



SIXTH SUPPLEMENT

TO

The London Gazette.

Of FRIDAY, the 23rd of MAY, 1919.

Published by Authority.

The Gazette is registered at the General Post Office for transmission by Inland Post as a newspaper. The postage rate to places within the United Kingdom, for each copy, is one halfpenny for the first 6 ozs., and an additional halfpenny for each subsequent 6 ozs. or part thereof. For places abroad the rate is a halfpenny for every 2 ounces, except in the case of Canada, to which the Canadian Magazine Postage rate applies.

TUESDAY, 27 MAY, 1919.

War Office,
27th May, 1919.

The Secretary of State for War has received the following despatch from General Sir F. R. Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt:—

London,
26th February, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your information and favourable consideration a report on the military operations and other events of importance in the Sudan since the outbreak of war up to the end of 1918.

You will recollect that only that portion of my despatch of 8th August, 1916, referring to the military operations in Darfur was published*, and that I was instructed to re-submit, at the conclusion of hostilities, the rest of the despatch describing the general situation in the Sudan.

This has now been done by Major-General Sir Lee Stack, K.B.E., C.M.G., who has acted as Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan

since my transfer as High Commissioner to Cairo in January, 1917; and he has added some further remarks, thus bringing up to date the narrative of events. With these remarks I am in entire agreement, and I have much pleasure—with special reference to War Office letter 0137/5618 (M.S.3) of 27th November, 1918—in endorsing his report on the excellent work of the British, Egyptian and Sudanese Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and men and others whom he has brought to notice. I have sent a copy of the enclosed despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with a view to recording the admirable services performed by the small and devoted body of civil officials who, with their military comrades, have worked untiringly throughout the period of the war, often in remote districts and under most difficult conditions, and have rendered unostentatious but no less valuable service to the Imperial cause.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,
(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE,
General,
High Commissioner.

* Printed in the London Gazette, No. 29800, of October 25th, 1916.

Governor-General's Office,
Sudan Government,
Khartoum, 19th January, 1919.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for Your Excellency's information a despatch describing the general situation in the Sudan during the war, together with some account of military operations undertaken and the services rendered by the Egyptian Army and Sudan Government to the Imperial Forces.

The first two years of the war are dealt with, so far as concerns military operations, in Your Excellency's despatch to the Secretary of State for War, which was dated August 8th, 1916*. In order to describe the general situation during that time I am including in this despatch the report which Your Excellency wrote and left with me at the time of your departure from the Sudan to take up the post of High Commissioner in Egypt.

This report accordingly forms the first part of the despatch, and describes the internal position in the Sudan at the outbreak of war, the general trend of events, and the nature of the contribution made by this country and by the Egyptian Army to the Imperial cause up to the autumn of 1916.

His Excellency

General Sir F. R. Wingate,
G.C.B., G.C.V.O., G.B.E., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O.,

His Majesty's High Commissioner
in Egypt,
Residency, Cairo.

Report by the Governor-General on the general situation in the Sudan during the first two years of the war.

1.

On the outbreak of war the British Army of Occupation in Egypt assumed responsibility for the maintenance of order and the protection of that country from foreign aggression; whilst the Egyptian Army, assisted by the small permanent British garrison at Khartoum, assumed a similar responsibility with regard to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

The forty-six garrison and military posts within the area of approximately 1,000,000 square miles comprised in the latter country have been supplied from the following regular units:—

British.

- 1 battalion infantry (Territorial or New Army).
- A detachment (65 of all ranks) R.G.A.

Egyptian Army.

- 4 batteries and 2 garrison artillery companies.
- 1 squadron cavalry and 3 companies of mounted infantry.
- 12 infantry battalions.
- 6 companies camel corps.
- 4 double-companies Arab battalion.

In connection with the operations in Darfur, reinforcements of 1 battery and 1 Egyptian battalion were brought to the Sudan from Egypt.

* Printed in the London Gazette, No. 29800, of October 25th, 1916.

The total regular force (British and Egyptian) thus comprised a little over 14,000 of all ranks.

To the above may be added six companies (approximately 660 rifles) of semi-regular, native, "territorial" troops in garrison of certain southern districts, and a provincial police force of some 3,925 rifles, mounted and dismounted, nearly all of whom have received elementary military instruction in drill and musketry. With the exception of a sprinkling of British, Syrian and Coptic officers, the *personnel* of the military and police forces is almost exclusively Moslem.

The administration of the Sudan, exclusive of the *personnel* of the various technical and Central Government services, has been carried out by some 110 British officers and civilians distributed in the various provinces.

The Christian population, comprising British and other Europeans, Copts and Syrians, but excluding the small British garrison, does not exceed 6,500, which is less than one-fifth per cent. of the total population of the country. Of the latter total roughly 66 per cent. represents the Moslem population: the remaining 34 per cent. is composed of Pagans.

The first news that Great Britain was at war possessed little significance to the bulk of the native population of the Sudan, which was pre-occupied with the prospect of an excellent harvest after a series of lean years, and passed almost without comment outside the larger towns and more sophisticated urban communities. In these latter, however, idle and ill-informed speculation, stimulated by a crop of ridiculous rumours, soon produced sentiments of alarm and unrest which, had they not been checked by the immediate return to the country of myself and all officers and officials from leave in England, would have provided a fair field for the activity of those professional and pseudo-religious propagandists whose influence in a semi-civilised country is so baneful and extensive.

As soon as the preliminary alarm had subsided the various measures, military and administrative, which the external situation (and more especially the contingency of Turkey engaging in war against the Allies) required, were initiated.

