



FIFTH SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette.

Of FRIDAY, the 12th of DECEMBER, 1919.

Published by Authority.

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MONDAY, 15 DECEMBER, 1919.

War Office,
15th December, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following Despatches from General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., on the military operations in the Hedjaz from the 9th June, 1916, to 31st January, 1919:—

[Despatch No. 1.]

Cairo,
25th June, 1917.

My Lord,

I have the honour to present the following report on the progress of military operations in the Hedjaz:—

1. The Arab leaders of the anti-Turkish revolt having expressed their desire for material assistance and the advice of Allied officers, the military control and supervision of all arrangements to that end devolved upon me. The selection of the necessary personnel was not an easy matter. Officers with the qualifications

for such delicate work, necessitating a combination of military experience, tact, knowledge of Arabs and acquaintance with their language, are extremely difficult to find, but we are fortunate in the few whose services it has been possible to secure.

2. Soon after the commencement of the Arab operations it became evident that it would be desirable to place a small force of disciplined troops at the service of the Sherif, and six mountain guns and six machine guns with the necessary officers and other personnel were organised as two complete batteries and despatched to the Hedjaz at the end of June, 1916.

That these troops did good service is evident from a message received from the Sherif on the 21st August, 1916, informing me of his satisfaction with the services executed by them, and bringing to special notice El Lewa Sayed Pasha Ali and Yuzbashia Abdel Hamid Effendi Fuad, and Mohammed Effendi Kamel.

3. When the Arab campaign opened on 9th June, 1916, the Turks were to a great extent taken by surprise, and the Sherif's forces were

successful in capturing Mecca and Jeddah within the first month. The garrison of Taif held out for three and a half months, its eventual capture on 22nd September, 1916, being very largely due to the support of the Egyptian Artillery detachment under the command of El Lewa Sayed Pasha Ali. Medina was invested immediately, but the presence of a picked force of 3,500 Turks destined for operations in Southern Arabia in connection with the Stotzingen Mission made it too difficult an operation for the Arab forces to carry out, and the city was not captured. This has led to a considerable prolongation of operations, as the Turks were enabled to keep open the railway and use Medina as a base from which to threaten Mecca.

4. In the middle of September, 1916, a French Military Mission left Suez for Jeddah under the direction of Colonel Brémond. The Mission was composed of two French officers and four Moslem officers of French regiments. The objects of this Mission were to keep in touch with the military situation and to concert with the King of the Hedjaz and the British authorities regarding such military assistance as it might be found possible and advisable to give to the Arabs on behalf of the French Government.

At that time the Arab threat on Medina had, to a large extent, been dissipated, and the enemy were in a position to threaten an advance against Mecca. It was of vital importance to prevent the recapture of Mecca by the Turks, more especially at a moment when the pilgrimage was about to start.

5. Early in October, although the pilgrimage had been carried out without hindrance, the situation in the Hedjaz had become a serious one, and the threatened advance from Medina via Rabegh to Mecca appeared to have a considerable chance of success. The Turks, under the direction of Fakhreddin Pasha, were steadily progressing with the establishment of advanced supply depôts, the collection of transport, and the improvement of communications, and, provided they were able to overcome the difficulties of supply and transport in a waterless country, there appeared to be no reason why they should not succeed in recapturing Mecca.

6. On 30th October, 1916, incidentally the day after the Sherif had declared himself King, approval was given for the despatch to Rabegh of a flight of aeroplanes, which it was hoped would prove of much value in the operations impending. The flight was despatched to Rabegh early in November.

7. In the autumn of 1916, when it was obvious that a direct attack on Medina was most unlikely to succeed, it had become evident that the only way of removing the threat against Mecca and eventually securing the fall of Medina was to undertake raiding tactics on as large a scale as possible against the railway and the enemy lines of communication from the north. With this object in view Emir Feisal, who had been operating against Medina from the west, with his base on Yambo, moved north against Wejh, and, after capturing the town with the aid of H.M. ships on 24th January, 1917, threatened the whole line of the railway from Hadiyah to Moadhdam. It was largely this move which early in January began to relieve the situation and necessitated the withdrawal of the bulk of

the Turkish Hedjaz Expeditionary Force to the neighbourhood of Medina, followed by the despatch of considerable reinforcements from Medina to the north for the protection of the railway line.

