

Surgeon W. H. Briggs.  
 Surgeon J. Magill.  
 Surgeon W. B. Allin.  
 Surgeon H. L. Donovan, M.D.  
 Staff-Sergeant Arbeiter.

Ordnance Store Department.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Pease, Assistant Commissary-General of Ordnance.  
 Major E. G. Skinner, Assistant Commissary-General of Ordnance.  
 Captain F. G. Wintle, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General of Ordnance.  
 Captain F. E. Mulcahy, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General of Ordnance.  
 Quartermaster C. L. Sheppard.  
 Conductor P. Mullen.

Pay Department.

Colonel W. R. Olivey, C.B.  
 Major R. G. Craig.  
 Major T. W. Drage.  
 Major F. N. Woodall.  
 Major G. T. C. St. J. Kneller.  
 Major A. P. G. Dowdall.

Veterinary Department.

Inspecting Veterinary-Surgeon W. B. Walters.  
 Veterinary-Surgeon First Class W. Burt.  
 Veterinary-Surgeon First Class C. Phillips.  
 Veterinary-Surgeon First Class A. Queripel.

From General Lord Wolseley to the Secretary of State for War.

MY LORD, *Cairo, June 16, 1885.*

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's consideration the accompanying Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir G. Graham, in which he describes the operations near Suakin that were carried out this spring under his immediate orders.

I have, &c.,  
 WOLSELEY, General.

The Right Hon.  
 The Marquis of Hartington, M.P.

From Lieutenant-General Sir G. Graham to General Lord Wolseley.

MY LORD, *Alexandria, May 30, 1885.*

HER Majesty's Government having decided to withdraw the greater portion of the Suakin Field Force from the Eastern Soudan, I have the honour to submit my final report on the operations of the campaign which has now been brought to a close.

2. I was appointed on the 20th February to the command of the troops to be collected at Suakin, and my instructions of the same date, from the Secretary of State for War, directed me to organize a field force, and to make such transport arrangements as were possible, so as to secure the first and most pressing object of the campaign—viz., the destruction of the power of Osman Digna.

3. I was directed to arrange next for the military occupation of the Hadendowa territory lying near to the Suakin-Berber route, so as to enable the contractors to proceed with the railway which it was proposed to construct from Suakin to Berber. In the Secretary of State's letter of the 27th February, 1885, my attention was again drawn to the necessity for rapidly constructing this railway. The direction of the works was to be entirely under my orders; their details and execution being in the hands of the contractors.

4. It will thus be seen that there were two distinct phases of the campaign contemplated,

after organizing the force and its transport, viz. :—

1st. The destruction of the power of Osman Digna, and the clearance of the country for the construction of the railway.

2nd. The construction of the railway, and the location of the troops for its protection, at points where the summer heats could be best endured.

5. In the first days of March, the troops began to arrive in quick succession, and on the 12th of that month, when I landed at Suakin, a force of 10,482 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men had been collected.

The work of disembarkation of men, animals, supplies, and stores, the formation of camps, the completion of the defences, the arrangements for the water supply, the general organization of the force in every branch and department was heavy and unceasing. A week before the above date there were only two or three officers of the Commissariat and Transport Staff, very little transport, but an accumulation of supplies. Officers and men soon, however, began to arrive from home, also camels from Egypt, Berbera, and Aden. The Government of India furnished large numbers of camels with drivers, organized in divisions, under transport officers, and thoroughly equipped. The organization and allotment of 10,000 animals and 7,000 transport men, collected from various source, and of the supply establishments for a large force, was necessarily a work of magnitude; but, by the 18th March, both supply and transport arrangements were fairly efficient.

6. From the sea-coast of Suakin a sandy plain rises gently in a westerly direction to an elevation of a few hundred feet above the sea-level in a distance of 10 to 12 miles, when it meets the foot of the mountains which bound it on the west. These mountains are of volcanic or metamorphic formation, and in many of the passes there stand up huge water-worn boulders of granite. In the immediate vicinity of Suakin, towards the north and west, the country is fairly open for a mile or two, but beyond this radius, and south-west towards Tamai, the bush is thick.

The scrub is chiefly composed of the prickly mimosa bush, growing sometimes to a height of six or eight feet, and of a growth of small shrubs in belts, following the shallow beds of the numerous watercourses or "khors," which carry off (in a north-easterly direction) the water flowing to the sea from the mountains during the periodical summer and autumnal rains.

The slope of the plain being so very gradual, these watercourses or khors are rarely deep or abrupt, except at special points—as, for example, the "Khor Ghob" near which Tamanieb and Tamai are situated. This great khor is 50 yards to 200 yards wide at the bottom, and from 20 feet to 60 feet below the general surface of the ground.

7. To appreciate properly the operations and the work of the troops in this campaign, it is necessary to bear in mind not only the nature of the country, but also the style of warfare practised by the enemy, which consists in long-range firing from cover, combined with desperate hand-to-hand assaults from the bush, through, and under which, they can steal unobserved.

8. The main difficulty in this campaign has been want of water. Here and there a well of brackish water might be found, and with labour the supply could be developed. But such an operation requires time, and for a force moving quickly it would be impracticable. Thus it became a principle that water to drink must be carried for the men, and this entailed the employ-