



# SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette

Of FRIDAY, the 18th of MARCH.

Published by Authority.

SATURDAY, MARCH 19, 1864.

*India Office, March 12, 1864.*

THE following General Orders and Despatches regarding the late Military Operations on the North-Western Frontier of India, have been received at this office.

*Military Department.*

No. 76 of 1864.

**GENERAL ORDER BY HIS EXCELLENCY  
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA  
IN COUNCIL.**

*Fort William, January 29th, 1864.*

HIS Excellency the Governor-General in Council, in publishing the despatches received from his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, regarding the late operations against the enemy in the Mahabun Mountain and the Chumla Valley, embraces with pleasure the opportunity now afforded him of thanking the troops for their services.

The gallantry, fortitude, and endurance which have been displayed throughout the expedition, are worthy of the highest praise, and his Excellency will have much satisfaction in bringing them to the notice of Her Majesty's Government.

The Governor-General in Council cordially acknowledges the very distinguished services of Brigadier-General Sir N. B. Chamberlain, K.C.B., (whose wound and impaired state of health are much regretted by His Excellency) and of Major-General J. Garvock in successive command of the Eusufzye Field Force.

He also thanks the Political Officers, Major H. James, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawur, and Colonel Reynell Taylor, C.B., for their valuable services.

While the acknowledgments of the Governor-General in Council are due to the whole of the Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Soldiers, composing the late Eusufzye Field force, for the excellent spirit they displayed from first to last, he desires especially to commend those who have been prominently brought to notice in the several reports of engagements, and by his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, more particularly Colonel

Turner, C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., in command of brigades, the latter of whom served throughout the operations, and for a time commanded the whole force to the entire satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief.

The Governor-General in Council also desires especially to thank those Officers who held the command of corps or batteries, or who performed responsible staff duties, and earned the approbation of the Commanders of the force and of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

The successful exertions of the Commissariat Department under Captain Jenkins, and the services of Surgeons Simpson, Munro, and Buckle, and of the Medical Department generally, are much appreciated by the Governor-General in Council.

It will afford the Governor-General in Council the highest satisfaction to submit to Her Majesty's Government the names of such British Officers and Soldiers as may be recommended by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for distinction or reward. The rewards bestowed by the Major-General commanding the force on native officers and soldiers in anticipation of sanction, are confirmed by the Government of India.

The Governor-General in Council laments the severe loss sustained by the troops in their gallant encounters with a brave and determined foe, and joins with his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in admiration of the noble spirit of the officers named by his Excellency, who died at their posts under circumstances most honorable to their memory.

H. W. NORMAN, Colonel, Secretary to  
the Government of India.

*From Colonel D. M. Stewart, Deputy Adjutant-General, to Secretary to Government of India, Military Department,—(No. 69, A, dated Head Quarters, Camp Peshawur, 17th January, 1864).*

I HAVE the honour to enclose, for the information of his Excellency the Viceroy in Council, des-

patches from Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., late commanding the Eusufzye Field Force, and from Major-General Garvock, who succeeded to the command of the force when it was relinquished by Sir N. Chamberlain on account of his wound.

2. In order that the Government may correctly understand the operations which have been carried out under these General Officers, the Commander-in-Chief directs me to submit the following explanatory details.

3. Sir N. Chamberlain was prevented from descending with his force into the Chumla Valley, in furtherance of the objects of the expedition, by causes with which the Government are already acquainted.

4. The position finally occupied by the Brigadier-General in the Umbeyla Pass, six or seven miles from the plains of Eusufzye, was a strategical and very strong one. It cut in two the enemy's line of mountain defences, and forced him to attack from lower ground a naturally strong position, which entirely commanded his advance, and which General Chamberlain had rendered still stronger by entrenchments. To these advantages must be added open communications with the base in the plains of Eusufzye.

5. The position was, however, subject to the disadvantages arising from the very difficult nature of the country, abounding, as it does, with deep ravines, covered with boulders and large masses of rock, interspersed with trees and brushwood, all favoring the peculiar tactics of the enemy, in their vehement attacks on the entrenchments.

6. Up to the 20th November the enemy had made frequent attacks, all of which were successfully repelled by Sir N. Chamberlain, and very great credit is due to the Brigadier-General and his troops for the resolution with which they held their ground.

7. As frequently happens in mountain warfare, piquets were taken and re-taken, but success invariably remained with Brigadier-General Chamberlain and his gallant force.

8. His Excellency regrets to say that the casualties were numerous; they were, in a great measure, caused by the peculiarly difficult nature of the ground above described, which favoured the bold and unexpected attacks of the mountaineers, who were enabled to collect unseen, and to remain under cover, till prepared for their sudden rushes on the defences.

9. It would also appear that tribes fought under one of the most powerful of influences, the spirit of religious fanaticism, fanned and excited to the utmost by the Akhoond of Swat.

10. Although General Chamberlain, for the reasons stated by him, acted solely on the defensive, the determined resolution with which he held his position, and repulsed all the daring attacks of the enemy; the great losses sustained by them, including some of their best leaders, and most forward fighting men, losses not easily replaced amongst inorganised combatants; the exhaustion of their resources, and the continued march of strong British reinforcements of all arms towards the scene of operations, doubtless induced the tribes to desist from their attacks between the 20th November and the 15th December, during which time there was nothing but an occasional interchange of shots between the outposts.

11. The enemy acknowledge up to the 20th November the loss of a thousand killed; but there can be little doubt that it exceeded this number, a conclusion which is justified by the number of dead actually left in front of the position, and the fact that in the obstinacy of their attacks they often remained exposed to the close and cross fire of artillery.

12. These losses produced much discouragement amongst the confederate tribes, and created a desire amongst many of them to enter into negotiations for peace with the British Commissioner, Major James.

13. These negotiations were carried on for some time, but the result proved that, although the tribes may have been willing to withdraw from the contest, they were not, with the exception, as it would appear, of the Bonairs, the most powerful of all the tribes, inclined to do so on the British terms.

14. On the 29th November, Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, with the sanction of Government, relinquished into the hands of Major-General Garvock the command of the Eusufzye Field Force, and on the 8th December the Commander-in-Chief had the honour to report to the Government of India, from Lahore, that the negotiations of the Commissioner with the tribes had failed.

