



FOURTH SUPPLEMENT

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MONDAY, 8 MARCH, 1920.

War Office,
8th March, 1920.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatch from Major-General Sir George F. MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., officiating Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, describing events since 1st January, 1919, including various operations between March and September, 1919:—

General Headquarters,
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force,
Baghdad.

12th November, 1919.

Sir,
I have the honour to forward a report on operations in Mesopotamia since Sir William Marshall's despatch dealing with events up to 31st December, 1918. (*Published in the London Gazette of 11th April, 1919, No. 31287.*)

These consist of:—

(a) Two minor operations against recalcitrant Arab Chiefs, on the Lower Euphrates in April and May.

(b) Certain operations of the force in North Persia in conjunction with a Persian Cossack Brigade, and

(c) Two separate more serious campaigns in Southern and Central Kurdistan.

Sir William Marshall left for home on leave early in February and was succeeded by Sir Alexander Cobbe who handed over Command to me at the beginning of May.

2. The first few months succeeding the Armistice were occupied in demobilising troops surplus to the force considered necessary for the Army of occupation and generally reducing all auxiliary services, during which time there were no local disturbances.

The long delay in coming to a decision as to the future of the country which originally looked to an effective British control as certain and immediate, has had a deteriorating result. Pan-Arab enthusiasts, Pan-Islam and Pan-Turk propaganda, the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the approach of Bolshevism towards Persia, have all had an adverse effect. Intrigue of all kinds has been rife and there have been many disturbing rumours in the air, which were not long in having evil results.

In March and April Sir Alexander Cobbe found it necessary to undertake minor operations against the tribes on the lower Euphrates who were defying the Civil Authorities and refusing the usual revenue. Disturbances had

also commenced amongst the Kurds north of Mosul, a Political officer being murdered by the Goyan tribe.

3. These events induced General Cobbe just before leaving, in consultation with me, to wire that he considered that the battalions on the Mesopotamian Lines of Communication (which included the guarding of 25,000 Turkish prisoners of war) should remain at 14 instead of being reduced to five in May as originally intended.

On taking over command and surveying the situation generally, I reported to the War Office that I was much struck with the volcanic possibilities of the country, giving as my reasons:—

(1) Muhammadan unrest in Egypt and India.

(2) The spreading Akwan (Wahabi) Movement in Central Arabia (which movement was bordering our territory on the Lower Euphrates).

(3) The Kurdish unrest.

(4) The Pan-Arab intrigue.

(5) The large number of well-armed tribes between Baghdad and the Sea, both on the Tigris and the Euphrates.

4. Shortly after the despatch of this telegram (early in May) minor troubles commenced on the Lower Euphrates. An Arab Chief, one Badr, who had refused to acknowledge our authority, became a centre of disaffection, collecting tribesmen and urging opposition to our authority. Action with troops, levies, gunboats and planes broke up the gathering for the time, and it appears that Badr will accept the inevitable. His son has been placed in power in his stead.

5. While these disturbances were occurring in the south, a fresh and far more serious storm centre developed in Southern Kurdistan many hundred miles to the north. Sheikh Mahmud, one of the principal Chiefs of Southern Kurdistan and our nominee rose in revolt, arrested all our officials, seized the Treasury, and cut the wires.

Pending further information of the extent of the crisis a brigade of the 18th Division was pushed across the plains to the foot of the hills, where the Kurds were already attacking our outposts and convoys. It was soon evident that an undoubted test of our power was in progress, which was giving rise to the wildest rumours throughout Mesopotamia, and I decided to undertake a summer campaign at once, sending Major-General Fraser with two brigades of his division to release the prisoners and crush Sheikh Mahmud.

After a sensational success on the Bazyan Pass, in which Sheikh Mahmud was wounded and captured, his force broken up, and the prisoners released, our troops traversed the whole of the area, and after two months' extremely trying operations in great heat and in difficult country, the Civil Administration was completely restored.

