

now submitted clear, it is necessary to annex the following copies of telegrams:—

I.—From the Quarter-master-General in India, to General Primrose, Kandahar;—(dated 9th July, 1880).

"Yours eighth. Under the circumstances, you can order up any troops from the line of communication you and General Phayre consider can be safely spared to reinforce Kandahar."

II.—From the Commander-in-Chief in India [Quartermaster-General] to General Primrose, Kandahar;—(dated 15th July, 1880).

"Wali's troops having deserted, the situation has completely changed. General Burrows must act according to his own judgment, reporting fully. He must act with caution on account of distance of support."

These telegrams refer to paragraphs 3 and 10 of General Primrose's despatch.

4. In paragraph 2 of Brigadier-General Burrows' report, a reference is made to certain instructions received, and copies of correspondence from the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kandahar Force, thereon, are attached.

The two telegrams there given only form a small portion of the correspondence between the Army Head-quarters and General Primrose, and it becomes, therefore, requisite to give copies of the telegrams which passed on the subject of Brigadier-General Burrows' movements, from the date of his return to Khush-i-Nakhud from the Helmand, up to the day of the action at Maiwand. These telegrams are annexed.

5. It should be stated that up to this time the intelligence regarding Ayub's strength is contained in the following copy of a telegram from General Primrose to the Quartermaster-General in India, dated Kandahar, 14th July, 1880:—

"Letter received this day from Colonel St. John; no date to it, but presumed 12th July. Ayub reached Farrah on 1st July, and his advanced cavalry left on 8th. He has 2,500 effective and 1,000 disaffected infantry, 800 regular cavalry, and 1,000 tribal cavalry, with 30 guns. Wali's troops shaky. One regiment all but openly mutinous; rest tainted. They have no ammunition, and St. John told Wali to take measures to put it out of reach. One other Sirdar deserted with his immediate followers, but failed to persuade others to follow him."

6. Brigadier-General Burrows has not informed us what military measures he took for ascertaining the strength and disposition of Ayub's army after it had crossed the Helmand, whilst it is evident that the information on which he broke up from Khush-i-Nakhud, and marched with the intention of anticipating Ayub at Maiwand, was either incorrect or reached him too late.

It appears to Sir Fred. Haines that had he been aware that Ayub could possibly have presented himself at Maiwand in such force as that ascribed to him, General Burrows would have considered himself hardly strong enough to attack him, but would rather have contented himself with retiring towards his base at Kandahar, keeping a close touch on the enemy with his cavalry, and would certainly have taken steps to rid himself of the enormous amount of stores and baggage with which he was encumbered on the day of the action.

It appears that the only reinforcement sent to him from Kandahar consisted of 50 sabres, 3rd Sind Horse, but it will be observed in paragraph 8. of his despatch that General Primrose had troops at Kandahar on the 23rd July from which to support him, and that he had arranged to do so; to the extent of 230 men of the 4th Native Infantry, but for some reason or other, not explained, this reinforcement was not sent.

7. Defective information was but a prelude to what followed. The apparently wholly unauthorised commencement of the action on the left by two guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant H. MacLaine, escorted by a troop of Sind Horse under Lieutenant A. M. Monteith, committed General Burrows to an action on ground not deliberately chosen by him, and with an enemy entirely unrecognised. This was highly prejudicial to his chance of success, for the position thus hurriedly taken up was in perfectly open ground, with both flanks *en l'air* in the face of vastly superior numbers.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief firmly believes that had the Native Infantry stood their ground and stemmed the rush of the ghazis, a victory might have been achieved; but when the line gave way from the left and the 66th Regiment was thus thrown into confusion, there was but one chance, and that was a cavalry charge. But the cavalry failed to charge, and a rout was inevitable.

8. There can be no doubt that General Burrows was vastly overmatched as to numbers, and that he had to fight a desperate battle under most unfortunate circumstances.

The unsteadiness of the two companies of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry (Jacob's Rifles) early in the day, must at once have destroyed all confidence in that corps, but it is evident that up to the moment of yielding on the left of the line, the conduct of the troops, with the above exception, had been excellent.

It is His Excellency's pleasing duty to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council the admirable behaviour of the officers and men of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, who fought most gallantly and suffered severely.

The guns which commenced the action were those apparently which were lost eventually. The gallant young officer who commanded them is not here to justify or explain his movement, for he met a tragic end at Mazra after a month's imprisonment in Ayub's camp, and this must be a lasting disgrace attaching to Ayub's name.

The detachment of the 66th under Lieutenant G. de la M. Faunce, which manned the smooth-bore battery, is also reported to have behaved extremely well; and an incident, not known to General Burrows when he wrote his dispatch, is worthy of record here, as a lasting tribute to the undaunted gallantry of the officers and men of the 66th Regiment from the mouth of the enemy.

General Roberts, under date 16th September, telegraphs as follows:—

"Colonel St. John reports from Kandahar as follows:—From the accounts of one of Ayub's officers present at the action of Maiwand, it appears that a stand was made by a remnant of the 66th Regiment round the colours, in an enclosure; informant estimated their number at 100, and states that they were surrounded by the whole army, and that when all but eleven were killed, these made a desperate charge, and perished fighting bravely to the last man."

This stubborn defence may have delayed the pursuit as well as checked the desire to pursue.

9. The artillery maintained their military formation and morale during the retreat.

But though the cavalry appear to have kept together, the General had lost all confidence in them, apparently with reason, and from this cause was unable to halt at Hauz-i-Madat.

Had this been done, no doubt many valuable lives and some stores and transport animals might have been saved, while some appearance of military formation might have been restored.

The retreat was thus continued without a