15. General Garvock, with laudable promptitude, after having been reinforced by the 1st Battalion 7th Fusiliers, 93rd Highlanders, 23rd Punjab Pioneers, and the 3rd Sikh Infantry, took measures for acting on the offensive, but on the 10th the Chiefs of the Bonair tribe made their appearance in the British camp and sued for peace. The negotiations were again fruitless, but the Bonairwals, on account of the causes already stated, seceded, it is believed, with a few exceptions, from the hostile tribes, who had meanwhile received considerable reinforcements from Dhér and Bajour.

16. On the 15th December General Garvock, as stated in his report, assumed the offensive, and with great vigour successfully attacked the enemy at Lalloo, about two miles and a half from the right flank of his position. This important success was gained at a trifling loss to the British force.

17. Whilst General Garvock was attacking the enemy at Lalloo, the position at the Umbeyla Pass was assailed by a portion of the tribes, who were, however, repulsed with loss by Majors Keyes and Brownlow, commanding, respectively, the 1st Panjab Infantry and the 20th Native Infantry, two officers of whose admirable conduct throughout the operations it is impossible to speak in too high terms.

18. Umbeyla was taken without opposition and burnt on the following day; but in a subsequent successful affair under Brigadier Turner, it will be seen one British officer was killed and four wounded.

19. Sir H. Rose directs me to bring to the special notice of the Government of India Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., and Major General Garvock, who have, respectively, commanded the Eusufzye Field Force, and to recommend that they may receive a suitable reward for the very important services which they have rendered to the State.

20. His Excellency likewise desires me to bring under the notice of Government, the very good service performed by Brigadiers Turner and Wilde, commanding, respectively, the 1st and 2nd Brigades. The latter officer served throughout the whole of the operations, and, after General Chamberlain was wounded, temporarily exercised the command of the force, during which time he earned the Commander-in-Chief's especial approbation.

21. The Commander-in-Chief entirely concurs in the encomiums bestowed by Generals Chamberlain and Garvock, on the officers and men of the Field Force at large, for the excellent spirit they displayed from first to last.

22. The duties devolving on the piquets were often prolonged and hard, but the troops, British as well as Native, performed them with a cheerful-

ness and good feeling, characteristic of their high discipline.

23. It is due to military merit and devotion of the highest order, and it may be some consolation to the relatives of the officers in question, that his Excellency should record how nobly three officers of the greatest promise, died in action. Lieutenant Richmond, of the 20th Native Infantry, when about to be relieved at the expiration of his tour of duty, prevailed on his commanding officer, because it was a post of danger, to allow him to remain for four successive days, in charge of the "Eagle's Nest" piquet, where he was killed by a bullet through his head.

Lieutenant Chapman, of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, although knowing that he was dying of a mortal wound, bound up the wounds of a brother officer, and sent an important message to the position.

Lieutenant Davidson, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, rather than retire from his post, died, fighting to the last against overwhelming numbers, with a heroism that elicited the admiration of one of the principal Chiefs of the Bonair tribe.

24. As regards the officers named for the Victoria Cross, the usual recommendations will be submitted hereafter.

25. So important is the question of supplies in all military operations, that the Commander-in-Chief would not do justice to the most efficient manner in which they were managed in the Eusufzye Field Force, were his Excellency not to bring to the notice of the Government, the excellent services of the Assistant Commissary-General, Captain Jenkins. Notwithstanding the difficulties of feeding so large a force in a mountainous country, beyond the limits of our own territory, not only was no complaint ever preferred, but the General Officers in command, and Commanding Officers of regiments report that the rations were remarkably good, and that their issue was liberal and uninterrupted throughout.

26. Surgeon W. Simpson, M.B., 71st Highland Light Infantry, and Surgeon W. Munro, M.D., 93rd Highlanders, on different occasions Senior Medical Officers with the British portion of the force; Surgeon Buckle, the Senior Medical Officer with the native troops, and the medical officers of the force generally, performed their duty ably and successfully, under difficult circumstances.

27. Before concluding this letter, it is due to the native troops employed, particularly to the regiments organised since 1857, that the Commander-in-Chief should submit to the Government of India a practical proof of their discipline and fidelity. Every effort was made by the Akhoond of Swat and the hostile tribes, to seduce to their cause, their co-religionists in the native regiments opposed to them, but with the exception of one young Bonair recruit, their sense of duty and discipline kept them true.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General,—(No. 1, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 21st October, 1863.)*

IN continuation of my letter of the 19th instant, reporting that the force would move from camp at Nowakilla the same evening, I have now the honour to submit for his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's information, an account of the proceedings of the force up to this date.

2. I must first inform his Excellency that, on the same day (18th October) that the other troops

moved up from their camps in the rear to Nowakilla, the troops, as per margin,\* marked to the mouth of the Durrun Pass. This is the Pass by which the force under Major-General Sir S. Cotton, K.C.B., entered the hills in 1858; and by moving the above troops to the mouth of this Pass, the impression was of course conveyed that the force was about to enter the hills by the same route as before.

3. On the afternoon of the 19th orders were sent to the troops mentioned in the last paragraph to march after dark to Perrouli, and there to form a junction with the troops as per margin,† which would leave the camp at Nowakilla at nine p.m. The united detachments were then to proceed under command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Wilde, C.B., to Goorkhawa, and thence penetrate into Chumla by the Umbeyla Pass.

The annexed report from Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., will inform the Commander-in-Chief of the proceedings of this advanced column and of its success in reaching the crest of the Umbeyla Pass on the afternoon of the 20th. I trust that his Excellency will concur with me in considering that the duty was satisfactorily performed, and that credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde and to the officers and troops employed under his orders.

4. I should here mention that, on the afternoon of the 19th, when it would be too late for the Chumla or other tribes to make any preparations on a large scale for impeding the march of the troops through the Umbeyla Pass, a proclamation was forwarded by the Commissioner to the Chumla and Bonair tribes, stating the object with which the force was about to enter the Chumla Valley, and assuring them that it was with no intention of injuring them or of interfering with their independence, but solely because it was the most convenient route by which to reach the Hindoostanee fanatics and to effect their expulsion from the Mahabun.