8. At this time the Turkish troops were distributed as follows:

At Medina.

1st Battalion of the 131st Regiment,
1st Battalion of the 129th Regiment, and
500 Camel Corps for work on the lines of communication between Medina and the protecting posts of Bir Darwish, El Ghayir and Bir el Mashi.

At the three last-named places was stationed a force covering Medina, consisting of:—

1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 55th Regiment,
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 42nd Regiment,
1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 130th Regiment,
300 Arab Camel Corps,
Three Companies Mule Mounted Infantry,
One Camel Battery Mountain Artillery,
Three Mountain Guns,
Two Field Guns.

Total, approximately, 9,500 men.

In addition to the above, 2,500 men were distributed along the railway, the town of Wejh had a garrison of 800, and small detachments held the coast towns of Dhaba and Muweilah.

As soon as Emir Feisal was established at Wejh, Emir Abdulla, who had advanced from Mecca along the interior road towards Medina and made a wide circling movement round the north of that town, crossed the railway line near Bueir and took up his position in the Wadi Ais with his base on the sea at Yambo, at the same time leaving small detachments to the north-east of Medina to intercept all supply caravans from the direction of Ibn Rashid.

Emirs Ali and Zeid took over command of the forces threatening Medina from the south and west, and thus the armies of Emirs Feisal and Abdulla were free to concentrate against the railway.

9. In view of the necessity of providing additional officers to assist Lieut.-Colonel Wilson (on whom up to date had fallen the whole of the difficult task of guiding and advising Arab leaders both in military and political matters) a British Military Mission, consisting of Lieut.-Colonel S. F. Newcombe, D.S.O., R.E., Major C. E. Vickery, D.S.O., R.F.A., Major C. H. F. Cox, D.S.O., R.F.A., and Captain W. E. Marshall, M.C., R.A.M.C., was despatched from England, and left Suez for the Hedjaz on the 9th January, 1917. The members of this Mission are all Officers of experience with native troops, and the tact and energy displayed by them was beyond all praise. Early in March, 1917, I was able, in view of the improved situation, and having regard to the necessity for senior and experienced artillery officers in other theatres, to dispense with the services of Majors Vickery and Cox, retaining only those of Lieut.-Colonel Newcombe and Captain Marshall.

10. The raiding operations which have been instituted against the enemy's lines of communication have attained a considerable measure of success. A training school in

demolition work was established at Wejh under Lieut. Garland, and a considerable number of Arabs were trained in demolition work and are now operating against the railway under the personal direction of Lieut.-Colonel S. F. Newcombe, D.S.O., R.E., Captain T. E. Lawrence and Lieut. H. Garland.

As the threat against the railway has become intensified, so the enemy have not only been prevented from withdrawing troops from the Hedjaz to reinforce the Palestine front, but have been forced to decrease the garrison of Medina itself and transfer units to El Ula, Medain Saleh, and other stations on the railway. This course was also, to some extent, necessitated by shortage of food in Medina, which made it necessary to expel all the civilian inhabitants and reduce the garrison as far as possible.

11. The situation at present is comparatively satisfactory, and it does not seem possible that the enemy will be able to withdraw any considerable number of troops without risking the entire loss of the Hedjaz; indeed, recent information shows that reinforcements amounting to one battalion, two mountain batteries, and one field battery have been sent to the Hedjaz from Damascus. At the same time, it must not be expected that Medina will necessarily fall in the near future, since the garrison has been reduced and the supply problem simplified by the reduction in the numbers to be fed. Continual pressure, however, against the railway and lines of communication on the lines now being followed should eventually result in wearing down the enemy and securing the capture of Medina, retaining meanwhile in the Hedjaz a considerable Turkish garrison and cutting off from all communication with Headquarters the enemy units in Asir and Yemen. This will mean the continued immobilising of some 12,000 Turks, exclusive of the Asir and Yemen garrisons.

