

5th February searched the dense primeval forests of the Mau with a screen of patrols which, moving constantly both night and day, in spite of great natural difficulties, maintained lateral communication throughout the operation and effectually prevented the enemy from breaking east or towards Elgeyo. On the 28th January the right wing emerged from the forests and occupied the line Kongoni-Ison on which, in accordance with orders, it halted. During this period the left wing, five companies under command of Major Walker, 1st K.A.R., drove Kamelilo and the Tinderet range.

By the 5th of February our first drive had resulted in clearing the Mau forests of all but a few of the enemy, who remained hiding in the dense thickets on the mountains, and in completely clearing Kamelilo and Tinderet of all Nandi.

5. Leaving four companies in Kamelilo to complete the clearing of that district by separate operations, I reinforced the right wing to 6½ companies, with which Lieutenant-Colonel Gorges, D.S.O., formed a driving line which enveloped the Kapchepkendi country in a semi-circle from the escarpment near Nandi Fort to the Uasin Gishu through Sile and Kongoni.

These companies had orders to save as much of the Nandi crops as they could, for the country they were to work over being near the confines of the reserve it was advisable to use Nandi corn, as far as possible, for the subsistence of the refugees and thus appreciably reduce the expense of food purchase. This entailed very slow progress on the part of the driving line and hard work on the troops who had to reap and winnow the standing crops and remove the contents of all huts and grain stores.

Before the work of harvesting the rich fields of millet which clothe the slopes of the Kapchepkendi valleys was half completed the rainy season broke, and the heavy rains which fell, by rotting the standing crops, rendered further efforts to save them unavailing.

6. By the 18th February the bulk of the Nandi had gone into the reserve and the Chief Political Officer had formed the opinion that, provided a strong garrison was left in the country whence they had been expelled, the Nandi question was at last definitely settled.

During our driving operations in Kamelilo and Kapchepkendi the enemy though completely disorganised, at first constantly harassed our patrols, more especially in Kamelilo and the Nandi edge of Mau.

During this period we lost 8 privates K.A.R. killed and wounded.

7. The Nandi Field Force was demobilised on the 27th instant, a garrison of five companies, under Major Walker, 1st K.A.R., being left in the cultivated portion of Nandi and in Kamelilo to prevent the return to their former locations of the inhabitants whom we have expelled.

8. Between the 18th October, 1905, the date we first entered Nandi, and the 27th February, 1906, when the force demobilised, the way both officers and men employed with the Field Force, representative of three battalions of the King's African Rifles, responded to all calls made upon them was admirable. Officers and men were as keen and showed as much dash at the end as at the beginning of our four months' campaign, during the first and last portions of which the inclement weather experienced at the high altitudes they were working over (between 7,000 and 9,500 feet) threw considerable hardships

on all ranks. The marching powers displayed by the rank and file, burdened with blankets, ammunition, accoutrements, and—at times—seven days' rations on the person, were often remarkable. Our casualties were 98 killed and wounded.

9. The medical arrangements made by the Principal Medical Officer and his staff were satisfactory. The health of the troops and transport porters was good throughout the period of operations. Exposure to cold and inclement weather accounted for the invaliding of six officers (15 per cent. of the British officers on the strength), the health of the remainder was, however, good.

10. The nature of the Nandi country precludes the use of any but porter transport. The average number of porters employed with the force was 600 (Wakikuyu and Mnyamwezi). On the whole they worked well, though not in any sense picked men, having been hurriedly collected in Nairobi by the Protectorate Transport Department.

The African troops and porters were rationed on rice, millet, and beans bought by contract. The rations were satisfactory in quality. A day's ration consisted of 1½ lbs. grain and ½ oz. salt. Throughout the operations valuable assistance was rendered to the Field Force by the Uganda Railway, the officials of which were always ready to help us in every way in their power.

11. The discipline of the troops was excellent as was also that of the Protectorate police, some 250 of whom were at different times attached to the force. On the police mainly fell the irksome and monotonous duty of guarding the railway, which duty they performed to my satisfaction.

12. In conclusion I have the honour to request that the African General Service medal, with clasp inscribed "Nandi, 1905-1906," may be granted to all members of the force employed in the theatre of operations between the 18th October, 1905, and the 27th February, 1906.

I have, &c.,

EDGAR G. HARRISON, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Nandi Field Force.

From the Officer Commanding Nandi Field Force
to the Inspector-General, King's African Rifles.

Nairobi, 28th February, 1906.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward for your consideration and recommendation the names of certain Officers whose services in the Nandi Field Force I am of opinion are worthy of being brought to notice.

I submit that the services of the following Officers are deserving of special consideration:—

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) E. H. Gorges, D.S.O. (The Manchester Regiment), 1st K.A.R., commanded No. I Column during the first phase and subsequently the right wing of the driving line employed in clearing the Mau forest and Kapchepkendi.

In my absence, while inspecting the Reserve during part of November and December, he commanded the Field Force. Colonel Gorges has shown conspicuous ability in the command of troops in the field.

He is able to infuse into the Officers and men under his command a spirit of keenness and