

former place, I decided to abandon my original intention of joining the 1st Brigade, and returning with it *via* the Bori Kandao and Lala Beg to Ali Masjid.

I may here mention that, though the valley near China is wide and open, stretching up to the Mangal Bagh Pass, China itself is the only large village in the vicinity, the other habitations being cave dwellings which were found to be deserted.

On December 27th, after destroying the defences and towers of China, I returned with the left column to Chora. The rear guard was followed up by the enemy, who were repulsed with heavy loss to themselves, the notorious Mullah Idris being among the killed. Our casualties were one British soldier killed, and four British and two Native soldiers wounded. During this day's march I met Major-General Symons near the Palosi caves, and directed him to move the next day with the 1st Brigade to Karamna, and the day after to Lala China, destroying *en route* the defences of such villages as had not been dealt with during his advance.

Rain fell during the night of the 27th. On the 28th, after destroying the defences of Chora, I marched with the left column to Lala China, no opposition being met with, and returned thence to Jamrud under an escort of two squadrons, 4th Dragoon Guards. On the 29th and 30th the 1st Division concentrated at Jamrud. The right column was followed up by the enemy during its march from Burg to Lala China and suffered some loss, while inflicting much heavier loss on the enemy. The total casualties in the 1st Division during the operations in the Bazar valley were 1 British officer, 6 British soldiers, and 4 Native soldiers killed; and 1 British officer, 30 British soldiers, and 17 Native soldiers wounded.

10. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Havelock-Allan left me at Lala China, and with my permission proceeded to Landi Kotal, arrangements being made to provide him with a sufficient escort. I deeply regret to report that on December 30th, as he was returning to Jamrud, he unfortunately left his escort near Ali Masjid, and riding down a ravine was shot dead by the enemy. Every precaution had been taken to ensure his safety, and on bidding him good-bye at Lala China I had impressed on him the necessity of invariably remaining with the troops detailed for his protection.

11. From December 30th up to the present date there is but little to record. The Peshawar Column met at first with considerable opposition in the Khyber, convoys and foraging parties being repeatedly fired on and followed up by the tribesmen, and the telegraph line interrupted daily between Ali Masjid and Landi Kotal. In view of the hostile attitude of the Zakka Khels in the Khyber, and the casualties resulting therefrom, I decided on January 3rd to strengthen the force occupying the pass by ordering the 1st Brigade from Jamrud to Ali Masjid, and by reinforcing the Landi Kotal garrison with the 45th Sikhs and 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkhas. On these movements being carried out the tribesmen dispersed, but they have since resumed their guerilla warfare, though in smaller numbers than before.

12. During the operations described in the foregoing paragraphs, I have received every possible support and assistance from the General Officer Commanding the Line of Communication, his staff, and the troops under his command. The requirements of the Main Column have

been promptly and fully met, while the arrangements made to protect the long and exposed line between Kohat and the Sampagha Pass, and afterwards to transfer the base from Kohat to Peshawar, have been all that I could have desired.

13. In bringing this narrative to a close I wish to record my high appreciation of the conduct of the British and Native troops serving with the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Up to the present date, their losses have amounted to 1,050 killed and wounded. They have been subjected to great hardship and exposure, harassed at night by assaults at close quarters or by distant rifle fire, and engaged in long and trying rear-guard actions. Their duties on picquet and in guarding foraging parties have been specially onerous. Hardly a day or night has passed without casualties, and, whether we advanced or retired, every soldier had to be constantly on the alert against enemies who made no stand in the open, but were unrivalled as skirmishers and marksmen. The operations were carried out in a country which offered every natural advantage to the tribesmen, and imposed on the regimental officers and the rank and file the necessity for individual initiative, unremitting watchfulness, and personal activity. I am glad to say that the troops responded nobly to the call made upon them. Cheerful and soldierlike under exceptionally trying conditions, officers and men upheld to the utmost the traditions of their corps and the honour of Her Majesty's Army.

The advance into Tirah was delayed, and the subsequent movements of the force were impeded, by the inferiority of a large proportion of the transport animals, and the want of proper discipline and training amongst many of the transport drivers and kahars. But it must be remembered that a peace organization which has to be rapidly expanded when war breaks out takes time to render it efficient, and that field requirements elsewhere had already absorbed much of the better class of pack transport, which would otherwise have been available.

The results attained by the expedition may be summarized as follows. The troops under my command have marched everywhere within Orakzai and Afridi limits, and the whole of Tirah has now, for the first time, been accurately surveyed. Our enemies, wherever encountered, have been punished, and their losses are stated on unimpeachable evidence to have been extremely severe. The towers and walls of almost every fortified village in the country have been levelled to the ground, and the winter supply of grain, fodder, and fuel of both tribes has been consumed by the force. The Orakzais have been completely subdued, and have complied with the terms prescribed for them, but the Afridis still hold out, although I have strong hopes that they may before long submit, and thus save their country from a fresh invasion in the spring.

14. During the present expedition the scouts drawn from the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas have proved especially valuable. Being trained mountaineers and accustomed to guerilla warfare, they were able to climb the most precipitous hills, lie in ambush at night, and surpass the tribesmen in their own tactics.

15. The Imperial Service Corps attached to the Force have taken their full share in the hardships of the campaign, and fighting side by side with their comrades in the regular army, have given a tangible proof of their readiness,