12. I am glad to avail myself of this opportunity of acknowledging the invaluable assistance and unvarying support received from General Sir Archibald Murray, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O., Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force and his Staff, among whom I especially wish to thank Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, K.C.M.G., C.B., and Major-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O. The large consignments of supplies and munitions which it has been necessary to send to the Hedjaz have been almost entirely supplied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and the Commander-in-Chief has also furnished most valuable assistance in the form of a Flight of the Royal Flying Corps, an Armoured Car Section, and other details.

I beg also to draw attention to the invaluable help which has always been afforded by the Navy under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O. The entire transport of stores, munitions, supplies and personnel has been carried out by the Navy under circumstances of extreme difficulty and in addition to their normally heavy duties. At no time have they failed to afford the utmost possible assistance, and have on many occasions by their active co-operation (notably at the capture of Jeddah and of Wejh) rendered an Arab success possible. It is not too much to say that, had it not been for the whole-hearted co-operation of the Red Sea Patrol, under the

command of Captain William Boyle, R.N., a successful revolt of the Sherif would have been impossible.

The lists of material sent to the Hedjaz as forwarded to the War Office by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force are an indication of the measure of assistance given by the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and the Vice-Admiral Commanding-in-Chief, East Indies and Egyptian Waters, and of the work carried out by their respective Staffs.

The Royal Flying Corps Flight, under the command of Major Ross, D.S.O., has more than maintained the traditions of the Corps. Exceptional difficulties of climate and terrain have been encountered and surmounted in circumstances of peculiar hardship, valuable reconnaissance work has been carried out, and the support, both moral and actual, which the Flight has given to the Arab Forces is incalculable. In this connection I am greatly indebted to Brigadier-General W. G. H. Salmond, Commanding the Middle East Brigade, Royal Flying Corps, for his unfailing help.

To the Acting Sirdar (Major-General L. O. F. Stack, C.M.G.), and the Headquarter Staff of the Egyptian Army my cordial thanks are due for the help they have ever afforded me, and for the excellent arrangements in connection with the detachments serving with the Arab Forces.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Wilson, as my political and military representative in the Hedjaz, has discharged a most difficult and arduous task skilfully, whole-heartedly, and with conspicuous success. He has acquired a remarkable influence with the Arab military leaders and functionaries, and to his personality and tact are primarily due the relative absence of friction and the measure of organisation achieved by the Arab levies. His work and that of his energetic staff are deserving of the highest praise.

The small nucleus staff formed at Cairo to assist me in the conduct of Arab affairs has worked efficiently and well under the supervision of Brigadier-General G. F. Clayton, C.M.G., my Chief Staff Officer; and to this Officer, to the members of the Arab Bureau (directed by Major K. Cornwallis), and to my personal staff at the Residency, my hearty thanks are due for the assistance and support they have always afforded me. In this latter connection I desire to call especial attention to the services of Major (Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) G. S. Symes, C.M.G., D.S.O., whose intimate knowledge of the details of the Arab Movement has proved invaluable.

I am submitting, in a continuing despatch, a list of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men whose names I wish to bring to Your Lordship's notice, together with a list of those Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men recommended for reward.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient, humble Servant,

REGINALD WINGATE,

General.

General Officer Commanding, Hedjaz.

STATEMENT OF OFFICERS, N.C.O.'S AND MEN LENT FOR THE HEDJAZ OPERATIONS.

	Officers.	Other Ranks.	Animals.	15-pdr. Field Guns.	2.95 Q.F. Mountain Guns.	87 mm. B.L. Howitzer.	Maxim Machine Guns.
Staff	3						
Artillery ...	14	313	276	6	10	2	6
Infantry ...	28	656	21				
Other Corps	10	41	12				
TOTALS ...	55	1,010	309	6	10	2	6

[Despatch No. 2.]

The Residency, Ramleh,
15th June, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a brief account of the military operations conducted in Arabia, south of the line Akaba—Tebuk, during the past twelve months, by the forces of His Highness the King of the Hedjaz.

