



SECOND SUPPLEMENT

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WEDNESDAY, 8 DECEMBER, 1920.

*Army Headquarters, India,
Simla, the 1st August, 1920.*

From His Excellency General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., A.D.C., Commander-in-Chief in India.

To the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

SIR,

I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, a report on the operations in Waziristan during the period 3rd November, 1919, to 7th May, 1920.

INTRODUCTORY.

2. I propose first to refer briefly to the events leading up to the operations with which this despatch deals.

3. As was anticipated, when the Afghans, in May, 1919, invaded our territory, they were actively supported by the tribes of Waziristan. The latter had been led to believe that our military weakness would enable them to secure an easy victory, and that we should in consequence be compelled to evacuate Waziristan.

During May, 1919, their resistance had been strengthened and their moral raised by

the successes they achieved against the Militia by the capture from the latter of rifles and small arm ammunition in considerable quantities, and by our evacuation of certain posts in the vicinity of Wana and Sarwekai. These events have already been brought to your notice in my despatch dated 1st November, 1919, which dealt with the operations against Afghanistan.

4. The conclusion of the peace negotiations with Afghanistan on the 8th August, 1919, did not affect the situation in Waziristan. In fact, at this time, the hostility of the tribes towards us was increased by a widespread belief that the British Government had made a compact with the Amir to transfer their country to Afghanistan, six months after the peace had been signed.

On the 8th August the most westerly positions held by our troops in Waziristan were in the Tochi Valley, Miranshah and Dardoni and in the Derajat area Jandola on the Tank Zam and Murtaza on the Gumal. The Waziristan Force, under the command of Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., was then directly under Army Headquarters and remained so throughout the operations.

5. During the operations against Afghanistan considerations of transport prevented a

concerted movement into Waziristan, but as soon as hostilities with the former country ceased it became necessary to consider how best to bring the Waziristan tribes to book for the many wanton attacks they had made on our troops.

Owing to the heat in the Tochi Valley and in the low-lying country of the Derajat area it was not advisable to carry out operations at that period of the year. Time was also required to make the necessary preparations, and further the men of Indian units, who had been separated from their families for a prolonged period, were urgently in need of leave. It was decided therefore to wait until the cold season before beginning punitive measures.

6. The plan determined on was to summon the Tochi Wazirs and Mahsuds to a jirga* about the beginning of November, when our terms would be announced. As regards the Tochi Wazirs, the troops would advance to Datta Khel, 25 miles west of Miranshah, where the reply to our terms would be received; if the reply was unfavourable an intensive aerial bombardment and punitive measures by land would be undertaken to enforce their acceptance.

As regards the Mahsuds a date would be given on which the reply was to be received. If the terms were refused the whole of the Mahsud country would be subjected to intensive aerial bombardment. If, after the aerial bombardment, they still refused to accept the terms, punitive operations on land would begin.

The terms first stated that there was no truth in the rumour that their country would be handed over to the Amir of Afghanistan, and then demanded that the tribes should agree to the following conditions:—

(a) The British Government was to have the right to make roads, build posts, and station troops wherever it should deem necessary or desirable in any part of the "Protected Areas"†

(b) All rifles, ammunition, bombs and other military equipment taken since May 1st, 1919, were to be returned

(c) The tribes were not to interfere with the movement of troops or convoys in their country nor to molest aeroplanes or their occupants when flying over their country.

(d) All unpaid allowances were to be forfeited. No allowances were to be granted until the British Government was satisfied with the good behaviour of the tribes.

(e) Each tribe was to deposit as a guarantee of good faith 200 rifles, which would be returned within a period of twelve months, subject to the continued good behaviour of the tribes.

(f) The Tochi-Wazirs were to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 and the Mahsuds Rs. 10,000.

In the event of the terms not being accepted, the plan was first to deal with the Tochi-Wazirs and then with the Mahsuds.

7. Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., who was placed in command of the operations, had at his disposal, both for the striking force and for guarding the Lines of Communication the following troops:—

52nd Wing Royal Air Force.

4 Indian Cavalry Regiments.

1 Section of 4.5 Howitzers (for the Tochi Column only).

No. 6 British Mountain Battery (for the Derajat Column only).

3 Indian Mountain Batteries.

3 Companies Sappers and Miners.

6 Infantry Brigades.

4 Additional Battalions.

The total strength of the force on the 13th November was

Combatant Troops ... 29,256

Non-Combatants ... 33,987

The troops which composed the Force and their distribution are given in Appendix No. 1 attached to this despatch.

8. As already mentioned in paragraph 4, the peace with Afghanistan had no effect on the situation in Waziristan. From the 9th August, 1919, to the beginning of November, 1919, the tribes displayed great activity. Gangs, which varied in strength from 70 to 600, carried out numerous raids into our territory and attacked posts and parties of our troops. A few instances will suffice to show their boldness and initiative.

Tank, 44 miles north-west of Dera Ismail Khan, was attacked by the Mahsuds on 3 different occasions. The first time the raiding party escaped with loot to the value of Rs. 15,000: on the second occasion they were driven off, losing 6 killed, many wounded and 1 prisoner. The third time they were also driven off and suffered many casualties. At the end of August a gang, which had raided Isa-Khel on the Kalabagh-Bannu Railway, 50 miles south-east of Bannu, attacked, on their way back, a Labour Corps Camp near Sarai Gambila, 25 miles south-east of Bannu. They killed 15 of the Labour Corps and wounded 14, but were themselves eventually driven off with the loss of 15 killed, 50 wounded and 2 prisoners.

On another occasion the piquets at Saidgi, 14 miles west of Bannu, were attacked by 250 Wazirs, who were driven off with a loss of 35 killed and wounded.

Reprisals either from the air or by land were undertaken by our troops and considerable casualties inflicted on the enemy.

The casualties sustained by the Waziristan Force during the period 9th August, 1919, to 2nd November, 1919, were 139 killed and 159 wounded.

9. The operations from 3rd November, 1919, fall under two heads—namely, the advance to Datta Khel, in the Tochi Wazir country, and the operations in the Derajat Area against the Mahsuds.

The Advance to Datta Khel.

10. On the 9th November, 1919, the Tochi-Wazir jirga assembled at Miranshah to receive our terms. Except for the absence of certain maliks* at Kabul, it was fully representative.

The maliks were informed that our advance to Datta Khel would begin at once, and that their reply to our terms would be received there on the 17th November.

On the 10th November, notices were dropped by aeroplanes in the Tochi-Wazir country, warning all the tribesmen that non-acceptance

* Jirga—Assembly of the Headmen of the Tribes.

† Protected Areas—Certain Provinces of the country administered by our political officers.

* Headman of a tribe.

of our terms would be followed by immediate air operations. They were also warned that, if they declined to accept our terms, their women and children should be moved to places of safety.

11. For the advance, two infantry brigades, with attached troops, under the command of Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., formed the striking force, which was known as the Tochi Column.

The remainder of the Waziristan Force was employed in guarding the Lines of Communication. Railheads were at Bannu in the north and Darya Khan in the south. From the latter place supplies, etc., were taken across the Indus to Dera Ismail Khan, and from there by Decauville to Tank. The value of a Decauville line over open country was again demonstrated. Its carrying capacity was 200 tons of stores daily, or the equivalent of one thousand camel loads.

The Force was not only responsible for the defence of communications west of Bannu and Tank, but also for the whole area between those places and the Indus as far as Kalabagh on the north 60 miles east of Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan on the south. This necessitated the protection of some 300 miles of communications.

As regards the 52nd Wing, R.A.F., the total machines available were:—at Mianwali, east of the Indus, a detachment of 3 D. H. 10's and a flight of 9 D. H. 9 A's, and at Bannu and Tank a squadron of 18 Bristol Fighters.

12. The Tochi Column was concentrated at Miranshah by the 8th November, with a strength of—

Officers and other ranks	...	8,444
Followers	...	6,464
1,382 horses and equipment animals.		

The transport consisted of 2,288 mules and 5,087 camels.

On the 13th November the Column began the advance to Datta Khel in three echelons.

The first echelon, which comprised the bulk of the force, formed the main column. The second echelon, composed of 2 battalions, a field company Sappers and Miners, and an armoured motor battery, was formed for the purpose of improving the road during the advance. The third echelon, which consisted of an infantry brigade with attached troops, was detailed to guard the road and expedite the collection of supplies at Datta Khel.

The composition of the three echelons is shown in detail in Appendix No. 2.

13. The advance encountered no opposition. On the 14th November, the first echelon reached Datta Khel, the second Degan and the third Boya. Permanent piquets for the protection of the road between Miranshah and Datta Khel were established without incident. A ten days' reserve of supplies, ammunition and stores for the whole column was moved from Dardoni to Datta Khel in readiness to carry out punitive operations if our terms were refused.

14. Major-General S. H. Climo reached Datta Khel on the 17th November, and met the jirga on the same day. The jirga, which was fully representative, except for the Madda Khel and two minor sub-tribes in the Kaitu Valley, accepted all our terms. The Madda Khel inhabit the Kazha Valley, north-west of Datta Khel, and are a sub-tribe of the Tochi-Wazirs. As they had not submitted by the 18th, they were bombed next day by 17 aeroplanes. This had the desired effect. All their

representatives made complete submission the same evening.

The two minor sub-tribes—the Titti Madda Khel and the Hassan Khel—live in the Kaitu Valley, 20 miles north-east of Miranshah. They were not dealt with until the middle of December, when they were bombed from the air. They then quickly accepted our terms and made verbal submission.

15. During the time the Tochi Column was at Datta Khel only a few shots were fired into the camp. On the 25th November the withdrawal was begun and by the 26th the whole Column was back at Dardoni.

The lack of opposition throughout the advance and withdrawal may be gauged by the fact that our total casualties amounted to one man killed.

The Operations in the Derajat Area.

