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WEDNESDAY, 25 OCTOBER, 1916.

War Office,
25th October, 1916.

The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir Reginald Wingate, G.C.B., Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan:—

Khartoum,
8th August, 1916.

SIR,—I have the honour to forward for the information of the Secretary of State for War my Despatch on the military operations in Darfur, together with a brief report on the services of the Egyptian Army and the Sudan Administration since the outbreak of war in Europe.

Before describing the military operations in the Sudan and in Darfur which the Egyptian Army has been required to carry out, I desire to refer to the cordial relations—mutually advantageous, I venture to think, to all parties—that have existed between the late Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Egypt (Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell), his successor (General Sir Archibald Murray), Sir Ian Hamilton (whilst in command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force), and myself.

On the one hand it has been the privilege of the Egyptian Army and the members of the Sudan Administration to render assistance, both in personnel and in material, to supply the many and urgent demands connected with

the military operations in Egypt and the Dardanelles. On the other hand the promise of reinforcements, should they be required in the Sudan, from the British Army in Egypt, relieved me of much anxiety. Fortunately it has hitherto proved unnecessary to requisition assistance from Egypt other than by the temporary loan of a section of the Royal Flying Corps, several Special Service Officers, and some mechanical transport and other details, the value of which I have most gratefully acknowledged in connection with the operations in Darfur.

The following patrols, involving military operations on a minor scale, have been successfully carried out in the Sudan since the outbreak of the European War. In these operations, the necessity for which has been generally due to the native unrest consequent on the war and to anti-Government propaganda, only units of the Egyptian Army have been employed.

LOKOIA PATROL.

The Lokoia tribes of Jebels Lyria and Luch, in Mongalla Province, openly defied the Government, and in January, 1915, a patrol, consisting of a half-company of the 9th Sudanese, one and a half companies of the Equatorial Battalion, and a detachment of the Medical Corps, under Major C. C. MacNamara, the Royal Irish Rifles, was despatched against them. The patrol successfully achieved its purpose, with but slight casualty to our troops.

JEBEL MIRI PATROL.

Fiki Ali, the powerful Mek (or chief) of Jebel Miri, in the Nuba Mountains province, assumed a hostile attitude towards the Government, and his disaffection constituted a menace to the peace of the whole of the province. In April, 1915, the following force, under the command of Major H. J. Huddleston, the Dorset Regiment, was rapidly concentrated at Kadugli:—

- 1 Squadron of Cavalry.
- 1 Camel Maxim Section.
- 3 Companies of Camel Corps.
- 1 Company 7th Battalion.
- 1½ Companies 11th Sudanese.

A total of 46 officers and 1,007 rank and file.

On April 20th and the two ensuing days our troops attacked Jebel Tuluk and the surrounding hills, which were strongly held by Fiki Ali and his tribesmen. The attack was completely successful, and the enemy were driven out of their stronghold, a large number of prisoners being captured. Fiki Ali, with his immediate following, succeeded in effecting his escape, but after being hunted from place to place for several months eventually was compelled to surrender.

MONGALLA PATROL.

The inhabitants of Jebels Imatong, Lafite, and Garia refused to obey Government orders, and a force consisting of

- 1 Section of Artillery.
- ½ Company 9th Sudanese,
- 3 Companies Equatorial Battalion,

under the command of Major D. Percy-Smith, D.S.O., the Middlesex Regiment, was despatched from Torit in February, 1916, to punish these recalcitrant tribesmen and to restore order.

These operations lasted till the 13th March, when the rebels sent in peace envoys and agreed to submit.

The following small patrols were despatched in connection with tribal disturbances and incipient revolt against Government authority:—

December, 1914.

To restore order and protect friendly tribesmen in the Duk Fadiat district of Mongalla province.

To punish the Nuer tribesmen of the Lau district of the Bahr el Ghazal province, who had made an unprovoked attack on a mission station.

February, 1915.

To punish raiders in the Zeraf valley of the Upper Nile province (Guweir Nuer patrol).

March, 1915.

To punish the recalcitrant Sheikh of Abujok (Sobat-Pibor district).

August, 1915.

To reinforce Government authority in the Torit district of Mongalla province.

December, 1915.

To quell an incipient revolt, engineered by a local witch-doctor, amongst the Dumjol Din-kas of the Upper Nile province.

To demonstrate Government authority in the

Fauwil (Nuer) district of the Upper Nile province.

January, 1916.

To restore order amongst the natives of the Tabi Hills (Nuba Mountains province).

In addition to the foregoing, those sections of the frontier which were especially exposed to raids have been constantly patrolled. Throughout the winter of 1914-1915, and during the following summer, a complete system of land patrols along the Eastern (Red Sea) littoral was carried out by Camel Corps and Police, and proved very efficacious in preventing the establishment of hostile communications with the Arabian coast. Great credit is due to Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) C. E. Wilson, Governor and Commandant of Troops in the Red Sea Province, for his excellent organisation of these patrols.

Similarly, on the Western frontier, some six hundred miles of desert frontier was observed by a chain of Arab posts, which stretched from west of Halfa, in the north, to the S.W. limits of Kordofan, and afforded a measure of protection alike from Furs, Tuareg and Senusist raiders. In May last a small regular mounted force was also despatched to Dongola, whilst the Dongola and Halfa-Shellal reaches of the river were patrolled by gunboats, the former manned by Egyptian Army Artillerymen and the latter by a detachment from the Royal Navy.

These patrols, although generally outside the sphere of active military operations, required a considerable organisation, and entail arduous service by the personnel employed. They have given proof on several occasions of their efficiency.

Military Operations in Darfur.

The Darfur Sultanate formed one of the chain of autonomous kingdoms extending across the centre of Africa, of which Abyssinia is now the sole independent survival. In 1874 its territory was invaded by Zubeir Pasha from the south and by Ismail Pasha Ayub from the east, and the Sultan—Ibrahim "Garrad," a lineal descendant of the famous Abd el Rahman el Rashid, Sultan of Darfur and Kordofan (1785-1799), who corresponded with Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt—was deposed, and the whole country annexed to the Egyptian Sudan.

The Egyptian domination in Darfur was subsequently overthrown by the Mahdist revolt, and the region was partially administered by a series of Dervish "Emirs" until after the battle of Omdurman (1898), when Ali Dinar, also a descendant of Abd el Rahman el Rashid, escaped from the Khalifa and fled to El Fasher, where he succeeded in establishing his authority. In 1899 Ali Dinar, with the sanction of the then Sirdar (Lord Kitchener), assumed the government of the Sultanate, and was subsequently appointed the Sudan Government agent in Darfur, and required to pay a light tribute, which was rendered annually from June, 1901, up to the outbreak of the present war.

The knowledge of the local conditions in Darfur possessed by the Inspector-General (Baron Sir R. von Slatin), who for many years was the chief intermediary between the Government and the Sultan, greatly facilitated the establishment of good relations; and Ali Dinar's attitude and disposition were gener-

ally satisfactory until questions arose concerning the western boundary of Darfur, and the overlordship of certain frontier districts. There are good grounds for the belief that the delay in arriving at a settlement of these questions reacted very unfavourably upon the Sultan's attitude and caused him to lend a willing ear to enemy propagandists and anti-Government intrigues, the effect of which it was difficult to counteract owing to the Sultan's refusal to allow a European to visit his capital or to enter Darfur.

