

throughout the long and trying retreat, of forty miles, he worked with unflagging energy, encouraging his men and tending the wounded officers and men who crowded his guns.

31. I was indebted to Major E. P. Leach, V.C., R. E., for valuable assistance during the retreat.

32. The casualty returns have already been forwarded to you.

Memo. from Major F. J. S. Adam, Assistant Quarter-master-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows, Commanding the Girishk Column,—(No. 473-K., dated 22nd July, 1880).

The following telegram, received from the Quarter-master-General in India, is forwarded to Brigadier-General Burrows, Commanding the Girishk Column, for information and guidance. It is requested that a copy may be furnished to the Political Resident, Southern Afghanistan.

From Quarter-master-General, Simla, to General Primrose, Kandahar,—(dated Simla, 22nd July 1880).

Simla, 22nd.—My telegram of yesterday and yours of last night. You will understand that you have full liberty to attack Ayub if you consider you are strong enough to do so. Government consider it of the greatest political importance that his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means from passing on to Ghazni.

From Major F. J. S. Adam, Assistant Quarter-master-General, Kandahar Force, to Brigadier-General G. R. S. Burrows, Commanding the Girishk Column,—(No. 470-K., dated 22nd July, 1880).

I HAVE the honour, by direction of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, to forward you a copy of a cipher telegram received last night from the Commander-in-Chief in India:—

Telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, to General Primrose, Kandahar,—(dated Simla, 21st July, 1880).

“Simla, 21st July.—You have not answered Chief's question relative to suitability of Burrows' position for striking a blow at Ayub. It is of the utmost importance that Ayub should not be allowed to slip past Kandahar towards Ghazni without being attacked. As your reinforcements arrive, to what extent can you strengthen General Burrows? What are that officer's views and intentions; and what steps are taken by Intelligence Department to obtain information of Ayub's movements? The Argandab road should also be observed. You must keep Chief more fully and early informed of situation, as reports of Ayub's and Burrows' moves are received by Foreign long before yours.”

2. General Primrose desires you will at once report what plans you have resolved on in the event of Ayub's main body crossing the Helmand at Girishk, and what you would propose in the event of his moving north and covering himself in your direction with cavalry. He would also much like to know if you are solely dependent for information on what is supplied you by the Political Resident, and if any steps have been taken by you to send out spies in the direction of Girishk, Maiwand and south towards Killa-i-Biet and the desert.

3. General Primrose desires me also to thank you for the letter received last night relative to an attack which it was reported would be made on the camp by Ayub's cavalry, but as this may not have taken place, he would be obliged by

your furnishing, as soon as possible, the information called for by the Commander-in-Chief.

From Brigadier-General T. Nuttall, Commanding the Cavalry Brigade, to the Brigade-Major, 1st Brigade, Kandahar Field Force,—(dated Kandahar, 3rd August, 1880).

I HAVE the honour to report the operations of the Cavalry Brigade under my command in the action fought in the vicinity of Maiwand on the 27th July, 1880.

2. On the morning of that day, agreeably to orders, by 5.30 the camp was struck, baggage packed, and the brigade, strength as per margin, mounted at 6 o'clock and marched from Khushki-Nakhud on Maiwand about 6.30. My dispositions were as follows.* The advanced guard was composed of a troop under the command of Lieutenant T. P. Geoghegan, 3rd Light Cavalry; in rear of the advanced guard, at about half-a-mile interval, followed the remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry, with four guns of E.-B., R. H. A.; the rear guard was brought up by Colonel Malcolmson, C.B., which consisted of 96 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, which regiment also provided parties of a troop to the left flank under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, with another party of 50 sabres, under Lieutenant E. D. N. Smith, to the right, to protect the baggage, which marched on this flank.

3. About 10 a.m., the enemy's Cavalry were seen on our left front at some distance, crossing our front, and moving in the Maiwand direction, and on the nearer approach of our columns, the greater portion of them inclined in a northerly direction towards the Gúrmao Valley, their advanced parties standing fast to watch our movements.

A village stood on our left front, and Lieutenant Geoghegan, with two guns, E.-B., under Major Blackwood, were directed to clear it if occupied.

It being found unoccupied, Lieutenant Geoghegan was directed to stand fast in front of the village, and there await the arrival of the baggage, which was ordered to be collected there. In the meantime the two guns of E.-B., R. H. A., under Major Blackwood, moved on to the edge of a rather difficult broad nullah, that ran in front of the village. It was at this place that both Major Blackwood and myself halted to reconnoitre the enemy's position, when we noticed that Lieutenant Maclaine, who had been left with the other two guns, had crossed the nullah some little way to our left, and, having been joined by Lieutenant Monteith with a troop of the 3rd Sind Horse, was advancing rapidly towards the enemy.

Mounted orderlies were despatched to recall him, but before they reached he had halted and had come into action. On noting Lieutenant Maclaine's unauthorised movement, I at once, with Major Blackwood's two guns, crossed the nullah, and with the remainder of the 3rd Cavalry moved rapidly to the front. In the meantime, orders were sent to bring up the two guns of E.-B., R. H. A., then detached with the rear guard. After advancing some little distance, the enemy's position and forces were distinctly seen drawn up towards Gúrmao, covering some miles. Their cavalry, infantry, and the ghazis appeared in countless numbers, and Major Blackwood at once brought his guns into action. As I considered Lieutenant Maclaine's guns were still rather isolated, I sent orders for him to move down and take up another position nearer the main body.

* E.-B., R. H. A., 6 guns; 3rd Light Cavalry, 260 sabres; 3rd Sind Horse, 200 sabres.