It was essential, in the first instance, to disabuse the native mind of the conception, which was being insidiously introduced from external sources, that the British power was on the wane, and most of the preliminary measures taken were directed to this end. No outward changes were made in the normal course of the administration, enterprises which had been undertaken for the development of the country were not abruptly closed down, and British officers and officials were made to understand that it was their duty to retain their appointments, whether with the Army or under the Civil Government, until and unless their services could be spared. The experience of the past two years has very fully vindicated the wisdom and necessity of this policy.

A rigid censorship of the press and telegrams which, as the evidences of enemy propaganda multiplied, was subsequently extended to all correspondence, and a careful search of passengers and baggage at the frontier stations were enforced. An active counter-propaganda, directed against Germany and her allies, was instituted; and means were taken

to inform the more intelligent sections of native opinion, through their leaders and the efficient medium of the local press, of the facts of the military and political situations and of the ascendancy of German influence at Constantinople, where all power had become centred in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress. In consequence, the rupture with Turkey, which came as an unpleasant surprise to the Sudanese, found native opinion in the Sudan to some extent prepared for the shock to their religious susceptibilities; and full advantage was taken of the remarkable wave of loyalty which, voiced in the first place by a few chiefs and religious dignitaries spread throughout the country. In the meantime the further measures, which in the eventuality were deemed necessary and had been carefully prepared beforehand, were carried out quietly and systematically.

The garrisons of certain frontier posts were strengthened and a more frequent and effective system of patrols established, particularly on the Red Sea and Abyssinian frontiers. Arrangements were made to deal promptly with any anti-Government disturbances in the larger towns. A number of undesirable persons, including several local merchants of enemy nationality, were deported. Martial law in the Sudan, which has never been repealed, was reaffirmed, and legislation introduced to strengthen the hands of the administration in dealing with riot and other emergency and to prevent trading with the enemy.

Notwithstanding the very satisfactory manner in which the news of the war with Turkey had been received in the Sudan, it was not to be supposed that an event so closely concerning the religious life of a Moslem population could have other than an unsettling effect.

The most important evidence of this appeared in our relations with Ali Dinar, the Suzerain Sultan of Darfur, who, after despatching several impudent letters on the subject, formally renounced his allegiance to the Sudan Government. Although the Sultan's example and declared hostility constituted a grave embarrassment to the Government, it was impossible for the moment to take steps to bring him to reason without applying for large reinforcements of British troops; nor, in the state of public opinion in the Sudan at the time, and in view of our slender military resources, was it considered prudent to detach troops from other localities to protect the western frontier. Lengthy and somewhat complicated negotiations were accordingly entered into with the Sultan in order, if possible, to modify his hostile attitude and to postpone the necessity for military action.

Other evidences of a sub-current of unrest were not slow in making their appearance in the form of refusals to pay tribute or taxes, or a recrudescence of inter-tribal fighting, particularly on the frontiers or Moslem "revivalist" activity culminating in local disturbance. These minor incidents, the importance of which is not to be underestimated when dealing with an unstable and excitable population, were settled in every case by the prompt action of the local officials, with or without the despatch of regular troops to the scene.

The formation of political groups for the discussion of news from abroad and religious

matters was noted in several of the larger towns, and the drift of their discussions undoubtedly took a strong anti-Government and undesirable turn, until action under martial law was taken against certain of their more irresponsible leaders. With the deportation of the latter and of several persons of well-known seditionist tendencies, the numbers of anti-Government pamphlets in circulation, and of threatening letters addressed to myself and to certain prominent natives who had given public witness to their loyalty, were very sensibly reduced.

In the Nuba Mountains province incipient dislike of any Government control was fanned into action by stories of Government's decline, and a situation arose which demanded immediate attention. Immediately after the suppression of a band of fanatics who had collected at Jebel Gedir, Fiki Ali, the Chief of the Miri group of hills and the most powerful and hitherto loyal native of the district, gathered together his adherents and defied the Government to dislodge him. Troops arrived in time to prevent the rebellion spreading, and, after short but difficult operations, secured the capture or surrender of all except the Chief and a small following. The latter were hunted from hill to hill for several months before Fiki Ali was induced to surrender himself, and the district reverted to its normal state.

The adverse development of the Senussist situation was watched attentively in the Sudan, but caused relatively little concern, as the Grand Senussi has few adherents or disciples amongst the Sudanese except in Darfur, and the alarmist reports current at the commencement of military operations on the western frontier of Egypt dissipated as the facts of the situation and the reverses to the Senussist arms became known. A cordon of native irregular posts was also formed along the whole length of the western frontier to prevent communications between the Senussi country and the Sudan and to intercept the passage of arms caravans along the Arba'in road to Darfur.

By the end of 1915 political equilibrium may be said to have been restored to the greater portion of the country, and, although vigilance was still required, public confidence in the strength and good intentions of the Government was re-established except in the Western Sudan.

In this latter region the turbulent and irresponsible tribesmen had been perplexed by our seeming indifference to the defiance and *Jehad* preached by the Sultan of Darfur, and their perplexity was in rapid process of being transferred into the belief that, after all, Government was too weak to vindicate its authority over so powerful a Sultan.

In the meantime Ali Dinar was busily pushing forward his military preparations, and, at the direct instigation of the Turkish Mission to the Senussi, had planned an invasion of the Sudan which was to be carried out in conjunction with the Senussist advance upon Egypt.

Copies of his proclamation of the *Jehad* against the British Government in the Sudan were despatched, with violent messages, to the Sudanese and other tribesmen, urging them to cast off their allegiance to Christians and threatening condign punishment to all who refused to obey his behests.