16. I now turn to the negotiations with the Mahsuds and the subsequent punitive operation it was found necessary to undertake against them. On the 3rd November the Mahsud jirga was summoned to assemble at Khirgi, 7 miles east of Jandola, to receive our terms.

This jirga, like that of the Tochi-Wazirs, was fully representative except for certain of the leading maliks who were at Kabul.

The next day aeroplanes were despatched to drop similar warning notices over the Mahsud country to those dropped, at a later date, in the Tochi-Wazir country.

On the 11th November, the date on which the reply to the terms was to be delivered by the Mahsuds, the jirga was attended by only a few maliks. As it was not representative, and as there was obviously no intention of accepting the terms of the Government, Major-General Climo dismissed those present. At the same time he warned them that operations from the air would begin at once, and would be followed, in due course, by operations on land.

On the 13th November, and on subsequent days, the principal Mahsud villages, especially Kaniguram, Makin and Marobi, were bombed from the air. These operations were continued until the 21st November. As a result, the Mahsuds distributed their cattle and sheep into small herds, which entailed a large increase in shepherds and watchers, and prevented the assembly of any lashkar or large raiding party. For this reason the Derajat area was noticeably free from raids at a time when they might otherwise have been expected, as the striking column was in the Tochi Valley, and we had definitely broken with the Mahsuds.

It soon became evident, however, that operations from the air, alone, would never force the Mahsuds to accept our terms.

17. In accordance, therefore, with the original plan, as soon as the withdrawal from Datta Khel was completed, orders were issued for punitive operations against the Mahsuds.

For these operations it was decided to use, as a striking force, the same troops that had composed the Tochi Column.

On the 27th November the Tochi Column was renamed the Derajat Column, and on the same day began its march of 140 miles from Dardoni to the Derajat Area. Although Kaniguram is only some 30 miles in a direct line south of Datta Khel, there were several reasons against undertaking an advance into the Mahsud country in that direction. It would

have entailed the crossing of the Razmak Narai—15 miles south-east of Datta Khei—a snow-covered pass some 7,000 feet above sea-level, and the construction of a camel road over difficult country. Besides, there were no suitable intermediate camping grounds for a force of the size of the striking column, and there was a great scarcity of water. It would also have meant the protection of about 95 miles of lines of communication from the railhead at Bannu. Further, it was hoped that the concentration of our striking force in the vicinity of Jandola, following on the air operations, would cause the Mahsuds to accept our terms and so make an advance into the heart of their country unnecessary.

It was therefore decided that the column should march to its concentration area *via* Bannu and Pezu.

By the 13th December the concentration of the Column on the line Tank-Jandola was completed, and preparations for the advance up the Tank Zam were begun.

18. In order that the narrative of these operations may be understood, it is necessary to explain shortly the policy which was adopted to secure the lines of communication.

Under modern conditions, to maintain a column the size of the striking force, daily convoys of pack animals had to be despatched along the lines of communication, and their protection was rendered more difficult owing to the abundance of modern rifles in the hands of the tribesmen. The large number of troops required to ensure adequate protection by means of escorts prohibited their use. A system was therefore introduced of establishing posts with permanent piquets, at fairly close intervals, on the most commanding ground on each side of the tracks used. These posts were strongly built for all-round defence, provided with traverses and protected with thick barbed wire entanglements. Their construction led to the majority of the actions which took place during these operations. The full strength of the Derajat Column had, on occasions, to be employed to drive the enemy off the ground selected for the various piquets, and then to cover and support the working parties whilst the defensive works were being constructed. Several days were often required to make the locality selected thoroughly strong against attack, and, until its construction was completed, all the troops had to withdraw to camp each afternoon.

19. As convoys sometimes amounted to over 4,000 pack animals, it was necessary to improve and widen the track along which the advance was to take place, in order that the animals could march on a broad front. Otherwise, they had to move in single file, which so increased the length of the column that it would have made the completion of a stage during daylight impossible.

For this reason, on the 11th December, to prepare for the advance, a force of two battalions and one section of mountain guns made good the Spinkai Raghza†—1½ miles north of Jandola Camp—and work on the road and on its defence was begun.

When the troops withdrew on the same afternoon the rearguard was attacked, with determination, by some 100 tribesmen.

On the 12th and 13th December the work was continued. During these three days we sustained 46 casualties, chiefly from enemy snipers.

As representatives of the tribesmen professed to be desirous of coming in, Major-General Skeen interviewed them at Jandola on the 17th. While they were still in camp a number of the enemy were seen closing in on our piquets, and at 3.30 p.m. a determined attack was made against us. The attack was repulsed. In one locality a party of the enemy, in spite of fire from guns and machine guns at close range, forced back a covering party. We suffered 34 casualties, while the enemy acknowledged the loss of 8 killed and 12 wounded.

20. The advance from Jandola began on the 18th December. On that day, the Mahsuds, estimated at 2,000 strong, were holding Sarkai Ridge, two miles north-west of Jandola Camp while it was reported that 1,500 Wana-Wazirs were in the valley of the Shahur, a stream which joins the Tank Zam 1½ miles west of Jandola.

The 68th Brigade (less 1½ battalions), with two sections of guns, under Brigadier-General J. L. R. Gordon, C.B., was ordered to make good the river route to Do Tak, two miles west of the Camp, in case it was required by the transport. This was accomplished without difficulty, and the brigade returned to Jandola that afternoon.

The main column, which consisted of:—

Column Headquarters,
1 Squadron (less 1 troop) 21st Cavalry,
No. 6 British and No. 27 Indian Mountain Batteries,
55th Field Company Sappers and Miners,
67th Infantry Brigade,
2-19th Punjabis (from 68th Brigade),
3-34th Sikh Pioneers and attached troops,
under Major-General Skeen, advanced at 8 a.m. to clear the Sarkai Ridge and then to secure the Spinkai Ghash in order to cover the occupation of a camp on the Palosina Plain, three miles north-north-west of Jandola Camp. The enemy was soon driven off the Sarkai Ridge, and by 1.30 p.m. the Spinkai Ghash was in our possession. The Mahsuds retired mainly up the Tank Zam, pursued by our aeroplanes. By 4.30 p.m. the transport, which consisted of 2,330 mules and 2,750 camels, had reached the camp without incident. During the day our casualties amounted to 78.

21. It is proposed now to give a short description of the country south of Mandanna Kach in order that the operations carried out during the next few days may be more easily understood, and also in order that some comprehension may be afforded of the difficulties of the terrain over which those operations took place.

The right or west bank of the Tank Zam, opposite the Palosina Plain, rises in steep cliffs to a small plateau, some 200 feet above the river bed. The north end of this plateau terminates in a rocky bluff, called Mandanna Hill, overlooking Mandanna Kach and the river to the north. The plateau, which is about 300 yards broad, is bounded on the west by a steep-sided ravine. This ravine starts from a tangled mass of broken ground known as "Broken Hill," 600 yards south-west of Mandanna Hill, and runs for about 2,000 yards in a south-easterly direction until it joins the Tank Zam.

On the west of the ravine is a ridge which forms the main feature in the vicinity. The

† Raghza—plateau.

southern end of this ridge consists of two features known as "Black and White Hill" and "Black and White Breasts." Going north along the ridge there are four decided features: a group of rocks which runs east and west and was known as "Red Rocks"; "Sandbag Hill," a rough and commanding point some 700 yards west of "Red Rocks"; "Comb Rocks," 200 yards north of "Sandbag Hill." The intervening space between "Sandbag Hill" and "Comb Rocks" comprises a steep drop of 150 feet, then an exposed strip of flat ground up to the foot of the latter. The fourth feature on the ridge was known as "Broken Hill," and covers Mandanna Hill from the south-west.

North of "Broken Hill" the ridge ends in an abrupt drop to "Pink Bowl" on the bank of the Tank Zam. The slopes of Tsappar Ghar, 3 to 4 miles west of Mandanna Kach, overlook the whole neighbourhood.

Operations in the Vicinity of Mandanna Kach.

22. On the 19th December a permanent piquet was established on Sarkai Ridge without opposition. The same day a force, which consisted of two battalions of the 67th Brigade, crossed the river with the object of establishing a second permanent piquet on Mandanna Hill to cover our advance up the Tank Zam. The ravine immediately west of the plateau was cleared by shell fire, and the troops rapidly seized "Red Rocks" and at 11 a.m. resumed their advance to capture "Comb Rocks," "Broken Hill" and "Mandanna Hill."

Although a certain amount of movement down the Tank Zam had been observed, there was nothing to indicate that any large numbers of the enemy were in the vicinity of "Comb Rocks." The original plan was to rush the ridge, but it was soon discovered that the broken nature of the ground made this impossible. The right battalion of the attack, however, succeeded in capturing an important position under "Sandbag Hill," but, owing to heavy casualties and determined attacks by large numbers of the enemy, it was unable to maintain the ground gained which was re-occupied by the enemy. The result of this was that the left battalion was outflanked and forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, the enemy, who had developed great strength, pressed back the whole line to the river, and, in spite of stubborn resistance by isolated parties, forced our troops to re-cross to the east bank. The artillery, which covered the retirement, took full advantage of the good targets offered by the advancing enemy.

23. The next day the attack was resumed by the whole of the 67th Brigade. By 10 a.m. we had captured "Red Rocks" and the northern end of the plateau, and, half an hour later, the eastern edge of "Comb Rocks" and Mandanna Hill were also in our possession. The co-operation of the Royal Air Force and the Artillery was most effective.

Work to put Mandanna Hill into a state of defence for the permanent piquet was begun at once. By the afternoon it was decided that the defences, though incomplete, were sufficiently far advanced to establish a piquet there for the night, and 100 rifles under a British officer were accordingly posted. The remaining troops were then withdrawn under the covering fire of guns and with aeroplane co-operation, and by 4.30 p.m. they were back

across the river without sustaining a casualty during the withdrawal.

