

officers and men effective; 45 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 10 horses.

66th Regiment — 12 officers; 241 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 70 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 7 horses.

1st Native Infantry — 6 officers; 273 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 72 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 7 horses.

4th Native Infantry — 7 officers; 533 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 21 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 8 horses.

19th Native Infantry — 6 officers; 586 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 27 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 6 horses.

28th Native Infantry — 7 officers; 671 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 36 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 7 horses.

30th Native Infantry — 5 officers; 319 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 77 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 6 horses.

Total — 97 officers; 4,533 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 438 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 1,244 horses; 12 guns; 2 8-inch mortars; 373 bullocks.

The baggage animals consisted of 1,021 camels, 135 bullocks, 602 ponies, and 68 mules.

24. The length of walls to be manned was 6,165 yards, not including the interior defences of the citadel.

25. The final distribution of artillery on the walls was as follows:—

9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, C-2nd—N.-E. Bastion; 9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, C-2nd, R.A.—Durani Gate; officer in charge, Lieut. Gardiner, R.A.; 9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, C-2nd, R.A.—Kabul Gate; officer commanding force, Major P. H. Greig.

40-Pr. B. L. R. gun, 5-11th—S.-E. Bastion; officer in charge, Lieut. W. A. Plant, R.A.; 6-Pr. S. B. gun—Shikarpore Gate; 40-Pr. B. L. R. gun, 5-11th—S.-W. Bastion; officer in charge, Lieut. A. Bell-Irving, R.A.; 9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, E-B, R.H.A.—S.-W. Bastion; officer in charge, Lieut. A. Bell-Irving, R.A.; officer commanding force, Captain G. M. B. Hornsby.

9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, E-B, R.H.A.—Herat Gate; officer in charge, Lieut. G. S. Jones, R.A.; 9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, C-2nd, R.A.—Tôp-khana Gate; officer in charge, Lieut. G. B. Smith, R.A.; 40-Pr. B. L. R. gun, 5-11th—N.-W. Bastion; officer in charge, Lieut. T.F.T. Fowle, R.A.; 9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, E-B, R.H.A.—N.-W. Bastion; officer in charge, Lieut. T. F. T. Fowle, R.A.; officer commanding force, Capt. J. R. Slade.

9-Pr. M. L. R. gun, E-B, R.H.A.—Eedgah Gate.

40-Pr. B. L. R. gun, 5-11th, R.A.—S.-W. Bastion of Citadel.

26. The skeleton map of Kandahar attached shows disposition and distribution of troops, &c.

27. The question of posts along the line had also received my careful consideration, and I had resolved in any case of emergency to bring the Mandi Hissar detachment into Kandahar, and to order those of Abdul Rahma, Mel-Karez, Dabrai and Gatai to fall back on Chaman, where, with the men already in garrison at that place, they would form a strong post (strength as per margin)*

capable of holding their own against any force likely to be brought against them before help could arrive from Quetta.

28. Chaman (a strategic point of the greatest value) would thus form an important connecting link between Quetta and Kandahar, and become an intermediate base for the concentration of troops marching in relief.

29. Under ordinary circumstances, the above posts, which had been strengthened, could easily have withstood any sudden attack made by the villagers around, but it was hopeless to suppose they could hold out against artillery fire and a regularly organized system of attack.

30. Communication would have been cut off between them, and they must have fallen one after another.

31. I therefore telegraphed to Abdul Rahman, ordering the garrison to retire at once on Chaman, picking up the other garrisons as they fell back, and I am firmly of opinion that it was solely in consequence of the promptness of their withdrawal that they were enabled to reach Chaman without serious loss. The Mandi Hissar post arrived here on the afternoon of the 28th.

32. On the movement of troops to co-operate with the army of Sher Ali on the Helmand, I had directed the Commissariat Department to lay in at once a full month's supply of bhûsa and grain for all the animals of the force, but such was the scarcity of carriage, that on the 28th of July only a thirteen days' supply was in hand.

33. Daily search, however, was made in the city, and by reducing the bhûsa ration, I found I had enough to last for more than a month.

34. All other food-supplies were plentiful, both for men and animals.

35. The wells in the city had been previously inspected and reported upon, and though all reports agreed that there was a well in nearly every house, they mostly stated that they would run dry if heavily drawn upon.

This latter statement, I am happy to say, has proved unfounded, and there is still an abundant supply of water within the city walls.

36. An increased provost establishment was organised for the purpose of putting a stop to looting and keeping order in the town, and I am happy to say that, considering the number of followers and the great temptations to which they were exposed, the complaints that reached me under this head were almost *nil*, and in nearly every case the culprit was caught and severely punished.

37. Regiments, corps and departments had various wells in the city allotted to their use, and a constant supply of water was always kept on the city walls.

38. Medical arrangements as under, in case of an attack, were made by Deputy Surgeon-General J. O'Nial:—

“Surgeon-Major J. F. Keith, M.D., will have charge of Eedgah Gate and the North Front.

“Surgeon A. H. C. Dane will have charge of Tôp-khana Gate and North-west Bastion. He will communicate by his right with

“Surgeon-Major Keith, and by his left with

“Surgeon-Major B. T. Giraud, M.D., who will have charge of the Herat Gate and South-west Bastion, communicating by his left with

“Surgeon-Major J. Arnott, M.D., who will have charge of the Shikarpore Gate and South Front, communicating by his left with

“Surgeon E. W. Kellsall, who will have charge of the Kabul Gate and South-east Bastion. He will communicate by his left with

“Surgeon K. R. Kirtikar, who will have charge of the Durani Gate and North-east Bastion, and

* No. 2 Mountain Battery; Poona Horse, 106 sabres; 19th Native Infantry, 195 men; Head-quarters and 4 cos., 27th Native Infantry; Sappers and Miners, 26 men.