

left Duru on the 24th, and reached Kotorokoshi on the 25th at about 1 p.m. He there came in contact with, and was charged by, the advance party of the enemy coming down the road from Kaura, but routed them with a loss of 40 killed and numerous prisoners, from whom he gained useful information. Continuing his advance towards Rawia he was riding up to a chief who apparently wished to surrender, when he was suddenly charged from an ambushade by about 30 horsemen, who broke through his men, but were repulsed, thanks to the steadiness of the latter, with a loss of five killed.

Lieutenant Wright camped for the night in a walled village, so as to be secure from a rush, as the enemy were reported in force, and not far away. Cautiously continuing his advance next morning, Lieutenant Wright was informed by his scouts at 8 a.m. that the enemy were advancing rapidly and in force. He at once formed square round his horses (which were held by his carriers and prisoners) in the thickest position of the mimosa bush that he could find. The enemy in great numbers charged the square repeatedly for two hours, and between the charges kept up a fire from the bush at about 100 yards distance.

At about 10 a.m. the enemy drew off, in good order, leaving 65 horsemen dead within 30 yards of the square, 11 of them being recognized as principal chiefs of Kano. Lieutenant Wright's loss was only one man wounded and three horses killed. After a short delay Lieutenant Wright resumed his advance, and sighted 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot drawn up in regular array in the open at Rawia, but as he had only 50 rounds per man left, he remained in observation until the enemy slowly filed away northwards. Lieutenant Wright then camped at Rawia for the night.

The enemy continued their retirement to Kamberawa, and 800 of them were watering their horses there in the afternoon when Captain Porter arrived on the scene and immediately charged and dispersed them with a loss of ten killed. The Mounted Infantry had one man wounded.

15. It appeared from subsequent reports that when the Emir Aliyu suddenly deserted his followers at Birni-n-Goga, the Kano chiefs decided to lead their forces back to Kano, some being for fighting and some for submission. After the fights with Lieutenant Wright near Kotorokoshi on the 25th, the peace party separated in the night and made for Kano by bush tracks, while the remainder attempted to overwhelm Lieutenant Wright's small party on the following day. Had it not been for the skilful and determined way in which that officer held the road with his small party against vastly superior numbers, a formidable body of fighting men would have succeeded in getting back to Kano, and I should have felt compelled to follow them with Colonel Morland's column, a course which would certainly have prolonged the operations considerably. As it was, Lieutenant Wright checked the enemy and headed them north until Captain Porter completed their discomfiture by his dashing charge.

16. Lieutenant Wright makes special mention of the assistance he received from Lieutenant C. L. Wells, 3rd Hampshire Regiment, who, between the enemy's charges, was employed in cutting down thorn bushes to form a zariba outside the square, and he praises most highly the extreme steadiness of his men, both when unexpectedly charged on the 25th, when they dismounted immediately and repulsed their assailants by dismounted fire, and again on the

26th, when they kept cool and did not fire a shot at over 50 yards range.

I would take this opportunity of acknowledging the valuable services rendered throughout the operations by the 100 Mounted Infantry, raised, trained, and led by Captain Porter. The admirable and prompt reports sent in by him and his officers afforded most reliable intelligence.

Their horses were always fit and all ranks always ready for work.

17. On the 27th February Colonel Morland's column reached Kaura and was joined by the Mounted Infantry and other detachments from the Kotorokoshi road.

During the next two days it was ascertained by Mounted Infantry reconnaissances that, with the exception of a few hundred men who had retired on Sokoto, no bodies of Kano fighting men remained in the field, and that the men who had returned towards Kano were only anxious to submit.

18. There seemed to me, therefore, no objection to withdrawing the field force from the neighbourhood of Kano and Zaria, where, with the Lagos troops I had ordered up, there would be about 550 infantry with four Maxims and one 75 mm. gun, and it only remained to carry out your original instructions with regard to Sokoto, from which place and Gando no answers had been received to the conciliatory letters sent by Your Excellency's orders.

19. It was necessary, however, to establish a post at Kaura, in which to leave the soldiers and carriers unfit to march, as there had been a good deal of sickness, principally chest complaints, due to the cold Harmattan wind. Captain Mackenzie, V.C., 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment, was, therefore, left in a fortified post with the force named in the margin,* and the remainder of the force, under Colonel Morland, marched for Bakura on the 3rd March.

20. A letter from the Sultan of Sokoto was received en route acknowledging receipt of the letter addressed to him, and promising a reply. But by the 6th March, when we reached Bakura, it was evident that all the chiefs with their fighting men had been summoned to Sokoto. I considered it, therefore, desirable, for military reasons, that a junction should be effected between Colonel Morland's column and Captain Merrick's force from Argungu. This course also appeared to me to be in accordance with the wishes you had expressed on the subject in your original instructions, and again in your letter of the 11th February from Zaria.

I therefore directed Colonel Morland to march westwards from Bakura on the 7th, and sent orders to Captain Merrick to join him at Shagali, about 30 miles south of Sokoto on the Gando-Sokoto road.

21. Colonel Morland arrived at Shagali on the 10th, and Captain Merrick, with the force named in the margin,† joined him on the 11th.

On the 12th a pacific reply was received from the Emir of Gando, but it was reported by the political officers that the Sultan of Sokoto was preparing for active hostility. One of our patrols had had a skirmish with Sokoto horsemen and some of our stragglers had been attacked; a carrier had been killed, another wounded, and a soldier who had left the line of march was missing.

* Two Officers, 1 Medical Officer, 1 British Non-commissioned Officer, 97 natives rank and file (of whom 21 were sick), 115 carriers (sick).

† Two companies Infantry (182) men, 1 gun with 19 gunners.