At 4.45 p.m. the Mandanna Hill piquet reported tribesmen collecting near the piquet, and at the same time a few of the enemy were seen running across the Tank Zam to the end of the Mandanna bluff. Shortly afterwards the piquet was attacked from the north and west. The British officer in command, with some of his men, charged the enemy coming from the west, but he and his party were all killed. The rest of the piquet, disorganised by the loss of their officer, evacuated the hill and retired across the river to the camp. Our casualties for the 19th and 20th December amounted to 113 killed, including 5 British Officers, and 200 wounded.

24. In accordance with a previously arranged plan, on the 21st December two battalions of the 67th Brigade left camp to establish a permanent piquet on the feature known as "Black Hill," a tumbled mass of ridges on the bank of the river which runs west of Sagarzai peak, and commands the camp at a range of 1,700 yards.

By 10.30 a.m. "Black Hill" was occupied without opposition and work on the locality was begun, in spite of some sniping fire. When the construction of the post was half finished the enemy was seen massing for attack at a point half way between "Black Hill" and the Sagarzai peak. Shortly after 1.30 p.m. sniping increased, and was followed almost at once by a rush of 800 to 1,000 Mahsuds. The Mahsuds attacked from three directions, and in spite of heavy loss from our artillery fire overran the right of the covering troops, and attacking the remainder in flank and rear forced them back. Meanwhile the officer in command of the working party of the 3-34th Sikh Pioneers, which was constructing the post, took all his men into the half-finished work, where they were immediately attacked by the Mahsuds in front and on both flanks. Four attacks were beaten off, and the fifth attack had developed when the officer in command found that ammunition and grenades were running short, and withdrew from the piquet towards the camp.

The covering troops, who had been reorganised on the ridge half way to camp, launched a counter-attack which reached the bottom of the steep rise to the piquet, but failed to make further progress, and accordingly at 4 p.m. our troops were withdrawn under orders to the camp on Palosina plain.

The splendid behaviour of the working party of the 3-34th Sikh Pioneers merits the highest praise.

During this action the losses of the Mahsuds were estimated at 250 killed and 300 severely wounded. Our casualties amounted to 66 killed and 256 wounded.

25. By this date, the 21st of December, five battalions had been heavily engaged with the enemy, and although severe losses had been inflicted on the Mahsuds three of these battalions were badly in need of rest. It was therefore decided that they should be replaced in the column by other troops. Accordingly two Punjab battalions, the 2-19th and the 82nd, and the 2-112th Infantry were withdrawn into the Lines of Communication, and the 4-39th Garhwal Rifles, 2-76th Punjabis and 2-152nd Punjabis from the 43rd Brigade took their place.

26. On the 22nd of December "Black Hill" was reoccupied without much opposition, and from that date was held permanently by a piquet. Fifty dead Mahsuds were found on the hill and in its vicinity, and during the day many burials were seen to take place in the vicinity of Kotkai, four miles north-west of "Black Hill," on the Tank Zam.

No operations were undertaken on the 23rd or 24th of December as, owing to low clouds and rain, close co-operation with aeroplanes was impossible. On the 24th December the Headquarters 43rd Brigade with the 57th Wilde's Rifles joined the Column at Palosina.

27. The weather cleared up on the 25th, and a force under Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., composed of—

- 4-39th Garhwal Rifles,
- 1-55th Coke's Rifles,
- 2-76th Punjabis,
- 2 companies 57th Wilde's Rifles,
- 1-103rd Maratta Light Infantry,
- 1 section 55th Field Company Sappers and Miners,
- 3 companies 3-34th Sikh Pioneers,

occupied "Sandbag Hill" and the hills to the north of it with little opposition, and the work on the Mandanna Hill was continued. Large numbers of tribesmen were seen on the slopes of Tsappar Ghar and near Kotkai. They were continuously harassed by aeroplanes, and probably for that reason they did not interfere in any way with the operations. In the evening all the troops were withdrawn to the camp.

The next day the 43rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General G. Gwyn Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O., repeated the operation unopposed, and the construction of the post on Mandanna Hill was finished and garrisoned by one British officer and 125 rifles. On the 27th of December another permanent piquet was established on "Chalk Hill," 1,200 yards north of Mandanna Hill, without incident.

28. Meanwhile, on the 24th of December messengers had come in from the leading Mahsud maliks to ask for peace and for permission to come to Jandola to arrive at a settlement. In spite of being told that our advance would not be stopped pending the result of the meeting, the maliks arrived at Jandola during the 28th, and on the 29th December Major-General Climo held a *jirga*. Representative maliks were present from nearly all the tribes and sub-tribes; the only notable exception were the Abdullais, who inhabit the country in the neighbourhood of Makin.

In view of the opposition that had been encountered we added to the severity of our original terms. These additional terms increased the number of tribal rifles to be surrendered from 200 to 300. The extra hundred were to be confiscated permanently by us. In addition, the representatives were told that our advance would be continued until the sincerity of their submission was proved by the payment of the full fine, and by the surrender of the full number of tribal rifles. In spite of these terms, complete submission of the Mahsuds was made, and was signed and sealed by those present.

29. The period from the 17th to 28th of December formed the first phase in the operations against the Mahsuds. The losses which they had sustained on the 21st of December caused most of the lashkar to disperse to their

homes with their dead and wounded, and without doubt their heavy casualties made them—for a time at least—desist from pursuing the rushing tactics which they had so recklessly resorted to. This breathing space enabled our troops not only to establish several important permanent piquets without opposition, but also made them realise that the losses of the tribesmen had been heavier than our own.

It must be emphasised that the tribesmen had fought in a way they had never done before. Their attacks were well organised and their combination of fire and shock tactics was excellent. This undoubtedly was caused by the presence in their ranks of many deserters from the former militia and retired regular soldiers.

30. In accordance with our decision, which was communicated to the *jirga* at Jandola on the 29th of December, a column consisting of Column Headquarters, with the 43rd Infantry Brigade and attached troops, left Palosina Camp and advanced with little opposition to Kotkai, a distance of four miles. A third of the advance was covered by the permanent piquets established during the operations round Mandanna Kach.

The distribution of the Column is shown in Appendix No. 3.

The Column remained at Kotkai until the 7th of January. During this period permanent piquets were established at various points between the latter place and Jandola, so as to complete the defence of the road and give adequate protection to the convoys. Permanent piquets were also established north of Kotkai to prepare for the next advance. These operations were carried out with little opposition from the enemy except on the 2nd of January, during the construction of a permanent post about 2,500 yards north-west of Kotkai. This operation was entrusted to Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas' Brigade. The 4-39th Garhwal Rifles, who were detailed to form the covering troops, reached their positions without much opposition. But between mid-day and 3 p.m. three determined attacks were made on their right company. Each of these attacks was pushed home in the most determined manner, and the enemy was only driven off after severe fighting. During the withdrawal of the covering troops the enemy made one more attack, but the battalion counter-attacked most gallantly and drove the enemy back after hard hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy's casualties were estimated at 100, whilst the 4-39th Garhwal Rifles lost 35 killed and 43 wounded. The latter displayed great endurance and gallantry and taught the tribesmen a wholesome lesson.

Operations in the Vicinity of Ahnai Tangi.

31. On the 6th January the 67th Brigade reached Kotkai Camp from Palosina Plain.

The next task before the Column was the capture of the Ahnai Tangi.* The latter is about 4 miles from Kotkai Camp, and consists of a gorge 60 yards in length and only 30 yards wide. The sides of the gorge are precipitous, and rise to a height of 150 feet above the river bed.

The description given below, of the country in the vicinity of the Tangi, will enable the fighting there to be more easily followed. The Spin Ghara range, a series of prominent hills

* Tangi—Gorge.

rising to a height of 700 feet above the river, runs in a south-westerly direction from the Tangi and commands all the approaches from the south and south-west. Between the range and the river the country consists of a plateau intersected by numerous deep ravines, which can only be crossed at a few points. Opposite the plateau on the left bank of the Tank Zam, the Konr range, a mass of crags rising to a height of 1,000 feet above the bed of the river, commands all approaches from the east.

It was decided to make the main attack across the plateau and seize the west flank of the Ahnai Tangi protecting the right of the attack by occupying the east bank of the river with another body of troops.

Accordingly, on the 7th January, the 43rd Brigade made good the east bank for a distance of some three miles from the camp, thereby protecting the advance of the 67th Brigade, which moved across the plateau, and by 11 a.m. was in a position to attack the west flank of the Ahnai Tangi. By this time, however, the enemy had massed on the lower slopes of the Konr range, south of the Tangi, and from this position effectually prevented any further advance of the 67th Brigade. It then became evident that, before the Tangi could be captured, it would be necessary to occupy the heights on the east bank. The lateness of the hour made it impossible to carry out this operation on the 7th, and so the troops were ordered to withdraw, at 1 p.m., to Kotkai Camp. During the withdrawal a party of the enemy rushed a small covering party of our troops, but coming themselves under cross fire lost 30 killed. Except for this fight camp was reached at 5.30 p.m. without further incident. Our casualties during the day were 10 killed and 34 wounded.

32. Although the enemy's tactics of massing on the east bank made it appear desirable to launch the main attack on that side of the river, yet the ground was so difficult and so suitable for defence by a few well-posted men, that any idea of attack in that direction had to be abandoned.

Accordingly, it was decided to adhere to the original plan, and to make the main attack on the west bank. But to ensure success orders were issued to establish, as a preparatory operation, a strong point east of Zeriwam, in order to protect the flank of the attack, and at the same time to move the 67th Brigade to camp further north, so as to make the approach march as short as possible.

With this object in view, the 67th Brigade left Kotkai Camp at 8 a.m. on the 9th January, and formed a new camp 2 miles further north. Meanwhile the 43rd Brigade started the construction of the strong point east of Zeriwam. About 11 a.m. hostile rifle fire became intense, and the right of the party which was covering the construction of the work was attacked and driven back. As the defences of the strong point had not been finished, the 43rd Brigade was withdrawn at 3 p.m. The enemy, who immediately occupied the half-finished work in large numbers, was shelled with great effect by our artillery from Kotkai plateau, and they also suffered heavily in some close fighting with the 4-39th Garhwal Rifles. The 43rd Brigade returned to Kotkai Camp, and the 67th Brigade, fighting portion only, remained for the night at their new camp.