At the date of my last despatch (June, 1917) plans were in preparation for offensive operations on a large scale against the Hedjaz Railway south of El Ula, with a view to the definite and permanent isolation of Medina from the north, from which it was hoped that the capitulation of that fortress might shortly follow. Circumstances, however, both military and political, have repeatedly intervened to delay the realisation of this project, and it is only now, after a lapse of more than twelve months, that the effective isolation of Medina, by the severance of its vital railway communications with the north, may at last be regarded as accomplished.

2. The general plan in contemplation in June 1917 was based on simultaneous attacks by Sherif Feisal, operating from Wejh against the railway between El Ula and Hedia, and by Sherif Abdulla, based on Yambo, against the section Hedia—Bowat; the forces of Sherifs Ali and Zeid co-operating to the south by vigorous offensive operations against the Turkish positions immediately covering Medina on the north and west. All these attacks were to be carefully synchronised, whilst, at the same time, a strong diversion was to be carried out in the Maan—Akaba area by the Howeitat under Auda Abu Tayi, accompanied by Captain (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Lawrence, in order to prevent any considerable movement of reinforcements to Medina from the north.

Owing, however, to the various causes of delay inseparable from Arab combinations, it was not until the end of June that the Sherifian preparations were completed, and, by that time, serious difficulties in regard to water supply, due to the partial failure of the winter rains, compelled considerable modification of the original plan.

3. The larger project was therefore of necessity for the time being abandoned, but raiding operations were extensively carried out by the Sherifian forces during July and August, causing, apart from heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, serious and constant damage to the railway throughout the section from El Ula to Bowat. As instances of the measure of success attending these operations may be

quoted the action of Sherif Zeid during the last days of June at Hanakieh, when a large Turkish convoy, proceeding from Hail to Medina, was successfully surprised by the Arabs, thirty Turks being killed and upwards of two hundred and fifty prisoners captured, in addition to four mountain guns, a large number of rifles, three thousand camels laden with foodstuffs and clothing, and two thousand sheep. Again, the attack on the railway about Zumurrud, carried out on July 6th-7th under Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Newcombe by a force of Arabs and an Egyptian demolition party, which resulted in the destruction, rail by rail, of more than five kilometres of line: or again, the series of raids carried out between July 27th and August 2nd by a mixed force of Egyptian troops, French Algerians and Arabs, under Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) P. C. Joyce, in the course of which upwards of two thousand rails and seven large culverts were destroyed in the section between Toweira and Hedia.

4. In the meantime, early in July, as the result of an operation, brilliantly planned and executed by Captain Lawrence, Akaba, the last position on the Hedjaz Coast held by the Turks, was captured; and three weeks later Sherif Feisal, with the whole of the trained force at his disposal, was transferred from Wejh to Akaba, with a view to extending the area of the revolt northward from that base. The subsequent operations conducted from Akaba by the Northern Army fall within the area of supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and are therefore outside the scope of this despatch.

5. With the transfer of Sherif Feisal to Akaba a definite phase of the campaign in the Southern Hedjaz was brought to a close, the main centre of activity from that time gradually shifting to the northern area. Towards the end of July, owing to the severe strain on both pilots and machines of continuous operations under conditions obtaining in Arabia during the intense heat of the summer months, it became necessary to withdraw the Royal Flying Corps detachment from the interior to refit at Wejh, and a month later the unit returned to Egypt after nine months of exceptionally arduous and valuable service in the Hedjaz.

I should like here especially to bring to your notice the valuable services rendered by the Indian Machine Gun Section, composed of Moslem gunners, who went to Wejh as volunteers in April, 1917. This detachment proved of very great assistance throughout the operations, and its Commander was awarded the Military Cross and promoted to the rank of

Rissaldar in recognition of the valuable services he had performed.

During August, this detachment and the British Armoured Car Section were sent to Egypt to refit—both these units returning subsequently to Akaba for employment with Sherif Feisal's Northern Army—and the Artillery units were, at the same time, withdrawn to Wejh; the only British-led troops temporarily retained in the interior being a detachment of Camel Corps and a machine-gun section, employed, under Major W. A. Davenport, upon raiding operations against the railway until the middle of September.