5. The main column, composed of the troops as per margin,‡ marched from Nowakilla at one a.m. on the 20th October, and reached Roostum at seven a.m. The road was a mere village track, and as any attempt to improve it earlier would have revealed our intended route, it had only received such improvement as a company of Sappers could hastily give it, late on the afternoon of the 19th, when concealment was no longer necessary or practicable; the civil authorities aided in removing obstructions by employing large parties of villagers, who worked at the road by torch-light, and a line of fires marked the route by which the troops were advancing.

6. The main column rested for a short time at Roostum for the troops to refresh and breakfast, and I took the opportunity of selecting the best available position for the dépôt of sick and weakly men, &c., to be left at that place. At about nine a.m. the troops were again in motion. As far as the village of Soorkhawa, the track was tolerably good, and lay through small open valleys; but at a little distance beyond Soorkhawa the real Pass commences. As a road for troops it certainly presents great difficulties. The track lies up the bed of a stream encumbered with boulders and large masses of rock, and is overgrown with low trees and jungle. The hills on either side rise to some

\* Peshawur Mountain Train; Huzara Mountain Train; 1st Punjab Infantry; 5th Goorkha Regiment.

† 100 Sabres, Guide Cavalry; 100 Sabres, 11th Bengal Cavalry; Guide Infantry; 5th Punjab Infantry; 20th (Punjab) Native Infantry.

‡ 4 C. battery, 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery; Company of Sappers; 71st Highland Light Infantry (550); 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers (500); 32nd Bengal Native Infantry; 3rd Punjab Infantry; 6th Punjab Infantry.

height, but for the most part with a gradual slope, so that infantry can ascend them without difficulty, except for the obstacle presented by thick thorny jungle. The guns were drawn by horses as far as possible, and then transferred to elephants. The progress of the force was of course extremely slow, as in most parts it was only practicable to move in single file, and the British troops were much fatigued; but the plentiful stream of water which flows through the Pass prevented their suffering from thirst, and late in the afternoon the rear of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column was reached. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column had not been strong enough to post flanking parties at more than a few of the most important points in the Pass. Detachments were therefore posted from the main column wherever it seemed necessary, and the entire 5th Goorkha Regiment was left about three-quarters of a mile from the crest of the Pass, in a commanding situation, where it served as a support to the small flanking parties, and also protected the baggage. The 32nd Native Infantry formed the rear-guard, but did not get beyond Soorkhowa on the night of the 20th.

7. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde had encamped the advanced column on and beyond the crest of the Pass on tolerably open and level ground, which afforded sufficient room for the main column also to bivouac as it came up; but it was ten P.M. before the guns reached camp. I had sent on the whole of the cavalry with the advanced column, under the representation that the Pass was much easier and shorter than it proved to be, in view to pushing them forward supported by some infantry and mountain train guns, and reconnoitring the road down the Pass and the head of the Chumla Valley. But when I found what difficulties the Pass presented even to the march of the troops, and how long it would necessarily be before the whole of the baggage could come up, I thought it prudent to make no further movement in advance. The ammunition mules of the infantry had been able with difficulty to keep up with the rear of their respective regiments, but with this exception not a single baggage animal reached the camp during the night of the 20th.

8. One of the Mullicks of Umbeyla had been made prisoner whilst opposing the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's column. From him it was ascertained that the slight opposition made in the Pass was made by the people of his own village, (situated at the mouth of the Pass in the Chumla Valley, and, therefore, belonging geographically to Chumla, but paying tribute to one of the Bonair tribes), and by a few of the Chumla villagers. This Mullick was sent to his people by the Commissioner, together with a wounded man, and they were allowed to take away the body of one man who had been killed. He was charged with a verbal message corresponding with the terms of the proclamation, and informing the Chumla people that if they would bring supplies they would be liberally paid for them. It was hoped that this message, and the proclamation together, would satisfy the Bonair and Chumla people as to our intentions regarding them and their country, and prevent their taking part against us.

9. I will now endeavour to make his Excellency acquainted with the nature of the position which the force occupies. On the left it is inclosed by the Gurroo Mountain, which divides the Umbeyla Pass from Bonair. This mountain, which is estimated roughly to be 6,000 feet high, rises in a succession of ridges; steep but not precipitous, the general direction of which is parallel to the Pass; occasional plateaux and knolls are found on its sides, which afford convenient and safe situations for our piquets, and above 1,000 feet above

the camp is a very remarkable heap of enormous granite rocks, which forms a conspicuous object from the entrance, and throughout the Pass, and marks the part at which the crest or watershed is reached, which separates Eusufzye from Chumla. The sides of the Gurroo Mountain are clothed with fir trees of large growth, interspersed on the lower slopes with the wild fig and the date tree, a remarkable mixture of the vegetation of a cold and of a tropical climate. To the front of the camp the Pass widens as it descends, and opens out into little plateaux, which, at last, meets the plain of Chumla. The latter is distant about three miles from the camp; and has the appearance of being well cultivated, with a stream flowing through the middle of it, the head of which gives water to our camp. A range of hills much lower than the Gurroo is on the right of camp, and is crowned by our piquets. To the rear of camp, but far below, is seen the plain of Eusufzye.

10. The further proceedings of the force will be duly reported for his Excellency's information.

P.S.—I am compelled to ask that you will forward a copy of this report to Colonel Norman, C.B., Secretary to Government, Military Department, as I have no means of having a second copy made, there being no clerks in camp.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Corps of Guides, to Major T. Wright, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, Peshawur Division,—(No. 1, dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, the 20th October, 1863).*

AS directed in Eusufzye Field Force Orders, I have the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding, that I marched from Nowakilla, at nine o'clock, p.m., on the 19th October, 1863. The troops under the command of Major C. P. Keyes, which were encamped at the entrance of the Durran Pass, met my column at the village of Perrouli during the night, and the two detachments having joined, moved on together towards the Umbeyla Pass in one column, consisting of the batteries and regiments named in the margin.\*

2. At sunrise on the morning of the 20th October, 1863, the Umbeyla Pass was entered, and the column halted for an hour inside it to rest the men who had been marching across country during the whole night. About nine o'clock A.M. the column having been organized for service, and the baggage directed to remain at the entrance of the Pass, under an escort of the 11th Bengal Cavalry, I advanced the troops; the Infantry of the Corps of Guides and the 1st Punjab Infantry leading, supported, respectively, by the 20th Punjab Infantry and the 5th Punjab Infantry. The 5th Goorkha Battalion remained as an escort to the two Mountain Train Batteries.