6. Before these operations came to an end, trouble broke out in Central Kurdistan some 200 miles to the north, where our administration was endeavouring to pacify and reorganise the Christian and Kurdish population of the Mosul Vilayet. Small outposts had been left in the Kurdish hills by the garrison at Mosul while the local Gendarmerie was being organised and our administration established.

It came as a great surprise when, on July 16th, the Muhammadan townspeople and

Gendarmes of Amadia, in the hills some 80 miles north of Mosul, murdered the British political officer, the Gendarmerie officer and the Christian Gendarmerie. An advance by troops from the nearest outpost was opposed, and it soon transpired that the tribes in this district also, believing our troops had gone, had risen to test our power. I immediately ordered Major-General Cassels, Commanding at Mosul, to move one brigade to Amadia, and followed this by assembling a second one at Zakkho. The hostility had by now grown so widespread that it appeared necessary to beat out the whole country and penetrate into every fastness. Three months' arduous operations and considerable fighting in the most difficult country, of these two brigades, under Major-General Cassels, resulted in the restoration of civil control and pacification of the country-side, from which the troops have now returned.

The lawless condition of the country may still result in outrage by small bodies, and we have no guarantee that trouble may not break out in districts hitherto unaffected.

7. The operations in both Central and Southern Kurdistan have been carried out in the height of a Mesopotamian summer, in most difficult country. During the concentration and actual operations the troops have been much exposed, have had to fight active and extremely well armed mountaineers, and the endurance of all-ranks has been beyond praise.

The prompt crushing of Sheikh Mahmud's dangerous rising is due to the energy, determination and knowledge of frontier warfare displayed by Major-General T. Fraser, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., while the success of the operations in Central Kurdistan and the penetration of the innermost Kurdish fastnesses is due to the vigour and thoroughness of Major-General Cassels, C.B., D.S.O.

In addition to the British and Indian troops, an Australian wireless troop and an Assyrian battalion raised from refugees took part.

The Royal Air Force took an active part in the operations in both Southern and Central Kurdistan, over very difficult country, in which a forced landing would almost certainly have meant disaster, especially in Central Kurdistan. Their assistance both in reconnoitring and in offence have been invaluable, and entailed a considerable strain on the personnel. I have specially brought to the notice of the Air Ministry the services of certain officers and men.

The operations referred to are described in more detail in Appendix "A," with which I also forward the following:—

Appendix "B."—Names of Officers, War-warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers and men deserving of special notice and reward. (*Names published in London Gazette dated 12th February, 1920, No. 31777.*)

Appendix "C."—List of troops engaged.

Appendix "D."—List of casualties.

Appendix "E."—Nominal roll of Officers killed, also explanatory general and local maps. (*Not reproduced in the Gazette.*)

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. F. MACMUNN,
Major-General,

Officiating Commander-in-Chief,
Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX A.

Detailed account of various operations in Mesopotamia between March and September, 1919:—

I.—OPERATIONS ON THE LOWER EUPHRATES.

These were not in themselves serious, but very indicative of the unrest that anti-British agencies were sowing and of the activities of the recalcitrant Arab Sheikh Badr al Ramaiyidh, who was becoming a centre to which intriguers and hostile agents could turn, and in which the notorious Ajami could act. His haunts were the country on the left bank of the Euphrates in the vicinity of Nasiriyah.

During February, tribal horse levies aided by gunboats and four 'planes attacked his camp on several occasions, and eventually drove him and his followers from the district for a time. In May, however, he returned with a fresh following and attacked Levy posts. An attempt was made to surround him with Levies and friendly tribes, supported again by gunboats, 'planes and a wing of infantry. Some smart skirmishing occurred, and Badr lost his camp and flocks, but got away. The floods were so widespread that it was impossible, at this time of the year, to do more than prevent his following increasing.