Although it seemed improbable that an

irruption in force by the Sultan's troops and levies into the Sudan could take place before the rainy season (July), when the country between his capital at El Fasher and the Kor-dofan boundary would become passable, and by which time the assistance he expected from the Turkish officers with the Senussi might have arrived, it was not clear that minor raids by the Sultan's detachments near the frontier upon our own and other friendly Arabs were imminent.

At the beginning of 1916 it was evident that the despatch of a considerable force to the frontier could only be delayed at the risk of alienating the sympathy of our border tribesmen and thereby facilitating the spread of serious disaffection in the Sudan.

The assembly of the necessary troops was accordingly carried out as quietly and rapidly as possible, and by the middle of March a mixed force of all arms was concentrated at Nahud under the command of Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) P. V. Kelly.

An account of the military operations in Darfur has been given in my despatch of August 8th, 1916, printed in the London Gazette of October 25th, 1916.*

It will readily be understood that the past two years have put a very severe strain upon the personnel and resources of the Egyptian Army and the Sudan Government. The number of British officers and officials in the Sudan even in normal times of peace is barely adequate to the ever-increasing needs of the country; and an enormous amount of additional work and grave responsibility devolved on individuals, the majority of whom have had to be denied the leave so necessary to the preservation of health and vitality in this climate.

It is then with especial gratification that I am able to particularise the assistance it has been possible to render in other fields of activity and military operations, from the Egyptian Army and the Sudan Civil Service.

Of 56 officers who have reverted to the *British establishment in England* since the beginning of the war, 9 have been killed in action and 3 wounded, and 16 have been mentioned in despatches.

Of 58 officers and 12 Sudan Government officials who have served—most of them for short periods equivalent to the amount of leave to which in normal circumstances they would have been entitled—with the *Mediterranean Expeditionary Force*, 15 officers eventually reverted to the British establishment, 6 officers were killed or died of wounds received in action, 11 were wounded; 21 officers and 1 civil official were mentioned in despatches.

Of 60 officers and 27 Sudan Government officials who at various times, and mostly for short periods, were loaned for service with the *Egyptian Expeditionary Force*, 13 eventually rejoined the British Establishment and 5 officers and 1 civilian were mentioned in despatches.

Besides the personnel referred to in the preceding paragraph, the services of Captain and Brevet Major (temporary Brigadier-General) C. F. Clayton, C.M.G., Director of Intelligence and Sudan Agent, on the outbreak of war were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding in Egypt, who has offi-

cially brought to notice the valuable work performed by this officer as G.S.O. in charge of the Intelligence Section. Brigadier-General Clayton and the officials of the Sudan Agency have continued to discharge their functions in connection with the Sudan Government in an entirely efficient manner.

Several buildings, belonging to the Egyptian War Department in Cairo, a quantity of war material of all kinds, and a large number of transport animals have been put at the disposal, either by loan or purchase, of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and, subsequently, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Of these the following are the most noteworthy:—

The loan of the Egyptian Army Hospital in Cairo, with equipment, etc., complete, to the New Zealand Division. The purchase in the Sudan of some 14,000 riding and baggage camels, the collection, veterinary examination and despatch of which necessitated the establishment of a special organisation with branches in almost every province, and threw a large amount of additional work upon province staffs as well as on the officers of the Veterinary Department. Credit for the collection of this large number of camels must be shared by the native notables and sheiks, without whose loyal and hearty co-operation it could never have been accomplished. The invention, manufacture, and supply of 174,000 "Garland" grenades. An average of 10,000 grenades a week was at one time being furnished to the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, and their output placed a severe tax upon the resources of the Egyptian Army Ordnance Department.

The manufacture and supply of 200,000 "bursh" mats. These were urgently required for the Suez Canal defences, and were made almost entirely in Berber province, at a rate of 50,000 a week.

The Sudan Government steamer "Enterprise," fitted with one 12 1/2 pounder gun and two Maxims, was handed over to the Admiralty for work in connection with Red Sea patrols, and three tugs and a number of steel plates were supplied to the Canal defences. A very large number of articles of equipment, clothing, etc., were made in the Stores Department of the Egyptian Army, and issued to British, Colonial and Indian troops of the Mediterranean and Egyptian Expeditionary Forces; in some cases units such as the Camel Transport Corps and the Zion Mule Corps for service in the Dardanelles being entirely clothed and equipped on formation from these stores. Orders were also received and carried out for the French and Italian Armies.

The work of the Stores Department (Egyptian Army) included a quantity of repairs and the supply of a great number of miscellaneous articles of camp and other kit to officers of the British and Allied forces, particularly after the evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula. The Supplies Department of the Egyptian Army in Cairo was also able to assist in various minor matters connected with the supply of units in Egypt; and Major E. S. Blunt's services in this connection and as Acting Director of the Stores Department (Egyptian Army) have been very valuable.

* No. 29800.

Units of the Egyptian Army have been employed outside the Sudan in the following theatres:—

IN EGYPT.

As guards to railway bridges, etc., and as garrisons at various points of strategic or economic importance in the interior. The Egyptian Army also supplied the personnel and guns for two armoured trains, which were stationed at Ismailia and Kantara, and furnished the garrison for the dam at Assuan.

A Camel Maxim section was formed by Captain E. M. Hutchinson, Royal Artillery, from the Egyptian Artillery, and this section and an armed detachment of the Military Works Department under Captain W. E. Day, Royal Engineers, were attached to the Bikanir Camel Corps, and took part in the operations against the Senussi (in which operations No. 1 squadron of Egyptian Cavalry was also employed) and in the attack on the Suez Canal in April, 1915.