6. Throughout September and October the railway was again subjected to constant attack at various points between Tebuk and Medina, resulting in the effective dislocation of traffic and inflicting upon the enemy considerable loss in material and personnel.

Towards the end of October a further detachment of one thousand five hundred "regular" troops, under Sherif Zeid, left Wejh to join Sherif Feisal at Akaba, the latter, about the same time, absorbing into his army the Arab Legion, a force of some four hundred men, raised mainly from Arab prisoner-of-war volunteers, under the auspices of the Anglo-French Political Mission, and trained under British and French Officers in Egypt for employment in Arabia.

Early in November the last Turkish aeroplane remaining in Medina was brought down with rifle fire by the Arabs near Bir Nasif. The wrecked machine was, in fact, subsequently recovered by the enemy and returned by rail to Medina, but since that date no further aerial activity has been shown by the Turks south of Maan.

7. At the beginning of November a combined attack, carried out by Sherifs Abdulla and Ali, resulted in the destruction of an important section of the railway between Abu Naam and Bowat; and, following upon this operation, appeared, for the first time, definite indications that the general evacuation of the Hedjaz, excluding Medina, was in serious contemplation by the enemy.

8. In order to prevent the realisation of this project the necessity of greater activity against the railway was strongly urged upon the Sherifs, and at the end of November the agreement of Sherifs Abdulla and Ali was obtained to a fresh plan of combined operations, having as their objective the effective occupation and destruction of the whole section of the railway from Bir Jedid to Bueir.

Preparations were immediately commenced—Sherif Abdulla moving forward his Headquarters to Murebba in the Wadi Ais, in order personally to direct the operations—and were already well advanced when, by great misfortune, Colonel Wilson, to whose energy and personal influence the acceptance of the scheme was due, and upon whose presence its successful execution largely depended, fell seriously ill with dysentery, contracted in Sherif Abdulla's camp, and was compelled to return for some months to Egypt.

During the first two months of the present year there were repeated indications that, despite the failure of the Turkish plans for withdrawing northwards the troops of their Hedjaz Expeditionary Force, the evacuation of the Hedjaz—whether inclusive or exclusive of

Medina itself—was about to be attempted; but, although it was not possible for the Sherifs to undertake organised offensive operations on any large scale, their policy of persistent aggression against the railway was pursued with a measure of success that rendered such an attempt on the part of the enemy—if indeed actually in contemplation—impracticable.

9. During the past three months no less than five convoys, aggregating over one thousand five hundred camels, have been captured by Arab detachments from Sherif Ali's army; whilst in Abdulla's area the Arabs, under Major Davenport's direction, have carried out many important raids against the railway, notably at Seil Matara on 8th April, when five kilometres of track and three culverts were completely destroyed, and at Bowat on May 11th, when, in addition to extensive damage to the line, twenty Turks were killed and over forty prisoners taken. In the meantime, by the success of Sherif Feisal's recent operations about Maan, the main object of the Southern campaign—the isolation of Medina—has, in fact, been accomplished by the effective destruction of the vital railway communications of Medina with the North. Moreover, the re-action of Feisal's success upon his brothers has produced, in emulation, a degree of activity in the southern theatre never hitherto attained, and a determination on their part to undertake the long-deferred combined offensive north of Medina, with a view to securing the close and permanent investment of that fortress.

10. Although the record of these operations thus briefly surveyed contains few military achievements of outstanding importance, yet the general results attained by the persistent aggression of the Arabs against the enemy's communications must not be under-estimated.

Constantly harassed by a mobile and almost invulnerable enemy, the moral and material pressure to which the enemy has, during the past twelve months, been continuously subjected, may be estimated by the fact that between Tebuk and Medina during this period an aggregate of more than fifteen thousand rails, fifty-two culverts and five bridges have been destroyed, two trains have been completely wrecked by electric mines, several station buildings and considerable quantities of rolling stock have been burnt, communication by telegraph and telephone has been interrupted almost daily, four hundred and fifty Turkish dead have been buried by the Arabs and nearly double that number of prisoners taken, whilst material captures during the same period include five field guns, four machine guns, nearly one thousand rifles and large quantities of ammunition, in addition to £.T.25,000 in Turkish gold, and several big convoys conveying live stock and supplies to Medina from the east.

