

8th August—19th Bom. N. I. 522 Lance-Naik Narayan Sing, slight.  
 8th August—19th Bom. N. I. 646—18th N. I. Private Babajee Shellar, mortal (since dead).  
 8th August—19th Bom. N. I. 1115 Private Baldeo Ram, severe.  
 12th August—19th Bombay N.I. 2130—17th N. I. Private Baluac Dharamnac, mortal (since dead).  
 12th August—19th Bom. N. I. 1054 Private Runchor Kolee (2nd), severe.  
 12th August—19th Bom. N. I. 1102 Private Sewratan Ahir, severe.  
 12th August—19th Bom. N. I. Private Nehal Shah,\* severe.  
 12th August—19th Bom. N. I. Private Sháhábúdí,† dangerous.  
 13th August—19th Bom. N. I. 19 Kahar Mahdoo Essoo, severe.  
 31st July—28th Bom. N. I. 704 Private Bhisra Rawool, slight.  
 31st July—28th Bom. N. I. 684 Private Tookaram Bhingaray, severe.  
 12th August—30th Bom. N. I. 2005 Private Jamanally Shah, slight.  
 12th August—30th Bom. N. I. Private Shah Ballum, severe.  
 15th August—30 Bom. N. I. 873 Private Jooma Khan, slight.  
 27th July—30th Bom. N. I. Dhobi Nur Sing, severe.  
 10th August—Transport Dept. 346 Surwan Mehurdeen Boota, mortal (since dead).

Roll of Men who have died of disease since the 28th July, 1880, at Kandahar.

E-B. Royal Horse Artillery—Shoeing-smith J. Wright, 8th August. Diarrhoea.  
 E-B. Royal Horse Artillery—Gunner R. Saunders, 23rd August. Remittent fever.  
 C-2nd Royal Artillery—Gunner Peter Tunney, 14th August. Pneumonia.  
 No. 2 Co. Sappers and Miners—Private Poorun Ahir, 1st August. Fever.  
 No. 2 Co. Sappers and Miners—Private Rookmaje, 27th August. Fever.  
 3rd Queen's Own Light Cavalry—Sowar Tookaram Gamblay, 25th August. Diarrhoea.  
 Poona Horse—Sowar Chundun Sing, 28th August. Diarrhoea.  
 3rd Sind Horse—Sowar Baz Khan, 24th August. Dysentery.  
 3rd Sind Horse—Sowar Chandan Sing, 17th August. Pneumonia.  
 Her Majesty's 59th Regiment—Private Patrick Waters, 11th August. Pneumonia.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Corporal James Ewin, 11th August. Dysentery.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Private Jesse Holmes, 11th August. Diarrhoea.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Private Edward Dalton, 16th August. Pneumonia.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Private Joseph Cunningham, 21st August. Pneumonia.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Private Alfred Orris, 24th August. Scurvy.  
 Her Majesty's 66th Regiment—Private George Bartlett, 29th August. Pneumonia.  
 1st Grenadiers, Native Infantry—Fifer Sucnac Yesnac, 9th August. Chronic bronchitis.  
 19th Regiment Native Infantry—Private Ram Sing, 29th July. Ague.  
 19th Regiment Native Infantry—Private Soondur Sing Dogra, 30th July. Scurvy.

\* This man belongs to the 19th Punjab Native Infantry, and was temporarily attached to the Bombay Regiment.

† This man belongs to the 25th Punjab Native Infantry, and was temporarily attached to the Bombay Regiment.

28th Regiment Native Infantry—Private Kondajee Sablay, 31st July. Retention of urine.  
 28th Regiment Native Infantry—Private Narrain Andarsay, 29th August. Remittent fever.  
 30th Regiment Native Infantry—Private Jowahir Sing, 26th August. Pneumonia.

J. M. PRIMROSE, Lieut.-General,  
 Commanding 1st Division Southern  
 Afghanistan Field Force.

Kandahar, 16th September, 1880.

From Lieutenant-General J. M. Primrose, C.S.I.,  
 Commanding the Kandahar Force, to the  
 Adjutant-General in India.—(No. 2, dated  
 Kandahar, 26th August 1880).

I HAVE the honor to report that the enemy, having clearly shown his intention of making a complete and careful investment of Kandahar, by occupying and fortifying the adjacent villages, which are all enclosed by high mud walls, under cover of which batteries could easily have been constructed and unmasked, when required, at the shortest notice, without any one being either aware of the number of guns or their distribution to villages, and in the absence of reliable information regarding the dispositions of the enemy, whose movements were all carried out at night, it became absolutely necessary to make a sortie to cause the enemy to show his hand.

2. Before resorting to this measure, I on two occasions carefully searched the villages to the south and east of the city by artillery and mortar fire, but without any apparent result, a few villagers only quitting the villages after the fire had ceased.

3. I, therefore, on the 15th August, determined to bombard one village heavily, and then to put some infantry through it.

4. The village I selected was that of Deh Khojah, situated to the east of the city, exactly opposite the Bar Durani and Kabul Gates, and running almost parallel to the city wall, distant from the former gate 600 yards, and from the latter 950 yards.

5. In making the selection the following points influenced me:—

I.—The village was isolated from the main body of the enemy's regular troops, who were encamped beyond Abasabad, some four miles to the west of the city, with Kandahar between them and Deh Khojah, and therefore out of supporting distance.

II.—The only supports available for the village would have to come from the south and pass over ground on which my cavalry could act with effect.

III.—The village lies on the regular road from Mandi Hissar to Kandahar, and I was most desirous to clear and keep this road open for the advance of General Phayre, as the Kushab road was studded with villages, which, if held in succession by the enemy, could only have been forced at immense cost.

IV.—Artillery had been fired from this village completely screened, and I was very anxious to ascertain what number of guns the enemy had in position there, where they were in battery, and what was the calibre of the guns. This information was most necessary, as all reports from Maiwand agreed that Ayub Khan had with him thirty guns, including two batteries of 12-pounder Armstrongs. Up to date he had only unmasked two Armstrong guns, and it was therefore a matter of vital importance to prevent his establishing an overpowering artillery fire within one thousand yards of the walls.

V.—I wished to confine the enemy's artillery to