

sufficient. Accordingly, on 25th, after destroying a village in the vicinity of the camp, the force returned with slight molestation to Ispana Raghza.

19. Whilst these operations were taking place several raids were carried out by aeroplanes of the 31st Squadron, Royal Flying Corps. Shingai villages in the Takhi Zam and others in the Badda Toi were bombed and in a particularly successful raid on 26th June nine hits were scored on Makin and six on Marobi, the home of Mulla Fazl Din, the titular chief of the tribe. These raids involved considerable risks. Engines were very liable to failure in the high temperature prevailing; distances from the base at Tank were long and hills up to 8,000 feet had to be crossed. These risks were, however, cheerfully taken by the flying officers and were well repaid by the results obtained, which undoubtedly contributed largely to the general desire for peace displayed by all sections of the tribe.

20. A letter had now been received from a *jirga* at Kaniguram asking for Government terms of peace. These were communicated verbally, and the messengers were informed that military operations would be suspended until 2nd July, on which date representative *maliks* were ordered to come in.

On this date the *maliks* from Kaniguram arrived at Boji Khel, to which place General Beynon had transferred his force on 28th and 29th June, owing to the water supply at Ispana Raghza being unsatisfactory. The *maliks* accepted the terms imposed, and hostages were given for their due fulfilment.

On 9th July, the first instalment of the rifles demanded from the tribe was handed in, and fresh hostages were given pending final settlement. The attitude of the tribe being now very satisfactory, Major-General Beynon's force moved back, on the 11th and 12th July, to Manzal, at the junction of the Shahur and Danawat Valleys, the post at Haidari Kach being at the same time transferred to Chagmalai.

Owing to the difficulty experienced by the *maliks* in collecting the rifles which had to be surrendered, the final *jirga* could not be held as early as had been hoped, but on the 10th August a full representative *jirga* of 3,000 Mahsuds ratified the settlement; peace was declared, and British territory opened to them for trade. By 12th August all troops had been withdrawn to Jandola, and the dispersal of the forces in the Derajat and Bannu areas commenced.

21. Whilst these operations had been taking place, the troops under Brigadier-General Bruce in the Bannu area were not called upon to undertake any offensive measures. The presence of strong forces at Bannu and Miramshah deterred the Mahsuds from raiding into the Bannu district and Tochi Valley, and kept them in a state of uncertainty as to whether an advance from Miramshah might not be contemplated. On one occasion only was it necessary for Brigadier-General Bruce to act against a body of the enemy. This was on the 14th June, when a body of Mahsuds approached the Saidgi defile in the Tochi Valley with the object of attacking the 1-1st Kent Regiment marching to Miramshah. The prompt concentration of troops both from Miramshah and Bannu, to effect which mechanical transport

was largely employed, successfully prevented the enemy from carrying out his design.

22. The physical and climatic conditions of this portion of the North-West Frontier are peculiarly trying, and the period during which the recent offensive operations had to be undertaken was the hottest time of the year. Nothing, however, could have exceeded the cheerfulness and determination with which all difficulties and hardships were faced and overcome by the troops; not only by those actively engaged against the enemy, but by those on the lines of communication who, at first in the Gomal and later in the Shahur Valley, were continuously employed on piquetting duties in difficult and dangerous country.

23. At the time when it was decided to take the offensive the most unfavourable season of the year was just commencing. It was necessary that operations should be undertaken with the least possible delay and with a force of adequate size to ensure rapid success. This entailed the immediate expansion of the force already available, which threw a great strain on the communications leading into the area. The Kalabagh-Bannu-Tank narrow gauge line was inadequately equipped for the movement of large bodies of troops and was liable to interruption in the event of heavy rain. The unbridged passages of the Indus at Kalabagh and Darya Khan added greatly to the difficulties to be overcome. Consequently the work of those responsible for the communications was very arduous, and the manner in which these duties were carried out is worthy of great praise. The administrative services and departments had also to work under high pressure and adverse conditions, and their untiring efforts contributed greatly to the success of the operations. The Supply and Transport and Ordnance Services successfully met all the demands made upon them. The Medical Services, under the direction of Colonel P. Hehir, C.B., C.M.G., I.M.S., by the timely use of precautionary measures, were able to prevent the outbreak of epidemics, and the arrangements made for the reception and evacuation of the large numbers of sick, which it was anticipated would have to be dealt with as a result of the great heat and unhealthy theatre in which the operations took place, were fully adequate to deal with the casualties which occurred. The provision and equipment of base hospitals and convalescent depots at Rawalpindi and in the Murree Hills was quickly carried out under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, 2nd (Rawalpindi) Division, and amply sufficed to meet all requirements.

The Royal Engineers had to carry through much work, especially in connection with hospital accommodation, which was expeditiously and satisfactorily executed.

Whilst Major-General Beynon's striking force was in the Shahur Valley, sections of No. 3 Wireless Signal Squadron had to be relied on almost entirely for maintaining communications with it, and great credit is due to these sections for the way in which they coped with the heavy traffic.

24. I wish to express my thanks to the North-Western Railway authorities for the manner in which the transport of troops and supplies was carried out, especially over the narrow gauge railway in the Trans-Indus area. The congestion on this line was very