

7. The difficulties of supply and movement in Northern Syria during the winter were great. The bridge over the Orontes at Hama, on the broad gauge line from Rayak to Aleppo, could not be repaired till February, and roads were in a bad state and became impassable after heavy rain. Consequently, the occupation of the places mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph was considerably delayed.

Killis and Aintab were occupied on December 24th, and a series of posts along the Bagdad Railway as far as Arab Punar, had been established by January 13th. But Marash and Birijik could not be occupied till towards the end of February; and it was the third week in March before the supply situation had improved sufficiently to make the occupation of Urfa possible.

8. During December and January the attitude of Ali Ihsan with regard to compliance with the terms of the armistice continued most unsatisfactory. Finally, at the suggestion of the War Office, I proceeded to Constantinople at the beginning of February, and interviewed the Turkish Foreign Minister and War Minister, to whom I stated the numerous breaches of the armistice committed by Turkish commanders in my area, and laid down certain conditions to be accepted by them and communicated to the Turkish authorities in my area.

This resulted in the removal of Ali Ihsan from his command about the end of February.

9. His removal and the demobilisation of the 6th Army in the Nisibin area and the 2nd Army West of Bozanti practically put an end to any further trouble or menace from the Turkish armed forces.

The conditions, however, both in Cilicia and in the area North and North-east of Aleppo have remained unsettled, and have from time to time caused anxiety. The repatriation of Armenians and the restoration of their property are matters of difficulty, and a revival of Turco-Armenian hostility in the form of riots has always been a danger. Propaganda by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress has been active, and armed bands of brigands are not uncommon in these provinces. The presence of troops in the principal towns has enabled order to be maintained, but their withdrawal would result in general disorder and insecurity, for the Turkish authorities are in no position at present to enforce order in the country.

*Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory.*

10. I had on the 22nd October, 1918, divided the Occupied Enemy Territory under my control into three Areas, viz.:—

(1) Occupied Enemy Territory (South) comprising the old Turkish Sandjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre.

(2) Occupied Enemy Territory (North), afterwards known as O.E.T. (West), comprising the town of Beirut, Sandjaks of Beirut, the Lebanon, Tripoli, Ladikiya and the Cazas of Jisr-Esh-Shoghur, Antioch, Haran, Bailan and Alexandretta.

(3) Occupied Enemy Territory (East), comprising all districts lying to the East of O.E.T. (South) and O.E.T. (North), up to the Northern limits of the Cazas of Jebel-Saman and El Bab.

After the occupation of Cilicia it became necessary to form another area of Occupied Enemy Territory, and, on the 19th January, 1919, I formed a new Area, consisting of the Vilayet of Adana less the Caza of Selefke (or Ichili). This was to be known as Occupied Enemy Territory (North), the district referred to in (2) being henceforth called Occupied Enemy Territory (West). At the same time, Occupied Enemy Territory (East) was extended to include that part of the Caza of Killis lying South and West of the Muslimie-Katma railway, and also the village areas of Azaz and Niam (lying North of the Katma-Muslimie-Jerablus railway).

The Area to the North of Occupied Enemy Territory (East) and to the East of Occupied Enemy Territory (North) has not been treated as Occupied Enemy Territory, but has continued to be administered by Turkish officials under the general control of the General Officer Commanding Desert Mounted Corps. The Administration in this Area is dependent on the Ottoman Government at Constantinople for funds.

I placed the following Chief Administrators in charge of the four Areas. They are all directly responsible to me:—

O.E.T.A. (South): Major-General Sir A. W. Money, K.C.B., C.S.I., Headquarters, Jerusalem.

O.E.T.A. (West): Colonel de Piépage, C.B., of the French Army, subsequently Colonel Copin, of the French Army, Headquarters, Beirut.

O.E.T.A. (East): Ali Riza Pasha el Rikaby, of the Arab Army, Headquarters, Damascus.

O.E.T.A. (North): Colonel Bremond, C.M.G., of the French Army, Headquarters, Adana.

In the administration of all these Areas I have been guided by the principles laid down in Sections VIII and IX of Chapter XIV (Laws and Usages of War on Land) of the Manual of Military Law, wherein my responsibilities as Military Occupant are defined. No departure from these principles has been permitted. Subject to the necessary modifications, the Turkish system of government and administrative machinery have been maintained in all areas. In O.E.T. (South), (West) and (East) the appointment of subordinate staffs was left to the discretion of the Chief Administrators, but in the case of O.E.T. (North) I instructed the Chief Administrator to carry out his functions through the medium of the Turkish officials, who were not to be dismissed without reference to me, nor were other Turkish subjects to be appointed as officials without my approval.

The co-ordination of administration between the different O.E.T.A.'s is carried out by a branch of my Headquarters Staff which has been strengthened for this purpose. A conference took place recently at which all Chief Administrators were present; and I propose, if necessary, to hold such conferences every three months. They will, in my opinion, do much to ensure mutual understanding and assistance between the several Administrations.

11. All these Administrations came into being under conditions of great complexity. The Turks during their retreat had destroyed or removed practically all records; large num-