Modern Darfur has a population of probably under 1,000,000. The internal politics of the Sultanate were complex and variable, but can be briefly described as follows:—The "slave" army of the Sultan, some 10,000 in number, and armed for the most part with firearms, was the supporter of the *status quo*, and formed the real basis of the Sultan's authority. Ali Dinar's domestic policy had proved detrimental to the interests of the Arabs, who were, generally speaking, passively disloyal to him, or, as in the case of the Rizeigat tribesmen of S.W. Darfur, openly hostile to his domination. The sedentary inhabitants of Central Darfur, including the natives of the district eventually traversed by the expeditionary force, chiefly desired to be left undisturbed, but were disposed to welcome the advent of a more lenient and enlightened administration. At the same time any diminution of Government prestige redounded to the credit of the Sultan, and the smallest victory over our troops would have been sufficient to bring large numbers of natives—instigated by fanaticism and the prospect of loot—to his standards.

On receipt of the news of war between Great Britain and Turkey, Ali Dinar assumed publicly, for the first time, a defiant attitude, which was followed, in April 1915, by a formal renunciation of his allegiance to the Sudan Government and a declaration of his adhesion to the cause of our enemies, with whom he was already in close communication *via* the Senussi. In December 1915 the situation became so threatening that a small force of Camel Corps was hastily despatched to Nahud to protect this important trade centre and as a warning to the Sultan against the execution of his threats of an offensive against the loyal Rizeigat tribe. This move of troops on our side of the frontier was answered by the prompt reinforcement of the Sultan's detachments at Jebel el Hilla, and it became evident that preparations by the Sultan for an invasion of Sudan territory were being pushed forward and that active hostilities could no longer be avoided.

I accordingly ordered the concentration at Nahud of a force of all arms under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel P. V. Kelly, 3rd Hussars (attached Egyptian Army), composed of the following units:—

- 2 companies Mounted Infantry.
- 2 batteries (six 12½ pounder Mountain Guns and two maxims) Artillery.
- 1 Maxim battery and (Mule) section.
- 5 companies Camel Corps.
- 6 companies Sudanese Infantry (XIIIth and XIVth battalions).
- 2 companies Arab Infantry (Arab Battalion).
- 3 companies Egyptian Infantry (IVth Battalion),

with the necessary medical and departmental units and details. A total of about 2,000 of all ranks.

Letters from the Sultan and other information from Darfur, received whilst this concentration was being carried out, brought further confirmation of the enemy's designs, and, after personally visiting Nahud early in March 1916, I instructed Colonel Kelly to cross the frontier and to occupy the well-centres at Jebel el Hella and Um Shanga. These two places commanded the first permanent water supplies to the west of Nahud and on the road to El Fasher, and their occupation by our troops not only afforded a means of securing our natives living between Nahud and the border from molestation, but was also an essential preliminary to any further operations in Darfur territory.

On the 16th March the independent mounted troops (Mounted Infantry scouts, "A" battery, maxim battery, five companies Camel Corps) left Nahud, and, advancing *via* Wad Banda, crossed the Darfur boundary and occupied Um Shanga, where an enemy observation post was dispersed on the morning of the 20th idem. It had been intended to push on to Jebel el Hella the same afternoon, but this proved impossible owing to the scarcity of water and inadequate watering facilities at Um Shanga. Colonel Kelly was accordingly faced with the alternative of returning at once to Nahud or of carrying out the further advance with such portion of his force as it was possible to water during the 21st, on the evening of which day the main body from Nahud was due to arrive, with only two days' water supply in hand at Wad Banda. In view of the grave objections involved by the adoption of the former alternative, Colonel Kelly decided to accept the risks attendant on an advance with a reduced force to Jebel el Hella, and sent instructions to the main body to remain at Wad Banda. Accordingly a flying column, composed of Mounted Infantry scouts, 2 guns, 8 maxims, and 240 Camel Corps, left Um Shanga at dawn on the 22nd. Its progress was but slightly opposed by enemy scouts until within four miles of Jebel el Hella, when an enveloping movement by some 800 Fur horsemen was prevented by our fire. Some two miles further on a considerable enemy concentration was located by the guns and maxims in a wooded valley to the left of our square, whence the enemy were subsequently seen to debouch and scatter in all directions. The column reached the wells at Jebel el Hella at 2.15 p.m. without further opposition, and a reconnoitring party was despatched thence to Lugud Wells, two miles distant. These latter wells were occupied in strength on the 26th, by which time the rest of the Field Force had arrived from Nahud, and was distributed according to the capacities of the various local water supplies at Um Shanga and Jebel el Hella. In the course of these operations the enemy are reported to have lost twenty killed and wounded: our casualties were insignificant.

The occupation of Jebel el Hella in a great measure restored our prestige in the Western Sudan and diminished the immediate menace of raids upon our tribesmen. It was, however, clear that the dispersal of Ali Dinar's main army would prove the sole effective guarantee to the security of the Western Sudan, and that we should therefore be in a position to undertake further and more extensive mili-

tary operations at the first favourable opportunity.

The main Fur army, estimated at between 4,000 and 6,000 riflemen, well supplied with ammunition, and an unknown number of auxiliaries armed with spears, remained at El Fasher, whither the Sultan recalled most of his provincial garrisons, other than those with whom our troops had been engaged, and who had been withdrawn to Burush and Um Kedada, where they were slightly reinforced. It was also probable that the Sultan would not risk a serious engagement with our troops at a distance from his capital, and intended to keep his army intact and concentrated at El Fasher until the advent of the rains, when the state of the country would be favourable to guerilla warfare and to raids upon our extended line of communications.

The immediate problem with which Colonel Kelly had to deal was concerned with the provision of the requisite water and other supplies for the troops and convoys operating in the country, at this time of the year almost waterless and denuded of food supplies, which extends for nearly 300 miles to the west of rail-head at El Obeid. On the establishment of regular communications and the rapid convoy of supplies over this inhospitable tract depended the safety of the force actually in Darfur and the course of all future military operations. I therefore conceived the plan of supplementing the camel transport, on which the troops in the field would have to rely throughout, by a mechanical transport service from rail-head to Nahud; and ordered a number of motor vehicles to be ready against the time that a make-shift motor road could be prepared. At the same time preliminary surveys and preparations were made with a view to the construction of a motor-road, capable of bearing light mechanical transport, from Rahad (on the railway) *via* Taweisha to El Fasher, a distance of about 460 miles, which will eventually bring the latter town to within four days' journey of the railway.

At the beginning of April minor enemy concentrations were reported at Burush, Um Eisheishat and Um Kedada, whilst a small force which had been previously posted at Taweisha, on our left flank, was withdrawn to Tulu. A reconnaissance in force of the country as far west as Abiad was therefore undertaken with a view (1) to supplement the water supply available for our troops and the increasing number of transport animals—a pressing necessity; (2) to disperse the enemy forces at Burush and Um Kedada; and (3) by denying to the enemy the important wells at Abiad, to secure in its entirety the main, and until the advent of the rains, the only practicable line of communication between Nahud and El Fasher.

On 3rd April a force composed of 2½ companies Mounted Infantry, 4 guns, 6 maxims, and the XIIIth Sudanese left Jebel el Hella and occupied Burush, whence a Fur Cavalry patrol was driven out, at midday. Our advance on Um Kedada on the day following was opposed by some 700 of the enemy, a section of whom were well entrenched in front of the wells, but were driven off by our guns. On the 8th April the reconnaissance was continued to Abiad, which was reached on the morning of the 9th idem and had been evacuated by the enemy on the previous evening. A detach-

ment of four companies of Sudanese Infantry with 4 guns was left at this place, where they successfully beat off enemy attacks on the 14th and 19th April. By the end of the month the whole Line of Communications was adequately garrisoned, with strong detachments at Abiad, Um Kedada, Burush, Lugud, Jebel el Hella and Um Shanga, and preparations for a further and final phase of the operations could be proceeded with without fear of serious disturbance by enemy attacks.