The general unrest, however, was spreading and towards the end of March tribes, who are well armed, in the district of Rumaithah, on the Euphrates, threatened to attack our Government centre at Rumaithah. Cavalry and machine guns were sent to Rumaithah to attack the tribes, and infantry were moved to several threatened points. The armed gatherings were attacked by 'planes, and considerable losses inflicted, with the result that the tribes in that neighbourhood handed in good firearms, including a large number of breech-loaders, and pulled down their towers.

II.—OPERATIONS IN PERSIA.

During this period certain minor operations took place in Persia, in support of the Persian Government, against the Jangalis on the borders of the Caspian at the end of March, and in support of the Persian Governor, against rebellious Kurds near our own border, in both cases at the request of the Persian Government through the British Minister.

Our share of the operations in the former case took the form of holding lines in a drive on the main road, and assisting the Persian Cossack Brigade with mountain guns and a detachment of infantry and 'planes. The activities of our troops largely contributed to the success of the operations, which were handsomely acknowledged by the Persian Government.

The latter consisted of attacks by aeroplanes on centres of Kurdish rising, which enabled the Persian force to quiet the whole district.

III.—OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN KURDISTAN.

Our general position in Kurdistan extended only to those portions of the Kurdish hills which lay within the occupied territory, viz., the vilayet of Baghdad and Mosul, as agreed on at the Armistice.

For general convenience these are referred to in my despatches as Southern and Central Kurdistan, divided by the Greater Zab, and include the town and district of Sulaimaniyah, the Rania plain, Rowanduz, Aqra, Amadia

and Zakkho, with all of which the ordinary administrative relations were opened on the withdrawal of Turkish troops and Turkish Higher Officials. For some months our chief energies were directed to feeding the starving inhabitants of the valley whose supplies had been eaten by the Turks and whose houses had been destroyed by Russian and Armenian troops.

Our relations with the tribes and Chiefs were well known to be benevolent, and to have good government and local sentiment at heart, but months of propaganda of the Committee of Union and Progress, added to wild rumours of Armenian revenge, gradually undermined the good will of many of the tribes. Added to this is the fact that in Southern Kurdistan the principal men are barons with armed retainers, who terrorize their neighbours, rather than tribal chiefs who lead and father their tribes. To such barons the Pax Britannica and level justice make no appeal.

In Southern Kurdistan Sheikh Mahmud in the early days of our arrival seemed the most likely leader to whom authority could be given, but it was soon found that his prominence largely rested on his own unscrupulousness, and on the prestige of his grandfather's name.

Impatience of control, the belief that we were sending most of our troops away and that he could safely play a hand of his own, induced him to make his coup d'état of May 22nd. Persian Kurds and his own adherents attacked and overpowered the Kurdish levies under British officers, and he himself seized the Treasury and imprisoned all British officers (six) and their assistants, cut the telegraphs, hoisted a flag of his own, and assumed full control.

The nearest British troops were distributed in support of the Civil power on the edge of the Kurdish hills, consisting of a battalion with detachments of cavalry, artillery and light armoured cars, of which the bulk were at Kirkuk, seventy miles from Sulaimaniyah. Eighty miles behind on the far side of the Tigris was a brigade and some divisional troops of the 18th Division, at and near the rail head of Baiji.

The Officer Commanding at Kirkuk was ordered to push forward a detachment as far as the Chamchamal plain on the easier hills, and the brigade at Baiji was ordered to push up to Kirkuk as fast as the heat and problem of water supply would permit. Unfortunately the Officer Commanding at Kirkuk thought circumstances justified his disregarding his orders, and endeavoured to penetrate the mountains with some mounted troops, levies, armoured cars and Lewis guns in Ford vans. This force penetrated to the Tashlujah Pass some 12 miles from Sulaimaniyah, the principal town of Southern Kurdistan (where our prisoners were confined), but was surrounded and compelled to retire, followed over 25 miles, losing four armoured cars and nineteen Ford vans, and suffered severe casualties.