Another attempt to complete the defences of the strong point was made on the 10th January, but was again unsuccessful. On the same day the 2-9th Gurkha Rifles arrived at Kotkai Camp from Jandola. During the 9th and 10th we sustained losses amounting to 43 killed and 126 wounded. The enemy's losses during the same period were estimated at 187 killed and seriously wounded.

33. Although the construction of the post east of Zeriwam had not been achieved, Major-General Climo decided that it was not advisable to delay any longer the capture of the Ahnai Tangi. Accordingly, as the conditions were favourable, orders were issued to make a night march, and by this means to surprise the enemy and make good the difficult ground before he had time to organise his resistance. The 43rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Gwyn-Thomas, which consisted of:—

4-39th Garhwal Rifles,
109th Infantry,
2 companies, 2-150th Infantry (joined the column from L. of C. on 29th December),
2-152nd Punjabis,

was, therefore, ordered to move at 5 a.m. on the 11th January, so as to be in a position by dawn to attack the high ground east of Ahnai Tangi.

The 67th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Lucas, consisting of:—

1-55th Coke's Rifles,
57th Wilde's Rifles,
2-76th Punjabis,
2-5th Gurkha Rifles (joined the column on 4th January),

was, at the same time, ordered to occupy during the night the Spin Ghara range, and to be ready to attack at dawn the west side of the Ahnai Tangi in conjunction with the 43rd Brigade. This operation was entirely successful. By 10 a.m. the west bank of the Ahnai Tangi was in our possession, and by 11.15 a.m. the occupation of the east bank was successfully accomplished. Our casualties for the day amounted to 5 killed and 28 wounded. Bearing in mind the great difficulties of the ground over which our troops had to advance, the success of this operation, at so small a cost, reflects great credit on both leaders and troops.

As soon as piquets had been established to hold Ahnai Tangi, the 43rd Brigade withdrew to Kotkai Camp, whilst the 67th Brigade formed a new camp west of Zeriwam, afterwards known as Ahnai Camp.

34. On the 13th January Column Headquarters and Column Troops joined the 67th Brigade at Ahnai Camp, and orders were issued for the advance to be continued on the 14th. A short description of the country will help to make clear the next day's fighting.

Running north from the Tangi, on the East Bank of the Tank Zam, is a long, narrow spur culminating in a flat-topped hill, some 150 yards in length, called "Flathead Left." The latter completely dominates the bed of the river and the west bank.

Any further advance north of "Flathead Left" is commanded by a mass of cliffs known as "Marble Arch," and, further to the right, by another hill, which is separated from "Flathead Left" by a steep and precipitous nullah. This second hill was known as "Flathead Right."

In accordance with orders, a strong advanced guard, consisting of 1-55th Coke's Rifles, 2 companies of the 2-5th Gurkha Rifles, and 2 guns of No. 27 Mountain Battery, advanced up the bed of the river on the morning of the 14th January. Meanwhile the 2-5th Gurkha Rifles, less 2 companies, moved along the spur to capture "Flathead Left," with the object of constructing there a post for a permanent piquet.

The main body was under Major-General Skeen, and consisted of—

- 1 troop of Cavalry.
- 4 guns.
- 3 Battalions.
- 1 Field Company Sappers and Miners.
- and attached troops.

Brigadier-General Lucas, with four guns and two battalions, was detailed to protect the route from Ahnai Camp to Ahnai Tangi and to escort the transport, which numbered 1,480 mules and 2,800 camels. The detail of troops engaged is shown in Appendix No. 4.

The advanced guard, in spite of hostile fire from "Flathead Right" and "Marble Arch," and after a hand-to-hand fight with a party of the enemy, succeeded in placing piquets on a steep ridge on the west bank of the river opposite "Marble Arch."

Meanwhile the flank detachment occupied "Flathead Left," but on advancing from there was heavily attacked by some 500 tribesmen. The 2-76th Punjabis were immediately sent from the main body, with orders to reinforce the 2-5th Gurkha Rifles and to make good "Flathead Right" to facilitate the capture of "Marble Arch." This battalion reached "Flathead Left" by 11.30 a.m., in time to ensure its retention, but failed to capture "Flathead Right" owing to the heavy and accurate rifle fire of the tribesmen and the difficulties of the ground. Orders were therefore issued to consolidate the ground gained.

35. As it was then 1.30 p.m., and as the transport was well closed up, it was too late in the day to return to Ahnai Camp. A further advance was impossible, as "Marble Arch" had not been captured. Major-General Skeen had, therefore, no alternative but to form a camp where he was, although the locality was most unsuitable.

The camp, afterwards known as Asa Khan Camp, was in the bed of the Tank Zam, and not only closely surrounded by hills, the loss of any of which might have created an awkward position, but was also cramped and confined.

During the afternoon the enemy was reported massing in a ravine to the west front of the camp. The 109th Infantry was immediately sent to drive them off, and, in spite of heavy losses, carried out their mission and maintained intact that portion of the defences of the camp.

Meanwhile the position on "Flathead Left" had become somewhat critical. The tribesmen made four determined attacks, supported by powerful and accurate covering fire, and it was only with difficulty that our troops held their ground.

However, two companies of the 2-9th Gurkha Rifles, sent by Brigadier-General Lucas from Ahnai Tangi, arrived in time to turn the tide in our favour, and helped to beat off a last desperate assault, in which bayonets, stones, knives and grenades were freely used. After

this the enemy pressure slackened, and no further attacks were made. Our troops spent the whole night in consolidating the position gained.

36. This fight was the most stubborn of the whole campaign. Our casualties amounted to 9 British officers killed and 6 wounded, 10 Indian officers and 365 Indian other ranks killed and wounded. The enemy's losses were estimated at 400 killed or seriously wounded.

Owing to the necessity of escorting the transport and securing the road, only a few units were available for the actual fighting, but the heavy casualties that these units suffered, especially in British officers, in no way shook their determination.

The Mahsuds fought with their usual spirit. They took full advantage of the difficulties of the ground, and by their accurate rifle fire covered the concentration and assault of their swordsmen. Many of these assaults were pushed home, and in the hand-to-hand fighting that ensued our troops proved themselves superior to the enemy.

The co-operation of the Royal Air Force was most effective, and was of material assistance towards the success of the day's fighting. Two of our aeroplanes were shot down by the enemy. The occupants, though wounded, succeeded in reaching our lines.

37. During the next three days Column Headquarters with column troops and the 67th Brigade remained at Asa Khan Camp whilst the wounded were evacuated, supplies collected and preparations made for a further advance.

This period was also employed in establishing permanent piquets in advance of the camp, including one on "Marble Arch," which on this occasion was not held by the enemy. It is interesting to note that, except for a few minor brushes with the enemy, little real opposition was encountered, as most of the lashkar, after the heavy losses sustained on the 14th, had dispersed.

On the 18th January the above troops, with the addition of the 3rd Guides, who had joined the column from the 68th Brigade, left Asa Khan Camp and moved forward some five miles to Sorarogha plateau. The enemy offered little resistance to the advance. The Sorarogha plateau formed an excellent camp, some 300 feet above the river. It was also sufficiently large to allow of a landing ground for aeroplanes. The troops halted at Sorarogha Camp until the 27th January.

This long halt was necessary in order to collect ten days' reserve of supplies, ammunition and stores for the striking force. Major-General Climo had decided only to advance by stages of from ten to twelve miles, and not to embark on a new stage until ten days' maintenance for the striking force had been collected at the head of the old stage. This was a necessary precaution to take, as, although every possible arrangement had been made to ensure the protection of the lines of communication, they were bound to be vulnerable.

38. The period 29th December, 1919, to 20th January, 1920, formed the second phase of the operations against the Mahsuds. It was a phase of steady progress and hard fighting, which broke the resistance of the enemy.

During these thirty days there had been twenty actions, in nearly all of which more than one brigade had been employed. Although this had naturally imposed a great strain on all ranks, it was a period of practical

training for the troops, and many valuable lessons were learnt.

The initial phases of five of the larger operations had been successfully carried out by night and over difficult country. This alone was a high test of discipline and efficiency.

These numerous and successful actions inspired our troops with confidence and made the column a really formidable force, ready to undertake with determination the most difficult operation.

Operations in the Vicinity of Barari Tangi.

39. About one and a-quarter miles north of Sorarogha Camp the Tank Zam cuts through the Sarkai Ghar ridge, forming a gorge called the Barari Tangi. The latter is some 300 yards in length and 60 yards wide, with sides which rise precipitously to an average height of 100 feet.

The bed of the river here turns almost due west, and is joined by the Barari Algd from a north-easterly direction.

After passing through the Tangi there are three important features which command any advance up the Tank Zam. These are, between the Barari Algd and the Tank Zam, "Barari Centre" and "The Barrier," and opposite the latter, on the right bank of the river, "Gibraltar."

The latter is a rocky and wooded bluff, and its existence could not be discovered during the preliminary reconnaissances from Sorarogha Camp.

Before the advance from Sorarogha Camp, permanent piquets were established on the highest points of the Sarkai Ghar ridge on both sides of the Barari Tangi. These piquets were each about 1,000 yards from the river.

They were only established in the face of considerable opposition and at a cost of 15 killed, including a British officer, and 35 wounded. Their possession was essential before any advance could be made on "Barari Centre," whilst the capture of the latter was a necessary preliminary to an attack of "The Barrier."

The southern approach to "The Barrier" was difficult, especially the last part, which involved a precipitous climb to the crest, which was nowhere more than a few feet wide.

The 43rd Brigade reached Sorarogha Camp from Kothai on the 26th January.

40. Major-General Skeen decided to seize "Barari Centre" by daybreak and push the attack against "The Barrier" before the enemy could concentrate for its defence.