During the month a complete system of intelligence and observation posts was also organised along the frontier from Gabr el Dar (Dar Homr) and Hafir Ogr, in S.W. Kordofan, to Shebb, W.N.W. of Halfa. Two hundred and sixty native "friendlies," armed with Remington rifles, were employed on this duty in Kordofan alone, under the direction of El Miralai (Colonel) Beshir Bey Kembal, whilst an additional 200 men of the Kababish tribe, under their Nazir (or head sheikh) Ali el Tom, were detailed to occupy Jebel Meidob, in N.E. Darfur, as a special observation post to watch the Arba'in road between Darfur and the northern (Senussist) oases.

My original scheme of operations, which was influenced by considerations other than those of the local military situation, had envisaged the necessity to consolidate our hold on the districts actually occupied by our troops and to defer the further and inevitable advance and occupation of El Fasher until later on in the year. But the state of the local water supplies, coupled with the information we had gained of the enemy's dispositions, necessitated a careful reconsideration of the matter and an immediate decision. The *pros* and *cons* to the question were summarised in my telegraphic despatch of the 24th April, 1916, wherein I stated that the sole advantage to be gained by delay consisted in the greater certainty of success that might be afforded by the employment of a considerably larger force than was permitted by the existing (dry weather) conditions of water supply and transport. The question, briefly, was whether under these existing conditions, which enabled us to pin the enemy down to his chosen place of concentration, we could bring up a sufficient force of all arms (and supply it from rail-head 400 miles distant) to defeat the Sultan's army and to occupy his capital, without risk of a reverse or an inconclusive battle, which might entail a rapid and disastrous retreat. After full consideration, and with the entire concurrence of Colonel Kelly, I decided that an advance on El Fasher during the full moon in May offered a reasonable prospect of the rapid attainment of our aims, and fully justified the risks inseparable from the enterprise. My opinion was further strengthened by the knowledge, which was communicated to me shortly afterwards, that the French military authorities in Wadai would be prepared to co-operate to the full extent of the limited means immediately at their disposal, an undertaking which was very amply discharged by the French occupation of Dar Sula, which was effected soon after the entry of our troops into El Fasher.

The early days of May were spent in reconstituting the line of communications, the garrisons on which were for the most part drafted to the front and partially replaced by reinforcements from Khartoum; in assembling the supplies and transport services for the advance

from Abiad, and in concentrating the striking force at the latter place.

On May 5th the garrison at Abiad beat off an attack by an enemy force estimated at 500; on the 9th the telegraph line was raided three miles to the east of the post, but was repaired immediately. On the 12th an aeroplane reconnaissance dropped a number of proclamations over the town of El Fasher, whence the Sultan's army apparently showed no inclination to move.

By the evening of the 14th May all preparations were completed, and the following force was ready at Abiad for the advance upon the capital:—

60 Mounted Infantry Scouts,
8 Guns,
14 Maxims (Artillery and British sections),
4 Companies Camel Corps with two maxims,
8 Companies Infantry (13th and 14th Sudanese, and Arab battalion),
with Field Hospital and details.

Colonel Kelly decided, owing to watering difficulties, that this force should leave Abiad in two parties—a slow-moving column "A" and a mobile column "B"—which should reunite 40 miles west of Abiad and 28 miles short of Meleit. The latter place, where an ample water supply was known to exist, was held by a small enemy garrison, and was the first objective, whence the final attack on El Fasher would be made.

At 4.15 a.m. on the 15th a small party of our Mounted Infantry Scouts, under Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant) Suleiman Effendi Omar, skilfully cut off a mounted enemy observation post, cleverly sited on a ridge two miles distant from the camp, and captured all but two individuals, who escaped on foot. It was subsequently ascertained that by this smart piece of work, which was typical of the excellent service rendered by these Mounted Infantry Scouts throughout the operations, information of the movement of our troops did not reach El Fasher before the latter were within striking distance of Meleit. Columns "A" and "B" left Abiad on the mornings of the 15th and 16th respectively, and after extremely hot and trying marches, reached the point of concentration on the 17th. That morning an aeroplane reconnaissance over Meleit dropped bombs on the village, whence some shots had been fired at the machine by a force of about 500 of the enemy. On the morning of the 18th the combined force reached Meleit, which the enemy had evacuated hastily on the previous evening, leaving a quantity of stock, which fell into our hands.

An aeroplane reconnaissance on the following day reported the country clear of the enemy for 15 miles, but, owing to the exhaustion of the troops, the further advance was postponed until the 21st, when our scouts kept touch with small parties of the enemy throughout the day.

On May 22nd Camp was struck at 5.30 a.m. and large parties of enemy horsemen and camelry were encountered from the outset. The country traversed consisted in a succession of low, broken sandhills, with many depressions and much concealed ground; scattered bush made it difficult to see for more than a few hundred yards in any direction, and at times one portion of the square would be on high ground and the other portion entirely

lost to view. Scouting was both difficult and dangerous, and a company of Camel Corps and 4 (British) Maxims were therefore pushed to the front to support the Mounted Infantry if necessary.

At 10.30 a.m. the enemy were observed to be occupying a strong position about 2,000 yards away, which was shelled by our batteries and the occupants driven from their advanced trenches. Enemy horsemen were also engaged on our left, and "A" and No. 2 batteries had an opportunity of shelling them at about 1,600 yards with good effect.

The square now advanced about 800 yards to a better position, where they entrenched, whilst the Mounted Infantry, "A" battery, No. 2 battery, British R.G.A. Maxims and one company of Camel Corps were sent to occupy an elevated position, south-west of the square, on our right front. At the same time enemy cavalry continued to threaten our left flank, to meet which eventually a company of Camel Corps, with one Maxim section, were ordered to some high ground on the left.

Some 500 yards in front of the square was situated the village of Beringia, about 600 yards south of which, and extending for about 1,000 yards east and west, was the main entrenched position occupied by the enemy. Their left formed a semi-circle, only a portion of which could be seen and reconnoitred by our scouts, and their right was thrown back with the flank resting on a Khor (valley or depression).

Colonel Kelly decided to attack forthwith and to clear up the situation. Whilst, however, he was making the necessary dispositions, the company of Camel Corps, who had been acting as escort to the Artillery and Maxims on the right front of the square, entered Beringia, and a few individuals boldly pushed right through the village to the southern crest, where they immediately came under a very heavy fire and commenced to withdraw. Seeing this, a number of the enemy emerged from their entrenched position in close pursuit, thus exposing themselves to the flanking fire of No. 2 battery from the right of the square, and forming a good target for "A" battery from the left of the square.

The enemy now debouched with great rapidity from the whole of their position and advanced in great strength.

At this time there were actually in the firing line on the south face of the square (from right to left) No. 2 battery; 3 companies Infantry; "A" battery; 1 company Infantry, with 1 section British Maxims: then, after a gap of 150 yards, another company of Infantry, with the remaining section British Maxims, these latter units facing east.

Colonel Kelly, fearing the enemy might envelop the flanks of the square, saw no immediate necessity for reinforcing the southern face until matters developed further; but, shortly afterwards, 2 sections of No. 6 Maxim battery were moved to the right of No. 2 battery, and 1 company of the Arab Battalion was pushed forward to a better position slightly in advance of the right of the southern face.

