

Fire was opened on them by the Zakkas and kept up during most of the day. The Seafortths on our extreme left occupied the Saran hills and kept the enemy to the south and west of Halwai.

Meantime Anderson's Brigade, moving north of China by Khwar and the Sarwakai pass, debouched on to the plain north of Halwai. During this movement the Zakkas kept up a dropping fire from the direction of Pastakai. The two columns now advanced simultaneously. The steep hills overlooking Halwai were occupied without a check, the mountain guns making the enemy's sangars quite untenable. Anderson's right was very well protected from any attack from the Thibai or Mangal Bagh passes by the 59th Rifles.

19. The towers and stacks of timber in Halwai were destroyed and the Force commenced its return march to camp. This was, as usual, the signal for numerous parties to come down from the Thabai direction. These opened fire at long ranges, but the Derajat Battery, very well handled, kept them on the move. Both Brigades were now moving by the south of China hills which were held by the 28th Punjabis. By the time the rearmost battalion had arrived abreast of China the Zakka fire had almost died away, but as the 28th Punjabis began to leave the hills, covered by the fire of six guns, the tribesmen appeared in considerable numbers and closely pressed the battalion. The Punjabis withdrew steadily, but lost one man killed and 8 wounded during the operation. Several acts of individual gallantry are reported and I am recommending three men for the Indian Order of Merit.

On our left (facing enemy) the Seafortths and Khyber Rifles were also attacked, the Zakkas advancing to close range, several of them being shot by both corps. It was whilst gallantly directing his rearmost companies at this stage of the fight that Major the Honourable Forbes-Sempill, Seaforth Highlanders, was killed.

The 53rd Sikhs who formed the rear centre covered the retirement and were very well handled.

By the time the rear guard had got east of China hills, the Zakkas drew off and only fired at long ranges. Our casualties were 1 British officer and 1 sepoy killed and 10 native rank and file wounded. Not a shot was fired into camp this night.

20. On the night of 22nd February the tribesmen tried the effects of sniping from several directions simultaneously, but although they wounded a sergeant in the Warwicks, their own casualties are reported to have been a good deal heavier.

21. Next morning General Anderson again visited China with a column and brought away most of the remaining wood and fodder. The Zakkas kept at a very respectful distance, but the mountain guns again did some good work. Whilst demolishing the last tower, two sappers and a follower were injured.

During the afternoon the first of the Afridi jirgahs arrived in camp and asked for terms and mercy for the Zakka Khel and expressed their eagerness and ability to deal with them in the future. I gave them 48 hours to complete these arrangements and they all left for Halwai. In order that they might meet the Zakka elders, I suspended active operations in the Halwai direction for that period.

22. On 24th February Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan, 54th Sikhs, with a small column

visited Jabagai and destroyed the towers. The Zakkas offered but a feeble resistance.

23. On 26th February a water escort of 45th Sikhs on Tsapara hill was attacked in thick scrub jungle and had one sepoy killed and two wounded.

24. On 27th February the combined Afridi jirgahs, about 1,100 men (including 300 Zakka Khel) arrived at China from Halwai with white flags. Lieutenant-Colonel Roos-Keppel, Chief Political Officer, went out alone half way to China to meet them and conducted them into camp.

Next day I held a public jirgah at which they presented a petition, the details of which are known to Government. They deposited 53 rifles of English manufacture as a guarantee of keeping their promise to punish the individual raiders and begged we would now spare the Zakka Khel; undertaking to hold themselves responsible for the conduct of the tribe in future. As in my opinion the terms more than satisfied the demands of Government, I accepted them and a formal agreement was drawn up and signed by 322 chiefs and elders, representing all the Afridi tribes, including the Zakka Khel.

25. Before the terms of above agreement were known at Chora on the night of 28th February, the camp at that post was heavily fired into and one sepoy, 23rd Pioneers, and four sepoys, 45th Sikhs, were wounded.

26. Immediately the terms of settlement with the jirgahs had been signed on 28th February secret orders were issued for the entire Force to leave the Bazar Valley at dawn next morning. The Zakka Khels and such others of the jirgahs as desired were allowed to proceed to China at once, and this proceeding convinced them that we had no intention of leaving for a few days at least.

27. At daylight on the 29th February Major-General Barrett's Brigade began to leave camp for Ali Musjid *via* Chora, a distance of 15 miles. The transport and baggage of both Brigades had gone by 9 a.m., and by 10 o'clock the rearmost piquets began to withdraw. Anderson's Brigade covered the withdrawal and his arrangements were very well carried out. I remained with this Brigade at Chora the night and next day marched through to Jamrud, where the entire force was concentrated prior to demobilisation. A battalion and two squadrons were left at Ali Musjid as a temporary guard to surplus stores.

28. From the time we left China till arrival in British India not a shot was fired by the Zakkas. I am glad to be able to add that during the entire operations not a single follower, public or private, was killed or wounded by the enemy, and only one rifle was lost in the Bazar Valley and that was on a man killed while skirmishing in thick bush.

29. I beg to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the soldierly conduct of all ranks of the Force. Their good discipline and cheerfulness have been very marked, and it has indeed been an honour to command such a fine division in the field. The fact that Brigades were employed intact under their own Generals and Staff, as they had been trained in peace time, made the carrying out of all operations a simple matter, and my own share in the work was appreciably lightened by having been allowed to select my Staff Officers from the permanent Divisional establishment.

That the enemy lost heavily whilst our own casualties were small is due to the improvement