3. About one-third of the Pass had been traversed when I received information that my advance would not be unopposed. Reports differed as to the numbers of the enemy, and the thickly wooded nature of the country rendered it difficult to ascertain what points of the hills were occupied.

4. At twelve o'clock the enemy commenced firing from the rocks in the vicinity of the road, but were gradually dislodged by the advance guard of the column; in this manner two-thirds of the Pass was gained when the end of the Pass called the "Umbeyla Kundao" appeared in sight. The hills

\* Peshawur Mountain Train; Huzara Mountain Train; Infantry Corps of Guides; 1st Punjab Infantry; 5th Punjab Infantry; 20th Punjab Infantry; 5th Goorkha Battalion; 100 Sabres Cavalry Corps of Guides; 100 Sabres 11th Bengal Cavalry.

on both sides high, covered with low brushwood and jutting rocks, but perfectly practicable to good light troops. On many of the most prominent rocks small parties of the enemy showed themselves and occasionally fired.

5. I directed the Infantry of the Corps of Guides to take the crest of the hills to the right, and the 1st Punjab Infantry to move up the valley slowly, and left it to Major Keyes to act as his judgment dictated. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, with his regiment, protected the flank of the column, which some parties of the enemy threatened. By two o'clock P.M. the top of the Pass, the water-shed of the valleys of Suddum and Chumla, was secured.

6. The Corps of Guides had ascended the heights on the right, driving small detached parties of the enemy before them. The 1st Punjab Infantry had with their skirmishers mounted the lower spurs of the hills on both sides of the Pass, and Major Keyes, with his reserve, continued to press the enemy in front along the valley, until they disappeared over the ridge. The opposition offered to our troops was nowhere determined, and a single shell fired by Captain DeBude, Commanding the Huzara Mountain Train, hastened the retreat of the enemy.

7. I estimate the numbers of the enemy in the field at from 200 to 250 men, and their loss amounted to 2 killed and 3 wounded, besides one captured. On the side of the troops there was no casualty.

8. Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant F. H. Jenkins, 2nd in Command, the Corps of Guides, led the regiments on whom the work fell, and both these officers displayed both skill and knowledge of hill warfare in the management of their Corps.

9. Colonel R. Taylor, C.B., the Commissioner of Peshawur, accompanied the column, and assisted me materially throughout by his advice, and I beg to acknowledge the value of his experience.

10. Considering that the Pass was gained without loss, and its occupation secures the entrance into the Chumla Valley, I feel sure the Brigadier General will be satisfied with the conduct of the troops on this occasion.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters, (No. 2, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 23rd October, 1863.)*

In continuation of my letter No. 1 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report as follows for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. Up to the evening of the 21st instant, the date of my last letter, but a small portion of the baggage had reached the camp, partly in consequence of the difficulties of the road, and partly from the inferior nature of much of the carriage and incompetence of the drivers. But on the morning of the 22nd, the rear-guard being then at no great distance from the camp, I considered that the preliminary steps might be taken for moving the Force forward.

3. Accordingly, in the forenoon of the 22nd, a detachment of Sappers (details of the 4th and 5th Companies) was set to work to improve the descent of the Pass. The Sappers were supported by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry under Major Brownlow, and as soon as the road was reported tolerably good were followed by the Cavalry\* under Lieu-

tenant Colonel Probyn, C.B., V.C. The Sappers were then sent back to camp, and the Cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre, supported by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, which occupied the gorge of the Pass, the reconnaissance being conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, C.B., Royal Engineers.

4. The information received was to the effect that a considerable body of the Bonair Tribe were occupying the Pass which leads from Chumla into Bonair from near Umbeyla, but that their intentions towards us were peaceable. The Commissioner had communicated with them, and they had avowed their intention of nearly acting on the defensive, and of opposing us only in the event of our attempting to enter the Bonair country.

5. Being of course most desirous to give the Bonair people no cause of offence, or even of suspicion, I had desired Colonel Taylor to act with the greatest circumspection. I was aware that from the foot of the Pass the reconnoitring party would have the choice of two roads through the Chumla Valley. The first, which was said to be the better of the two Passes, by the village of Umbeyla, and keeps the north side of the Chumla Valley under the hills which divide Chumla from Bonair. The second is by Kagah, and along the south side of the Valley. Knowing that Umbeyla was regarded by the Bonair people as one of their own villages, though actually in Chumla, I gave Colonel Taylor orders to avoid that road and to proceed by the Kagah route, thus guarding in every possible way against giving offence to the Bonair people, and endeavouring to prove to them that we desired to hold entirely aloof from them and their country.

6. The information we possessed of the assembly of the Bonair people in their Pass, was confirmed by the observation of the reconnoitring party, as will be seen by Colonel Taylor's report, which I have the honour to enclose. No obstruction was offered by them to the reconnoitring party in its advance down the Valley, and they contented themselves with peaceably watching its movements from the hills. But it was otherwise as the party returned. A body of the Bonair people descended from their Pass and attempted to cut off the retirement of the Cavalry, opening fire upon them. In pure self-defence the Cavalry were compelled to charge and open the road, which they did, killing some six of the enemy, with a loss to themselves of two men wounded and two horses missing. The attempt upon the Cavalry was followed by an attack upon the Infantry, which it had been necessary to call up in support, and Major Brownlow had to fight his way up the Pass into camp. Major Brownlow's conduct on this occasion and his management of his Regiment was most praiseworthy; for, from the nature of the ground, the operation was at any time a difficult one, and rendered more so by the approach of night, and the determined bearing of many of the enemy, the most forward of whom endeavoured to close with the skirmishers sword in hand. The regiment behaved with great steadiness, and Lieutenant Richmond, doing duty Officer, who with a party held one of the spurs which commanded the mouth of the Pass, exhibited great gallantry. Lieutenant Brown, Royal Engineers, who had directed the work of the Sapper Detachment, and on its return to camp had joined the 20th (Punjab) Native Infantry, also distinguished himself, and was slightly wounded.