The failure of this premature action confirmed the Kurds in their rebellion, and a convoy and reinforcements moving to Chamchamal were heavily attacked in the lower hills, by this time the situation was clearing, and I ordered Major-General Fraser, Commanding 18th Division, to leave his headquarters at Mosul, take a second brigade of infantry and more artillery, and assume command of a special force (called the Southern Kurdistan

Force) to which troops and services to complete the line of communication were added. Major-General Cassels, Commanding the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, was ordered to assume command of the troops at Mosul, and withdraw detachments from the hills north of Mosul to within reinforcing reach of his own force.

As soon as Brigadier-General Morris and the leading troops of the 55th Brigade reached Kirkuk, reinforcements were pushed up towards Chamchamal. The first echelons had been pushed on to protect the road, and a detachment of 32nd Lancers and 1/5th East Surreys were surrounded and had to defend themselves for 36 hours against heavy attacks, without water, while a small convoy was captured. The arrival of more troops soon restored order, and Major-General Fraser then proceeded to assemble his force at Chamchamal and organize his communications.

During this period the daily temperature varied from 104 to 112, and the foot hills were as hot as the plains, so that the collecting of sufficient troops to advance from Kirkuk and hold 70 miles of hilly road between Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah took some time.

During this period of preparation Sheikh Mahmud was informed that any harm or indignities offered to the prisoners in Sulaimaniyah would be visited on his head, and aeroplane reconnaissances had seen them on the roof of a house. The regular move forward of troops, however, had steadied the tribes, and Sheikh Mahmud's following lessened.

It was not till the 17th June that Major-General Fraser felt he could safely advance, but the intervening time had been spent in settling the disturbed districts adjacent, in making various reconnaissances, and keeping his troops supplied. Sheikh Mahmud was found to be holding the Darbandi Baziyan Pass in the Qara Dagh range of hills 12 miles from Chamchamal, the only entrance into the hills, and a famous pass in which so recently as 1910 a Turkish force had been destroyed. The hills here consisted of a wall of rock 4,000 feet high with a "V" shaped gap 1,000 feet lower. This gap had been spanned by a solid but now ruined stone wall useful as a breast work.

On 17th June Major-General Fraser advanced to within striking distance of this pass, and it was now impossible to hide his intentions from the enemy above after driving in bodies of Kurds. The next morning before daybreak our troops started to scale the almost perpendicular heights of the Qara Dagh, and were practically on the top when at early dawn the guns opened on the pass. The Kurds, expecting a frontal attack in the Turkish style up the roads, were paralysed to find themselves attacked and surrounded from above. The 85th Burmans smothered them, and by 4.45 a.m. the whole pass was in our hands, Sheikh Mahmud and his brother wounded and prisoners, and the whole of his force killed, captured or vanished. Forty-eight of the enemy lay dead on the ground and well over 100 were captured, which is a considerable result against mountaineers.

Major-General Fraser, anxious for the safety of the prisoners in the hands of disappointed guards, immediately ordered the 32nd Lancers to push right through the remaining 30 miles to Sulaimaniyah. Short of officers, led only by two very junior subalterns, this regiment pushed on with great dash, carrying the town by surprise, overpowering the guard before the

news of defeat on the Baziyan had penetrated, and releasing the prisoners after ten weeks' close confinement.

The main force entered Sulaimaniyah the next morning, and thus ended a brilliant little operation which stemmed what might have been a very serious rising, and which all Mesopotamia was watching.

Once the preliminary stage had passed, our losses in the main actions were trivial.

The next six weeks were spent in exacting punishment from the rebellious chiefs, small columns penetrating every mountain fastness, while a lightly-equipped column that had been sent through the difficult hills from railhead near the Persian border also marched into Sulaimaniyah from the south. By the first week in August order had been fully restored, and Major-General Fraser withdrew after restoring the Civil Administration to full control of the country, leaving a temporary garrison at Sulaimaniyah and establishing the headquarters of a reduced force at Kirkuk. A small column had been sent to Erbil to withdraw the Civil Administration from a very isolated position at Rowanduz and to march through the Rania district.

