

morning of the 28th July, at about 1 a.m., I received intelligence of the action near Maiwand.

2. In consultation with Brigadier-General Brooke, I decided on moving into the citadel during the day, and at once ordered the heavy battery, sick, and baggage to be taken there, directing Brigadier-General Brooke to proceed along the Kokeran road with a small force of all arms, in the direction of Sinjuri, with a view of helping in the men and followers of Brigadier-General Burrows' column and protecting them from the villagers, who were then firing on them, and holding the cantonments in the meantime with the 4th Native Infantry and a portion of the 28th Native Infantry, with two guns of C-2nd Royal Artillery.

3. I myself proceeded to the city, and ordered all the gates to be seized and strongly held.

4. It was utterly impossible for me to remain in the cantonments, which are quite indefensible (except with a very large force), and from which the water-supply could be diverted at any moment, and in fact had already been cut off for some days.

5. My ordnance and commissariat stores were in the citadel, and I therefore decided on taking possession of the whole town.

6. It thus became of paramount importance to occupy the city with the least possible delay, as it had become evident that the whole of the Pathan population in and around Kandahar were inimical to us, and were only waiting for any success of Ayub Khan's to rise.

7. This conviction had forced itself upon me as events developed themselves at Girishk, and clearly seeing that the Wali had neither influence nor power in the country, I made up my mind to seize and occupy Kandahar.

8. Could I have expected the slightest assistance from the representative of the Wali, I would have held on to the cantonments,—at all events for some time; but there was no disguising the fact that a settled Government had ceased to exist, and that unless the most stringent measures were at once taken, the city would be in a state of anarchy.

9. Having seen to the immediate security of the place I returned to cantonments, as heavy firing was reported in the direction of Sinjuri. This turned out to be Brigadier-General Brooke's force engaging the villagers, who fired upon him directly he quitted the lines.

10. On my re-entering the city, I met the Wali, who requested a confidential interview with me.

11. I at once accorded it (Colonel St. John had not then arrived) and he strongly advised my retiring from Kandahar, unless my force was very strong, as the country was in a blaze, Ayub Khan's army was very large, and his guns overpowering.

12. I informed him that my force was not large, but that I had not the slightest intention of leaving Kandahar, as, in the first place, it was my duty to remain, and, secondly, the true interests of my country were now centered in the city.

13. He then most strongly urged upon me the necessity of turning the Pathans and other disaffected people out of the city, and as I fully agreed with him on this point, I told him I would see that it was done.

14. Shortly before dusk on the evening of the 28th, Brigadier-General Brooke having returned and reported he could see no signs of any more men coming in, I withdrew all my force from the cantonments, and told them off to the city walls as below:—

15. To the Shikarpore Gate Front—400 men,

under the command of Brigadier-General Brooke, with Major R. J. Le P. Trench, 19th Native Infantry, commanding the gate.

Length of this front, 1,300 yards.

16. To the Herat Gate Front—500 men, under the command of Brigadier-General Burrows, with Colonel S. De B. Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, commanding the Herat Gate, and Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith, 1st Native Infantry, the Töp-khana Gate.

Length of this front, 1,987 yards.

17. To the Eedgah Gate Front—400 men, at first under my own personal command, with Lieutenant-Colonel T. R. Nimmo, 28th Native Infantry, to command the gate; but, later on, Brigadier-General Burrows was transferred to the charge of this front, and Colonel Edwardes, 2nd Native Infantry, posted to the Herat front.

Length of this front, 1,178 yards.

18. To the Kabul Gate Front—500 men, under Brigadier-General Nuttall, with Colonel W. Bannerman, 4th Native Infantry, in command of the Kabul Gate, and Colonel W. G. Mainwaring, 30th Native Infantry, in command of the Bah Durani Gate.

Length of this front, 1,700 yards.

19. Colonel C. T. Heathcote, 19th Native Infantry had the command and supervision of the Töp-khana square.

20. A reserve of 200 men were located in the in the Char-sú, for distribution to posts as required, under the command of the field officer of the day, and a second reserve of 100 men in the Töp-khana square, to replace men drawn from the first reserve.

21. A body of marksmen were told off to the bastions and other good positions for long-range shooting, and, under the command of Major F. G. F. Moore (Paymaster), 7th Fusiliers, did excellent service during the siege.

22. The remainder of the men available for duty were held in reserve in the citadel.

23. The total strength of my garrison was as under, including the Head Quarters of the 28th Native Infantry, which marched in on the morning of the 28th, and those troops who came in from Maiwand, as to the numbers of which I could obtain no reliable information until late in the afternoon of the 28th.

E-B, Royal Horse Artillery—4 officers; 115 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 19 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 123 horses; 4 guns.

C-2nd Royal Artillery—5 officers; 101 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 14 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 81 horses; 4 guns.

5-11th Royal Artillery—4 officers; 90 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 1 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 12 horses; 4 guns; 2 8-inch mortars; 373 bullocks.

Poona Horse—5 officers; 213 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 11 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 226 horses.

3rd Sind Horse—5 officers; 358 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 9 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 396 horses.

3rd Light Cavalry—6 officers; 354 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 29 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 355 horses.

No. 2 Company, Sappers and Miners—1 officer; 59 non-commissioned officers and men effective; 7 non-commissioned officers and men sick; 7 horses.

7th Fusiliers—24 officers; 620 non-commissioned