A detachment of 1 officer and 100 men of the Military Works Department was sent to Ismailia for duty in connection with the defences of the Suez Canal.

Two companies of the 2nd (Egyptian) Battalion, under Captain G. F. Pridham, the Welsh Regiment, garrisoned Tor (Sinai Peninsula) in January, 1915, and took part in the reconnaissance inland and the attack on the enemy's position near that post in the following month. The garrison of Abu Zeneima (Sinai) was supplied (in February, 1915) by 50 men of the 1st (Egyptian) Battalion, who were reinforced, in the following April, by 5 officers and 150 men of the 2nd Battalion.

No. 5 Battery of Artillery, under the late Captain I. D'E. Roberts, Royal Artillery, played a prominent part in the action of the 2nd and 3rd February, 1915, when the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal was beaten off. The Camel Maxim section also took part in these operations.

In the course of 1915, 2,230 Egyptian reservists were called up and handed over to the Officer Commanding the Canal defences for excavation and other works connected with the defence scheme. A number of Egyptian officers from pension and unemployed lists volunteered for service with these reservists and gave invaluable assistance in connection with their organisation and administration.

Colonel E. S. Herbert, the Commandant of the Cairo District (Egyptian Army), who was for several months serving with the British forces at Gallipoli, has done excellent work both as Senior Military Officer, Egyptian Army, and in connection with all assistance rendered by Egyptian troops in Egypt.

DARDANELLES.

In May, 1915, a Works battalion was formed for service at the Dardanelles. It consisted of six companies of 100 rank and file each, three companies being found by the Military Works Department and three by the Railway Battalion, Egyptian Army. It was commanded by Captain (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) M. R. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O., late Royal Engineers, with the following officers:— Captain B. T. Wilson, Royal Engineers; Captain R. Micklem, Royal Engineers; Captain W. E. Day, Royal Engineers; Captain P. C. Lord, late Royal Engineers; (temporary Cap-

tain) C. A. Hickley; (temporary Lieutenant) H. Claxton; Captain W. S. Blunt, Royal Engineers; and Captain (temporary Major) M. E. Sowerby, Reserve of Officers.

The battalion returned to Cairo from Gallipoli on the 15th September, 1915, and was there disbanded. Its service and utility were acknowledged in a Special Army Order.

UGANDA.

At the request of the Governor of Uganda 1 and 1/2 companies, IXth Sudanese, were sent to Madial, Morongole and Kitgum to protect the northern frontiers of Uganda from raids by the Dodinga tribesmen. These troops left Mongalla on the 21st September, 1914, and a detachment consisting of two British officers (Captain D. A. Fairburn, the West Riding Regiment, and Captain H. F. C. Hobbs, the West Yorkshire Regiment), 2 Egyptian officers, 67 non-commissioned officers and men, co-operated with the Uganda troops in the operations against the Turkhana tribe on the shores of Lake Rudolf in April and May, 1915. At the conclusion of the Turkhana operations one company under Captain Hobbs was left as a garrison at Madial, Captain Fairburn and the remainder being withdrawn. The valuable service performed by this detachment has been cordially acknowledged by the Government of Uganda.

FRENCH CONGO.

On February 18th, 1916, Major R. F. White, the Essex Regiment, the Commandant at Tembura post (Bahr el Ghazal province), received a letter from the (French) Chef de Division de Mopoi, stating that he had been suddenly attacked by that chief and forced to retire on the Belgian post at Bangaro. On the 4th March, in reply to a further request for assistance, Major White, accompanied by Captain J. A. Clark, Royal Army Medical Corps, with a force of 80 men of the Equatorial Battalion and about 600 native levies, crossed the frontier and proceeded to Mopoi post, which he reached on March 16th. Major White's camp was attacked that night, and on the following day (March 17th), when the French and Belgian contingents were approaching the post, met and dispersed with heavy losses a party of the rebels. On March 18th combined operations were undertaken in the Zamba valley, where the enemy had taken refuge, and by the evening of March 19th numbers of the latter had surrendered.

A letter of thanks for the prompt and valuable co-operation given by Major White's detachment was received from His Excellency M. Merlin, the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa.

(Signed)

REGINALD WINGATE, General.

Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan.

PART II.

For the period subsequent to the conclusion of the above report I do not think I can usefully add much to Your Excellency's diagnosis of native opinion and the attitude of the country generally. It will suffice to say that the results have fully justified the policy adopted by the Government at the outset, and as time went on it became apparent that the mass of opinion was solidifying in favour of

Great Britain and the Allies, and that the steady and uninterrupted administration of the country was tending to obliterate the symptoms of unrest which in the early days of the war the propaganda of the enemy and the uncertain course of operations had been inclined to excite.

With regard to events within the Sudan, the narrative of operations in Darfur was continued by my despatch to Your Excellency, dated 5th April, 1917, from the occupation of El Fasher down to the death of Ali Dinar at Guiba on 6th November, 1916.* This event brought to a conclusion organised resistance in Darfur, but it still left to be performed the task of putting down local disturbances, reducing the population to order, and, more especially, of protecting Darfur against raids from the followers of Sayed Ahmed El Senussi in the North.