In closing the outline of this short, self-contained campaign, I would specially comment on the endurance of the troops, who were without shelter much of the time, on their success as mountaineers against famous mountain tribes, and on the excellent administration of the force which resulted in very little sickness at a time of intense heat.

The fighting during the preliminary stage was severe, and I have specially to refer to the conduct of Lieutenant (temporary Major) Fraser, an officer of four years' service, who was commanding the force referred to as having been attacked for 36 waterless hours in great heat, and of the men of his regiment, 32nd Lancers, and 1/5th East Surrey Regiment forming his detachment. For actions on this occasion I have given certain immediate rewards.

The communications from Baiji to Kirkuk were under command of Brigadier-General G. A. F. Sanders, an officer of wide experience and organizing powers.

IV.—OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL KURDISTAN.

The operations that I was compelled to take in Central Kurdistan, some eighty miles north of Mosul, just as those in Southern Kurdistan were drawing to a close, were necessitated by the murder of the Assistant Political Officer, the Gendarmerie Officer, with one British N.C.O. with their servants on the night of the 14th July, as well as of certain Christian Gendarmes.

The Amadia Valley and Plateau is occupied by a mixed Christian and Kurdish population, and was administered by us in the interest of law and order, the Political Officer in charge being assisted by local Gendarmerie, in which both Muhammedan and Christian tribesmen were enlisted. From January to May a small British detachment had supported the institution of British control, and had been withdrawn 25 miles in May to a more accessible spot. There was also a British outpost at Zakkho on the Khabur.

For some time Turkish intrigue and propaganda had been rife, and in March the Goyans, a very inaccessible tribe near the Armistice Line, after inviting a Political

Officer to visit them, murdered him (March 19th). The attempt to penetrate to Amadia after the murder of the Political Officer, with a military escort, was strongly resisted, and it soon became evident that a large number of the tribes had joined against us, and that the moment was regarded by the whole countryside as a test of our power to hold our own and maintain order.

While the situation was being gauged, a brigade from the 18th Division, under Brigadier-General Nightingale, was ordered to assemble at Sowaira, the outpost 25 miles from Amadia. As soon as the extent of the rising became evident, I assembled a second brigade partly drawn from the 17th Division at Zakkho, under Brigadier-General Wooldridge, the whole under command of Major-General Cassels, and I decided to traverse the whole country thoroughly as the only means of punishing the murderers and generally re-asserting our prestige and authority.

It took a fortnight to assemble the troops and their transport, many of which had to come from Baghdad, owing to the main portion of the 18th Division being still engaged in Southern Kurdistan, but by the end of July all was ready.

The first move was made by Brigadier-General Nightingale, who marched during the night of 1st August and surrounded the rebellious village of Bamurni, with complete success, killing and capturing a considerable number of the enemy and a store of rifles. This move was followed by a steady tramping out of all the neighbouring valleys, with sharp fighting, loss inflicted on the enemy, and the capture and execution of some of the murderers. On the 8th August a reconnaissance was severely handled in most difficult scrub-clad gorges by a Kurdish ambush, which was eventually driven off with considerable loss, and our wounded recovered. The column then moved through the Ser Amadia (8,000 feet) to visit villages and districts beyond, where loss and punishment were inflicted on the Barwaria.

While Brigadier-General Nightingale was traversing the Sar Amadia, a gathering of more distant tribes from the west of the Khabur River attacked the Northern Advanced Base at Sowaira in force just before dawn. Unfortunately, a commanding piquet was lost which took some time to regain. The troops, surprised in their camp, behaved admirably, and, despite considerable casualties, recaptured the piquet and drove off the enemy, inflicting considerable loss. They were much assisted by two aeroplanes which arrived in the middle of the fight. The enemy in this action was extremely well supplied with ammunition.

