

10. I beg to append a Return of Casualties, which, I am glad to add, were not very serious, as owing to the darkness of the night, the enemy did not fire much or effectively.

11. In the morning, not more than eight or ten of the enemy were in sight, and my men having been forty-eight hours on picket, during which time they had worked all day and watched all night, were completely worn out; their muskets also were so foul that they could scarcely load. I therefore applied to Major Ross, commanding the advanced picket, for a relief, and at eight A.M. made over command of the post to the late Captain J. P. Davidson, who came with a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

(Signed) C. H. BROWNLOW, Major,
Commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

From Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wide, C.B., Commanding Right Defence,—(Dated Camp, Umheylya Pass, the 16th November, 1863.)

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the morning of the 13th November, I was on the standard hill of "Keyes' Right Picket" with Lieutenant Conolly of the Peshawur Mountain Train, who was preparing a platform for his guns on the side of the hill for the protection of "Keyes' Centre" and "Cliff" pickets. Constant firing was heard at the "Crag" picket, but it did not attract any particular notice, as heavy firing had been kept up there all night, and was continued at intervals after the relief of the picket. While at the platform I received a note from the late Captain Davidson, who was commanding the picket, to say that he had only 90 men with him, which he did not consider sufficient. I immediately sent him up a reinforcement of 30 rifles under a Native officer, all that could be spared, as a serious attack was expected on the "Centre" and "Cliff" pickets.

2. Shortly after this reinforcement reached the "Crag" picket, I observed, as I was descending the standard hill, the men of the "Crag" picket rushing down in confusion. I did not see the commencement of the retreat, as the position was not visible from the platform where I was at the time. I immediately proceeded to the breastwork across the road by which the main post is approached from the "Crag"; here I rallied all the men that I could together, and kept up a heavy fire, which was taken up by Captain Hughes' guns; this checked the advance of the enemy; but, as many wounded and others from the "Crag" rushed past the breastwork and could not be stopped, a panic was communicated to our camp-followers, who took to flight and increased the confusion. These men retreating had a visible effect upon all, and I felt the necessity of an advance to re-assure those that were wavering, and to further check the enemy until reinforcement should arrive. I therefore directed a few men to remain in the breast-work, and ordered the rest to "charge"—Lieutenants Pitcher and Young, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, headed this charge. A small detachment of the Guides that were in charge of the rear defence of our post was brought up by Lieutenant Forlong, of that corps, and gallantly proceeded to support Lieutenant Pitcher; they were too weak, however, to regain the "Crag," which with the greatest coolness and daring, they attempted to assault, but they had to fall back on the rocks. I got together a few more men whom I sent up to support them.

3. Major Ross, commanding the post, arrived at this time from the lower picket. I considered

my presence at the breastwork absolutely necessary to keep the men together; the duty therefore of leading the first charge devolved upon Lieutenant Pitcher, and I beg to bring to the special notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the admirable manner in which he performed this important duty; he was by many yards the foremost of his party, and the gallant bearing of this excellent young officer was the admiration of all spectators. It is impossible to say too much or to over-rate his services on this occasion. Lieutenant Pitcher was severely wounded, and was obliged to be carried back. I beg also to bring to the special notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Young—this officer ably assisted Lieutenant Pitcher throughout, and made himself most conspicuous for his coolness and gallantry, which was witnessed by all below, and elicited the special notice of Major Ross, Commanding.

4. The following men also distinguished themselves:—

Sepoy Syud Khan,	No. 4 Company.
" Gunda Sing,	No. 5 "
" Shurruff Khan,	No. 8 "
" Zurreef,	No. 1 "
" Futteh,	No. 1 "

A Casualty Return and Returns of arms and accoutrements lost on this occasion, is herewith enclosed.

From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Army Head-Quarters,—(No. 8, dated Camp, heights above the Umheylya Pass, the 21st November, 1863.)

IN continuation of my former reports, I have the honour to report for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that at daylight on the morning of the 18th instant, the whole of our pickets on the Gurroo Mountains, under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's command, consisting of the Huzara Mountain Train, and 3rd, 5th, and 6th Punjab Infantry, were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the Pass, which position alone the force has since occupied.

2. In anticipation of this change of position the Commissariat stores, reserve ammunition, &c., &c., had been gradually removed, on previous days, to the eastern ridge. The guns of Captain Griffin's Battery were removed from the advanced breast-work of camp late on the evening of the 17th, and placed in the new position, so as to cover the withdrawal of the pickets from the Gurroo. They were replaced temporarily by two guns of the Huzara Mountain Train from the Gurroo. Every precaution was at the same time taken to prevent the enemy from suspecting the intended movement, and the troops, both on the Gurroo, and in the front line of defence, continued, up to the last moment, to strengthen their breastworks and defences. These precautions were successful; and though the enemy's pickets on the Gurroo were not 400 yards above our own, the withdrawal was effected without their knowledge, and in the most perfect order.

3. The concentration of the whole of the troops on the eastern heights made it necessary to extend the position, and particularly to secure the full command of the water, on which the whole force was now dependent. With this view, the troops as per margin,* moved out under my personal com-

* Peshawur Mountain Train; Wing 101st Regiment; 1st and 6th Punjab Infantry.