The establishment of an administration was taken in hand at once, and, though it was a severe strain on the depleted personnel of the Sudan Government, a working arrangement was rapidly set in force which maintained peace and localised any trouble there might remain from the revolt of Ali Dinar. This trouble consisted partly in the presence of armed bodies of escaped slaves who were roving the countryside and marauding. They were divided into two main bands, under two former adherents of Ali Dinar, Abdel Mukerram and Angabu. Both bands took refuge in the south-west of Darfur, where, as the country was little known and the majority of the forces at the disposal of the Government were urgently needed elsewhere, protracted pursuit was impracticable. Abdel Mukerram ultimately passed south across the Bahr-el-Arab and surrendered to the Government post at Kafia Kingi, where the band was disarmed and its members settled in a suitable place.

Angabu, on refusing to surrender to the officer commanding Dibbis Post (S.W. corner of Jebel Marra), was declared an outlaw in January, 1917, and fled southwards. In March he had moved into French territory with about 100 followers and 80 rifles, where he is now living peaceably, most of his followers having deserted him and returned to Fasher.

The establishment of posts at Nyala and Zalingei in February, 1917, served to keep the peace in the disturbed area.

The raids of Senussi sympathisers from the North were a more serious menace, but provided an opportunity for the Sudan Government to co-operate with the French in Wadai. These raids were connected especially with Mohammed Erbeimi, the head of the Teika section of the Guraan. The Guraan live chiefly in French territory, and subsist almost entirely by raiding. They acknowledged a vague sovereignty to the Senussi and to Ali Dinar, but were not actually under any definite control. In 1916 they raided into Darfur, under the leadership of Mohammed Erbeimi, and obtained some 500 camels from the Um Gellul section of the Mahamid tribe, north of Abiad, and another 500 from adjacent tribesmen. The French troops in Ennedi were already operating against them, and the pursuit of the raiders of Darfur was the first step in active co-operation with the French. To this end a force, consisting of six British

officers, 250 rifles, Camel Corps, four Maxims, under the command of Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) T. B. Vandeleur, D.S.O. (Royal Irish Regiment), proceeded to Furawia in January, 1917. Mr. E. G. Sarsfeld Hall (Sudan Civil Service) accompanied the force as Political Officer. This force failed to get into direct communication with the French force, which had already retired northwards. However, our own Arab friendlies, who were on the watch for Guraan incursions into the Western Sudan, had got into touch with Erbeimi's tribesmen at various points and driven them back. Erbeimi, after two years of varying fortunes, during which he was continually harassed by the French, finally surrendered himself to the Sudan Government post at Furawia in December, 1918. His suppression should go far to maintain security and prevent raiding on the northern and north-western border of Darfur.

In January, 1918, the refusal of the Beni Holba tribe, in southern Darfur, to obey Government orders compelled the despatch of a small patrol into their country, under the command of Captain H. F. C. Hobbs (West Yorkshire Regiment), accompanied by Mr. J. A. Gillan (Sudan Civil Service) as Political Officer. The patrol returned in February, having secured its objectives.

In May, 1918, some unrest was noticeable in Dar Masalit, and gave further opportunity for co-operation between the French and Sudan Governments. It appeared that Bedowi, the brother of Mohammed Bahr el Din, the Sultan (commonly called Endoka), encouraged by Abu Shillukh, his chief officer, proposed to attack simultaneously the French and Sudan posts, which by mutual agreement had been placed at Adre and Kereinik, on the Wadai and Sudan borders of Dar Masalit respectively. News of the threatened movement was received in time and reinforcements were sent. This display of force deterred any action by the natives, and Endoka was prevailed upon to hand over Abu Shillukh to our post at Kereinik, whence he was sent to El Fasher, whilst Bedowi was despatched on a journey to Mecca for the pilgrimage, from which he returned in December, 1918. It is hoped that the opportunities he has had of seeing the world, and more especially the resources of the Government, will have impressed him sufficiently to deter him or his brother from further intrigues.

Facilities for co-operation with the French have been greatly improved in this area by the establishment of wireless telegraphy at Kereinik, thus connecting Abesha and Fasher. Also a system of runners recently instituted to carry mails should not only increase security, but improve commercial relations between Wadai and the Sudan.

The new province is now rapidly settling down, as the administration extends and increases its hold over the people.

I consider the conquest of Darfur to have had most important results on opinion in this country. Any feeling of lack of confidence that there may have been in certain quarters as to our capacity to hold and rule the country while the Empire was engaged in a death-struggle in Europe, disappeared entirely when the news of the destruction of Ali Dinar's forces was received.

In other parts of the Sudan the chief military preoccupation of the Government has mainly been confined to three areas. The unrest

* Printed in the London Gazette, No. 30102, dated 29th May, 1917.

which called for the use of force on these occasions cannot altogether be attributed to unhealthy influences from outside or to any general feeling that the Government power was weakening. To a certain extent such operations are inevitable in the administration of an extensive and semi-barbarous country.

The three areas I refer to were:—

- (1) On the East Bank of the Upper Nile among the Lau section of the Nuer tribe.
- (2) The Nyima Hills in the Nuba Mountains province.
- (3) Among the Dinka tribes on the West bank of the Nile.

1. *The Lau Nuers.*

For the past five or six years the Lau Nuers had shown a disposition to be insubordinate to the Government. The acquisition of rifles from across the Abyssinian frontier and a growing belief that the Government was incapable of dealing with them, encouraged them in their unsatisfactory behaviour, which culminated in an attack on a Government post near Kongor, the garrison of which, with their officer, were practically annihilated.

As neighbouring sections of the Nuer tribe were waiting to see what the result of a conflict between the Lau Nuers and the Government would be it was considered desirable to take strong measures. Accordingly a force, under the command of Major E. A. T. Bayly, D.S.O. (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), accompanied by Major C. H. Stigand (Royal West Kent Regiment), Governor, Upper Nile Province, as Chief Political Officer, was sent in February, 1917, to round up the enemy by means of driving columns, and, if possible, bring them to action in force.