The above incident necessitated strengthening the lines of communication, and it was not till the 18th August that the next phase of the operations developed. This consisted of Brigadier-General Wooldridge advancing from Zakkho against the Guli tribe who had taken part in the attack on Sowaira, while Brigadier-General Nightingale again advanced into the less accessible country beyond the Sar Amadia.

Brigadier-General Wooldridge now found himself in terrain combining the precipitousness of the more difficult parts of the North-West Frontier of India, with the jungles of the North-Eastern Frontier, which called for great individual enterprise and activity from companies and platoons. The first move was

against Bernuna, a village surrounded by precipitous ridges covered by a large force of the enemy on an adjacent natural fortress. The fighting here was considerable, and in several successive movements through the gorges our troops inflicted loss on the enemy, and sustained few casualties.

By this time a considerable force of Gulis and Goyans had again assembled at Bernuna and Nightingale's column was brought down to assist in the operations. With the exception of a small force surprised in Bernuna the bulk of the enemy evaded our attempt to surround them.

The force had now been joined by the Assyrian battalion, which had been raised from the refugees and had come to us in 1918, via Persia, from the Christian districts beyond Amadia, after the Russian collapse. This battalion under British officers was entirely composed of mountaineers; and proved a most valuable addition to our force, quite equal to the Kurds at their own tactics.

The next few weeks were spent in finishing the tramping out of all the valleys occupied by the hostile tribes, with the result that almost all had sent in to ask for terms, and the programme for Nightingale's column working from Amadia was finished by September 15th. Wooldridge's column was still engaged with a similar object west of the Khabur, and with similar results when a large body of Goyans, whose distant valleys had not been visited but who, it was hoped, had had enough, appeared. After some fighting it was obvious that they were not yet subdued and must be hammered. To ensure a quiet winter I decided it would be necessary to re-enter the gorges and penetrate to Karoar their principal village. As this meant passing through several miles of gorges, Major-General Cassels arranged to concentrate both columns on the one line and move on Karoar. This was done, Nightingale leading; and the Goyans were defeated in an engagement on the Balakish ridge in which the troops showed great dash, the heart of the country reached, and part of Karoar burnt as a punishment for the murder of the Political Officer in March.

The forces then withdrew unmolested and dispersed towards Mosul, the Goyans showing no desire for further hostilities.

This closed a campaign of two and a half months, in which the exertion of the troops, coming at a time when they might well have looked for rest, has been beyond praise. The hills and jungle had been precipitous and scrub-clad, and every day's operations meant ascending and descending two and even three thousand feet. The results promise already to be of the happiest; all the tribes are in a penitent and amenable mood, while the ability of our troops to penetrate the most inaccessible mountains and compete in mountain warfare with pronounced success, has spread through the countryside, and, I confidently hope, will enable the Civil Administration and the Gendarmerie to carry out its duties not only unmolested but with the respectful good will of the tribes.

I have already expressed my acknowledgments to Major-General Cassels for his energy in pushing the campaign and conducting the intricate problem of supply, and would specially acknowledge the skill and determination of Brigadier-General Nightingale, C.M.G., D.S.O., and Brigadier-General Wooldridge.

APPENDIX "C."

List of troops engaged.

A.—SOUTHERN KURDISTAN OPERATIONS.

55th Brigade.

1/5th East Surrey Regiment.

85th Burma Rifles.

1/87th Punjabis.

1/116th Mahrattas (less 1 company).

239th Company, 18th Indian Machine Gun Battalion.

55th Brigade Signal Section.

55th Brigade S.A.A. Section.

1 Company, 49th Bengal Infantry.

Mobile Section, 18th Division, Light Trench Mortar Battery.

39th Combined Field Ambulance.

