

behind it from the north while we were attacking it from the south. This duty was remarkably well carried out by General Brocklehurst. Excellent gun positions were selected by Major Burrows, Royal Horse Artillery, and the 4th Division Mounted Infantry were extremely well placed, and General Brocklehurst's dispositions generally inflicted great loss upon the enemy, and contributed considerably to the success of the day's operations.

The 7th Brigade, under Colonel (local Major-General) F. W. Kitchener, moved forward along the ridge from Vogelstruispoort towards Bergendal, the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment being detached to the right, were directed to entrench themselves on the eastern crests of the ridge, and under cover of this regiment the following guns were brought into action against Bergendal from right to left:—

- Two 12-prs., No. 10 Mountain Battery;
- Two 4.7-in. guns, No. 6 Coy., Western Division, R.G.A.;
- Two 5-in. guns, No. 16 Coy., Southern Division, R.G.A.;
- Two 12-prs., No. 2 Coy., Western Division, R.G.A.;
- 61st Howitzer Battery; and
- 21st Battery, Royal Field Artillery.

The 42nd Field Battery were entrenched on the right of the Manchesters, where they were able to command the valley and prevent any movement of the enemy from south to north.

The other guns at 11 a.m. began to shell Bergendal Farm and the rocky kopje, and for about three hours continued their fire. The howitzer fire was particularly effective, especially as we heard afterwards from prisoners, the combination of a salvo from the howitzers with a salvo of shrapnel from a Field Battery directed on the same target, the latter being fired as the first shell of the howitzers' salvo exploded on the target. The guns, under a fire throughout of a pompom at short range, a Long Tom and several high velocity guns, made excellent practice, and fortunately suffered no loss.

The bombardment was much assisted by a 4.7-in. gun posted at Belfast, which the Commander-in-Chief, who was watching the operations, at once directed to co-operate with us.

After three hours' shelling, as the enemy still clung to the kopje, the Infantry were ordered to assault it. General Kitchener directed Lieut.-Colonel Metcalfe to move the 1st Bn. Rifle Brigade under cover of the ridge from which our guns were firing, and place his battalion across the main east and west ridge on which the kopje of the farm stands, and to assault in front from the west; Lieut.-Colonel Payne to move the Inniskilling Fusiliers down the face of gun ridge and to assault the flank of the position from the south; the 1st Bn. Devon Regiment supporting the left centre, and the 2nd Gordon Highlanders supporting the right attack. At the moment of starting to descend gun ridge, the leading companies of the Inniskilling Fusiliers were met by a very accurate and heavy pompom fire which staggered them for a moment, but the men reformed themselves and pressed onward with hardly any delay. Both regiments were admirably led by their Commanding Officers. The enemy stood their ground with great gallantry, and only left their positions when the Rifles were among them and the Inniskilling Fusiliers on their flank, between 20 and 30 of them keeping up fire until actually made prisoners. The attack, which, as I have described, was made without the assistance of any cover, was a most

gallant one; the moment the kopje was carried, the Rifle Brigade, although they had lost their Colonel who, to our great regret, was wounded while gallantly leading the advance, at once reformed and swept on on their own initiative up the plateau carrying all before them, supported by the Devons, who had got up on the left, and the Gordons and Inniskillings who joined in on the right.

The honours of the assault belong to the Rifle Brigade as they had to attack that part of the kopje which had been most protected from our Artillery fire, but all the troops did splendidly, and the carrying of such a position held as it was by resolute men, will always remain present to the minds of those who witnessed it as a most gallant feat of arms.

One very noticeable incident in the attack was the great tactical skill with which the maxims of the Gordons, Inniskillings, Rifle Brigade and Devons were handled by their respective detachments. The fire of these guns contributed materially to the successful result of the assault. General Kitchener especially brings to notice the conduct of No. 2860 Corporal William Macdonald, Gordon Highlanders, and of Lieutenant A. C. Jeffcoat, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, while in command of gun detachments.

Lieutenant-General Lyttelton's dispositions for the day were excellent, and the manner in which his instructions for the assault were carried out by General Kitchener was most praiseworthy.

The dispositions throughout the day of Colonel L. W. Parsons, Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery, were excellent.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. E. Metcalfe, Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Payne, D.S.O., Inniskilling Fusiliers, and Major T. A. H. Davies, D.S.O., 1st Devon Regiment, showed conspicuous ability, and Major G. Cockburn, D.S.O., Rifle Brigade, deserves the greatest credit for the manner in which, on his Colonel being wounded, he assumed command, and the moment the assault was successful, reformed his regiment, and pushed on in pursuit.

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade galloped up immediately the kopje was taken, and with them and the 7th Brigade, the pursuit was carried for over three miles towards Dalmanutha, when it was checked by the rocky nature of the low ground which afforded admirable cover to the retreating parties of the enemy.

Except one pompom which we captured, the enemy only had long-range guns in action, and these were so scattered and at such distances from the position, that there was no hope of reaching them. General Kitchener, therefore, wisely checked the pursuit and bivouacked just overlooking Dalmanutha Station.

The enemy left 14 dead and 19 prisoners—8 of whom were wounded—at Bergendal Farm, but the importance of this successful action does not depend upon the enemy's dead found by us. The loss of the post at Bergendal led to the enemy abandoning in great haste the whole of their immensely strong position about Dalmanutha, and forced them to withdraw in great confusion beyond Machadodorp; in fact the capture of Bergendal by the Rifle Brigade and the Inniskilling Fusiliers cleared the whole of the high veldt of the enemy.

Our losses were serious, and amounted to:—  
Officers: 1 killed, 7 wounded (of whom 2 since dead), all of the Rifle Brigade. Men: 12 killed, 96 wounded, and 4 missing.