Accordingly, Brigadier-General Lucas, with:—

- 1-55th Coke's Rifles,
- 2-5th Gurkha Rifles,
- 109th Infantry,
- 2 Companies 3rd Guides,

moved off at 5.30 a.m. on the 28th January, and by daybreak "Barari Centre" was in our possession, and he was in a position to cover the attack on "The Barrier." At daybreak the advanced guard of the main column, consisting of the 57th Wilde's Rifles and 2-150th Infantry, under Brigadier-General Gwyn Thomas, entered the Tangi and pushed on towards "The Barrier" and "Gibraltar."

Immediately behind the advanced guard came a special detachment composed of the 4-39th Garhwal Rifles and two companies of the 2-9th Gurkha Rifles, detailed for the

capture of "The Barrier." The enemy was taken by surprise, and by 10 a.m., with practically no opposition, "The Barrier" was in our possession, and our position was rapidly consolidated.

Meanwhile the vanguard had got well past "Gibraltar," and was approaching Bangivala when the troops sent from the main guard to piquet the former place were held up by accurate sniping from a network of nullahs and wooded plateaus some 600-1,000 yards to their left front. The remaining two companies of the 2-9th Gurkha Rifles were immediately sent to reinforce the piquetting troops. These two companies, skilfully handled and under close artillery support, drove the enemy back, and at 1 p.m. captured "Gibraltar." Owing to persistent sniping consolidation was not carried out till after dark.

The column camped for the night at Ahmad-wam, just north of Barari Tangi, except the bulk of the transport, which, owing to the limited extent of the camp, had to return to Sorarogha Camp.

During the 29th January, the construction of posts on the localities selected for permanent piquets was completed. Considerable numbers of the enemy were seen during the day up the Tank Zam, and two guns supplied by the local Afghan Commander Shah Daula and brought from Wana, came into action against us for the first time. These guns did no harm to our troops. They only had a range of about 2,000 yards, and the majority of the shells did not burst. Heavy rain during the night of the 29th made it impossible for the transport to move on the 30th, and it was not until the 1st of February that the advance could be resumed.

Between the 28th and 31st January, both dates inclusive, our casualties amounted to 8 killed and 68 wounded.

The Advance from Barari Tangi to Kaniguram.

41. It was realised early in the advance from Jandola that the promises of the Mahsuds to accept our terms were made solely with a view to procrastination. They hoped that outside assistance would reach them and were convinced that we had not the power to penetrate into the heart of their country.

Consequently, as I have already stated in this despatch, our advance into their country proceeded without regard to verbal professions of submission.

At the same time, every opportunity was given to the tribesmen to prove the sincerity of their promises by actual payment of fines or submission of rifles. Also, no punitive measures were carried out, except in a few cases as retaliation for certain specific offences.

By the time, however, our troops had reached the Barari Tangi it was considered that forbearance had been carried as far as was advisable, and that all possible means would have to be employed to convince the tribes that our terms must be complied with. Major-General Climo, therefore, informed them that after we had reached Janjal our original terms were null and void. Further, that no overtures would be considered until all the tribal rifles demanded had been surrendered, and the fine paid up in full, and if this was not done the column would visit both the Makin and Kaniguram areas.

The halts necessitated by the collection of reserves of supplies, ammunition and stores gave the tribes ample time to comply with these terms had they so desired, but nothing

appeared to convince them that we intended to proceed to the occupation of their territory.

42. Orders were issued for the advance to continue on the 1st February. Considerable opposition was expected. The character of the country north of the Barari Tangi changes, the hills are thickly covered with scrub and bush, which afford good concealment for hostile snipers and prevent accurate observation from aeroplanes. Further, information had been received that, encouraged by the presence of some well-known Afghans and the arrival of the two guns mentioned above, a lashkar over 4,000 strong had assembled to oppose our troops. For these reasons Major-General Skeen decided to carry out the first stage of the advance under cover of darkness.

This operation took the enemy by surprise, and was entirely successful, and all our objectives, some two miles from camp, were gained and rapidly consolidated with under 30 casualties. The enemy made no attack against our new position, although large gatherings in front of our leading troops were reported by the Air Force. These gatherings were successfully engaged by our artillery and aeroplanes, and considerable casualties inflicted.

43. Bad weather prevented operations being resumed until the 5th February. On that day the troops moved out at 1 a.m., and all our objectives were gained and consolidated.

This night march was a very fine feat of endurance on the part of all ranks. Although the heavy rain and snow had ceased, the weather was still severe. Not only was the temperature 25 degrees below freezing point, but a strong wind added to their discomfort. The Tank Zam had to be crossed many times, and each time that our troops left the river their feet and legs were cased with ice. Men working on the construction of defences on the high ground had first to wrench up the stones frozen fast to the ground and then handle this icy material in order to construct the defences.

In spite of the hardships endured by the troops this operation proved a most signal success and so thoroughly disheartened the enemy that no further combined opposition was offered by him.

By 5 p.m. the column was concentrated at Janjal with the loss of only one casualty during the day.

On the 6th February a camp was formed, on a good site, on a plateau west of the Piazza Algad, and on the 7th daily staging between the latter place and Sorarogha, a distance of nine miles, began.

44. The column remained at Piazza Raghza until the 14th February in order to collect a reserve of supplies and improve the roads. Permanent piquets were established up to Dwa Toi,* where the Dara Toi and the Baddar Toi streams join and form the Tank Zam. The weather continued very cold, with much snow and rain, and the accumulation of the reserve of supplies was only completed with considerable difficulty.

Marobi, four miles west of Piazza Rahza camp, was occupied on the 15th February, very little opposition being encountered, and on the 16th a camp was formed near the Taoda China valley, two miles south-east of Makin. On the 17th February some 50 Mahsuds attacked a party of the 4-3rd Gurkha Rifles, who had

joined the column on 12th February, and who were covering the collection of fuel. The enemy were driven off and satisfactorily dealt with.

The column remained in the Taoda China camp until the 29th February. In carrying out operations in this area considerable opposition from hostile snipers was at first encountered. The villages are generally situated in open spaces, and are surrounded with high rocky hills, thickly covered with undergrowth. The long range rifle fire of the snipers was remarkably accurate, whilst the nature of the country made their location difficult.

During the first few days our troops sustained over 200 casualties, but after that opposition decreased to such an extent that we only had some twenty casualties during the last eight days.

45. It was decided to evacuate the Makin area on the 1st of March and to occupy Kaniguram, which we had told the tribesmen (*vide* paragraph 41) we intended to do in the event of their not complying with our terms.

The advanced piquets, which were two miles north-west of the Taoda China camp, although in close touch with the enemy, were successfully withdrawn towards the camp during the night, and the whole column marched at dawn. Owing to the precautions taken, the withdrawal came as a surprise to the enemy, and only a few small parties attempted to molest the march. The column reached Dwa Toi the same day, with the loss of only five casualties.

The tribesmen, who swarmed into the evacuated camp at Taoda China, were dealt with by our artillery and aeroplanes, and suffered considerably.

On the 3rd March the column reached Ladha, some three miles up the Baddar Toi. The country in this valley was the most difficult that our troops had had to negotiate since leaving Jandola. Although the Mahsuds endeavoured to oppose our progress, owing to the skilful handling of the advanced guard, camp was reached with the loss of only ten casualties.

On the 6th of March, the advance was resumed, and the column went into camp about 800 yards east of Kaniguram. Little opposition was encountered, but accurate sniping caused us a loss of 13 men in the area north-west of the village.

46. During the stay of the column at Kaniguram the Mahsuds gave little trouble. Most of the tribes made genuine efforts to collect and pay in their share of the fine and their proportion of tribal and Government trifles, but certain sections, especially those further removed from our line of advance, made little or no effort. The worst offenders were the inhabitants of the upper valleys of the Baddar Toi, who believed themselves out of reach of our troops.

These people were well-known recalcitrants, and as no troops had penetrated into their country for many years it was decided to punish them. Accordingly a force consisting of six guns and 2,620 rifles, with 2,000 transport animals, moved up the Baddar Toi on the 6th April, the rest of the column remaining at Kaniguram. The force reached Giga Khel and returned to Kaniguram on the 8th April. During this punitive operation we lost 16 killed and 45 wounded.

47. The operations in the Baddar Toi valley closed the active work of the Derajat Column. After a sixteen-foot road had been constructed from Kaniguram to Ladha the whole column

* Toi—Stream.

left the former village and moved to Ladha, and started there the construction of a permanent camp.

Owing to the severe losses that the Mahsuds had sustained during the heavy fighting in our advance, practically all resistance had now ceased and our troops were unmolested. Consequently it was possible to reduce the garrison at Ladha to one Infantry Brigade with a Battery of Artillery, a Field Company Sappers and Miners and a Pioneer Battalion. On the 7th May the Headquarters of the Derajat Column was dispersed.

Conclusion.

48. Before concluding this Despatch I desire to comment briefly on certain points of interest which have come to my notice during these operations.

The Waziristan Force was equipped with the most modern weapons, many of which had not previously been employed on the Frontier. Amongst these weapons the experiences gained by the use of aeroplanes and of the 3.7-inch Mountain Howitzer are of considerable interest.

It is impossible to over-estimate the value of aircraft in tactical co-operation with other arms. Their presence greatly raised the moral of our troops, whilst correspondingly decreasing that of the enemy. Aeroplanes, when thus employed, did considerable damage and helped, in no small measure, towards the success of many of the actions.

The information obtained from photography was of great tactical and topographical value. Further, they caused extensive damage to the enemy's flocks and herds, especially at the beginning of operations.

On the other hand, results obtained from bombing and tactical reconnaissance did not fulfil expectations. This was largely due to the nature of the country and the skill with which the tribesmen concealed themselves.

