasus. Winter in the hills had rendered impracticable the movements of heavy consignments of arms, even had there been the goodwill to move them, which could hardly be expected.

As any instructions to surrender could not be acted upon during the winter, none were given till the early spring. This delay had the advantage of giving time to prepare close estimates of the armament actually in possession, and made it possible to press the demand when made. During this period the cadres of the Ottoman Army remained responsible for the custody of their armament, subject to supervision by British control officers. To have stationed Allied guards on the large numbers of collecting places and stores would