For this success the Arabs owe much to the unsparing efforts of the British and Allied officers attached to the Sherifian forces, and working often under intensely trying conditions.

11. With the development of the Arab movement the work of my staff in Cairo has steadily and considerably increased.

I am greatly indebted to General Sir Edmund H. Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. To him and to his Staff, amongst whom I would especially mention

Major-Generals Sir Louis Bols and Sir Walter Campbell, and the Staff of "Q" Branch, 2nd Echelon; I tender my very cordial thanks.

The assistance of the Royal Navy has been very essential to the execution of the military operations on land: and I wish to express my warm thanks to Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., the senior Naval Officers of the Red Sea Patrol, Captain W. H. D. Boyle, C.B., R.N. (until November, 1917), and his successor, Captain H. A. Buchanan-Wollaston, R.N., to the Principal Naval Transport Officer, Commodore E. Unwin, V.C., C.M.G., and his Staff, and to the Commanders of the "G" boats, for their unfailing and invaluable help.

The Acting Sirdar has been, as ever, most ready and prompt to meet such requests for personnel as I have found it necessary to make to him: and the work of the Egyptian Army detachments in the Hedjaz has been most praiseworthy.

The heads of the French Military Mission, Colonel E. Brémond, C.M.G., and his successor, Commandant Cousse, have discharged their functions in a spirit of accommodation and good-fellowship which has greatly facilitated the conduct of joint operations. As an instance of the good relations existing, it may be mentioned that Colonel Brémond in November last placed all French troops in the area under Colonel Wilson's personal command for the operations it was then hoped to carry out between El Ula and Medina.

The relations between the British Officers, serving in an advisory capacity, and the King of the Hedjaz have continued to be thoroughly cordial and satisfactory. This is due in a very great measure to the personality and energy of Colonel Wilson. During the latter's illness his difficult and onerous duties were discharged very efficiently by Lieut.-Colonel J. R. Bassett.

To the Officers of the Headquarters Staff at Cairo, to the Arab Bureau, and to my personal Staff I am indebted for their excellent work. The organisation on a more practical basis than formerly of the Hedjaz staff has been mainly due to Lieut.-Colonel A. Dawnay, whose previous experience as a Staff Officer, tact and capacity have proved of very great assistance.

I have the honour to forward separately a list of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and Men whose names I desire to bring to Your Lordship's notice with a view to recognition for specially valuable services performed in connection with these operations.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's obedient Servant,

REGINALD WINGATE,

General.

General Officer Commanding, Hedjaz.

[Despatch No. 3.]

The Residency, Cairo,

27th December, 1918.

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit my third despatch on the military operations in the Hedjaz.

1. At the date of my last despatch of June 15th the isolation of the enemy's Second Composite and Hedjaz Expeditionary Forces had been effected by the complete destruction, by Emir Feisal's northern army, during April, of the Hedjaz railway south of Maan to Mudaw'ra (exclusive). Since then the Turkish garrisons in the Southern Hedjaz, including that of Medina, were entirely cut off from communication with the outside world, with the exception of a single aeroplane despatch, which reached Tebuk from the north about the middle of August, and of infrequent and very irregular supply convoys to Medina from Hail or Riadh.

2. In the meantime the Sherifs were encouraged to occupy the summer months in demolition attacks on the railway and in raiding operations against the Turkish garrisons north of Medina, whilst maintaining as rigidly as possible the blockade of Medina from the east, and preparing for operations on a decisive scale against Medina, to be carried out during the autumn—the most favourable campaigning season in the Southern Hedjaz. In accordance with this general intention, towards the end of May Emir Abdulla, supported by strong contingents of the Huteim, Ateiba and Juheina tribesmen, attacked the Wadi Hamdh bridges; but, although at the first assault several outlying advanced posts were captured, the attack failed to develop. A week later a fresh offensive was undertaken further south, in the section between Bir Nasif and Hafira, this time in co-operation with a detachment of Emir Ali's army, led by the Emir in person; but, again, little more than demonstration was effected, although some 1,000 rails and half a dozen culverts were destroyed by Emir Abdulla's demolition parties. On June 7th a more successful raid was carried out in the neighbourhood of Toweira, in the course of which 1,200 rails, a bridge and three large culverts were demolished and a water train with its locomotive was captured and destroyed by the Arabs. In this operation the losses of the enemy were heavy, and a number of prisoners were taken.