The assault was delivered with great desperation—many of the attackers falling within ten yards of our firing line—but after the square had been in action some 40 minutes the enemy's ranks were seen to waver, and at this moment Colonel Kelly ordered the "advance" to be sounded. Our counter-attack was exe-

cuted in a most orderly manner, but with great dash, our Infantry being well supported by the Artillery, whilst the Maxims advanced with the line. In a short while the enemy were broken and fled in disorder, leaving our troops in undisputed possession of the field.

A careful estimate of the Fur casualties, which was made subsequently, gave the total losses at over 1,000; 231 dead and 96 seriously wounded were counted within 500 yards of our position immediately after the battle. From parade states discovered at El Fasher it appeared that the enemy's force on this occasion consisted of 3,600 riflemen, besides a number of spearmen and auxiliaries.

Colonel Kelly pays a warm tribute to the admirable manner in which the various units engaged on this occasion were handled by their commanders, and to the steadiness and discipline of the troops, who throughout were most skilfully supported by the guns. To these factors he ascribes the credit for this signal victory won over a numerically very superior force, in what was distinctly a "soldiers' " battle.

Our casualties were:—

Officers.

Captain H. C. Maydon, 12th Lancers, Mounted Infantry, severely wounded.

El Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant) Mohammed Effendi Yusri, Artillery, slightly wounded.

El Mulazim Tani (2nd Lieutenant) Ahmed Effendi Mohammed Zahran, 14th Sudanese, slightly wounded.

Rank and File.

Killed	2
Died of wounds	3
Wounded	18

The force resumed the march to El Fasher at 4.0 p.m. the same evening, and went into bivouac, which was strongly entrenched for the night, a few miles outside the capital. Here, at 3.0 a.m. next morning (23rd May), they were attacked by what, in the light of our star shell and magnesium flares, appeared to be a force of about 500 horsemen and 300 infantry. This attack was driven off with the loss to the force of one artilleryman wounded. At 6.0 a.m., when the troops were about to advance, some hundreds of the enemy to our left flank were dispersed by artillery and maxim fire and bombed by aeroplane. At 10.0 am. Colonel Kelly, with the mounted troops, entered El Fasher, which was found to be almost deserted except by women.

Sultan Ali Dinar, on receipt of the news of the crushing defeat at Beringia, made a final effort to rally the remainder of his army to the attack in the early morning of the 23rd, and subsequently fled with some 2,000 men, who were bombed as they emerged from the south end of the town by Lieutenant J. C. Slessor, Royal Flying Corps, in the course of a gallant and successful flight. The Sultan is now in the neighbourhood of Jebel Marra with a greatly reduced following, and is unlikely for the moment to give further trouble.

The booty taken at El Fasher included four guns, 55,000 rounds S.A.A., and the whole of the local plant for the manufacture of gunpowder, and upwards of 4,000 rifles were captured or handed in within a few weeks of our occupation of the town.

On the 9th June I was able to report that the greater portion of the local population had already returned, and that amongst the numerous individuals who had surrendered since the battle were included nearly all the Sultan's lieutenants and Darfur notables who were not previously accounted for.

I am well aware that these operations are insignificant in importance as compared with the tremendous conflicts now being waged in Europe and Asia; but I have described them at some length inasmuch as they constitute, in themselves, a military feat of some distinction.

It will be realised that a most careful and comprehensive organisation was required to convey some 3,000 men, with stores, guns, aeroplanes and other bulky equipment of a modern expeditionary force, from the base at Khartoum (500 miles by rail from the nearest seaport) to rail-head 428 miles distant, and thence across a desolate tract of roadless country, almost barren of food supplies and served by half a dozen local water centres, for nearly 400 miles, and there to occupy a stronghold defended by a numerically superior and fanatical enemy, armed with modern rifles and of no mean fighting spirit. That this was accomplished without a hitch or set-back of any kind is due to the excellence of the preliminary staff arrangements, to the fine qualities of leadership possessed by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his subordinate commanders, and to the splendid fighting spirit and endurance shown by all ranks of the expeditionary force under the very arduous conditions inseparable from a campaign during the summer months in the Sudan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's sound judgment and correct appreciation of the military situation have been frequently shown in his admirable conduct of the expedition. He pays a tribute, which I gladly endorse, to the loyal and unfailing support he has received from the commanding and subordinate officers of the units of his force. In particular he acknowledges the great assistance afforded to him at all times by Major C. W. Spinks, Royal Artillery, Commanding the Artillery, by Major C. H. Little, his Chief Staff Officer (who also was responsible for much of the early preparation for the expedition), and by Major H. J. Huddleston, O.C. Camel Corps, and Major W. H. M. Cowan, Cameron Highlanders, Commanding Arab Battalion, and Major E. A. T. Bayly, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Commanding 13th Battalion, Sudanese Infantry. Of the work of (temporary) Captain H. A. MacMichael, the Political and Intelligence Officer, Colonel Kelly speaks in the highest terms. It is satisfactory to know that Captain MacMichael's remarkable knowledge of Darfur and its natives, and his capacity for incessant work, will be fully utilised in connection with the future administration of the 150,000 square miles of new territory which this successful expedition has regained to the Sudan.

I have included the remainder of Colonel Kelly's mentions of individual officers and men who have performed specially meritorious services in the list submitted at the end of my despatch.

I desire also to bring to notice the valuable contribution to the success of these operations which has been rendered by certain corps and units whose work could not conveniently be described in the foregoing summary.

Royal Flying Corps.

The flight of the Royal Flying Corps, which was generously placed at my disposal for the Darfur operations by the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, more than justified the high expectations I had formed of its utility and of the great moral effect of its first appearance in Darfur. The transport of machines, hangars, repair shops and other necessary equipment from Suez to Rahad (on the Kordofan railway), and thence over the rough motor track to Nahud, which had been cleared by the Public Works Department, proved a most difficult and laborious undertaking. The petrol supply was affected by a temperature which sometimes reached 120° F. in the shade, lorries were marooned for whole days in sand up to the axles, and success was only attained by the excellent organisation and the untiring efforts of Major V. W. R. C. Groves and the personnel of the flight.

Amongst the most noteworthy flights may be mentioned that by Lieutenant F. Bellamy, on the 12th May, from Jebel el Hella to El Fasher and back, landing at Abiad on the out and return journeys; that by Captain E. J. Bannatyne, on the 17th May, to find Bir Meleit, a flight of over eight hours—a very remarkable performance under local flying conditions—during which his propeller was hit by a bullet when flying at a low altitude; and Lieutenant J. C. Slessor's flight over El Fasher on the morning of the 23rd May, which also brought the first news of the victory at Berin-gia, and in the course of which he was slightly wounded.

The conduct and efficiency of this flight throughout its period of service in the Sudan fully upheld the splendid reputation of the Royal Flying Corps.

Transport and other Services.

Two outstanding difficulties, largely inter-dependent one on the other, were connected with the transport service and water supply. The northern (Dudia) road between El Obeid and Nahud proved impracticable owing to the absence of water along it. Between Nahud and Um Shanga, a distance of over 100 miles, the only reliable water supply was that stored in the Tebeldi trees. These are hollow trees of great girth which, from time immemorial, have served the natives of the region as reservoirs for the storage of water which is collected during the rains against the needs of the dry season. The trees supplied sufficient water for a small force, but required constant refilling, which involved the employment of special camel-convoys and considerable manual labour. Between Um Shanga and El Fasher wells are more frequent, but during the advance they were found to be usually over 200 feet in depth, very narrow, and requiring constant repair. At all posts the men were on continuous fatigue duty drawing water. At Um Kedada and at Abiad, before the final advance on El Fasher, work on the wells never ceased by day and night for four days, during which time 1,800 transport and riding camels were watered and over 12,000 gallons drawn for carriage with the force. This work was carried out at all times with the greatest good will, and the men of the Camel Corps, who are well acquainted with the local conditions, set a particularly fine example, and were invaluable in this respect.

