

conduct of the operations, which, though short, were perhaps, from the rapidity with which the troops took the field, and from the fact that the operations commenced at a very late season, of even a more trying nature than is usual in Burma.

3. General Wolseley's forces were successful throughout, except in the capture of the Sawbwa, who fled precipitately on the approach of our troops; and his advance on the jade-mines, as having opened out a hitherto unknown country and anticipating an expedition which would have been forced upon us at a very early date, has been of very great advantage.

4. I cordially endorse General Wolseley's opinion of the conduct of the troops under his command, and I cannot too strongly bring to favourable notice the admirable conduct of the military police—the Inspector-General, Brigadier-General Stedman, C.B., and subsequently Major Peile, having done their utmost to cooperate with the military authorities.

5. I fully concur in the recommendation of the officers named by General Wolseley, and I would specially mention for services worthy of recognition Captain H. D'U. Keary, Commandant, Shwebo Police, and Second-Lieutenant H. C. Holman, of the Devonshire Regiment.

6. In conclusion, I cannot say how fully I appreciate the assistance and advice rendered by Mr. G. D. Burgess, C.S.I., Commissioner, Northern Division, who, from his knowledge of the circumstances which necessitated the expedition, his appreciation of the situation at the earliest date, and his control of the political operations, helped so much to bring the expedition to a satisfactory and speedy conclusion.

Dated Rangoon, 6th June, 1891.

From Brigadier-General G. B. Wolseley, C.B., Commanding Wuntho Expedition, to the Adjutant-General, Madras Army (through the General Officer, Commanding the Burma District).

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report upon the operations of the Northern, Southern, and Mogaung columns of the Wuntho expedition.

2. The objects of the expedition, as defined for my guidance, was briefly:

Firstly. To suppress a sudden outburst of rebellion which had broken out almost simultaneously in the extreme northern and southern limits of the hitherto independent State of Wuntho.

Secondly. To depose and, if possible, capture the Sawbwa and his father; failing which, to drive them and all their adherents out of the country.

Thirdly. To annex, disarm, and permanently secure the future peaceful administration of the country.

3. To enable me to carry out these objects, the following troops were placed at my disposal:

Northern Column.		Rifles.
Two guns, No. 6 (Bombay) Mountain Battery.		
1st Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	100	
10th Regiment (1st Burma Battalion) Madras Infantry	200	
Karen Police Battalion	100	
Total	400	

Southern Column.		Rifles.
Two guns, No. 2 Mountain Battery		
2nd Battalion, Devonshire Regiment	100	
1st Battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	150	
2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire Light Infantry	200	
11th Madras Infantry	100	
20th Madras Infantry	650	
Total	1,200	

In addition to these regular troops, the Katha Battalion of Military Police and portions of the Ye-u, Shwebo, and Môn-ywa Battalions of Military Police, as well as all military and civil police holding posts in or bordering on the Wuntho State, were placed under my orders.

4. The first pressing necessity was the immediate despatch of troops to Kawlin, which was reported to be in a state of siege, surrounded by hundreds of temporarily emboldened rebels who had burnt Kawlin and other Government police posts and numerous bordering villages.

5. The first intelligence of this alarming state of affairs reached Mandalay on the 15th February, and within three days of that date Lieutenant Nesbitt, with 100 rifles of the 20th Madras Infantry, arrived in Kawlin from Ti-gyaing, followed on the 19th of the same month by Captain Keary with a detachment of the Shwebo Battalion of Military Police, and on the 21st by 105 rifles of the Devonshire Regiment under Captain Davies, 100 rifles of the 20th Madras Infantry under Lieutenant Sandford, 25 mounted infantry of the 20th Madras Infantry under Lieutenant Hodding, and 50 mounted infantry of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry under Captain Custance, and finally, on the 23rd, by Major Smyth, Royal Artillery, with a section of his battery, 50 rifles of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry under Captain Eveleigh, and 50 mounted infantry of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry under Lieutenant the Honourable W. J. H. de Montmorency. Meanwhile Captain Hutchinson with 130 rifles of the Ye-u Battalion, and Captain Hodges with 134 rifles of the Môn-ywa Battalion, were marching on Kawlin, and reached Okkan on the 22nd and 23rd February respectively.

6. The arrival at Kawlin of Captain Keary with his detachment on the afternoon of the 19th February may be regarded as the critical turning point of this southern outburst, as the enemy was actually at the time of his arrival engaged in attacking Kawlin on three sides; and Captain Keary's gallant charge on their centre was a brilliant feature in the campaign, which, followed as it was by a dismounted party of his men, under Subadar Prakasa Rai, attacking and capturing a strongly stockaded position in which the enemy, dispersed by the charge, had sought refuge, and killing every man inside it, completely changed the whole aspect of affairs.

In this engagement our losses were—

Shwebo Battalion, Military Police.

1 sepoy killed, 4 sepoys severely wounded, 1 sepoy slightly wounded.

Katha Battalion, Military Police.

1 sepoy mortally wounded.

20th Madras Infantry.

1 sepoy mortally wounded, 1 sepoy severely wounded.

On the enemy's side 18 dead bodies were found on the ground, but 30 were reported to have been killed.