This object was not fully attained, as the enemy effected no large concentration, but they were severely punished in casualties and captures, their three leading chiefs surrendered, and the neighbouring tribes who were hesitating in their loyalty were effectively convinced of the powers of the Government.

This expedition has been dealt with in detail by my despatch to Your Excellency, dated November 14th, 1917.*

2. *The Nyima Hills.*

Similarly there had been unrest for some time in various portions of the Nuba Mountains, which came to a head among the inhabitants of the Nyima group, led by Agabna Wad el Sultan Arowga. Their continued refusal to pay taxes and to give up refugees from justice led to the despatch of a company of mounted infantry to assist the Inspector of the District, Captain R. W. Hutton (Royal Marines), in restricting the influence of Agabna to the smallest area possible.

Unfortunately Captain Hutton, whose energy and ability were making a marked improvement in the district, was killed while attempting to arrest Agabna by a surprise visit to his village, and the set-back caused by this event made it imperative to send a patrol sufficiently large to clear up the situation finally.

A force of about 3,000 men was therefore gradually concentrated at Dilling by October, 1917, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel L. K. Smith, D.S.O. (Royal Scots). Major R. S. Wilson (late Lancashire Fusiliers), Governor, Nuba Mountains Province, accompanied the force as Chief Political Officer.

Owing to the nature of the ground and the fact that the enemy lived in caves, where they could practically defy direct attack, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith decided to reduce the hills by investment. These tactics were completely successful, and by the end of February, 1918, the operations terminated with the capture of Agabna and his chief lieutenant, and the surrender of 4,000 prisoners, with 700 rifles and a large number of cattle.

The expedition was described fully in a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, which I forwarded to Your Excellency on August 7th, 1918.*

The success was important, as these tribes had never been finally subdued. Against Derwish forces the hill strongholds were practically impregnable, and they felt themselves to be secure against attack. Under the present Government a lenient and conciliatory attitude has always been taken up, and in case of disturbance surrender had always been accepted after a light punishment and the infliction of a fine. There is no doubt they regarded this as a confession of inability to control them properly.

The reduction of the Nyima hills has completely dissipated the feeling. The behaviour of neighbouring hills has been satisfactory since Agabna's defeat, and it is hoped in time to bring about a better understanding between the tribes and the Government.

3. *The Dinka Tribes.*

In 1914, a Dinka named Malwal Matiang, in the Bahr el Ghazal Province, had alienated himself from the Government and set himself up as an independent chief. By offering a harbour to criminals and malcontents he gathered a considerable number of adherents and became a menace to public security. His following was not specially dangerous as a hostile force, but he appeared likely to unsettle the tribes in his neighbourhood. He was declared an outlaw in 1917, but his prestige locally ensured his safety. Accordingly a force under the command of Major R. H. Darwall, D.S.O. (Royal Marines), accompanied by Major E. D. Bally (Somerset Light Infantry) as Political Officer, left Rumbek in March, 1918, and proceeded to Matiang's village, Lewell. Matiang fled north. The force pursued him in two columns and captured large quantities of cattle, including most of Matiang's own herd, and inflicted many casualties on his followers. The operations were extremely difficult, and for three days the troops were marching waist deep in water, maintaining the advance with great energy and endurance. Matiang had now lost all his prestige and became a fugitive, so it was considered unnecessary to take any further punitive action, as his personal capture in this extensive and difficult country was very unlikely.

The force now turned its attention to the Afak Atwots, a tribe inhabiting the south-east corner of the Bahr el Ghazal who had attacked a Government post in the autumn of 1917, and committed other acts of disorder. A patrol had been sent against them at the time, but the flooded state of the country prevented the operations being carried through. The patrol managed to capture the chief of the section, named Dio, but he unfortunately escaped while being brought back to Headquarters. In

* Not published in the London Gazette.

March, 1918, Dio broke out into open revolt, and other chiefs in his neighbourhood began to render him active assistance.

Major Darwall's force concentrated on the river Lau early in April, and dividing into two columns proceeded to patrol the country and harass the enemy, destroying his villages and capturing his cattle. In one of these patrols Captain E. G. Lawton (East Surrey Regiment) was unfortunately speared by a single Dinka hiding among the cattle, and died of his wound before he could reach medical assistance.

Many casualties were inflicted on the enemy, about 5,000 cattle captured, and several villages and cattle camps destroyed. By the middle of May Dio was a fugitive without followers, and the operations were brought to a conclusion on the 16th. A few days later Dio came in, and this was followed on the 26th by the surrender of Chief Matiang.

The expedition was thus highly successful in spite of the very difficult conditions encountered, and there is little doubt that the punishment inflicted will have had a lasting effect on a part of the country, which has been for some time in a very unsettled state.

I am sending to Your Excellency a separate despatch on this patrol which describes the operations in detail.*

Government troops have on two occasions apart from the joint expedition with the French against Erbeimi on the North-west frontier of Darfur, co-operated with neighbouring Governments.

1. In 1917 the authorities in the French Congo asked the Governor, Bahr el Ghazel, for co-operation in disposing of a certain outlaw named Krikri, who, having evaded arrest for elephant poaching in the Congo, had collected a following and was raiding loyal chiefs. A force under Captain V. H. Fergusson (Scottish Rifles) proceeded to patrol the frontiers in case Krikri should attempt to break through into Sudan territory. He was finally arrested in April.