The 3-ton lorries with the detachment of Army Service Corps Mechanical Transport, which were lent from Egypt, did excellent work under Lieutenant S. W. Carty, Army Service Corps, between El Obeid and Nahud; and the mechanical transport services organised by the Director of Public Works were also of great assistance on several occasions; whilst the Ford Ambulances, supplied from England by the Director-General, Army Medical Service, worked with great efficiency and despatch between Nahud and El Obeid.

The great bulk of the transport service and all transport with the troops in Darfur, however, was carried out by camel; and very great credit is due to Major S. E. H. Giles, Army Service Corps, and his subordinates, as well as to Major J. J. B. Tapley, D.S.O., and Captain R. S. Audas, Army Veterinary Corps, whose powers of organisation and improvisation were put to a high test. I am also greatly indebted to the Managing Director for the loan of several Inspectors of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate for work in connection with the transport services.

In normal times it is possible to hire almost any number of camels, with their drivers, for service in the Sudan, but at the time of mobilisation the country had been so depleted of transport animals by the requirements of the British forces in Egypt that it was necessary to organise and equip at once 10 Army transport companies, each of about 260 camels, with the necessary personnel. To add to Major Giles' difficulties there was a shortage of pack saddles, which had also been supplied in relatively large numbers to the forces in Egypt. Nevertheless one transport company was ready to accompany the independent mounted troops from Nahud on March 15th, and two more companies accompanied the main body four days later. Camels had actually to be employed putting water into Wad Banda for the use of the personnel of the transport working between Nahud and Jebel el Hella, to which post the transport had to work direct from Nahud owing to lack of water at Um Shanga; and even after the arrival of the force at Jebel el Hella all the transport companies were kept working at high pressure bringing up stores, material for the telegraph extension and for the construction of *hangars* for aeroplanes.

The transport was re-allotted for the final advance on El Fasher to enable each unit to leave Abiad with 15 days' rations, 5 days' forage, and 4 days' water for personnel and horses, thus bringing the number of camels actually with the force to a total of 1,800.

Line of Communications.

The work executed on the line of communications was very considerable, and the thanks of all those engaged in the military operations are due to the very efficient assistance rendered by Captain R. V. Savile, Governor of Kordofan province, Messrs. E. N. Corbyn, F. Atterbury, R. A. Bence-Pembroke, J. A. Gillan, and other members of the province staff. Their contribution, especially in connection with the provision of transport camels, was a very valuable one. Much excellent work was also carried out in the improvement of existing tracks for mechanical transport work by personnel of the Public Works Department under temporary Captain H. Claxton, who is now in charge of the larger scheme

devised by Captain M. R. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O., for the construction of a motor-road from the railway to El Fasher.

Good work was also done by the Military Works Department, and particularly in connection with the building, at very short notice, of aeroplane sheds at Jebel el Hella.

Telegraphs.

Much credit is due to Captain R. Chenevix Trench, Royal Engineers, and Mr. S. Dennett for the prompt extension of the telegraph line westwards from Nahud. In anticipation of the advance, Mr. Dennett pushed the head of the ground wire to Wad Banda on March 14th, and it reached Jebel el Hella on the 24th idem, 48 hours after the arrival of the independent mounted troops. The further extension of the wire to Abiad was completed on the 22nd April, and was of the greatest service to the force.

Railways.

The arrangements made by Captain E. O. A. Newcombe, Traffic Manager, Sudan Government Railways, for transporting the expeditionary force to railhead—involving journeys varying from 430 to 600 miles—worked without a hitch, at a time when the calls on the railway for other transport, particularly the camels and other requirements for the British forces in Egypt, were exceptionally heavy, and the General Manager has brought to my notice the names of several subordinate officials who performed excellent work in this connection. The railways administration is also to be congratulated on the remarkable despatch with which the aeroplane flight was conveyed from Port Sudan to Rahad (877 miles), and the provision of facilities at the latter place whereby aeroplanes which were disembarked at Port Sudan on the 24th April were unloaded at Rahad on the 27th idem and erected immediately.

The constant solicitude and keen interest displayed by His Highness the Sultan in all that pertains to the welfare of the Egyptian Army has always been of the utmost value, and I desire to repeat here my respectful appreciation of the whole-hearted efforts of His Highness to further the well-being of the troops and to give his gracious encouragement to all those taking part in our military operations.

Since the declaration of war I had occasion from time to time to seek the advice of the former Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan, the late Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, and in most gratefully acknowledging the powerful aid he invariably extended to his successor in this country I desire, on behalf of all British officers and officials serving in the Sudan, the officers and men of the Egyptian Army, and the inhabitants of the Sudan, to express our heartfelt sorrow and regret at the loss to our King and Country of the services of this great Officer of State, whose keen sympathy for all that concerned the welfare of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and its scattered garrisons continued unabated to the end.

In conclusion I desire to pay a warm tribute to the valuable work of the officers of the Egyptian Army and the officers and officials of the Sudan Government during the past strenuous and eventful two years. All in their various fields of activities, military and administrative, have contributed to the successful results

achieved, and deserve the greatest credit for work well and conscientiously performed.

The greater burden has inevitably fallen upon the British personnel, and of the patriotic and unselfish manner in which these have discharged their duties in this country, under trying climatic conditions and at a time when all those of military age, and particularly seconded officers and non-commissioned officers on the active list of the British Army, were eager to play their part in other and more important theatres of war, I can speak in the highest terms of praise and gratitude. They have indeed deserved well of the Empire.

During the whole period under review I have received most loyal support and efficient assistance from Colonel W. H. Drake, C.M.G. (Adjutant-General and Chief Staff Officer), and from Lieutenant-Colonel L. O. F. Stack, C.M.G. (Civil Secretary). These two senior officers, with the co-operation of Colonel The Honourable M. G. Talbot, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Palmer (Commandant of Artillery and Director of Ordnance), Captain M. R. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O. (Director of Public Works), and temporary Captain C. A. Willis (Assistant Director of Intelligence), with Captain The Honourable B. A. Forbes (Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General) as Secretary, constitute a Permanent Committee of Defence which has proved of much value, and I am glad to place on record my warm appreciation of the excellent services continuously rendered by them and by the respective Military and Civil Headquarter Staffs.

To E. Bonham Carter, Esq., C.M.G., Legal Secretary, I am indebted for much valuable advice on legal and other matters.

I have received most loyal and unfailing support from all members of my Personal Staff. Major G. S. Symes, D.S.O. (Private Secretary), has made a special study of the all-important Arab questions, in which the Moslems of the Sudan and the neighbouring countries are so closely concerned; his general capacity and powers of sustained effort have been of the greatest assistance to me. Major R. Rees-Mogg (Military Secretary) and Major F. W. L. Edwards (Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General and Aide-de-Camp) have worked indefatigably and in the best interests of the combined administrations.

I should be failing in my duty were I to omit a reference to the loyal and whole-hearted assistance rendered to the cause of civilisation and good government by many of the native chiefs and notables, whose influence upon their fellow-countrymen has been most salutary and whose experience and valuable advice have been proffered unhesitatingly to the Administration. Their contribution affords perhaps the most striking testimony to the general recognition by the native population of the benefits conferred on their country by British rule, of which they have now some seventeen years' experience.