The 3.7 inch Mountain Howitzer proved of great value. It combines sufficient mobility with considerable shell power effective against both personnel and material. Owing to its high trajectory it can open fire from the neighbourhood of the line of march. The flat trajectory of a gun, on the other hand, necessitates its being placed so as to enable its shell to clear the crests of intervening ridges, which frequently entails taking up a position some distance from the line of march, and consequent delay. The fire of the Howitzer is accurate, searching and rapid. And, further, the improvement in the last few years in the detonation of H.E. shells has enhanced the value of Howitzers as compared to guns. For these reasons experience points to a preponderance of Howitzers to guns being required in the future for mountain warfare.

49. In addition to the facts mentioned above, other experiences have merely borne out the principles of mountain warfare, which are well known from many former campaigns. It is, however, necessary here to lay emphasis upon the supreme importance of adequate training of troops prior to their employment in a frontier campaign. Nothing can take the place of careful individual training. If possible, it is more essential in mountain warfare than in any other class of fighting that troops should have confidence in their weapons. This can only be obtained by systematic individual training, which must include instruction in making

the best tactical use of the ground, in the principles of fire and movement, and in the mental development of the soldier to such a degree of alertness, that no target escapes detection, and appropriate action is immediately taken. At the beginning of these operations a proportion of the troops were not fully masters of their weapons. This was due to their ignorance of how to use them to the best advantage, as, owing to the demands made by the Great War, men had been somewhat hastily trained, and it is probable that the severity of the fighting in December was due, to a certain degree, to this lack of training. However, as the campaign proceeded, the lessons learned in the field gradually transformed the troops into a highly efficient force, confident in themselves, in their weapons and in their leaders.

50. The well-known principle of war in relation to the efficacy of surprise was well exemplified during this campaign. Major-General Skeen, by means of numerous night advances, continually forestalled the enemy in occupation of important tactical points, and when thus surprised the latter rarely attempted to dispute their possession. Both the actual defiles of the Ahnai and Barari Tangis were seized by night advances. Subsequent knowledge of these localities proves without doubt that their capture by a daylight attack must have been a costly operation. Night advances not only enabled the column to make good any difficult ground with little loss, but the uncertainty and surprise engendered by these operations so unnerved the tribesmen that it was the chief cause of the dispersal, without any serious engagement, of the large tribal concentration between the Barari Tangi and Dwa Toi.

The success of these operations, conducted as they were over such a difficult country, is a high tribute to the competence of the staff and the discipline of the troops.

51. The system adopted of protecting the lines of communication by permanent piquets had the most gratifying results. This system has been explained in paragraph 18 of this report.

In the Valley of the Tochi no attempt was made against our communications, and on the Tank Zam only one raid occurred, and this was a very minor affair. Sniping convoys was practically unknown. Throughout the whole of these operations the losses in the convoys by enemy action did not exceed twenty-six animals. This result is remarkable, both in view of the length of these communications and of the difficult country through which they pass. From information received, there is no doubt that the tribesmen would have carried out raids if they could have found opportunity, and they kept a careful watch on the lines of communication for that purpose.

52. The close of these operations on the 7th May brought to an end a frontier campaign of unparalleled hard fighting and severity. The enemy fought with a determination and courage which has rarely, if ever, been met with by our troops in similar operations. The character of the terrain, combined with trying and arduous climatic conditions, alone presented difficulties before which the most hardened troops might well have hesitated. The resistance of the enemy has been broken and the difficulties successfully overcome by a force composed almost entirely of Indian troops. No British troops, except for the Royal Air Force and a British battery of Mountain

Artillery, were employed. This fact has without doubt considerably raised the prestige of the Indian Army on the frontier, and increased the esprit de corps of the troops engaged.

Amongst the many battalions that have done well, I wish particularly to bring to your notice the 4-39th Garhwal Rifles. This battalion fought with magnificent spirit, eagerly engaged the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting, and obtained a moral superiority over him that reacted at once throughout the force. In addition to this battalion, the following units have distinguished themselves in numerous actions in the Tank Zam, in the vicinity of Makin and Kaniguram, and in the Upper Baddar Toi:—

55th Field Company Sappers and Miners.
3rd Battalion Q. O. Corps of Guides.
3-34th Sikh Pioneers.
1-55th Coke's Rifles.
2-76th Punjabis.
109th Infantry.
2-150th Infantry.
4-3rd Gurkha Rifles.
2-5th Gurkha Rifles.
2-9th Gurkha Rifles.
3-11th Gurkha Rifles.

53. I take this opportunity to bring to notice the admirable work which the Royal Air Force has performed. The difficulties and dangers of flying over the Mahsud country are particularly great, but, in spite of the high hills and deep and narrow valleys, pilots and observers showed no hesitation in flying at the lowest altitudes in order to obtain successful results against the minute targets that existed.

In tactical co-operation with troops the bold and fearless manner in which the machines were handled gained the admiration of the Infantry and the respect of the enemy. At the start of the campaign all ranks were filled with the desire to force the submission of the Tribes by bombing, and daily, for weeks on end, all available machines were out on this difficult and dangerous duty.

The Brigade of Mountain Artillery was fortunate in the possession of a considerable number of experienced personnel in its batteries, and its work reached a high standard of efficiency. No. 6 British and No. 27 Indian Mountain Batteries accompanied the Derajat Column throughout, and especially distinguished themselves.

A peculiarly heavy burden was imposed on the Engineer and Works Services, both preparatory to and during operations. They had to deal with a vast amount of work, which included the collection and issue of the varied material now required by troops in the field, the erection of temporary buildings, mostly for hospital purposes, and the construction, improvement and repair of roads to suit the requirements of the many varieties of transport. They met every demand made on them with praiseworthy rapidity, and I desire to express my appreciation of the excellent work they have done.

The Signal Service performed its duties with its customary efficiency and untiring energy, in spite of the shortness of British personnel, especially wireless operators.

The working of the Postal Service was most expeditious and regular, and thereby did much to ameliorate the discomforts of the campaign.

The detachment of the Survey Department did excellent work, not only in the rapidity and accuracy with which it produced maps of an

unsurveyed country, but also in the valuable and willing assistance it always gave in the reproduction of aeroplane photographs, panorama sketches and matters of a similar nature.

In spite of the difficulties with which they were confronted, the Supply and Transport Services were admirably administered throughout by all ranks and grades of the Corps. The march discipline of the various transport corps and the excellent condition of the animals was most creditable to all.

The heroism of the Army Bearer Corps gained the universal admiration and gratitude of all ranks. The following units have been especially brought to my notice as deserving of the highest praise:—

No. 1 Bearer Unit.
No. 2 Indian Field Ambulance.
No. 42 Combined Field Ambulance.

The evacuation of the sick and wounded was most efficiently performed, and in no single case throughout the operations did any delay occur in this most important service. At each stage on the way down the Lines of Communication the wounded received all possible attention. Only the most serious cases were evacuated to India; other cases were treated locally and returned to their units. Much of the comfort of the hospitals, which were provided with every necessity, may be attributed to the presence of Nursing Sisters, who devoted themselves with untiring care and zeal to their work of mercy.

The unique standard of comfort and efficiency which obtained in the hospitals could only have been achieved by administrative ability of the highest order and by minute attention to detail on the part of all ranks. My thanks are due to the Senior Medical Officer with the Force and to his subordinate officers for their devotion to duty and their solicitude for the sick and wounded.

At the Bases the following hospitals have been brought to my notice for work of high order:—

Bannu General Station Hospital.
43rd Indian General Hospital at Dera Ismail Khan.
49th Indian General Hospital at Manzai.

Particularly heavy work fell on the Ordnance Service, especially at the beginning of the operations, when, owing to demobilisation, it was short of British personnel at a time when they were most required. In spite of these difficulties this branch supplied the needs of the Force with unflinching accuracy.

The work of the Veterinary Service was ably carried out. By foresight and close attention to detail, Directors and Officers of the Corps eliminated all possibility of a breakdown of the transport service from disease. Many of the animal Transport Corps were without experienced transport officers, and the Veterinary Service made up the deficiency by advice and constant inspections.

The Remount Service was administered to my entire satisfaction.

54. The comfort of the troops depended greatly on the efficient working of the Lines of Communication. Modern conditions have largely increased the amount of stores of all sorts required, and, especially in frontier warfare, the systematic and regular delivery of these stores to the troops is a complicated matter, owing to the varied forms of transport and the difficulties of the roads. Throughout

these operations foresight and determination overcame all obstacles, and the organisation of the Lines of Communication worked perfectly smoothly throughout. Every individual on the staff was impressed with the one idea of assisting the officers and troops by passing all stores as rapidly as possible up and down the Lines. The most advanced troops were never short of anything which was obtainable.

The equipment and clothing of the troops and followers and the generous scales of rations for all personnel and animals left nothing to be desired, and enabled them to stand the hardships of this campaign, which was carried out under most trying climatic conditions.

55. The Joint War Committee of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England and the British Red Cross Society established depôts within the Force under the able direction of the Revd. C. F. Hall, and ministered to the comfort of the troops in hospitals, both at the base and on the Lines of Communication. Their Christmas gifts to the troops were most welcome, and were highly appreciated. My grateful thanks are also due to the late Punjab Comforts Fund (Lady MacLagan) and to the Seal War Fund (Mrs. Simpson, Calcutta) for their kind gifts to the troops. Her Highness the Begum of Bhopal generously presented mufflers for distribution to the troops, and Indian gentlemen of Bannu, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan presented game and fruit to the hospitals and money for the comfort of the troops, which enabled many a want to be met. My special thanks are due to Mr. W. C. Lintott, proprietor of Lyons Cinema, Rawalpindi, who generously sent two cinematograph establishments, which visited the various camps during the last eight months and provided excellent entertainments free of all charge.

56. Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., commanded the Waziristan Field Force to my entire satisfaction. In every theatre of war in which he has been employed he has proved himself to be an exceptionally able and resolute commander, and especially so in this arduous campaign, which has demanded the highest qualities of leadership. His knowledge of frontier warfare and the best means of dealing satisfactorily with the complex problems created thereby has been most marked. His extensive acquaintance of administrative detail enabled him to provide successfully for the comfort and health of his troops. This was especially noticeable on the Lines of Communication, where the provision of Rest Camps, wherein the sick were attended to and relieving troops provided with ample food and shelter, largely contributed to the efficiency of the Force and the success of the operation.

I desire here to express my indebtedness to the advice and assistance which the Hon'ble Sir A. H. Grant, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province, has given throughout these operations. His knowledge of the local conditions, which he has readily placed at the disposal of my officers, has been of the greatest help.

Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., commanded the Tochi and Derajat Columns. His special knowledge of staff duties and his administrative ability have been of great advantage to the large body of troops under his command. As a commander in the field he was faced with problems of unusual difficulty and

with situations which demanded high qualities of leadership and of military discernment. His determination, judgment and expert knowledge of frontier warfare won for him from his troops their high regard and confidence.

Brigadier-General H. C. Tytler, C.M.G., D.S.O., has carried out the duties of I.G.C. with striking success. He has devoted his abilities and powers of organisation wholeheartedly to the welfare of the Force.

Brigadier-General W. S. Leslie, C.M.G., D.S.O., who was Brigadier-General, General Staff to the Headquarters of the Waziristan Force, is a staff officer of high calibre and of great mental vitality. His foresight and the precision with which he carried out his duties have been of the highest value to the Force.

Brigadier-General C. R. Bradshaw was D.A. and Q.M.G. to the Headquarters of the Waziristan Force. His considerable powers of organisation and of administration have been of great value to the Force. He has anticipated the wants of the troops throughout, and has proved himself absolutely reliable.

Colonel C. W. Profeit, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.M.C., was D.D.M.S. of the Force. His administrative ability and devotion to duty has ensured the remarkable success of the Medical Service.

Colonel H. A. P. Lindsay, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.D.S. and T. of the Force, has laboured unceasingly to ensure efficient maintenance of the Force. He has shown himself to be an officer of high administrative ability.

57. A list of the names of those whose services have been of particular value is herewith enclosed

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

C. C. MONRO, General,

Commander-in-Chief in India.

APPENDIX No. 1.

TROOPS COMPRISING WAZIRISTAN FORCE, 1919-20.

Commander.—

Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B.,
D.S.O.

Headquarters, Waziristan Force.—

Dera Ismail Khan.

Attached Troops—

Royal Air Force.

52nd Wing, Headquarters, Dera Ismail
Khan.

No. 20 Squadron, Tank and Bannu.

1 Flight, No. 97 Squadron, Mianwali.

No. 99 Squadron, Mianwali.

Details.—

Draught Cable Section of 38th Divisional
Signal Company.

Draught Cable Section of 40th Divisional
Signal Section.

2 Mobile Pigeon Lofts.

Headquarters No. 10 Armoured Motor
Brigade.

One Survey Section.

1 Co. 4 Litho. Section.

STRIKING FORCE—TOCHI AND DERAJAT COLUMNS.

Commander.—

Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G.

COLUMN HEADQUARTERS.

Cavalry.—

*2 Squadrons, 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
 †1 Squadron (less one troop), 21st P.A.V.O., Cavalry (for advance as far as Kotkai only).

Artillery.—

*One Section, 4.5-inch Howitzers, R.F.A.
 †No. 6 Mountain Battery, R.G.A.
 †No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.
 *No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery.
 No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery (joined L. of C. defences during advance of Derajat Column).
 Divisional Ammunition Column.

Sappers and Miners.—

55th Field Company.
 *74th Field Company.
 One Survey Section.
 †No. 4 Photo. Section.

Signal Units.—

†38th Divisional Signal Company, H.Q. Section.
 *40th Divisional Signal Company, H.Q. Section.
 No. 16 Pack Wireless Station

Infantry.—

43rd Brigade. (Commander.—Brigadier-General G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O.)
 Brigade Signal Section.
 4-39th Garhwal Rifles.
 57th Wilde's Rifles.
 82nd Punjabis.
 2-152nd Punjabis.
 67th Brigade. (Commander.—Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.)
 Brigade Signal Section.
 1-55th Coke's Rifles.
 1-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
 104th Wellesley's Rifles (relieved by 109th Infantry from 68th Brigade in Derajat Column).
 2-112th Infantry.

Pioneers.—

3-34th Sikh Pioneers.
 2-61st Pioneers (remained on L. of C. after Derajat Column reached Kotkai).

Militia.—

*Northern Waziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts and 20 Mounted Scouts).
 †Southern Waziristan Militia (100 Infantry Scouts).

NOTE.—

The 2-19th Punjabis,
 „ 82nd Punjabis,
 „ 1-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry,
 „ 2-112th Infantry
 were transferred to the L. of C. during the latter part of December. They were, later

* Tochi Column only.
 † Derajat Column only.

on in the operations, replaced in the force (with the exception of the 2-19th Punjabis, who came from the 68th Brigade, and were only with the Derajat Column for 5 days), by the following battalions, who joined the Column on the dates shown:—2-5th Gurkha Rifles, 5th January; 2-9th Gurkha Rifles, 10th January; 4-3rd Gurkha Rifles, 12th February; and 3-11th Gurkha Rifles, 16th February, 1920.

The 3-11th Gurkha Rifles became Column troops, while the 3 remaining Gurkha Regiments joined the 67th Brigade.

ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS WITH STRIKING FORCE.

Supply Units.—

No. 12 Divisional Supply and Transport Headquarters.
 No. 12 Divisional Troops Supply Section.
 No. 12 Divisional Supply Column Headquarters.
 No. 12 Divisional Supply Park.
 Nos. 7 and 34 Brigade Supply Sections.
 No. 381 Bakery Section.
 No. 381 Butchery Section.
 ½ No. 71 Bakery Section.
 ½ No. 71 Butchery Section.

Transport Units.—

48th, 49th, 66th, 67th (3 troops) and 71st Pack Mule Corps.
 3rd Government Camel Corps.
 8th Patiala Camel Corps.
 52nd, 53rd, 55th and 57th Silladar Camel Corps.

Medical Units.

Nos. 2 and 4 Indian Field Ambulances.
 No. 42 Combined Field Ambulance.
 No. 1 Bearer Unit.
 5 Combined Staging Sections.
 No. 3 Sanitary Section.

Post Offices.—

3 Field Post Offices.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION—FIGHTING TROOPS.

TOCHI.

No. 1 SECTION, BANNU LINES OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCES.

Area.—

From Mianwali—Kalabagh (inclusive) to Pezu (inclusive) and Idak (exclusive).

Commander.—

Brigadier-General T. R. Maclachlan, C.M.G.

Headquarters.—

Bannu.

Cavalry.—

31st D.C.O. Lancers (less 2 Squadrons).

Artillery.—

One Section, No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery.
 *2 10-pr. Post Guns.
 1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F.G.A.
 1 Section, 6.3-inch R.M.L. Howitzers, F.G.A.

* Later transferred to Nos. 2 Section, Tank Lines of Communication.

Machine Gun Corps.—

No. 5 Armoured Motor Battery.
Post Machine Guns.

Infantry.—

45th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-4th Rajputs.
2-25th Punjabis.
1-150th Infantry.
2-154th Infantry.
1 Company, Northern Waziristan Militia.

Supply Units.—

No. 9 Brigade Supply Section.
Nos. 77 and 78 Bakery Sections.
Nos. 77 and 78 Butchery Sections.

Details.—

Post Stokes Mortars.
E. Wireless Station.

NO. 2 SECTION, BANNU LINES OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCES.

Area.—

From Idak to Datta Khel (both inclusive). Datta Khel was evacuated on 25th November, 1919.

Commander.—

Brigadier-General W. C. Walton, C.B., C.M.G.

Headquarters.—

Dardoni.

Cavalry.—

2 Squadrons, 31st D.C.O. Lancers.

Artillery.—

No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).
1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F.G.A.

Sappers and Miners.—

74th Field Company.

Infantry.—

47th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-21st Punjabis.
2-69th Punjabis.
3-151st Punjabi Rifles.
3-152nd Punjabis.
Northern Waziristan Militia (less one Company).

Supply Units.—

No. 76 Brigade Supply Section.
No. 110 Brigade Supply Section.
No. 157 Bakery Section.
No. 157 Butchery Section.

Details.—

Post Stokes Mortars.
Post Machine Guns.
One Wireless Station.

DERAJAT.

NO. 1 SECTION, TANK LINES OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCES.

Area.—

Darya Khan to Hathala (both inclusive), later from Darya Khan to half-way between Khirgi and Jandola.

Commander.—

Brigadier-General R. B. Worgan, D.S.O.

Headquarters.—

Dera Ismail Khan (later Tank).

Cavalry.—

16th Cavalry.
21st P.A.V.O. Cavalry (less 1 Squadron).
27th Light Cavalry.

Artillery.—

1 Section, No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.
1 Section, 15-pr. Guns, F.G.A.

Machine Gun Corps.—

Nos. 6 and 7 Armoured Motor Batteries.
Post Machine Guns.

Infantry.—

62nd Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.
2-90th Punjabis.
2-94th Infantry.
2-102nd Grenadiers.
2-113th Infantry (later moved up to Kotkai and joined No. 2 Section, Tank L. of C.).
2-127th Baluchis (later moved up to Sora-rogha and joined 43rd Brigade).
2-150th Infantry (joined 43rd Brigade at Palosina on 29th December, 1919).
Southern Waziristan Militia (less detachment with Striking Column).

Supply Units.—

No. 119 Brigade Supply Section.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 395 Bakery Section.
 $\frac{1}{2}$ No. 395 Butchery Section.

Details.—

Post Stokes Mortars.
1 Stationary Wireless Plant.

NO. 2 SECTION, TANK LINES OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCES.

Area.—

From Hathala (exclusive) to Murtaza and Jandola (both inclusive), later took over area from half way between Khirgi and Jandola to Ahnai Tangi (inclusive).