A Flight 63rd Squadron, R.A.F.

32nd Lancers.

1 Section B Battery, 336th Brigade, R.F.A.

D Battery, 336th Brigade, R.F.A. (less 1 Section).

25th Indian Mountain Battery.

No. 2 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.

Cable Section, 17th Divisional Signal Company.

Motor Airline Section, 31st Signal Company.

23rd Pack Wireless Station, 2nd Squadron, Sappers and Miners.

Body's Column.

1 Sub-section 26th Indian Mountain Battery.

No. 13 Company, 2nd S. and Miners (less 1 Section).

No. 28 Pack Station, 2nd Wireless Squadron, S. and M.

1/10th Gurkha Rifles.

1 Platoon, 1/32nd Sikh Pioneers.

Lines of Communication.

1½ Squadrons Guides Cavalry.

B Battery, 336th Brigade, R.F.A. (less 1 Section).

1 Section D Battery, 336th Brigade, R.F.A.

1 Section 50th Indian Mountain Battery.

53rd Brigade Signal Section.

No. 32 Pack Station, 2nd Wireless Squadron, S. and M.

6th Loyal North Lancs. Regiment.

3/9th Bhopal Infantry.

1/3rd Gurkha Rifles.

2 Companies 8th Rajputs.

1 Company 1/116th Mahrattas.

207th Company, 18th Indian Machine Gun Battalion.

1 Section L.A.M. Battery.

53rd Brigade, S.A.A. Section.

2 Section, 38th Combined Field Ambulance.

No. 8 Mobile Veterinary Section.

B.—CENTRAL KURDISTAN OPERATIONS.

Headquarters, 18th Division.

A Flight, 63rd Squadron, R.A.F.

Amadia Column.

34th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).

2 Sections No. 8 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.

No. 14 Pack Station, D Troop, 1st Aus. Wireless Sqn.

Dett. 54th Brigade Signal Section.

2 Companies 1/39th Garhwal Rifles.

1/52nd Sikhs F.F.

1/7th Gurkha Rifles.

Assyrian Battalion (less 1 Company).

1 Section 48th Combined Field Ambulance.

Amadia Column, Lines of Communication.

2 Squadrons 11th Lancers.

1 Section C Battery, 336th Brigade, R.F.A.

2 Section, 61st Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners.

No. 24 Pack Station, D Troop, 1st Aus. Wireless Sqn.

2 Companies 1/8th Rajputs.

1/128th Pioneers

Dett. 106th Pioneers.

30th Combined Field Ambulance.

Dett. 40th Combined Field Ambulance.

Zakho Column.

49th Indian Mountain Battery (less 1 Section).

2 Sections No. 6 Company, 1st Sappers and Miners.

No. 13 Pack Station, D Troop, 1st Aus. Wireless Sqn.

Dett. 31st Signal Company.

1/39th Garhwal Rifles (less 2 companies).

1/113th Infantry.

1/126th Baluchistan Infantry.

1 Sec., 238 Company, 18th Indian Machine Gun Battalion.

Dett. 32nd Combine Field Ambulance.

Zakho Column, Lines of Communication.

1 Squadron 11th Lancers.

1 Section 49th Indian Mountain Battery.

61st Company, 2nd Sappers and Miners (less 2 Sections).

No. 32 Pack Station, 2nd Wireless Sqn., 1st S. and M.

18th Rajputs (less 2 Companies).

Garrison Section, 18th Divisional L.T.M. Battery.

Dett. 40th Combined Field Ambulance.

APPENDIX "D."

This Appendix is not reproduced. The following is a summary of it covering the Southern and Central Kurdistan operations:—

	Officers.		Other ranks.	
	British.	Indian.	British.	Indian.
Killed ...	10	4	8	115†
Wounded ...	7	12	14	207†
Missing ...	—	—	—	9
	17	16	22	331

† Includes in each case 1 Assyrian.

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