Finally, I have the honour to append a list of names of officers, officials and others whose work in connection with military operations and the situation in the Sudan created by the war is deserving of special notice and commendation.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,

Your Obedient Servant,
REGINALD WINGATE, General,
Sirdar and Governor-General of the Sudan.

No. 1.

DARFUR OPERATIONS.

Staff.

Kelly, Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) P. J. V., 3rd Hussars, Commanding the Force.
Little, Maj. C. H., Somerset Light Infantry.
MacMichael, Temp. Capt. H. A., Sudan Civil Service.
Mahmud Effendi Hafez, Sagh., Cavalry and Mounted Infy.
Flint, 3043 Colour Serjt. R. S., King's Royal Rifle Corps.

Royal Flying Corps.

Bannatyne, Lt. (temp. Maj.) E. J., 19th Hussars.
Groves, Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) P. R. C., Shropshire L.I.
Slessor, Lieut. J. C., Spec. Res.
Batty, 2197 Flight Serjt. F.
Hemming, 3724 Serjt. H. A.
Horton, 3682 1st Class Air Mechanic T.
Maddams, 4745 Pte. G., Army Service Corps.

Royal Garrison Artillery.

Marsh, Capt. A. C., East Lanc. Regt.
Shillabeer, 29636 Serjt. W. H.
Westmoreland, 21008 Serjt. G. A.
Bush, 28803 Serjt. A.
Gould, 30788 Gunner (Acting Bombr.) T. R.
Begley, 10504 Pte. T. R., Royal Army Medical Corps.

Cavalry and Mounted Infantry.

Azab Effendi Selim, M. Awal.
Cobden, Maj. G. G., 9th Lancers.
Hamed Effendi Saleh, M. Awal.
Maydon, Capt. H. C., 12th Lancers.
Mohammed Effendi Shahin, Bimbashi, D.S.O.
Suleiman Effendi Omar, M. Tani.
Mohammed Hafez Atawia, 4804 Sol Tayin.
Masud Ismail, 651 B. Shaw.
Abd El Nebi Khelil, 59 Shaw.
Faris El Taib, 296 Shaw (Rough Rider).
Ismail Mohammed Ali, 248 Shaw.
Mohammed Ali El Haddad, 33 Shaw.
Beshir Maruf, 374 W. Shaw.
Abd El Tam El Hag, 412 Onb.
El Awd Omar, 702 Onb.
Omar Hassan, 172 Onb.
Said Murgan, 11 Onb. (Farrier).
Zein El Abdin Abdulla, 57 Onb.
Koko Hassan, 498 W. Onb.
Ragab Ayub, 236 W. Onb.
Yehya Guma, 845 W. Onb.
Ahmed Shadwan, 861 Nafar.
Bekheit Fadl El Mula, 1090 Nafar.
Selim El Daw, 94 Nafar.

Artillery.

Ali Effendi Islam, Yuz.
Gee, Maj. E. D. F., Royal Artillery.
Hassan Effendi Husni El Zaidi, M. Awal.
Hutton, Capt. R. W., Royal Marine Artillery.
Mahfuz Effendi Nada, M. Awal.
Mahmud Effendi Rashad, Yuz.
Mohammed Effendi El Subki, Bimb.
Mohammed Effendi Yusri, M. Awal.
Mustafa Effendi Nada, M. Tani.
Spinks, Maj. C. W., Royal Artillery.
Thurburn, Capt. J. O., Royal Artillery.
Mohammed Hassan Essawi, 6533 B. Shaw.
Saleh Ahmed Mugahid, 7111 B. Shaw.
Ali Khelil, 6622 Shaw.
Awadi Adwan, 6599 Shaw.
Hamoon Helal, 6906 Shaw.
Said Mogahed, 6125 Shaw.

Beshai Diman, 6933 Onb.
Hassan Naas, 1839 Onb.
Ismail Abu El Gait, 6854 W. Onb.
Abd El Razzik Saleh, 6619 Nafar.
Ahmed Tantawi, 6855 Nafar.
Hassanain Abdulla, 7017 Nafar (Armourer).
Heffni Hussein, 7874 Nafar.
Said Mowasa, 6570 Nafar.

Camel Corps.

Abdulla Effendi Adam Gabril, M. Awal.
Ahmed Effendi Ibrahim, M. Awal.
Ali Effendi Beshir, M. Tani.
Belal Effendi Rizk, M. Awal.
El Nur Effendi Tirab, M. Tani.
Fadlalla Effendi El Nur, M. Awal.
Grigg, Capt. S. T., West Yorks Regt.
Huddleston, Maj. H. J., Dorsetshire Regiment.
MacLaine, Capt. R. G., Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders.
Mahmud Effendi Bahgat, Sagh.
Mohammed Effendi Talat, M. Awal.
Nawar Effendi Hamed, M. Tani.
Peake, Capt. F. G., West Riding Regiment.
Vandeleur, Capt. T. B., Royal Irish Regiment.
Warren, Capt. E. G., Northamptonshire Regiment.
Awad Idris, 1553 B. Shaw.
Abdulla Musaad, 844 Shaw.
Mohammed Obeid, 308 Shaw.
Osman Mowanis, 708 Shaw.
Abdel Samad Abd El Nalim, 305 W. Shaw.
Mohammed Abbas, 1040 W. Shaw.
Abdulla Idris, 1222 W. Onb.
Adam Abu Bakr, 1423 Nafar.
Fadl Hamid Tala, 1240 Nafar.
Shahia Mohammed, 1696 Nafar.

13th Sudanese.

Abd El Hai Effendi Idris, Yuz.
Ahmed Effendi Fahmi, Bimb.
Bayly, Maj. E. A. T., Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Ibrahim Effendi Allam, M. Tani.
Mabruk Effendi Fiki, Yuz.
Pott, Capt. A. J., Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Said Effendi Osman, Sagh.
Walker, Capt. R. K. B., South Wales Borderers.
Haseeb Garr, Sol Tayin.
Said Adam, 2280, B. Shaw.
Said El Emin, 2577 B. Shaw.
Bekheit Ilyas, 2257 Shaw.
Saleh El Kheir Mansur, 2466 Shaw.
Abd El Radi Saleh, 3311 Onb.
Kapsun Said, 2918 Onb.
Nesib Mohammed, 2689 Onb.
Mohammed Abd El Bain, 2995 Nafar.
Murgan Dinkawi, 2301 Nafar.

14th Sudanese.

Abd El Dayem Effendi Mohammed, M. Tani.
Darwall, Maj. R. H., Royal Marine Light Infantry.
Ismail Effendi Kamel, Yuz.
Mahmud Effendi Shukri, Yuz.
Ali Fadl, 358 Shaw.
Faragalla Ali, 199 Shaw.
Abd El Hassan Ahmed, 214 Onb.
Farag Shenawi, 381 Onb.

Arab Battalion.

Ahmed Effendi Agha Ibrahim, M. Awal.
Hussein Effendi Taher, Yuz.
Ismail Effendi Zaied, M. Awal.
McCowan, Maj. W. H., Cameron Highlanders.
Adam Hag, 315 B. Shaw.
Mohammed Omar Ibrahim, 230 Shaw.

Suleiman Ali, 1173 Onb.
 Idris Salam Ali, 883 Onb.
 Idris Ali, 1072 Nafar.

Medical Corps.

