

from Lumbo, on the mainland west of Mozambique.

Little was known about the rivers; but the Lujenda and Lurio proved to be of considerable volume, especially in the rainy season; and the Licungo and Melela, flowing into the sea north of Quelimane, were only passable by a few fords.

The central districts (which the enemy would naturally make for) were reported to be well elevated, healthy and fertile.

In fact, Portuguese East Africa appeared an ideal theatre for the operations of a commander of a compact and mobile force, tied to no base, independent of lines of communication, and adept in the art of "living on the country," whose aim would probably be to avoid encounters with superior forces and to remain in being as long as possible.

It was therefore clear that the forthcoming operations, though on a much smaller scale than those of 1917, would be arduous and exacting, and had to be considered in the light of a new undertaking.

My own aim was twofold: to prevent the enemy in any force returning to German East Africa and to get to grips with him as soon and as often as possible, for though he might enlist new askari he could not replace his Europeans.

The campaign of 1916 and 1917 had shown that it was practically impossible to round up a mobile enemy in the difficult terrain of East Africa, and, from the character of the German Commander, it did not appear probable that any general surrender would take place until his forces had been so reduced as to be innocuous. The campaign had therefore perforce to be one of virtual extermination, and I ordered my commanders to miss no chance of fighting, and thus cause enemy casualties, whatever the risk.

3. The enemy, after the engagement at Ngomano, travelled very rapidly southwards up the Lujenda River, followed by the 25th Cavalry and part of the Nigerian Brigade; but when our cavalry patrols reached Nanguare on the 19th of December, they found the enemy had already gone, apparently heading for the fertile area between Muembe and Mtarica. He was thus completely out of reach of my forces from the Lindi area. Meanwhile, General Northey moved the 1st King's African Rifles Column to the southern end of Lake Nyasa, and landed the 2nd Cape Corps at Mtengula, on the eastern shore of the lake.

At the request of the Portuguese I arranged to despatch a force to Port Amelia, and the leading troops of the Gold Coast Regiment disembarked at that port on the 14th of December, by which time the Portuguese reported that a detachment of the enemy had occupied Medo, some 130 miles westward of Port Amelia.

The gradual rise of the Rovuma signalled the advent of the rainy season, when my troops on the southern bank would be in danger of being cut off from their supplies; I therefore withdrew them, leaving the Nigerian Brigade on the north bank opposite Ngomano, with one battalion at Massasi. The 3rd/4th K.A.R. was despatched to Tunduru, and General Northey held the Songea area in strength. The rest of the troops in the Lindi district formed a reserve at Ndanda. These measures put me in a good position to deal with any attempt on

the part of the enemy to recross into German East Africa.

4. On the 19th December a detachment of the 2nd Cape Corps left Mtengula to occupy Unango, 50 miles eastwards, with a view to developing a line towards Mtarica; and on the 21st December, Colonel Hawthorn's Column (1st/1st and 2nd/1st K.A.R., with 3rd/1st in reserve) had reached a point 15 miles north-north-east of Namwera, and was heading for the Upper Lujenda about Luambala.

The Gold Coast Regiment completed their landing at Port Amelia by the end of December, and began to develop a line towards Medo. As it was evident that this would be one of our main lines of advance from the sea, I despatched the 4th/4th K.A.R. and one section 22nd Mountain Battery to Port Amelia, forming the whole into a column under command of Colonel Rose, Gold Coast Regiment.

Between the Port Amelia-Medo line and the Rovuma the Portuguese Forces, based on Mocimboa-da-Praia, held the Mocimboa-do-Rovuma-Chomba line.

My intention was thus to form a barrier to the north of the Rovuma, and to close in on the enemy from east and west simultaneously. Operations were to be continued throughout the rainy season, as far as possible, without intermission.

The enemy's dispositions at the beginning of January were approximately as follows:—Headquarters and five companies, Mtarica; about Muembe, three companies; near Luambala, three companies; Medo and eastwards, four companies.

5. By the end of the first week in January 750 rifles of the 2nd Cape Corps had reached Unango, and Colonel Hawthorn had about 1,300 rifles on the line Katuli to Luambala. Heavy rain was being experienced, which greatly impeded operations.

On 7th January Colonel Hawthorn attacked an enemy force holding both banks of the Lujenda River and Luambala and drove it northwards. Heavy floods in the Lujenda temporarily hindered his advance, but by the 15th he succeeded in reaching and occupying Luambala after some opposition. On the 14th the 2nd Cape Corps, advancing from Unango, occupied Likopolue.

Meanwhile, Colonel Rose, from Port Amelia, had pushed his advanced troops inland to Pamune, some 50 miles south-west of Port Amelia, the enemy's activities being confined to patrols, and raiding parties to the coast. In this area, too, the rains seriously hindered operations.

On 21st January the 2nd Cape Corps occupied Muembe unopposed, the enemy retiring towards Mtarica, while the enemy opposing Colonel Hawthorn also fell back down the Lujenda.

At Port Amelia the main body of Colonel Rose's force had, by the end of January, occupied Ankuabe, with patrols well forward to Meza, 23 miles to the west, where the enemy was reported to be in position.

6. From the middle of January onwards rain had been constant, and it was clear that the wet season had set in with full violence. This meant that operations would necessarily be slow, and might occasionally be at a complete standstill for days on end. The use of motor transport could only be intermittent, and the length of the lines involved made it very difficult to maintain adequate forces, by