7. The attack upon the reconnoitring party was followed by a general attack upon the piquets in the front and on the flanks of camp, which continued at intervals until midnight. The enemy, as I must now call them, were repulsed with but trifling loss to ourselves, but I regret to

\* 100 Sabres Guide Cavalry. 100 ditto 11th Bengal Cavalry.

say that Lieutenant Gillies, Royal Artillery, of the Huzara Mountain Battery, was killed in the attack. The nature of the ground, which is very broken and covered with brushwood, enabled the enemy to carry off most of their dead during the hours of darkness, but eight of their bodies were taken up in the morning, and the spies report that some fifty were killed in the attack, amongst them some people of influence.

8. The Bonair people having thus taken a decidedly hostile part against us, is extremely serious, and has altered our whole position; and probably our plan of operations. That their conduct has been prompted by the Hindoostanee fanatics at Sitana, &c., there can be no doubt. Some papers have been intercepted, which show that ever since it became known that the present expedition was being organized against them, the Hindoostanees have been endeavouring to obtain the assistance of the people of Bonair by alarming them as to our intentions of annexing their country. The hostility of Bonair must now be considered as a fact, and our course of action guided accordingly. Its probable effect upon the security of our communications has first to be considered and guarded against.

In this view I have ordered up the Wing of the 14th Native Infantry from Nowakilla to Roostum, and applied for another Native Infantry Regiment to be sent from Peshawur. I have requested the Commissioner to arrange for the occupation of the lower portion of the Pass with his Foot Levies, and it is probable that I shall have to ask for more Native Infantry before the communication with the rear can be considered

secure, even so long as the force occupies its present position on the crest of the Umbeyla Pass.

9. His Excellency is in possession of my original plan of operations, namely, to use the Chumla Valley as the route for reaching the Hindoostanee settlements on the Mahabun. But with a powerful and warlike tribe like the people of Bonair in declared hostility on the left flank of our proposed line of march, and in a position to which they can always return, even though once dislodged and beaten, it may now be impossible to persevere in this plan of operations. Besides, our latest information is to the effect that the Bonair people have summoned the Hindoostanees to their aid, and that a portion of them at least have obeyed the summons. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the original object in view can now be obtained by the force penetrating to the Mahabun, and whether the Hindoostanee fanatics will not be either encountered in our present position, fighting with the people of Bonair, or have to be sought elsewhere than on the spurs of the Mahabun.

10. A deputation, consisting of almost all the influential men of the Judoon tribe, came into camp to the Commissioner this morning, and many of the Chumla Mullucks are also in camp.

11. Both the British and Native Troops have had to undergo considerable discomfort from the baggage having been delayed, but the plentiful supply of firewood has fortunately enabled us to keep up large watchfires, and the troops generally are healthy, except those who have brought the Peshawur fever with them.

12. Enclosed is a Casualty Return up to date.

#### EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the above Force, on the 22nd October, 1863.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, October 23, 1863.*

Regiments.	Killed.		Wounded.				Horses.	Mules.	
	European Officers.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Huzara Mountain Train Battery	1	...	...	1	...	2	...	1	1
Guide Cavalry ... ..	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...
11th Bengal Cavalry ... ..	...	...	1	...	...	...	3	...	...
1st Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...
3rd " " " " " "	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...
20th Native Infantry ... ..	...	2	...	2	...	9	...	...	...
32nd Native Infantry ... ..	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...
Total ... ..	1	2	1	3	1	18	3	1	1

Examined  
(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Signed)

N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General.  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, Royal Engineers, to Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General. Dated Camp, top of Umbeyla Pass, the 23rd October, 1863.*

FOR the Brigadier-General's information, I have the honour to report the details of the reconnaissance of the 22nd instant.

2. Agreeably to instructions received, I proceeded on the morning of the 22nd, with two companies of Sappers and a detachment of the 32nd Pioneers, to improve the road from camp to the Chumla Valley.\*

3. We found the Pass to be about two miles in length, and unoccupied by any enemy. The road was fair.

4. Shortly after one p.m., I was joined at the mouth of the Pass by a detachment of Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, C.B., V.C., and the 20th Punjab Infantry under Major Brownlow. The Sappers and Miners returned towards camp to repair the road. Major Brownlow occupied the foot of the Pass, and I proceeded with the Cavalry down the Chumla Valley in the direction of Kagah.†

5. As we passed the Kotul leading into Bonair on our left, and about 2½ miles distant, we observed that it was occupied in force by the Bonairwals, but from all we could learn, none had descended into the Valley.

6. Arrived at Kagah (4 miles from camp). The reports that the Valley was quite unoccupied were confirmed, and I considered it desirable to take advantage of such a favourable state of affairs to push down the Valley as far as was compatible with the General's order to be in camp by sunset.

7. Leading the main body of the cavalry at Kagah, I proceeded with a small escort to Koonia (7 miles beyond Kagah), and reached Kagah again about half-past four, P.M.

\* Sappers and Miners, 50 rank and file under Lieutenant Tucker. Detachment of 32nd, 124 rank and file, under Lieutenant Drake.

† Guide Cavalry, 100 sabres. 11th Bengal Cavalry, 100 sabres. 20th Punjab Infantry, 260 rank and file.

8. On arriving at the foot of our Pass we found that the Bonairwals had, and were still descending in considerable numbers with the view of preventing our return. They attempted to gain possession of a patch of very broken ground at the extreme end of the Valley through which our road lay. It was necessary to prevent them and to check them until Major Brownlow could come up in support: with this view the Cavalry charged in the most spirited way, and our object was attained. Major Brownlow occupied the broken ground with two companies, and the Cavalry, under a small escort of Infantry returned to camp. The rear-guard duties now devolved on Major Brownlow.