Archibald, Capt. R. G., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Cassidy, Capt. C., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Cummins, Capt. A. G., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Halim Effendi Khelil Saadeh, M. Awal.
 Musa Effendi Khouri Zacharia, Yuz.
 Nasralla Effendi El Burgi, Yuz.
 Perkins, 1430 Serjt. W. T., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Abd El Aziz Surur El Sudani, 1740 Shaw.
 Khatib Omar El Sakran, 7171 Shaw.
 Salem Margawi, 1859 Onb.
 Noman Ahmed Hassan, 1899 W. Onb.
 Hassan Mosalli, 2007 Nafar.
 Ibrahim Abd El Rahman, 1825 Nafar.
 Mohammed Mahdi Ibrahim, 2167 Nafar.

Department of Ordnance.

Bird, 1185 Armr. Staff Serjt. J. H., Army Ordnance Corps (deceased).
 Duce, 1125 Armr. Staff. Serjt. E. A., Army Ordnance Corps.
 Beshara Girgis Fadlalla, 4731 Sol Tayin.

Veterinary Department.

Abd El Mejid Effendi Bahgat, M. Awal.
 McCartney, Capt. W. J. St. J., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Mohammed Effendi Talat, M. Awal.
 Nicholas, Maj. T. A., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Ahmed Mohammed Saleh, B. Shaw.
 Ahmed Mahmud Gabra, 267 Shaw.
 Ismail Mohammed El Kafau, 269 Onb.

Lines of Communication.

Abd Rahman Effendi Fuad, M. Awal.
 Abdulla Effendi Khelil, M. Awal.
 Ali Effendi Musa, M. Awal.
 Archdale, Temp. Capt. R. G.
 Atterbury, Mr. F.
 Audas, Capt. R. S., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Bence-Pembroke, Mr. R. A., Sudan Civil Service.
 Carty, Temp. Capt. S. W., Army Service Corps.
 Chenevix-Trench, Capt. R., Royal Engineers.
 Claxton, Temp. Capt. H., Sudan Civil Service.
 Corbyn, Mr. E. N., Sudan Civil Service.
 Craig, Mr. J. D., Sudan Civil Service.
 Dennett, Mr. S., Inspector of Posts and Telegraphs.
 Giles, Maj. S. E. H., Army Service Corps.
 Gillan, Mr. J. A., Sudan Civil Service.
 Hart, Sagh. S.
 Hunter, Mr. C. J. H., District Traffic Manager, Sudan Government Railways.
 Ibrahim Effendi Kamel, Sagh.
 Kennedy, Capt. (temp. Lt.-Col.) M. R., C.M.G., D.S.O., Res. of Off., R.E.
 Mahmud Effendi Abd El Rauf, M. Awal.
 Maxwell, Temp. Capt. R. C.
 Mogahid Effendi Dawadar Abd El Aziz, M. Tani.
 Mohammed Effendi Hassan, Sagh.
 Mohammed Effendi Husni Bedawi, M. Awal.
 Mohammed Effendi Mustafa, M. Tani.
 Pelham, Hon. H. G. G., Assistant Traffic Manager, Sudan Government Railways.

Pinckney, Mr. F. G. A., District Engineer, Sudan Government Railways.
 Rainsford-Hannay, Capt. A. G., Royal Engineers.
 Said Effendi Mohamed Saad, M. Tani.
 Sayed Effendi Ahmed Shehab El Din, M. Tani.
 Shaker Effendi Mansur El Rubi, M. Awal.
 Stafford, Maj. P. B., East Surrey Regiment.
 Storrar, Mr. G. R., District Engineer, Sudan Government Railways.
 Tapley, Maj. J. J. B., D.S.O., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Thwaites, Maj. G., Army Service Corps.
 Worsley, Maj. R. S., D.S.O., Army Service Corps.
 Worthington-Wilmer, Maj. G. R., Scottish Rifles.
 Zeki Effendi Ali Ghonaim, M. Tani.
 O'Brien, 15459, Serjt. P., Royal Engineers.
 Summerfield, 19388 Serjt. R. M., Royal Engineers.
 Hennessy, S/23240 Corpl. R. R. J., Army Service Corps.
 Elphick, M2/132760 Pte. G. T., Army Service Corps.
 Skandar Effendi Khelil, Telegraphist.
 Taha Effendi Mohammed, Translator.
 Yahni Effendi Abidir, Telegraphist.
 Belal Atta, 195 B. Shaw.
 Abd El Tam Ibrahim, 1136 Shaw.
 Adam Ghalil, 27 Shaw.
 Adam Abdel Mahmud, 577 Shaw.
 Abdel Salama, Onb.
 Ali Saad Kaila, 6048 Onb.
 Abdel Ati Ali, 74 W. Onb.
 Koko Wau, 26 W. Onb.
 Ali Bedawi, 5810 W. B. Amin.
 Batalla Babikir, 212 Nafar.
 Hamdan Suleiman, 31 Nafar.
 Ismail Abdel, 3858 Nafar.
 Mohammed Ali, 171 Nafar.
 Mohammed Allam El Din, 3830 Nafar.
 Mohammed Mirsal, 56 Nafar.
 Fadl El Mula Ahmed, Telegraph Linesman.
 Osman Ahmed, Telegraph Linesman.
 El Miralai Beshir Bey Kambal.
 Nazir. Ali El Tom.
 Nazir. Abderrahim Abu Dagl.
 Nazir. Ahmed Abd El Aiser.

MINOR OPERATIONS.

Abd El Radi Effendi Ismail, M. Tani.
 Abd El Rahman Effendi Mohammed, Yuz.
 Beaumont, Maj. H., Lancashire Fusiliers.
 Bekheit Effendi Ali, M. Tani.
 Belal Effendi Ali Said, M. Awal.
 Buist, Capt. D. S., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Butler, Capt. Hon. T. P. P., Royal Artillery.
 Clinton, Capt. W. L., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
 Davenport, Capt. W. A., West Yorkshire Regiment.
 El Sayed Bey Ali, Mir.
 Gibbon, Capt. E., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Graham, Maj. C., Northamptonshire Regiment.
 Hobbs, Capt. H. F. C., West Yorkshire Regiment.
 Jones-Vaughan, Capt. H. T. C., Rifle Brigade.
 Macnamara, Maj. C. C., Royal Irish Rifles (died of wounds).
 Mahmud Effendi Gadein, M. Awal.
 Matar Effendi Suleiman, M. Tani.
 Mohammed Effendi Besim, Yuz.
 Mohammed Effendi Fahmi, M. Tani.

Mohammed Effendi Taufik, Yuz.
 Mohammed Effendi Wifki, Bimb.
 Percy-Smith, Maj. D. C., D.S.O., Middlesex Regiment.
 Reynolds, Capt. (temp. Maj.) A. J., 37th Lancers, Indian Army.
 Said Effendi Nur, Yuz. (since killed in action).
 Smith, Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) C. L., V.C., M.C., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
 Vickery, Maj. C. E., D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
 Worsley, Capt. R. H. W., King's Own Scottish Borderers.
 Abd El Farawi Guma, 847 B. Shaw.
 Khelil Ali, 79 B. Shaw.
 Faragalla Ali, 355 Shaw.
 Sheikh Fadl el Mula wad Rakha.
 Sheikh El Hag Gowai Hassan.
 Sheikh Kheirallah el Amin.
 Sheikh Yusef Amara Abu Sin.

Staff and Administrative Services.

