

afterwards moving to a cave on the Hela Tug, fifteen miles north-west of Medishe, where Le deposited his two machine guns, arms, ammunition and treasure. Here he hid until he was informed of the presence of the troops at Jidali and the capture of Baran, when he decided to flee south. Ibrahim Boghol, one of his best known leaders, had been sent back to arrange for the complete evacuation of the Surud-Jidali area and the flight to the Nogal, and it was clear that the whole of the Dervish force and stock would already be streaming south. The estimate of the Dervish riflemen was given as 700. There were great numbers of other people in the Mullah's following, but their fighting value was negligible.

15. The Camel Corps took up the pursuit from Jidali at 6 p.m. on the 30th and, marching through the night, with a brief halt seven miles south of Bariat, arrived at Eil Der at 9 a.m. on the 31st. The tracks of the Mullah's party, crossed near Jitasale, were apparently leading towards Danan (lat. $10^{\circ} 7'$, long. $47^{\circ} 49'$). After despatching a mounted patrol to follow their tracks, Colonel Summers decided to push straight on, moving parallel to and west of the Mullah's line of retreat in the most direct line to the Nogal with the intention of cutting in if once ahead of the party. At Eil Der the Camel Corps crossed the main line of the Dervish retreat, littered with discarded property. Small parties of Dervishes were now seen moving in every direction driving stock. A few shots were exchanged and a considerable quantity of camels, cattle, and sheep, as well as some ponies, were rounded up. But driving the stock entailed delay, while the Mullah at the head of the retreat was reported to be moving fast. It was most important to head him off before he got right away south, and in any case it seemed certain that with the Camel Corps once ahead of the main retreat all the Mullah's property in the Surud and Jidali area must subsequently fall into our hands or be taken by the friendlies. Consequently the stock collected was handed over to Illaloes, and after a short rest at Eil Der, the column pressed on reaching Gud Anod by 8 p.m. That morning at 10 o'clock aeroplanes patrolling the country east of Eil Afweina intercepted near Daringahiye (lat. $9^{\circ} 57'$, long. $47^{\circ} 34'$) bombed and shot up from 100 feet a party of horsemen escaping south with the Mullah's own baggage and faster moving stock. At Gud Anod Colonel Summers had to decide whether he would cut straight across to Daringahiye or move to Eil Afweina. Believing that the Mullah was still well ahead and the chase would be a long one he chose the latter course. The column moved on at once and reached Eil Afweina just after midnight, having covered the 70 miles in 30 hours. With replenished supplies the mounted column continued the pursuit next morning, moving towards Hudin (lat $9^{\circ} 8'$, long $47^{\circ} 25'$) via Ber Waiso (lat. $9^{\circ} 43'$, long. $47^{\circ} 33'$). Colonel Summers himself returned to Eil Afweina to organise, in the absence of his "Q" Staff Officer at Jidali, a light supply column to follow the mounted troops; and Lieut.-Colonel Ismay, in command of the Camel Corps, had orders to establish a post at Hudin. The Camel Corps reached this point at 6.30 p.m. on the 2nd February, having thus covered a distance of 150 miles in 72 hours. Animals and men now needed a rest.

16. While these operations and movements

were in progress His Majesty's ships "Odin" and "Clio" had been ceaselessly patrolling the Somali coast and had performed invaluable service by maintaining wireless communication between "A" and "B" Force, and assisting officers of the Royal Air Force who had made forced landings on the coast. With the disruption of the Dervish forces in the Jidali area the time had come for the projected naval attack on the Dervish fort at Galbaribur. Accordingly a naval contingent from the two ships consisting of 8 officers, 91 petty officers, non-commissioned officers and men, with 3 Lewis guns, 2 Maxim guns and 1 12-pounder 4 cwt. Naval field gun, under the command of Captain Hewett, disembarked on the 5th February at Sanak. The contingent arrived within sight of Galbaribur fort at 4 p.m. on the 6th February. Early next morning the first attack was delivered, the field gun opening fire with high explosive shell at a range of 525 yards, which was later reduced to 400 yards. After two hours' bombardment, during which the 12-pounder had fired 47 rounds, a considerable breach had been effected in the upper story of the fort; but the rubble and debris at the foot of the wall was not sufficiently high to make it scaleable without storming ladders. Captain Hewett accordingly decided to withdraw to the *zariba* to await the arrival of fresh ammunition. At 8.15 a.m. on the next day the attack was renewed. By 9 a.m. the breach seemed practicable for storming, and at 9.20 a.m. a storming party consisting of 10 marines, selected from both ships, and the "Clio" Lewis gun detachment, under the command of Lieutenant Philip H. Calderon, Royal Navy (H.M.S. "Clio"), advanced with Mills bombs and short signal lights under cover of a Lewis gun. In the meantime the whole firing line advanced by sections and closed in on an arc around the western face of the fort. Within four minutes the storming party had scaled the breach and were firing into the interior of the fort with Lewis gun, rifle and pistol. Working their way on to the roof they threw their bombs into the covered portion of the courtyard, where the garrison were now sheltering, firing through the loopholes, and some fodder was set alight which blew up the Dervish ammunition. At 10.35 a.m. the commander of the garrison left the fort with his rifle and attempted to make off in an easterly direction, but was shot dead before he had proceeded 50 yards. At 10.40 a.m. the Illaloes swarmed into the courtyard and the remainder of the garrison, which refused to surrender, were killed. The fort was subsequently demolished by a party under the command of Lieutenant Charles V. Jack, Royal Navy (H.M.S. "Odin").

17. As soon as the flight of the Mullah south was known Eil Afweina had been commissioned by Group Captain Gordon as an advanced base for the Royal Air Force; and on the 1st February an aerial reconnaissance was carried out to Tale, which was located and bombed, valuable photographs being taken. These photographs revealed that Tale was a formidable, strongly-fortified position consisting of a main walled enclosure surmounted by 13 forts, with three covering forts of great height and strength distant about 200 yards. Subsequent inspection, after the capture of the position, showed that these fortifications were all stone built, 12-14 feet thick at the base and about 6 feet at the top, and the covering forts were not less