

cable to some parts of Albania; but the Russian Commissioner, for the reasons stated by him at the time, was unable to accept this scheme without instructions. The other Commissioners adopted it, and recommended it to the Porte, adding that they would wish that in introducing the new Provincial Statute into other parts of Albania regard should equally be had to the immunities of the mountain districts beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Scutari; and especially to the immunities of the Chimara. The Commissioners also saw no objection to the Albanian districts being united in a single vilayet.

In supporting these proposals Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, with the concurrence of all the other Commissioners, stated that the Commission ought not to separate without having given this tangible proof to the Albanians that the Powers were concerned for their welfare.

It would be very desirable that some opportunity should be taken to make the Albanians acquainted with the interest that has thus been taken by the Powers in the improvement of their local administration, and in securing to them their ancient privileges and immunities. One advantage of the Dulcigno arrangement is, that it avoids interfering with the organisation of the mountain clans, and as the free navigation of the Boyana is already secured to Montenegro by Treaty, it practically affects the Albanians as little as possible.

The note of the 22nd September has completely changed the situation so far as the acquiescence of the Albanians is concerned. It has been apparent throughout all these transactions that the Turkish authorities, while professing to be unable to overcome the resistance of the Albanians, have been stimulating it, and making use of the loyalty of the Albanians to the Sultan as a means of delaying the settlement, not only of this frontier question, but of the other questions pending with the Porte which the Sultan and his advisers are doing their utmost to evade. If the Albanians knew what was really taking place they would probably realize this for themselves, now that the Porte has declared that it makes the settlement of the Montenegrin frontier depend, not upon Albanian interests, but upon an assurance from the Powers that they will abandon any future naval demonstration upon any question whatever.

The consequence of this note has been that Riza Pasha has refused to surrender Dulcigno, and that he has warned the Prince of Montenegro that any advance on his part will be considered as an act of hostility, and that force will be repulsed by force; whereupon the Prince has requested the Powers to inform him if in this conflict he may count upon political and military support more efficacious than that of a naval demonstration in its present limits.

The Ambassadors have replied on the 26th September, in a collective note, to the conditions required by the Porte in the note of the 22nd, that the first condition cannot be accepted, as no Power can consent to alienate or limit its inherent sovereign right to make use of its forces whenever it thinks necessary, and that all the Cabinets reserve to themselves in that respect entire liberty of appreciation and action; that the Powers accept the second condition, which has already been anticipated by the XXVIIth and XXXth Articles of the Treaty of Berlin, and are ready to formulate and complete the guarantees by a special declaration, and that the Powers must maintain the frontier-line indicated in the collective note of the 15th September, though they willingly agree, when the Porte has accepted and executed the conditions therein

mentioned, not to demand any other territorial concession in favour of Montenegro.

The note further states that the Powers protest unanimously against the resistance of the Porte to their legitimate demands, and that the Turkish Government must bear all the responsibility for the consequences which may ensue.

This note has been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, as well as the *Pro-memorandum* which your Excellency has informed me was this day delivered to the Porte, and in which the Ambassadors state that they have taken note of the verbal declaration made by the Sultan through Artin Effendi announcing the resolution of His Majesty to settle the question definitively by the 3rd October, and express the firm confidence that this settlement will include the immediate surrender of Dulcigno, and the dispatch of instructions accordingly to Riza Pasha.

Her Majesty's Government cannot believe that the Sultan can seriously intend to refuse to settle the Montenegrin frontier; and they consider that the gravity of the situation arises, not so much from the immediate difficulty respecting the surrender of Dulcigno, as from the determination shown by the Sultan and his Ministers throughout all these negotiations to avoid, by procrastination, the execution of the engagements of the Porte under the Treaty of Berlin.

The Treaty Powers have done all they could to facilitate the settlement of this frontier question. After the Treaty of Berlin the Prince of Montenegro had consented to evacuate Dulcigno without waiting for the complete execution of the Treaty by the surrender of Guşinjé and Plava. When the Porte declared itself unable to carry out this surrender; the Powers consented to the substitution of the agreement signed between the Porte and the Montenegrin Chargé d'Affaires on the 12th April, and when the Turkish authorities failed to execute this in good faith; and the Porte again declared that it encountered great difficulties in carrying it out, the Powers proposed an arrangement, the execution of which could be attended with no difficulties. When the Porte represented that the cession of Dinosi would prevent the arrangement from being acquiesced in by the Albanians, the Powers again modified their proposals; and agreed to the district around Dinosi being retained by Turkey.

All these concessions have hitherto been unavailing; and now the Porte withdraws from its assent to the surrender of Dulcigno unless the Powers will agree to conditions which it was obvious that the Powers could not accept.

The settlement of this frontier is of the utmost importance to the Porte, as, until it has been accomplished, there can be no prospect of this part of European Turkey being reduced to order; and, as your Excellency has on several occasions pointed out, the condition of the Vilayet of Prizrend is a standing danger to Turkey, since the assassination and oppression of the Christians and of all who show any resistance to the exactions of the armed gangs who infest the country in the name of the Albanian League may at any time provoke an insurrection or an appeal to foreign intervention.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 3.

Earl Granville to Mr. Goschen.

SIR,
Foreign Office, October 9, 1880.
AS I observe that statements have been made that the allied fleet in supporting the Prince of Montenegro in obtaining possession of Dulcigno would have bombarded the town, Her Majesty's