

down sniping, and to prevent any of the enemy being able to watch our movement to the right.

44. The attacking party consisted of the Royal Welsh and Royal Scots Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers under General Barton; the Royal Lancaster, the South Lancashire, the York and Lancaster, and the West Yorkshire under General Kitchener, and the 4th Brigade, the whole under command of General Warren.

45. General Hart held the *tete du pont* on the north bank of the Tugela with the Connaught Rangers, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Imperial Light Infantry.

46. The position occupied by the enemy consisted of three rocky hills rising abruptly from the Tugela to a height above it of about 600 feet. The westernmost hill, called by us Terrace Hill, is separated from the middle hill and from the rugged crests of the north bank of the Tugela, by a valley which, rising steeply from the Langerwachte, ends in a shallow nek between the two hills over which the Colenso-Nelthorpe track passes. The middle hill, called by us Railway Hill, is separated from the eastern, called Pieter's Hill, by a deep ravine along the western side of which the railway to Pieters winds through deep cuttings. Pieter's Hill rising steeply on the west from this ravine, falls by gentler gradients to the north-east towards the Klip River, the valley of which is intersected by dongas clothed in thick mimosa and camel thorn scrub.

47. Terrace Hill was a formidable position, it was strongly fortified with three tiers of trenches and flanked by trenches running down the Langerwachte Spruit on one side, and up almost to the crest of Railway Hill on the other. The crests of these hills were about 1,700 yards distant from the river, which here flows through a deep gorge, the sides of which on the north are almost precipitous to about 400 feet, the ground from the crest of this gorge to the crest line of the hills presenting an excellent field of fire for a force occupying the crests. Within this field of fire sangars had been constructed in every suitable spot. Pieter's Hill was not so strongly held, but a very considerable force was, as we found out later, concealed in the ravine between it and Railway Hill. Our approaches to the position were of the worst possible description; there was no road, and the attacking column had to scramble up an almost precipitous rocky cliff to gain the crest of the ravine. We had, though, one great advantage, our Artillery positions were excellent, and from the length of our line the enemy's positions were in almost all cases partly enfiladed as well as met by frontal fire.

48. At 10.30 a.m. General Barton's force crossed the pontoon bridge, and scrambling about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles down the edge of the Tugela, ascended the steep cliffs of Pieter's Hill unopposed, the rifle and machine gun fire from the south bank having cleared the north bank.

49. As the troops passed over the crest they were met by a heavy fire in front from the enemy in the ravine between Pieter's and Railway Hills, and also in flank from a reinforcement which came from Bulwana into the ravine on the east. These last were, to some extent, kept back by our guns on Monte Cristo, but owing to the fact that General Kitchener's advance was somewhat delayed, General Barton's force had to bear a heavy attack for a considerable time single-handed. His dispositions were extremely good; his three regiments were very well

handled; his men fought most gallantly, and stubbornly maintained their position.

50. General Kitchener's Brigade followed General Barton over the pontoon bridge, and diverting slightly to their right, scaled the shoulder of the ravine, and gained the railway cutting. General Kitchener then directed the West Yorkshire and the Royal Lancaster Regiments to attack Railway Hill, but the men of the latter seeing the main position, Terrace Hill, on their left front went straight at it, and were stopped by a heavy fire from the sangars in the valley. General Kitchener at once remedied the mistake, and directed the South Lancashire on the right of the Royal Lancaster, between them and the West Yorkshire, who were then gaining the crest of Railway Hill.

51. During the delay thus caused General Barton's force was, as has been said, left exposed, but directly the West Yorkshire took Railway Hill, they dislodged the enemy from the ravine and captured a Maxim gun. Meanwhile the South Lancashire pressed forward, and, aided by the Artillery fire, captured the sangars in the valley, taking a few prisoners and killing many of the enemy, who were practically confined to their trenches by the severity of the Artillery fire.

52. The fire of the naval guns here was particularly valuable, their shooting was admirable, and they were able to keep up fire with common shell long after the Royal Field Artillery were obliged to cease their shrapnel. Indeed, Lieutenant Ogilvy, H.M. Ship "Terrible," kept up fire on the largest sangars till the infantry were within 15 yards of them. His guns must have saved us many casualties. No one who watched the operations can have the slightest doubt that Artillery, cooperating with Infantry in an attack on a prepared position, ought to have a considerable proportion of common shell.

53. The sangars in the valley were soon taken, though I regret to say, at the cost of the life of Colonel McCarthy O'Leary, who fell while gallantly leading his regiment, and the Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire pressing on, well supported by the York and Lancaster on the right, and the 4th Brigade on the left, soon gained the summit of the hill, and the day was won.

54. The enemy fled in all directions, but as they were driven off the hills to the west they were able to keep up so strong a fire from the broken ground in the Langerwachte Valley, that it was impossible that evening to bring up the Cavalry and Artillery.

55. By 8 p.m. firing had ceased, and at daylight the enemy had disappeared from our front and flanks.

56. On the 28th, General Lyttelton's Division marched unopposed along the railway line and Boer road to the position captured the previous day, and the Cavalry and Artillery were sent forward.

57. I assigned the frontal advance to Lord Dundonald, as I was anxious the Colonial troops should, if possible, be the first to enter Ladysmith. He was opposed by some 200 of the enemy near Nelthorpe, but a few rounds of shrapnel dispersed them, and, pushing forward, he entered Ladysmith about 6 p.m. The 1st Cavalry Brigade went to the right across the southern slopes of Bulwana, and found the enemy's rearguard posted in a strong position in a very rugged country, with three guns.

58. On the 1st March, I was moving to attack Bulwana, when I found it had been evacuated