9. Emboldened by our continued retreat, the enemy had recovered from the effects of Colonel Probyn's charge, and by the time we had fairly entered the Pass, had assembled in great numbers and had surrounded a piquet under Lieutenant Richmond on the north side of the Pass. It was long before it could be got down. By this time daylight had quite gone, and the remainder of the retiring was effected in dim moonlight. The enemy pressed Major Brownlow very closely, and several times came in amongst his men sword in hand. Eventually, as we drew into camp, the camp piquets became engaged, and Major Brownlow's trying duties ceased. Nothing could be better than the way the whole affair was conducted, nor than the conduct of both officers and men.

10. Our knowledge of the Chumla Valley does not extend much beyond Kooria. Its general shape and the position of the villages appear to be as shown by Major Walker's map. From Umbeyla to Kooria its surface is level and free from obstructions; beyond Kooria it is rugged and difficult. Confining myself to the portion of the valley between Umbeyla and Kooria, it is quite practicable for Field Artillery. The nullah banks are all low; water is abundant, and the land highly cultivated: fuel must be supplied from the hills; there is no jungle in the valley.

11. The people of Kooria informed us that the roads thence to Cherorai and to Nagrai were about equal in length, but that the Cherorai-road was difficult for laden mules and little used, while that to Nagrai was good.

## CASUALTIES.

		Killed.	Wounded.				Horses.
		Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Sowars.	Wounded.
20th Punjab Infantry	...	2	...	2	9	...	...
Guide Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	2	...
11th Bengal Cavalry	...	...	1	...	...	...	2
		2	1	2	9	2	2

1 Officer's charger and  
1 Sowar's horse missing.

1 Officer's charger and  
1 Sowar's horse missing.

(Signed)

T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters,—(No. 3, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 25th October, 1863.)*

IN continuation of my No. 2 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that yesterday morning the sick, both British and Native, all baggage except that absolutely necessary for efficiency, and all carriage rendered spare by this arrangement were sent to the rear under a strong escort, whilst an Infantry Regiment occupied the spur of the Gurroo Mountain, which commands the Pass on the Bonair side, and protected the convoy as it filed down the Pass. At the same time parties from the camp were employed in improving the road and in removing the worst of the obstacles. The enemy remained quiet, but large bodies of men, with numerous standards were observed approaching the mouth of the Pass, and from information since received, it is known that these consisted of the tribes from the Northern Indus, as per margin,\* with a portion of the Hindoostanees under Syud Mobaruck Shah. The night passed over quietly.

2. Soon after daylight this morning an attack was made upon the right piquets of the camp by the hostile bodies which joined the enemy yesterday as above detailed. They were, however, repulsed by Major Keyes, commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, and driven off in the direction of Kagah. This affair was most skilfully managed by Major Keyes, who had only one man wounded, whilst the enemy left ten bodies on the ground. Major Keyes' report is enclosed for his Excellency's information, and I would beg to bring to his notice the officers named by him, especially Captain Hughes, commanding Peshawur Mountain Train, Lieutenant Davidson, second in command, and Lieutenant Pitcher, Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

3. Whilst the attack was going on on the right, the heights above the left flank piquets were crowned by large bodies of men; and it has since become known that a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the camp had been arranged by the enemy, but the Bonair people, who were to have attacked the left flank, failed to keep their agreement. This has given great offence to the tribes engaged in the right attack, and the majority of them, but not the Hindoostanees, are believed to have returned to their homes. The loss of the enemy in the attack on the right is stated to have been 30 killed and a number wounded. Amongst the killed was the brother of a Syud of some note, of Chumla, although this tribe was reported in my last letter to have sent in a deputation to the Commissioner.

4. There appears to be reason to believe that the Bonair people have applied to the Akhoond of Swat for aid, and should they succeed in enlisting him in their cause, which is not improbable, as they are his spiritual followers, the object with which this force took the road of the Chumla Valley will be still more difficult of attainment. The influence of the Akhoond of Swat over all the Hill and Plain Tribes on the Peshawur Frontier is very great, and towards them he fills a position which I can best illustrate by comparing it with that of the Pope of Rome. If he declares against us, he will no doubt bring an immense accession of material as well as moral strength to the people of Bonair and the other tribes already in arms against us. In the mean time the halt of

the force at the crest of the Pass is not without its advantages. The situation is a menacing one, it obliges the enemy to keep a large body of men together, whom they will find it difficult for a continuance to feed, and it makes it indispensable for them to become the attacking party, in which case all the advantage is on our side.

5. In the meanwhile the security of the camp has been provided for, as far as possible, by occupying the heights which command the camp with strong parties of infantry. The piquets are all stockaded, and the approach to camp by the gorge is defended by a breast-work, and by guns in position. The rear has also been secured from attack. The front piquets are under the command of Colonel Hope, C.B., Commanding the 71st Highland Light Infantry, the right flank is under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., Corps of Guides, the left flank under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is already in possession of a plan of the camp, to which I would refer him for all further particulars of our position and defensive arrangement.

*From Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, to Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, the 25th October, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Brigadier-General Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, that, in obedience to orders received from Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., Commanding the Right Defence, I occupied with my regiment, on the night of the 24th instant, the advanced piquets of the right defence.

2. A little after daylight on the morning of the 25th, the enemy showed on a ridge of hills opposite my piquets, and which from its vicinity to my position, I considered it dangerous to allow them to occupy in any force. I called upon Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Defence, for support, and proceeded to dislodge them from the ridge. I had then about 200 men, 100 of whom I sent under Captain Davidson, second in Command, to take the enemy in flank, and when he had sufficiently far advanced on the ridge occupied by the enemy, I advanced at the double to attack them in front and drove them from height to height, until I obtained a position which I could safely hold till reinforced.