2. Expedition against the Turkhana Tribe.

This is a pastoral tribe situated in the Northern frontier of British East Africa in the vicinity of Lake Rudolf. They had for some time past defied the control of the British East African Government, and had been consistently raiding the peaceable tribes to the South and South-west. The British East African authorities placed the number of cattle looted in 1917 as high as 30,000 head, while the Uganda Protectorate had another claim of some 3,000 head. Abyssinian influence, and even participation in some of the raids, had been established, while the Donyro and Marille tribes had also been actively allied with the Turkhana.

As the provisional Sudan-Uganda boundary divides the Turkhana tribe in two, and it was felt that no action against the tribe would have lasting results unless punishment were inflicted upon the whole tribe simultaneously, it was

decided that the Sudan Government should co-operate with the British East African forces in the undertaking of the following objects:—

(1) The punishment and disarmament, in respect of firearms, of the Donyro, Marille and Turkhana tribes, and of any other native tribes resident in the military area who had shown hostility to the Government.

(2) The expulsion of Abyssinians from East Africa and Uganda Protectorates West of Lake Rudolf.

(3) The reduction of the military area to a state suitable for Civil Administration.

(4) The recapture of looted stock.

Concentration of the Sudan Force, under Major R. F. White (Essex Regiment), who, as senior officer later took command of the combined force, was completed on December 12th, 1917, at Ikoto, on the Sudan-Uganda border (Lat. 4° 05' N., Long. 33° 05' E.), and from there units moved across the border to Loyoro (Lat. 3° 20' N., Long. 34° 08' E.). The force was accompanied by the late Major H. T. C. Jones-Vaughan (Rifle Brigade) as Chief Political Officer. During the next five months columns operated both to the West in Uganda and to the East in British East Africa, the force eventually working across to the Western shore of Lake Rudolf and fighting several actions during this period.

An outstanding incident of the operations was the attack made by the Abyssinians on the column under Captain J. H. R. Yardley, D.S.O. (Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers), in the Lorusia hills (Lat. 4° 15' N., Long. 35° 20' E.) on May 27th, heavy casualties were inflicted and the Abyssinian force driven off. At the time of writing the participation of the Abyssinians is to undergo an official investigation on the spot by representatives of the British and Abyssinian Governments.

In June, 1918, the objects of the expedition having been attained, the Sudan force was withdrawn and a temporary chain of posts was established by the British East Africa authorities.

Before reaching their stations in the Sudan, some units of the force were occupied in minor operations in different districts. One company, operating in the vicinity of Madial (lat. 3° 50' N., long. 33° 25' E.), in conjunction with Uganda Police, from 3rd to 5th July, encountered some resistance from the outlaws, of whom several were killed; and a section of the same company was again engaged in those mountains on 21st July. Action was also taken against some villages near Mengi rest house (four miles west of Liria, in Latuka district), where a policeman had been killed and some mails were stolen.

In addition to these more serious operations there have been some twenty-eight occasions in which troops have been turned out to prevent inter-tribal fights or to uphold Government authority. Such minor disturbances have occurred almost without exception on the remote confines of the country, and are without political importance. They do not call for individual mention, and I only refer to them to show that the business of garrisoning the country is not negligible even in the ordinary routine of administration.

I trust that the account I have given of military operations will not convey the impression that the prevailing tone in the Sudan has been one of unrest. The reverse has been the case. The fighting I have described has

* Not published in the London Gazette.

been—apart from the trouble on the Western Frontier, which was the natural sequel of the conquest of Darfur—the inevitable accompaniment of administration in this and, I imagine, every other country where control is exercised over savage tribes. It has taken place almost entirely in outlying districts, where government is mainly in its initial stages. The attitude of the whole of the central and northern part of the Sudan—the part which contains the more civilised and thinking population, and where public opinion of a kind tends to be formed—has been not merely one of acquiescence in the supremacy of the Government, but of active sympathy and good will.

PART III.

The direct military contribution made by the Egyptian Army to the British forces in the Near East has been dealt with by Your Excellency in the report I have quoted above.

The following is a brief account of the additional detachments sent and services rendered.

In 1917, a Squadron of Cavalry, a Sapper Company, and three battalions of Infantry were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and have since July in that year been employed in Palestine and on the lines of communication. Other details have been lent for duty with the Air Force, for ammunition depôts and railway construction.

In 1918 an Egyptian Army Transport Corps was raised for duty with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, with the following establishment:—

- 2 British officers,
- 42 Egyptian officers.
- 2 Translators.
- 4008 N.C.O.'s and men.

The Stores Department of the Army has issued to units of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force saddlery, clothing and equipment of all descriptions to the value of some £120,000.

Barracks, hospitals and other Egyptian Army buildings in Cairo and Alexandria have been placed at the disposal of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

The Sudan Government railways supplied three engines and 50 trucks for use on the railways in Palestine at the time of General Allenby's advance on Jerusalem. This small item was a considerable sacrifice, as the railway rolling stock was very severely taxed at the time to carry the enormously increased exports.

In December, 1916, instructions were received from the Foreign Office to increase the production of wheat and other food grains in the Sudan. At the same time the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt sent an urgent request for food supplies, as owing to the limited amount of shipping available he was compelled to draw to the utmost on local resources. Every effort was therefore made to develop the country's productive capacity as quickly as possible.

Food supplies in the Sudan were placed under the control of a Resources Board, and the direction of exports was undertaken by the Licensing Officer appointed in connection with War Trade Regulations.

There is no need to describe the various measures taken in the last two years to give effect to this policy. It has to be remembered that in the Sudan the cultivation is spread in patches over thousands of miles of sparsely inhabited country, ill-provided with transport,

and that cattle and sheep are pastured by nomadic tribes over wide stretches of territory. It is, in consequence, extremely difficult to get into touch at short notice with supplies and to develop and control output.