Commander.—

Brigadier-General J. L. R. Gordon, C.B.

Headquarters.—

Manzai (later Jandola and Kotkai).

Cavalry.—

1 troop, 21st P. A. V. O. Cavalry.

Artillery.—

No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery (less one Section).
2 10-pr. Guns (from No. 1 Section, Bannu L. of C.).

Sappers and Miners.—

75th Field Company.

Infantry.—

68th Brigade Headquarters.
Brigade Signal Section.

3rd Guides (joined Striking Column on 18th January, 1920).

2-19th Punjabis.

2-76th Punjabis (joined Striking Column on 21st December, 1919, until 28th January, 1920).

109th Infantry (transferred to 67th Brigade on 17th December, 1920).

Supply Units.—

No. 37 Brigade Supply Section.

$\frac{1}{2}$ No. 396 Bakery Section.

$\frac{1}{2}$ No. 396 Butchery Section.

Details.—

Post Machine Guns.

No. 3 Pack Wireless Station.

ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS ON THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

Headquarters.—

Inspector-General of Communications,
Brigadier-General H. C. Tytler, D.S.O.

Signal Units.—

No. 1 L. of C. Signal Section.

L. of C. Signal Company (Indian Telegraph Department).

Headquarters Pack Cable Section and one Brigade Section of 40th Divisional Signal Company.

1 Brigade Section of 38th Divisional Signal Company.

Technical Units.—

Advanced Engineer Parks, Bannu, Tank and Mari-Indus.

26th Railway Company, Sappers and Miners.

122nd, 126th (one wing), 127th and 131st Railway Construction Companies.

No. 49 Works Battalion.

Detachment No. 9 Works Depôt.

Detachment No. 12 E. and M. Works Depôt.

11th Military Works Company.

3rd Punjab, 4th Madras and 5th Madras Works Battalion.

6th United Provinces Works Battalion.

13th, 15th, 101st, 103rd and 120th Military Works Labour Corps.

99th, 110th 112th and one wing 118th Labour Corps.

Supply Units.—

No. 21 Force Supply and Transport Headquarters.

No. 13 Divisional Supply and Transport Headquarters.

No. 13 Divisional Supply Park.

No. 13 Divisional Troops Supply Section.

Nos. 33, 35, 36, 61, 62 and 63 Brigade Supply Sections.

No. 13 Divisional Area Troops Supply Section.

Nos. 63, 64, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Bakery Sections.

Nos. 63, 64, 383, 384, 401, 402 and 675 Butchery Sections.

Nos. 22 23 and 24 Supply Depôt Headquarters.

Nos. 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,

173, 174, 175, 176, $\frac{1}{2}$ of 177, 206, 207, 312, 313 and 314 Supply Depôt Sections.

Nos. 22, 44 and 45 Supply Workshop Sections.

Nos. 77, 79, 80, $\frac{1}{2}$ of 82, 135 and 136 Supply Tally Sections.

Cattle Depôts at Bannu and Darya Khan.

Transport Units.—

64th, 65th, 68th (2 troops), 70th (5 troops), 72nd and 101st (6 troops) Pack Mule Corps.

157th Pack Sub-Division.

58th (4 troops), 59th, 60th (4 troops), 62nd and 69th (4 troops) Draught Corps.

2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 71st (3 troops) Government Camel Corps.

Nos. 7, 9, 14, 30, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 49, 50, 54 and 81 Bullock Half Troops.

3rd, 4th (4 troops), 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th (4 troops), 11th, 12th 14th (4 troops), 17th, 18th and 19th (4 troops) Bullock Corps.

81st (6 troops), 82nd and 83rd Local Corps.

1 Horse Transport Company.

Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 Ford Van Companies.

Medical Units.—

British Hospital, Bannu.

Indian General Hospital, Dera Ismail Khan.

Indian General Hospital, Tank.

Indian General Hospital, Bannu.

Indian Station Hospital, Dardoni.

Nos. 38, 43 and 49 Indian General Hospitals.

Nos. 7, 27, 38 and 118 Casualty Clearing Stations.

Nos. 16, 25, 27, 43 and 64 Combined Field Ambulances.

Nos. 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 41 and 43 British and 55, 59, 60 and 66 Indian Staging Sections.

Nos. 19 and 22 X-Ray Sections.

Nos. 4, 8 and 36 Sanitary Sections.

Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Bleaching Powder Laboratories.

Nos. 11 and 13 Advanced Depôts, Medical Stores.

No. 3 Motor Ambulance Convoy.

No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less one Section).

Veterinary Units.—

Nos. 5, 14 and 21 Field Veterinary Sections.

Nos. 26 and 27 Field Veterinary Sections (Camels).

No. 4 Base Depôt Veterinary Stores.

Remounts.—

Remount Depôt, Dera Ismail Khan.

Remount Depôt, Bannu.

Remount Depôt, Tank.

Ordnance.—

Advanced Ordnance Depôt, Bannu.

Advanced Ordnance Depôt, Tank.

Ordnance Transit Depôt, Mari-Indus.

No. 34 Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Bannu.

Post Offices.—

3 Field Post Offices.

APPENDIX No. 2.

COMPOSITION OF THE THREE ECHELONS OF THE TOCHI COLUMN ON 13TH NOVEMBER, 1919.

No. 1 Echelon.—

Column Headquarters—Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., Commanding.

No. 40 Divisional Signal Company, H.Q. Section.

No. 16 Pack Wireless Section.

1½ Squadrons, 31st D.C.O. Lancers.

1 Section, 4.5-inch Howitzers, R.F.A.

No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.

55th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.

2-61st Pioneers.

Northern Waziristan Militia Scouts (Cavalry and Infantry).

67th Brigade (comprising—1-55th Coke's Rifles, 1-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, 104th Wellesley's Rifles and 2-112th Infantry).

Survey Section.

Medical Units.

Supply and Transport Units. Also

2-21st Punjabis, and

2-76th Punjabis (less 2 Companies), both from 47th Brigade. These troops were used

for the defence of the L. of C. The 2-76th Punjabis were later transferred to the 68th Brigade for the Derajat operations, and on 21st December joined 67th Brigade.

No. 2 Echelon.—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. R. Wilkinson, D.S.O., 2-152nd Punjabis, Commanding.

74th Field Company, Sappers and Miners. 3-34th Pioneers.

2-152nd Punjabis.

No. 6 Armoured Motor Battery.

Medical Unit.

Supply and Transport Unit.

No. 3 Echelon.—

Brigadier-General G. Gwyn-Thomas, C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding.

1 Squadron (less 2 troops), 31st D.C.O. Lancers.

No. 33 Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).

43rd Brigade (less 2-152nd Punjabis), comprising—(4-39th Garhwal Rifles, 57th Wilde's Rifles, 82nd Punjabis, Medical Units and Supply and Transport Units).

APPENDIX No. 3.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE DERAJAT COLUMN ON THE 28TH DECEMBER, 1919.

Palosina.	Jandola.	Khirgi.	Manzai.
<i>Troops moving forward on 29th December, 1919.</i>	Headquarters 68th Brigade.	2-112th Infantry.	1 Section, No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.
Column Headquarters.	1 Troop, 21st P.A.V.O. Cavalry.		2-19th Punjabis.
No. 6 Mountain Battery, R.G.A.	No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery (less 2 Sections).		82nd Punjabis.
No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.	75th Field Company, Sappers and Miners (less one Section).		
1 Squadron, 21st Cavalry (less one troop).	2-61st Pioneers.		
55th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.	3rd Guides.		
3-34th Sikh Pioneers.	104th Wellesley's Rifles.		
38th Divisional Signal Company H.Q. Section.	2-150th Infantry.		
No. 16 Pack Wireless.	No. 3 Pack Wireless.		
109th Infantry.	Medical Units.		
2-76th Punjabis.	Supply and Transport Units.		
Headquarters 43rd Brigade.			
4-39th Garhwal Rifles.			
57th Wilde's Rifles.			
2-150th Infantry.			
2-152nd Punjabis.			
Medical Units.			
Supply and Transport Units.			
Divisional Ammunition Column.			

Troops remaining at Palosina Camp.

Headquarters 67th Brigade.

1 Section, No. 35 Indian Mountain Battery.

1 Section, 75th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.

1-55th Coke's Rifles.

1-103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

2-113th Infantry.

Southern Waziristan Militia Scouts.

Portion of Medical and Supply Units.

APPENDIX No. 4.

DETAIL OF TROOPS ADVANCING THROUGH THE
AHNAI TANGI ON THE 14TH JANUARY, 1920.

Advanced Guard.—

Commander. — Lieutenant-Colonel H. Herdon, C.I.E. (1-55th Coke's Rifles).
1-55th Coke's Rifles.
2 Companies, 2-5th Gurkha Rifles.
1 Section, No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.

Advanced Party, No. 38 Divisional Signal Company (H.Q. Section).

Special Flank Guard.—

Commander. — Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Crowdy, D.S.O. (2-5th Gurkha Rifles).
2-5th Gurkha Rifles (less 2 Companies).

Main Body.—

Commander.—Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G.
1 Troop, 21st Cavalry.
No. 6 Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).
No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery (less 2 Sections).

2-76th Punjabis.
2 Companies, 109th Infantry.
3-34th Sikh Pioneers.
55th Field Company, Sappers and Miners.
No. 38 Divisional Signal Company (H.Q. Section) (less Advanced Party).
No. 16 Pack Wireless Station.
Survey Section.
Photo. Section, 2nd Sappers and Miners.

Rear Guard.—

Commander. — Major A. E. Mahon, D.S.O. (attached 109th Infantry).
109th Infantry (less 2 Companies).

Covering move of Transport on road in rear of Column.—

Commander.—Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.
2-9th Gurkha Rifles.
57th Wilde's Rifles
1 Section, No. 6 Mountain Battery, R.G.A.
1 Section, No. 27 Indian Mountain Battery.

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