3. This advanced position was on a ridge overlooking a plain 200 yards broad, over which the enemy had been driven. On the other side of this plain was a conical hill, the summit of which commanded the ridge at a range of 700 yards. On this the enemy were collecting from the plain by the villages of Lalloo and Kagah. They appeared to be coming in considerable force, which eventually amounted to between 2,000 and 3,000 men. I at once wrote off that I might be supported by a Mountain Train Battery and a Regiment, ordering my men to keep under cover, and not to return the fire of the enemy. Owing to the distance from camp, and the nature of the ground, these reinforcements did not arrive till two P.M. First arrived 150 European soldiers from Her Majesty's 71st and 101st Foot, with Captain Fosberry, Musketry Instructor. The marksmen of this party were selected, and placed along the ridge. The men of the 1st Punjab Infantry being recalled and drawn up out of sight of the enemy, as also the

\* Hussunzyes. Chuggurzyes. Maddur Khail

5th Goorkha Regiment, which joined shortly afterwards as soon as the Peshawur Mountain Train Battery arrived, they were brought up as near the ridge as possible without showing themselves to the enemy. The guns were then dragged up by hand into position marked by sections standing in their front, and immediately opened fire with shrapnell at a distance of 600 yards, the marksmen opening fire at the same time.

The conical hill held by the enemy was rocky and very precipitous, but essentially a weak position, having a line of retreat that would expose the retreating enemy to great loss, if closely pursued.

4. After the guns had fired two rounds, the 1st Punjab Infantry was advanced at the "double," supported by the 5th Goorkha Regiment, the whole of the Europeans keeping up the fire from the ridge.

5. The enemy did not stop to defend their position, but after firing a few shots, retreated at their utmost speed; to the admirable practice of the guns, and the withering fire of the marksmen, may be attributed our obtaining the hill without any loss. The enemy left several bodies on the ground, and their total loss has since been ascertained to have been 33 killed and upwards of 40 wounded.

6. The first discharge of shrapnell having killed their men on the summit of the hill, great credit is due to Captain Hughes, Commanding the Peshawur Mountain Train Battery, for the admirable manner in which he brought up his guns over the very difficult ground he had to traverse, and his very effective practice when brought into action; also to Major Campbell, Commanding 5th Goorkha Battalion, and the Officers Commanding the European Companies, for the manner in which they carried out the object in view, of making all movements until the moment of attack.

As soon as the enemy were seen to have re-passed the village of Lalloo on their way to the plains the troops were dismissed to their quarters.

On the first advance from the piquets our loss was one private wounded, the only casualty of the day.

Captain Davidson took up his flanking party with great spirit, and performed essential service in driving back the enemy.

I cannot close this report without bringing to the notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding Eusufzye Field Force the energy, intelligence, and zeal of Lieutenant and Adjutant H. W. Pitcher, who was foremost in every movement, and who by his quick perception rendered me most effective aid. I consider him a most promising young officer.

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding Right Flank Piquets.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., for  
Brigadier-General Commanding Eusufzye Field  
Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters,  
—(No. 4, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla  
Pass, the 27th October, 1863.)*

IN my letter No. 3 of the 25th instant, I mentioned that a simultaneous attack upon both the

right and left flanks of the camp had been arranged by the enemy to come off on the 25th instant; but that the Bonair men, upon whom it had devolved to attack the left, had failed to keep their agreement on that day. Large bodies of men, however, were seen collected upon the Gurroo Mountain on the 25th instant, and it was therefore necessary to provide both against the threatened attack on the left, and also against the possibility of the enemy making an attempt from the spurs of the Gurroo upon a convoy of sick, &c., about to be sent to the rear.

2. With this view I reinforced the left piquets under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan yesterday morning, with the marksmen of the two British regiments, 30 in number, under Lieutenant Fosberry (who joined the force by order of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of testing the value of a shell invented by him), 200 men of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, the 5th and 6th Punjab Infantry, and the Huzara Mountain Battery. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan was thus prepared either to repel any attack on the left piquets, or to act offensively, if the designs of the enemy should appear to be to attack the convoy in the Pass.

3. These troops took up a position near the highest and most exposed of the left piquets, known in camp by the name of the "Eagle's Nest."

This piquet occupies the top of a very steep rocky knoll, which rises out of the southern face of the Gurroo, and is the apex of that portion of the mountain which overlooks the left flank of the camp. The knoll had been hastily prepared for defence the preceding afternoon, and had been surrounded with a breastwork; the breast-work was capable of containing 110 men, namely, the 30 marksmen and 80 of the 20th Punjab Regiment Native Infantry, and some large rocks at the base of the knoll sheltered 120 more, namely, 70 of the 20th, and 50 of the 3rd Punjab Infantry. It was necessary to hold this position with a piquet by day, in order to give security to the grass-cutters, &c., of the camp; but its distance from camp, and the consequent difficulty of reinforcing it quickly, had made it inadvisable to hold it by night until the ground below had been securely occupied, and the piquet had been subsequently withdrawn at sunset to a lower position.

4. The troops were no sooner observed by the enemy on the mountain above to be taking up their position, than a large body of them descended by the different spurs, and with loud cries attacked at once the troops drawn up and the "Eagle's Nest" in the most determined manner. The steady fire of the Huzara Mountain Battery checked such of the enemy as came under its effect, and afforded a favourable opportunity for the 6th Punjab Infantry, which was in reserve, to charge them. But the nature of the ground prevented the guns from being brought to bear at first upon those who assailed the "Eagle's Nest," and they were able to swarm up the steep sides of the knoll, and to plant their standards immediately under the breastwork, where the fire of the garrison could hardly reach them. They were, however, ultimately repelled by the excellent shooting of the marksmen, and by the steady fire of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, aided by the flanking fire of the guns, and the Enfield rifles of the 71st Highland Light Infantry. The first effort of the enemy was followed by others of a less determined character, which were more easily repulsed, and until late in the evening, a heavy fire was kept up from the spurs and ridges of the mountain, from which

the troops suffered some casualties, though kept under cover as much as possible. For further particulars I would refer his Excellency to the enclosed reports from Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, who commanded the troops, and from Major Brownlow, who commanded in the "Eagle's Nest."

