

direction the enemy was advancing from. I had better have said: "Come to my support."

My position at 7 A.M., was full of interest, for, instead of 400, I have since ascertained I had 2,500 Boers (300 from Transvaal, six guns, one Hotchkiss, one Maxim), and at the same moment I had reliable information from Major Rimington that 500 fresh Boers, plus a laager behind them, were behind some kopjes two miles off, and in my rear. I then heliographed to the Guards, and continued my attack.

The fighting was far harder than on Thursday, and I would not let a man go forward until I had covered the two high hills with shrapnel. The manner in which the batteries were handled, their accuracy in firing, is beyond all praise, and why this action is, to my mind, interesting is that you can compare it to Belmont. In the battle of Belmont you have a surprise and one battalion losing direction and suffering heavy loss; in the battle of Enslin you have a position well prepared by shrapnel, the right battery fires 500 rounds, and you have the Naval Brigade behaving splendidly, but not taking advantage enough of cover and suffering accordingly. The loss was great in both cases, and convinces me that if an enemy has his heart in the right place he ought to be able to hold his own against vastly superior forces, and it does our men great credit that nothing stops them.

The 9th Brigade consisted of the Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Northhamptons, half Battalion Loyal North Lancashires, 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. The Naval Brigade was attached to this brigade, and was commanded by Captain Prothero. The brigade was distributed as follows:—5 companies Northumberland Fusiliers, remained as a containing line in front of right of the enemy's position, and did not advance until the end of the engagement; 2 companies Northumberland Fusiliers, escort to guns; the remainder of the brigade attacked the kopjes on left of the Boer position. The fire from here was very heavy, and the Naval Brigade suffered severely, keeping in too close formation. The Officers, petty officers, non-commissioned officers led their men with great gallantry, and I have great pleasure in bringing to your notice the plucky conduct of Lieutenant W. T. C. Jones, Royal Marine Light Infantry, who although he had a bullet in his thigh, led his men to the top of the kopje, and only had his wound dressed at the conclusion of the action. The command of the Naval Brigade devolved on Captain A. E. Le Marchant, Royal Marine Light Infantry, when his senior officers were killed or wounded, and he led the remnant of the Naval Brigade up the kopje, with great coolness and ability. The kopje gained, it was found evacuated, and the enemy having gone to the right, their position was enfiladed. The position was taken by the Naval Brigade, Marines, Yorkshire Light Infantry, and Loyal North Lancashires. The attack was ably supported by the fire of the Field Artillery Battery on the right. I beg to bring to your notice No. 1843 Colour-Sergeant Waterhouse, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who at a critical moment acted with great coolness in shooting down an enemy who had been doing great execution on our men at 1,150 yards. Lieutenant Taylor, Aide-de-Camp, is favourably mentioned. The heights gained, I found I had taken the whole Boer force in flank, and had entirely cut them off from their line of retreat. My guns played on the masses of horsemen, but my few cavalry, dead beat, were powerless, and for the second time I longed for a Cavalry Brigade and a Horse Artillery

Battery to let me reap the fruits of a hard fought action. I buried 21 Boers; there were 50 horses dead in one place. I found over 30 wounded in the Boer hospital here, and I have fought distinctly different Boers on the two days. My casualties were as follows:—

Officers.

Naval Brigade.—Killed, 3; wounded, 3.

King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.—Wounded, 3.

Total. Killed, 3; wounded, 6.

Rank and File.

Naval Brigade.—Killed, 6; wounded, 89.

King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.—Killed, 7; wounded, 34; missing, 4.

Royal Marine Light Infantry.—Wounded, 2.

Northumberland Fusiliers.—Wounded, 2.

2nd Battalion North Lancashire.—Killed, 1; Wounded, 6; missing, 2.

Northhamptons.—Killed, 1; wounded, 4; missing, 1.

Total. Killed, 15; wounded, 137; missing, 7.

I am, &c.,

METHUEN, Lieutenant-General.

P.S.—I enclose an interesting account of work performed by the Naval Brigade near the line. Their guns were of great value, and the work performed was of great interest. Lieutenants Campbell and L. S. Armstrong displayed great coolness in conducting the fire of their guns. Petty Officers Ashley, "Doris," and Fuller, "Monarch," laid their guns with great accuracy under fire.

I again draw attention to the exceptional organizing power of Colonel Townsend at Swink's Pan at 11.30 P.M. I was informed that owing to all the ambulances having been used for taking the wounded to the train at Belmont, I had scarcely a field hospital mounted officer, only three ambulances, and three stretchers. I knew I had to fight next morning, so got together 50 blankets in order to carry wounded with help of rifles. I also sent to Colonel Townsend to make arrangements for wounded by 3 A.M., a messenger having to ride 7 miles to him. He met me on the field with full supply of ambulances, and I never saw anything more of him or the wounded because he had a train ready for them between Grass Pan and Belmont. His only complaint is that there is not much of his mules left, an observation which applies equally to men and animals.

METHUEN,

Lieutenant-General.

(A.)

From General Officer Commanding 1st Brigade to Chief Staff Officer 1st Division.

SIR,

Enslin, November 25, 1899.

IN accordance with orders received last night the Guards Brigade fell in as escort to the baggage train at 4 A.M. to-day; it was, however, 6.30 before the whole train was ready to start. We followed the guide of Rimington's Horse to within a mile and a half of Grass Pan Station. I saw firing to the north-west and decided to advance, giving orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Codrington to protect the baggage column with the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, and extending the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, and the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers, facing north. During the extension a few blind shells fell near the firing line doing no damage. At this time (7.30) the 1st Battalion Scots Guards came up from Belmont, and with them I prolonged the line to the left, but soon afterwards received a telegram from the General Officer Commanding, informing me that the Scots Guards were taken as a divisional battalion. I therefore advanced with