Abd El Rahim Pasha Fahmi, Lewa.
 Ali Effendi Taher, Sagh.
 Anderson, Maj. G. W., late Seaforth Hrs., Director of Stores (deceased).
 Anderson, Maj. R. G., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Asad Effendi Selim Ayub, Sagh.
 Bagshawe, Maj. W. F. M., Royal Artillery.
 Blunt, Maj. C. E. G., Res. of Off.
 Bond, Captain I. R. B., M.C., Suffolk Regt.
 Byam, Maj. W., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Carroll, Lt.-Col. F. F., M.B., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Danels, Capt. L., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Drake, Lt.-Col. (temp. Col.) W. H., C.M.G., R.A., half-pay.
 Farag Bey Sidki, Mir.
 Forbes, Capt. Hon. B. A., Royal Irish Rifles.
 Forth, Maj. N. B. de L., M.C., Manchester Regiment.
 Garsia, Lt.-Col. H. G. S., D.S.O., Res. of Off.
 Gelal Effendi Munir, Sagh.
 Godwin, Capt. C. C., Yorkshire Regiment.
 Gowlland, Capt. G. C., Royal Engineers.
 Hearn, Maj. H. S., Royal Artillery.
 Herbert, Lt.-Col. (temp. Col.) E. S., half-pay.
 Herring Cooper, Major W. W., D.S.O., A.S.C.
 Hussein Bey Fehim, Kaim.
 Ibrahim Effendi Abu Haider, Yus.
 Hussein Effendi Mohammed Mustafa, Yuz.
 Ibrahim Pasha Rafaat, Lewa.
 Kenny, Major W. D., Royal Inniskilling Fus.
 Kyrke, Maj. H. V. V., Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
 Logan, Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) M. H., West Yorkshire Regiment.
 Mahmud Pasha Hilmi, Lewa.
 Mansur Effendi El Hag, Sagh.
 Middleton, Maj. W., Shropshire Light Infantry.
 Mohammed Bey Badr, Mir.
 Mohammed Effendi Emin El Reshid, Bimb.
 Mohammed Effendi Yusef, Bimb.
 Mursi Effendi Ibrahim, Bimb.
 Musa Bey Fuad, Mir.
 Mustafa Effendi Hebib, Sagh.
 Palmer, Lt.-Col. C. E., D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
 Purdon, Lt.-Col. D. W., Indian Army, Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Garrison Battalion.
 Smith, Maj. L. K., D.S.O., Royal Scots.
 Taufik Bey El Hekim, Kaim.
 Willson, Deputy Commy. of Ordnance and Hon. Capt. (temp. Commy. of Ordnance and Hon. Maj.) H. S., Army Ordnance Dept.

Baxter, S/18048 Staff Qr.-Mr.-Serjt. A. V., Army Service Corps.
 Campbell, 321 Serjt.-Maj. J., Irish Guards.
 Emmerson, 51 Serjt. T. W., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Fitzgerald, 3043 Qr.-Mr.-Serjt. G. L., North Staffordshire Regt.
 Fowles, S/20474 Staff Serjt. C. D., Army Service Corps.
 Hatfield, S/20084 Serjt. W. W., Army Service Corps.
 Herdman, 5286 Serjt.-Maj. N., Seaforth Highlanders.
 Joines, 1037 Armr. Staff-Serjt. W., Army Ordnance Corps.
 Mason, 16040 Co. Serjt.-Maj. R. P., Royal Artillery.
 Muir, 4890 Sub-Cond. A. J., Army Ordnance Corps.
 Shepherd, No. 12504 Qr.-Mr.-Serjt. E., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Smith, 6651 Qr.-Mr.-Serjt. W., Yorkshire Regiment.
 Spackman, 11896, Qr.-Mr.-Serjt. A. P., Royal Army Medical Corps.
 Spraggs, 4906 Serjt. H. V., Army Ordnance Corps.
 Willes, 4770, Sub-Cond. H. R., Army Ordnance Corps.
 Andrikides, Mr. A.
 Brockbank, Mr.
 Garland, Mr. H.
 Hartley, Mr. W. T.
 Marc Bey Bialobos.
 Mishelany, Bey G.
 Wiseman, Bey C.

NO. II.

List of Officers and Officials mentioned for administrative work connected with the situation in the Sudan created by the War:—

Personal Staff.

Edwards, Maj. F. W. L., King's Royal Rifle Corps.
 Keown-Boyd, Mr. A. W.
 Rees-Mogg, Maj. R. J., Royal Irish Regiment.
 Shahin Bey Girgis.
 Symes, Maj. G. S., D.S.O., Hampshire Regiment.

Headquarters.

Bernard, Bt. Col. E. E., C.M.G., Lt.-Col. Res. of Off.
 Bonham-Carter, Mr. E., C.M.G.
 Carr, Maj. F. U., Army Veterinary Corps.
 Chalmers, Dr. A. J.
 Crispin, Dr. E. S.
 Draper, Lieut.-Commdr. P. N.
 Drummond, Mr. P.
 Drury, Lieut.-Commdr. W. B., R.N., ret.
 Havercroft, Mr. C.
 Hewins, Mr. H. P.
 Hodgson, Mr. C. G.
 Midwinter, Capt. E. C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., late Royal Engineers.
 Moir, Maj. J. P., D.S.O., Royal Engineers.
 Newcombe, Capt. E. O. A., Res. of Off.
 Stack, Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) L. O. F. M., C.M.G., Res. of Off.
 Wheatley, Maj. M. J., Dorsetshire Regiment.

Intelligence.

Ibrahim Bey Dimitri.
 Pearson, Maj. H. D., Royal Engineers.
 Nalder, Mr. L. F.
 Willis, Temp. Capt. C. A.

Governors of Provinces.

Bassett, Maj. J. R., Royal Berkshire Regiment.
 Browne, Mr. C. P.
 Cameron, Maj. A., Res. of Off.
 Feilden, Maj. R. M., Res. of Off.
 Iles, Mr. G. E.
 Jackson, Bt. Col. H. W., C.B., retired pay.
 Lyall, Mr. C. E.
 More, Mr. R. E.
 Owen, Capt. R. C. R., C.M.G., Res. of Off.
 Savile, Capt. R. V., Res. of Off.
 Struve, Mr. K. C. P.
 Townsend, Capt. C. H., Res. of Off.
 Wilson, Bt. Maj. (temp. Lt.-Col.) C. E., Res. of Off.
 Wilson, Capt. R. S., Res. of Off.
 Woodward, Maj. F. W., D.S.O., Loyal N. Lanc. Regt.

Miscellaneous.

Sheikh Mohammed Mustafa El Maraghi (Grand Kadi).
 Sheikh El Taieb Hashim (Grand Mufti).

Officers.

Ahmed Pasha Fetin, Lewa.
 Ahmed Bey Hilmi El Metaini, Kaim.
 Ahmed Effendi Khelil, Sagh.
 Haider Effendi Rustum, Bimb.
 Mohammed Bey Ahmed, Mir.
 Mohammed Bey Emin, Kaim.
 Mohammed Bey Fadel, Kaim.
 Mohammed Bey Fahmi El Metaini, Kaim.

Junior Officials.

Bishop, 4212 Serjt.-Maj. G. H., Rifle Brigade.
 Khelil Effendi El Hag.
 Patterson, Mr. W. B.
 Samuel Effendi Attiyeh.
 Walkley, 27130 Batty. Serjt.-Maj. C. E., Royal Artillery.

Non-Officials.

MacGillivray, Mr. D. P.
 Sayed Ahmed El Morghani.
 Sayed Ali El Morghani, Sir, K.C.M.G.
 Sherif Yusef El Hindi.
 Nazir. Abdulla Abu Sin.
 Nazir. Abd El Azim Bey Khalifa
 Nazir. Ibrahim Musa.