In view also of the pressing external demands for produce, it has been a primary consideration to retain a sufficient food reserve within the country, and it has been a matter of some anxiety to strike a mean between the desire to contribute a maximum of assistance to the Army and Egypt and the necessity of protecting home food reserves.

The net result has been that during the last two years the Sudan has supplied to Egypt and the British Forces:—

- 169,000 tons of food grains.
- 61,000 cattle.
- 318,000 sheep.

The value of these was, approximately, £3,595,000. Roughly speaking, the Sudan has doubled the quantity of its usual output of food products during the last two years. For purposes of comparison I may mention the export of millet. Before the war the maximum export in any one year was 32,000 tons, whereas the quantities allowed to leave the Sudan in the years 1915-1918 have been respectively 46,000, 57,000, 85,000, and 54,000 tons.

Of the quantities mentioned above the British forces in Egypt have received the following, of the approximate value of £1,215,000:—

- 75,000 tons of food grains, etc.
- 8,000 cattle.
- 161,000 sheep.

As regards increase in production, some 10,000 acres were added to the area under wheat in 1916-1917, and a further 11,000 acres in 1917-1918.

With the aid of funds generously advanced by Egypt various irrigation schemes for wheat production were started in 1917, but delay in shipment of machinery has hindered their progress. Most of the areas will, however, be under cultivation this year. By means of the same funds extra Egyptian staff were obtained to develop the output of cattle and sheep.

The export of camels for the use of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force has in three years reached the figure of 16,625, a number which was large enough to react unfavourably on the internal transport of food grains. In the past year also over 3,000 donkeys have been supplied to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

I may also mention that in 1917 and 1918 about 26,000 tons of grain have been spared to supplement a shortage which was causing anxiety in Arabia and the Italian colony of Eritrea.

The measures (briefly alluded to above) which were taken to organise these resources to the best advantage have not only been cheerfully agreed to, but have been most actively backed by the leading natives, and I should like here to record my appreciation of the unflinching loyalty and good will with which the chiefs and sheikhs have responded to every appeal. Without their co-operation it would have been impossible to provide the numbers of camels and donkeys which were sent North for the use of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, nor the unprecedented export of cattle and sheep and foodstuffs to Egypt. Moreover, the most generous contributions have

been made by all communities and classes to the Prince of Wales's Fund and the Red Cross Funds of Great Britain and France. The help and support thus rendered to us are, to my mind, evidence of a genuine feeling of friendship and liking for the Government that has administered the country for the past twenty years. It may be too soon to talk of the growth of a national idea among the tribes of the Sudan, in past years disintegrated and often mutually hostile—though I think the germ of such an idea may be detected—but I am convinced that the four years of war have wakened a consciousness of the Empire which did not exist before, and which may, I trust, in coming years develop into a spirit of citizenship.

The credit for what may be regarded as a very satisfactory situation belongs, in the first place, to the sound system of administration, based upon personal intercourse and contact with the inhabitants, which was built up from the beginning of our occupation. But high praise is due to the present staff of officers and officials who have patiently and cheerfully carried out their military or civil duties during the war. Their situation has been one which, I think, calls for sympathy. From the beginning of the war it has been the keenest wish of every Englishman in the country to take a more direct share in the conflict with Germany than has in appearance been offered by the humdrum life of civil and military routine. This is specially the case with the Officers, Warrant and Non-commissioned Officers attached to the Egyptian Army, who, by the accident of their positions at the outbreak of war, have been debarred from employing their skill and experience in the profession for which they have been trained, and accompanying their units on active service. Enough, however, has been said above to make it clear that the efficiency of both military and civil work here would have been disastrously impaired if officers had been allowed to return to the British Army as freely as they wished. This decision was intimated to them early in the war, and has been loyally accepted.

The civil officials, like their military col-

leagues, have been prevented from offering their services to the Army. And I would say here that I do not see how any course could have been adopted by the Government other than to refuse at the outset all resignations. Had resignations been permitted freely the country would not have been left with a single British official of military age and fitness. As it was, the release of those whom, owing to special circumstances, it was impossible to retain has thrown a strain upon the remainder which, accentuated by an inevitable curtailment of leave, has been the cause for some anxiety. I am glad to have this opportunity of recording my appreciation of their services.

In addition, I wish to express my sense of obligation to the whole personnel, both military and civil, for the loyal support they have always accorded to me. In circumstances which have been often adverse and difficult, they have never failed to give their best work in a most cheerful and ungrudging spirit.

Finally, I cannot close this despatch without a reference to the loss the Sudan Government sustained in 1917 when Mr. E. Bonham Carter, C.M.G., decided to accept the post of Senior Judicial Officer in the new Administration in Mesopotamia. Mr. Bonham Carter's services are too well known to Your Excellency to require commendation from me, but I should like to take this opportunity of thanking him for his unfailing support and sympathy and most helpful advice, not only in matters concerning his own Department, but in all the problems which confronted the Government during an anxious and difficult time.

I am sending Your Excellency under separate cover a list of the names of those who have rendered valuable services in both military and civil capacities during the war.

I have the honour to be.

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient Servant.

(Signed) LEE STACK,

Major-General.

A./Sirdar and Governor-General
of the Sudan.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses:
IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and 28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1;
37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER; 1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF;
23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH;

or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

Printed for His Majesty's Stationery Office by WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., Fetter Lane, Fleet St., London, E.C. 4.

Tuesday, 27 May, 1919.

Price Four Pence, Net.