

The King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 4th Sikhs, No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners, No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, two squadrons of the Guides, to which were added from Khar the 11th Bengal Lancers and the 15th Sikhs, and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. The 4th Sikhs and No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, fired at the enemy on the hills; the King's Own Scottish Borderers (four companies) and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery attacked Ramorah fort. Under cover of the fire of the 4th Sikhs and No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, the whole of the cavalry and the 15th Sikhs crossed by a ford about 800 yards from the hills. Directly the cavalry crossed the main ford, the river here consisting of five branches, the enemy began to stream up the plain towards Uch, thus getting a long start of the cavalry, who pursued them as far as the Katgala pass, nine miles, cutting up about 100 of them, the majority falling to the 11th Bengal Lancers. Two companies of infantry advanced to Uch, five miles, in support of the cavalry, the 15th Sikhs occupied Chakdarrah, the 4th Sikhs Saidabad, and three companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and a section of sappers, crossing by a breast-high ford, Ramorah fort, which proved too strongly built to be destroyed by the explosives at hand. In the evening the two companies returned from Uch, the cavalry, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, and a section of Sappers returned to camp at Aladand, the 15th Sikhs and the 4th Sikhs remaining in their position across the river.

The enemy's loss by rifle and shell fire could not be estimated. Our casualties consisted of one man killed, two men drowned crossing the ford, and ten men wounded, and three horses killed and eight wounded.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.  
GENERAL ORDER.

*Simla, the 10th May, 1895.*

FIELD OPERATIONS.—CHITRAL.

No. 476.—THE Right Honourable the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the following communication from the Adjutant-General in India, submitting a Despatch from Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B., commanding the Chitral Relief Forces, regarding the encounters with the enemy which took place near Sado on the 13th and 14th April, 1895.

No. 494-G, "Field Operations," dated Simla, the 24th April, 1895. From Major-General G. deC. Morton, C.B., Adjutant-General in India, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Submitted for the information of the Government of India.

No. 150-A, dated Camp Ghobani, the 18th April, 1895. From Major-General Sir R. C. Low, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force, to the Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief a condensed report of the action near Sado on the 13th and 14th April, 1895.

1. On the previous evening the Guides Infantry Battalion had been sent across the Panjkora River on a slight raft bridge, with orders to construct a defensive post on the right bank and protect themselves for the night, and to burn the next morning certain villages on the right bank a mile or two lower down from which firing at our troops and transport had taken place. It was intended to support this battalion early the follow-

ing day with other troops, but during the night the raft piers were so damaged by logs carried down by the current, that the bridge became useless, and had to be broken up. The Guides Infantry had started up the hill at daylight, and could not be stopped in time.

2. Shortly before noon on the 13th instant, a report was sent in by the Officer commanding the Guides Infantry that two large columns of the enemy were coming down the Ushiri Valley towards him. I at once ordered out the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, with No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, and the four Maxim guns with the brigade. The Guides Infantry were seen to be occupying a very high ridge on the southern side of the Ushiri Valley, and distant about 2,000 yards from the left bank of the Panjkora River. From this point they were retiring very slowly in a north-westerly direction, coming down a spur towards the junction of the two rivers. The batteries opened fire as soon as the enemy advancing from the west showed over the ridge.

3. The Guides Infantry continued to retire slowly down the spurs, and as soon as the enemy had come sufficiently far down the eastern slopes of the hill, our infantry opened fire at ranges from 800 to 1,200 yards from the left bank to cover the retirement. Orders were signalled to the Officer commanding the Guides Infantry to move across the open valley and the Ushiri stream to his post of the previous night, which, being only 100 yards from the left bank, could be well protected by our fire. This he proceeded to do, but was a good deal harassed during the movement by the appearance of the second column of the enemy; which now showed on the north-side of the Ushiri Valley, and moving parallel to the Guides attempted to get round to some spurs commanding the post, to the east of the village of Khazana. I regret very deeply to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Battyc, commanding the Guides Infantry, was killed by a gunshot wound during this movement. The retirement of the Guides was most steadily carried out, and moving the guns and infantry gradually round the bend of the river on high ground commanding the far bank I was able to keep the enemy at a distance.

4. It was nearly dark by the time the Guides Infantry reached their post. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery and some infantry were left on the left bank, and ammunition and supplies as well as two Maxim guns under Captain Peebles, Devonshire Regiment, and one company of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on mussuck rafts to reinforce the Guides. Firing, however, continued till nearly 11 p.m., and commenced again at daylight the next morning (14th), when Captain Peebles was mortally wounded, and I regret to say, died on the following morning (15th).

5. The enemy withdrew entirely up the valley soon after daybreak on the 14th. I estimate their strength at about 2,000 men in each of the two columns, and their casualties were no doubt numerous, but being unable to pursue, I am without definite information on this point.

6. The enemy are reported to have been a mixed gathering of Salarzais, Mamunds, subjects of the Amir from Asmar and Kunar (of these we know 18 were killed), and Utman Khels of Amrang, who were far the boldest in coming on.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT.  
GENERAL ORDER.

*Simla, the 10th May, 1895.*

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