

have also been very heavy; and His Excellency is much indebted to Major-General R. Wace, C.B., Director-General of Ordnance, and the officers and subordinates of the department, for the promptness with which the wants of the army in the field have been complied with.

16. It again becomes His Excellency's pleasing duty to bring to notice the valuable services rendered by the Telegraph Department, and His Excellency tenders to Mr. C. H. Reynolds, C.I.E., Director-General of Telegraphs, and the officers and subordinates employed with the force, his grateful acknowledgments.

17. His Excellency is also much indebted to the officers and subordinates of the Survey Department for the excellent map which has been prepared of the large area of new country through which the troops have been operating, and to the officers and subordinates of the Postal Department for the punctuality with which postal communication has been maintained.

18. To Colonel M. Brackenbury, Royal Engineers, Manager, Mr. E. F. Jacob, Traffic Superintendent, and the subordinate staff of the North-Western Railway, His Excellency's thanks are due for the valuable assistance afforded in the rapid mobilisation of the troops on the frontier.

It has been ascertained that between the 1st July and the 31st October, 1897, the additional trains on the North-Western Railway required for military traffic, amounted to 4,544, or an average of 37 trains per diem in excess of normal traffic. Any break-down of the railway arrangements during the period when troops and supplies were being pushed to the front, would have had a very serious effect on the military operations, and that no such failure occurred is due, in His Excellency's opinion, to the able administration of his railway system by the Manager, and to the untiring efforts of his subordinates.

From General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Commanding Tirah Expeditionary Force, to the Adjutant-General in India.—No. 812-T.C. Head Quarters, Tirah Expeditionary Force, Camp Rawalpindi, dated the 26th January, 1898.

IN continuation of my letter No. 524-T.C., dated 9th December, 1897, I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following account of the operations of the force under my command from the 1st November, 1897, up to the present date.

2. As previously reported, on October 31st, I entered Afridi Tirah and encamped in Maidan with the 2nd Division and the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division, the 1st Brigade being left in Mastura to dominate that valley and to hold the Sampagha Pass. At this time the troops at my disposal in Maidan numbered 9,700, and in Mastura 2,330.

3. On November 1st, I directed a reconnaissance to be made to Bagh with the object of visiting the mosque which was notorious as the spot where the Afridi rising originated, and as the focus of political intrigue and fanaticism. The force employed consisted of No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the 1st Battalion, 3rd Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Dixon, C.B. Some opposition was met with, Captain T. G. MacLaren, King's Own Scottish Borderers, and

three men of the 3rd Gurkhas being wounded, and one man of the 3rd Gurkhas being killed. The mosque was found to be an open wooden shed situated at the confluence of the streams which drain the Maidan Valley. No documents were discovered either in the mosque, or in the houses in its vicinity.

On November 1st and 2nd, the Zakka Khels on either flank of the northern slope of the Arhanga Pass attacked convoys proceeding to camp in Maidan, and succeeded in capturing 60 transport animals, with 13 boxes of Lee-Metford ammunition, and a number of kits belonging to the 1st Battalion, Royal West Surrey Regiment, and the 15th Sikhs.

On November 3rd, the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier-General Kempster reconnoitred up to Tseri Kandao, whence the upper part of the Waran Valley was seen and sketched. The troops were followed up by the enemy with a loss of five native soldiers wounded.

The following day, I issued a proclamation to the several clans of the Afridis and Orakzais, directing them to select and send in representatives to hear the conditions under which their submission would be accepted by the Government of India. These conditions were not specified in writing, as I was advised that any written document would have to be explained to the tribesmen by their Mullahs, who are almost the only educated men in the country, and that the latter would be certain to misrepresent the terms which it had been decided to enforce.

On November 8th, a piquet of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Gurkhas, guarding the southern slopes of the Arhanga Pass, surprised an ambush of the enemy lying in wait to attack convoys near the village of Unai, and inflicted heavy loss on them.

On November 9th, I made a reconnaissance in force to the crest of the Saran Sar, 5 miles east of camp. The force, under the command of Brigadier-General Westmacott, consisted of—

No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 5 Bombay Mountain Battery.

1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment.

1st Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment.

15th Sikhs.

36th Sikhs.

No. 4 Company, Madras Sappers and Miners.

During the advance but few of the enemy showed themselves, but in the retirement, which began at 2 P.M., the Northamptonshire Regiment forming the rear-guard was closely pressed. Its movement from the crest into the valley, which was much delayed by the steepness of the descent and by the number of wounded men who had to be carried by their comrades, was covered by the guns, the flanks being held by the two Sikh regiments. Eventually a portion of the Northamptonshire Regiment became entangled in a deep ravine, where they were fired into at close quarters by the tribesmen. The 36th Sikhs were sent back to extricate them, but evening was coming on, and before assistance could be rendered a party consisting of an officer and 12 men was cut off and shot down. Had the battalion kept to the high ground, where its flanks were protected by the two Sikh regiments, its loss would probably have been small; but unfortunately a route was chosen which offered every tactical advantage to the enemy, the result being that some of our troops became isolated, and were then attacked by overwhelming numbers. Our casualties were 2 British officers and 17 British soldiers killed;