3. At the end of July an offensive was launched by Emir Ali against the Turkish positions at Jelajila, north-west of Medina, but the enemy's defensive works proved too strong to be taken by infantry assault without extensive artillery support, which, owing to difficulties of transport, Ali lacked; and, notwithstanding a determined and praiseworthy effort on the part of the Sherifial troops engaged, Jelajila remained in the hands of the enemy.

In the meantime the capture of Mudaw'ra by an Imperial Camel Corps column operating from Akaba, on August 8th, and the destruction of the water supply at that place, compelled the enemy to evacuate the railway south of Maan as far as Dhat El Haj, and finally dispelled any hope he may till then have entertained of the ultimate communications with Medina from the north.

4. From the beginning of August until the Turkish débâcle in Syria in the last week of September no operations worthy of separate mention were carried out by the forces of Emirs Ali or Abdulla.

5. With a view to the inception of the autumn offensive operations against Medina,

to which reference has already been made, the organisation and equipment of a mobile force of camel-mounted infantry and artillery was commenced at Wejh early in August, and was proceeding satisfactorily when, on September 14th, an epidemic of plague broke out among the Arab population, which spread to the troops and indefinitely postponed preparation for the operations in prospect.

Notwithstanding this enforced postponement, however, the increasingly low morale of the Turkish troops in the Southern Hedjaz due to privation was evidenced by the number and condition of the deserters brought in to the Arab forces; and the reaction of the Turkish catastrophe in Syria gave hope, at the end of September, that an offer of honourable capitulation might be accepted by the Turkish Commander at Medina. Such an offer was accordingly despatched by King Hussein, supported by a written guarantee by myself, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that honourable treatment and safe conduct to Egypt would be assured to the garrison; but this offer was refused by Fakhreddin Pasha.

6. Tebuk was seized by the Arab forces on October 12th, over 300 prisoners with four mountain howitzers and six machine guns being captured; and the Turks subsequently evacuated their posts on the railway north of Kalaat-el-Akhdar, losing material and stores in the process. Mudarij was captured by the Arabs, who also attacked with a measure of success the Turkish garrisons at Medain, Saleh, and Abu Naam.

7. In the meantime Sherifs Ali and Abdulla moved to El-Ayun and El-Jafr, where a large force of tribal levies was concentrated with a view to an early and vigorous effort to secure the capitulation of Medina. These arrangements, which were on a more extensive scale than previous ones, were rendered abortive by the Armistice with Turkey, when all hostilities by the Arabs were at once suspended.

8. The foregoing review of operations in the Hedjaz would be incomplete without reference to the great victory achieved by the Army under General Allenby in Syria, and its corollary, the entry of the Arab forces under Emir Feisal, after a series of cleverly-planned and daring flanking operations, into Damascus. These operations of the Northern Arab Army, in which Lieut.-Colonel T. E. Lawrence played so distinguished a rôle, will, as occurring within the area controlled by the Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, be reported on by the latter; and in paying a tribute to his military genius I would record my gratitude to General Sir Edmund Allenby and his Staff for their ready assistance and consideration on all occasions. To this, and to the close and cordial relations existing between us and our respective Staffs, may be attributed the fact that the divided control of Arabs' operations, described in my previous report, has worked without any sort of friction or difficulty.

9. I take this final opportunity of expressing my deep sense of obligation to all ranks of the British, French, Egyptian, and Indian detachments serving in the Hedjaz; however courteous and helpful the Emirs Ali, Abdulla, and Zeid, and the other Sherifial military

commanders have been in their relations with their European advisers, the service has been a difficult and trying one which, whilst giving fewer opportunities of showing their military skill than in other theatres of war, made no light demands on their loyalty, enthusiasm and powers of endurance.

