

The enemy were vain enough to think that, although their attacking powers had been crushed, they still might oppose us in fortified positions. The simultaneously successful attacks on the 22nd February upon their entrenched and stockaded positions at Kyaingkwintaung and near Ôkkan must undoubtedly have convinced them even of this folly, for after that date they never again really stood against us, and after the turning movement on their final position on the Mankin pass between Wuntho and Pinlebu on the 25th February, and the subsequent shelling of the stockaded village of Mankin on the same day, all armed resistance in Southern Wuntho ceased.

7. In the engagements on the 22nd I regret to say our losses were heavy.

#### AT ÔKKAN.

Captain Hutchinson, Commanding the Ye-u Battalion, Military Police, mortally wounded.

1 sepoy killed, 2 sepoy's dangerously wounded, 3 sepoy's severely wounded, 2 sepoy's slightly wounded.

Whilst Captain Pond, who successfully concluded the fight after Captain Hutchinson was wounded, narrowly escaped a similar fate by receiving a bullet through his helmet.

#### AT KYAINGKWINTAUNG.

Devon Regiment.

3 privates killed, 1 private dangerously wounded, 6 privates severely wounded.

Second-Lieutenant H. C. Holman slightly wounded.

Sergeant-Major Birch slightly wounded, 1 private slightly wounded.

Commissariat Department.

Sergeant A. G. Seward severely wounded.

Shwebo Battalion, Military Police.

3 sepoy's severely wounded.

20th Madras Infantry.

1 sepoy severely wounded.

Enemy's losses.

At Kyaingkwintaung 53 dead bodies were counted, and at Ôkkan the enemy lost 27 killed. Number of wounded in both actions unknown.

Our losses on the 25th were nil.

8. Thus, within ten days of the first outbreak of hostilities at Kawlin, the first object of the expedition had been successfully accomplished in Southern Wuntho before even the expeditionary force had been regularly organized. This unique feature of the expedition—namely, the suddenness with which it had to take the field—rendered it necessary for me to remain in Mandalay until the 24th February to make all those preliminary arrangements which should ordinarily be made before any concentration of troops for field service is effected. Luckily the General Officer Commanding in Burma was in Mandalay at the time, and, thanks to his advice and help, and the liberal manner in which he supported all my demands, I was enabled to facilitate the equipment and organization of the force. It was decided that for the troops operating in Southern Wuntho, Tigyaing, a military post on the right bank of the Irrawaddy, 180 miles from Mandalay and 41 from Kawlin, should become the base; whilst Katha, a military police station some 40 miles higher up, on the same bank of the Irrawaddy, was chosen as the base for the Northern Column.

9. At this time the Mogaung Column was working altogether independently, and operating beyond the sphere of Wuntho territory; so it had not to be taken in consideration.

10. Meanwhile the Northern Column was be-

ing concentrated at Katha, and pushed on as rapidly as possible to Mawteik, where Colonel Macgregor assumed command on the 26th February.

11. The delay in the concentration of this column was owing to the increased distance of its base, Katha, from Mandalay, whence the greater portion of its troops had to be drawn. On the 27th February the advance guard of this column was opposed soon after leaving Mawteik on the road to Banmaux, but easily overcame the resistance after interchanging a few shots. Further on fire was again opened on it from the stockaded village of Banmaux, which it was found necessary to shell, and, on flanking parties being sent out, the enemy retired, and the column occupied it without any casualties on our side. On the morning of the 28th Lieutenant Caulfeild advanced on Kyank-tonlon, where the Wuntho Sawbwa's father, Maung Shwe Tha, was reported to be holding a strong position. It was successfully carried by flank attacks, with a loss on our side of only one Karen slightly wounded, whilst on the enemy's side nine dead bodies were found and 25 wounded were reported. In this engagement the old ex-Sawbwa narrowly escaped capture, and it was the last occasion on which any opposition was offered to our troops throughout the expedition.

12. I assumed the personal control of the operations at Wuntho on the night of the 26th February, and proceeded next day with Major Smyth's column towards Pinlebu.

13. My first care on arriving in the country was to circulate freely throughout the country the proclamation in Burmese which had only just been got ready in time to be taken with me on leaving Mandalay on the 24th, and to encourage the people to return to their villages and bring their arms into Wuntho. This I found they had already begun to do on my arrival there.

14. On my arrival at the deserted village of Pinka next afternoon, I found a letter in the village from the young Sawbwa, asking me not to proceed further, and offering to pay any reasonable fine I might think fit to impose for the damage already done by his people; also informing me that he had forbidden his people to offer any further resistance to our troops.

15. To this I sent on at once a reply to the effect that, until he surrendered to me in person, I was precluded from making any terms with him beyond offering him his life and protection to his family and private property. His object in addressing me in these terms may have been, as he stated in his letter, to give him time to induce his father to surrender or to gain time to further strengthen his and his father's powers of resistance. But as I was impressed with the conviction that he had tried to dissuade his father in the first instance from hostilities, and had himself only taken up arms against us because of his having failed to influence his father, my duty seemed clearly to accept the latter interpretation of his letter.

16. Whatever his real object was, the fact remains that he bolted from Pinlebu on the morning of the 27th, which was occupied the same afternoon by Captain Hodges and Captain Pond with their military police. From information subsequently received, it appears that he was actually reading a letter from Mr. Fowle, who, previous to my arrival in Wuntho, had written to him in the same terms as I did on the 27th, when he received information of the