

counter-attack with the bulk of his force against No. 2 Column, in which he suffered considerable loss, but regained ground which enabled him to keep open the Mtshakama road and retire by it during the night. No. 3 Column reached Nambanditi without opposition.

The left and centre columns (Nos. 3 and 1) continued their advance directly towards Mtshakama, while the right column (No. 2) moved via Kirongo against the three or four enemy companies at Kilaganeli. These retired south and were followed up, slight rearguard resistance being encountered at Mtandawala on the 14th. A concerted attack on Mtshakama by all three columns was designed, but the enemy did not await this blow, and continued his movement southwards. No. 2 Column was thereupon directed on Likawaje, Nos. 1 and 3 Columns on Narungombe. The two latter encountered rearguard opposition on the 17th and 18th, and by nightfall on the 18th had reached a point two miles north of Narungombe, which was reported to be held in force. No. 2 Column was thereupon directed to co-operate in an attack on Narungombe on the following day.

The allotment of troops to the columns had varied during the advance in accordance with the tactical situation, and on the 18th was as follows:—

No. 1 Column (Colonel Orr).

8th South African Infantry (less two companies).

Gold Coast Regiment.

33rd Punjabis.

2/2nd K.A.R.

27th Mountain Battery.

No. 2 Column (Colonel Ridgway).

7th South African Infantry.

1/3rd K.A.R.

2/3rd K.A.R.

22nd Mountain Battery.

No. 3 Column (Colonel Taylor).

8th South African Infantry (two companies).

3/3rd K.A.R. (less one company).

40th Pathans (detachment).

Early on the 19th No. 1 Column gained touch with the enemy and engaged him in front, while Nos. 2 and 3 Columns moved against his left and right flanks respectively. The enemy was found to be strongly entrenched and the fighting was particularly severe. In the centre the 33rd Punjabis and Gold Coast Regiment succeeded in capturing the enemy trenches in front of No. 1 Column, but were heavily counter-attacked, and finally compelled to evacuate them after a stubborn resistance. On the left bush fires greatly interfered with the movements of No. 3 Column. The enemy took advantage of this to launch heavy counter-attacks against No. 3 Column, and the detachment of the 40th Pathans on the extreme left, which quickly lost all its British officers killed or wounded, was forced back. The remainder of the column, which was in imminent danger of being rolled up, was compelled to give ground.

Meanwhile on the right No. 2 Column had gained a position well round the enemy's left flank, repelling three counter-attacks, and by the afternoon was pressing the enemy closely. In order to relieve this pressure the German

Commander made another strong counter-attack, which was stopped, and in turn counter-attacked by the 1/3rd K.A.R. under Major Durham. The enemy was driven back right through the trenches on his left flank, which were taken and firmly held.

This success decided the action, the enemy evacuating the whole of his position at dark and retiring towards Mihambia. His losses had been heavy.

The 22nd and 27th Mountain Batteries and Gold Coast Battery gave close support throughout the day to the attacking infantry, whose gallantry and endurance were most marked. The casualties, particularly amongst officers, had been considerable in nearly all units engaged.

The occupation of Narungombe practically completed the clearing of the Kiturika Hills, which had been an arduous task for the troops engaged. The effective fighting strength of the Kilwa force had been greatly depleted by malaria and other sickness, and rest and reinforcements were necessary before the advance could be resumed.

At Lindi the month passed quietly in reconnaissance, and preparation for an advance early in August.

13. While progress was thus being made in the main operations, Naumann remained north of the Central Railway, and by his activities threatened to prove a serious nuisance.

It was never possible to forecast his intentions, as his detachment, though a sufficiently effective fighting force of 600 rifles, twelve maxims, and two guns, was completely mobile and small enough to live on the country. On the 28th June he captured Fort Ikoma, a small post east of Lake Victoria, garrisoned by a few irregulars. The Belgian pursuing column reached Ikoma the following day, and had a sharp engagement with the enemy, who thereafter turned eastwards towards Lake Natron. This movement necessitated my taking steps to garrison the Magadi and Aruscha Districts, troops for the purpose having either to be taken from my reserve or from new K.A.R. battalions under training.

Naumann passed through the Sonjo district and then moved in a south-east direction, reaching Engaruka on the 17th, his objective them appearing to be Aruscha. A mobile Belgian column left Ikoma on the 20th with the object of forcing him southwards towards the Central Railway. On that day Naumann was on the north shore of Lake Manyara, and was reported to be making for Kondoa. The Cape Corps, from Aruscha, was directed to join in the pursuit. The enemy passed through Ufiome and Massogoloda, leaving the latter place on the 25th, and moved southwards east of Mount Hanang, with the apparent intention of recrossing the railway.

I arranged with Colonel Huyghe that the Belgian troops should endeavour to drive Naumann south on to the railway near Dodoma, where my reserve column could engage him, and at the same time I reinforced Kondoa and made preparations to deal with a possible move to the east.

14. The general situation at the beginning of August had cleared up considerably. The enemy had been driven out of Portuguese East Africa, and on the western front had been pressed back to the general line Kidatu-Idete River-Mpepo-Mpondas. On the eastern front he had been compelled to withdraw from the