In my previous despatches I have referred to the French Military Mission, which has co-operated with the Arab Forces since September, 1916, up to date—firstly under the direction of Colonel Bremond, C.M.G., and latterly under Chef de Bataillon Cousse, C.M.G. To both these Commanders, their French and Moslem subordinates and officers, and to the *sous-officiers* and men comprising the French Algerian detachment, the greatest credit is due. Their efficiency, good comradeship and readiness and resource under difficult and trying conditions of climate and service invariably assisted largely in the success of the joint operations in which they took a very gallant and conspicuous part.

It is a matter of extreme satisfaction to me to be able to offer this cordial testimony to our gallant French allies who, no less in the Hedjaz than in the various other theatres of operations, have so whole-heartedly co-operated in the successes which have liberated Arabia and inflicted so severe a blow on the prestige of our enemies in the Near and Middle East.

It is also my pleasant duty to refer again to the valuable services of the various detachments of the Egyptian Army, who have taken no inconsiderable share in these operations since their inception in June, 1916, up to the signature of the Armistice. They have shown a gallantry and endurance under hardships which is in every sense most praiseworthy. The admirable behaviour of the men under difficult conditions reflects great credit on themselves, no less than on their officers and non-commissioned officers, who were responsible for the efficiency of the organisation and for the excellent spirit of discipline maintained throughout the various units.

In my second despatch I also referred to the outstanding services rendered by the small detachment of Indian Moslem Gunners under the able command of Jemadar Hassan Shah, who was promoted Rissaldar and granted the award of the Military Cross for gallantry and devotion to duty. I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of this detachment, "who," in the words of Major Davenport, "never complained in spite of great hardships, and did all the arduous service they were called upon to perform with a willing smile." This detachment specially distinguished itself at the defence of Zumurud Fort and displayed a military zeal and resource in action which was most praiseworthy.

My task has been greatly facilitated by the ready co-operation given me at all times by the Acting Sirdar; by Rear-Admiral Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., and the officers commanding ships of the Red Sea Patrol; Brigadier-General G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G., as my liaison officer with the Commander-in-Chief, and latterly as Chief Political Officer; Temp. Lieut.-Colonel K. Cornwallis, D.S.O., the Director of the Arab Bureau, and Commander D. G. Hogarth, have rendered very valuable services in connection with Arab military and political affairs. My

hearty thanks are also due to Colonel C. E. Wilson, C.M.G., D.S.O., who has rendered notable and praiseworthy service, in a joint military and political capacity, since the beginning of the Hedjaz revolt, and to his Staff at Jeddah; to the members of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, and to my personal Staff at the Residency, and, in particular, to Lieut.-Colonel G. S. Symes, C.M.G., D.S.O., who has been indefatigable in the execution of his onerous duties and whose valuable services I desire specially to acknowledge; also to my Aide-de-Camp Captain J. U. F. C. Alexander (Coldstream Guards and Egyptian Army), who has been of the greatest assistance to me at all times.

I am submitting in a separate despatch a list of officers, N.C.O.'s and men whose names I wish to bring to Your Lordship's notice, together with a list of officers, N.C.O.'s and men recommended for award.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship's obedient, humble servant,
REGINALD WINGATE,
General.
General Officer Commanding, Hedjaz.

[SUPPLEMENT.]

The Residency, Cairo,

18th January, 1919.

Sir,

Supplementary to my despatch No. 3 of the 27th ultimo on the military operations in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to report that Fakhri Pasha, Turkish Commandant at Medina, surrendered to Arab Headquarters at Bir Dervish on the 10th instant. The Emir Abdulla, representing his father the King of the Hedjaz, entered Medina at 11 a.m. on the 13th instant.

The evacuation of the Turkish garrisons in the Hedjaz is now proceeding, and is expected to be completed shortly.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,
Your obedient servant,

REGINALD WINGATE,
General.

General Officer Commanding
Hedjaz Operations.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE.

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Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office by WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., Fetter Lane, Fleet St., London, E.C. 4.

Monday, 15 December, 1919.

Price Four Pence Net.