5. The enemy being in such force on the mountain, and the importance of continuing to hold this position having become apparent, I fully concurred with Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's recommendation that the troops should not be withdrawn at night-fall (as had been intended), even at the risk of a renewal of the attack. The enemy, however, attempted no further offensive movement. To day the "Eagle's Nest" has been strengthened, and an adjoining eminence which supports it has been stockaded, and both positions will be permanently held in the strength as per margin.\*

6. The return of killed and wounded in this attack will best explain to his Excellency the severe nature of the contest, particularly at the "Eagle's Nest" itself. I must regret the loss of the two young officers who were killed, Lieutenant Richmond, of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Clifford of the 3rd Punjab Infantry. The former officer was mentioned in my letter of the 23rd for the gallantry in the attack on the reconnoitring party the day before. He was killed whilst encouraging his men by his personal example in their gallant resistance to the enemy. Lieutenant Clifford, Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, was on leave when the force was formed, and joined it as a volunteer, to serve with an Infantry regiment. He was killed whilst leading a sally at the head of the party of his regiment from the rocks at the foot of the "Eagle's Nest." Subadar Major Meer Ally Shah, of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, died like a gallant soldier at his commanding officer's side, recommending his son to Major Brownlow's protection.

7. I beg to ask his Excellency's approval of the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, who commanded on this occasion, and of the officers and others mentioned by him and by Major Brownlow. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's management of the troops was excellent, and I consider myself indebted to his clear judgment for the very successful result of the action. Major Brownlow has been already noticed in my report of the 23rd for the able way in which he covered the retreat of the reconnoitring party, and on this occasion also he greatly distinguished himself by his ready resource and gallant personal bearing. Captain Hoste's charge at the head of the 6th Punjab Infantry was very bold, but was unfortunately carried too far,—whence the severe loss the regiment sustained.

8. The conduct of all the troops engaged was, I am assured by Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, excellent. The admirable shooting of the marksmen,

\* "Eagle's Nest."—40 British Infantry, 300 Native Infantry.—Vaughan's Piquet.—Huzara Mountain Battery.—60 British Infantry.—300 Native Infantry.

and the steadiness and gallantry of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, have been already noticed. The fire of Captain DeBude's guns was most ably directed, and of the greatest service. The detachment of the 71st Highland Light Infantry behaved with great steadiness under Major Parker, and greatly assisted the retirement of the 6th Punjab Infantry after their gallant but hasty charge. The 5th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant C. E. Stewart's command was chiefly employed to cover and support the guns; but one Company under Lieutenant Beckett did excellent service in supporting the advance of the 6th Punjab Infantry, and withdrew in the best order after the 6th had regained the position.

9. Whilst the attack on the left flank was going on, the enemy made a demonstration in the front of camp, but retired at dusk.

Lieutenant Drake, of the 32nd Native Infantry, (Pioneers), was unfortunately wounded here; but this was the only casualty.

10. This morning some of the Bonairs approached the "Eagle's Nest" and asked permission to take away their dead, which was granted. Some conversation was held with them, both by the Commissioner and myself, which it is just possible may lead the people of Bonair to understand how completely they have mistaken our intentions.

Their demeanour was courteous, and they conversed unreservedly with us; but I gathered from their manner that they were not in the least humbled.

11. Our information as to the loss of the enemy yesterday is as follows. I give it in detail, that his Excellency may understand how general is the combination of the Bonair tribes against us:—

Slurzye	.	.	48 killed.
Dowlazye	.	.	38 "
Gadarzye	.	.	57 "
Hindoostanees	.	.	15 "
Total	.	.	158 killed.

Upwards of 30 bodies of Hindoostanees were, however, counted by us upon the ground during the short truce this morning, so that probably the loss of the Bonair tribes is also understated above. Indeed, the latest accounts make the enemy's loss 250 killed, and state that the wounded have been carried in numbers to their homes, or crawled to the nearest Bonair villages.

12. Enclosed is a casualty return showing the casualties in the force on the 26th.

P.S.—I request the favour of your supplying Colonel Norman, Secretary to Government, with a copy of this despatch.

Note.—This despatch was drafted before the Brigadier-General was wounded on the 20th instant, and was approved by him.

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
for Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the above Force,  
on the 26th October, 1863.*

Regiments.	Killed.				Wounded.					Mules.		Remarks
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.	
$\frac{1}{2}$ C. 19th Royal Artillery	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	
Peshawur Mountain Battery	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	
Huzara Mountain Battery	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	2	...	1	
71st Native Light Infantry	...	...	...	1	...	...	1	...	4	...	...	
Guide Infantry ...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	
1st Punjab Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	
3rd ditto	1	...	1	2	...	2	...	1	4	...	...	Lieut. Clifford (killed).
5th ditto	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	5	1	...	
6th ditto	...	...	2	9	...	5	2	1	35	...	...	
20th ditto	1	1	...	8	...	1	...	...	29	...	...	Lieut. Richmond (killed).
32nd ditto	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	Lieut. Drake (wounded).
5th Goorkhas ...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	
Survey Department...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	Lieut. Barron, R.A., (wounded)
Total ...	2	1	3	25	2	9	3	2	82	2	1	

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
for Brigadier-General Commanding Eusufzye  
Field Force.

Examined.  
(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

## PRESENT State of the Euzufzye Field Force.

Camp, Umbeyla Pass, November 23, 1863.

Regiments.	Effective.					Sick.				
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.
½ C. 19th Royal Artillery ...	3	...	5	1	46	...	...	1	...	13
Peshawur Mountain Battery ...	3	3	8	2	115	...	...	1	...	9
Huzara ditto	3	2	...	...	145	...	...	...	...	7
3rd Punjab ditto	1	1	...	...	43	...	...	...	...	4
Guide Cavalry...	2	4	...	...	56	...	...	...	...	1
11th Bengal Cavalry ...	3	5	...	...	75	...	...	...	...	1
Sappers and Miners ...	1	1	...	...	71	...	...	...	...	...
71st Highland Light Infantry	20	...	21	19	418	1	...	1	...	14
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers...	20	...	30	18	431	...	...	1	...	20
Guide Infantry ...	4	17	45	19	475	1	1	4	2	29
1st Punjab Native Infantry ...	7	10	19	14	308	...	2	5	...	55
3rd ditto ditto	6	14	30	9	381	...	...	...	...	10
5th ditto ditto	6	10	23	12	357	...	2	2	...	17
6th ditto ditto	5	5	15	12	273	...	3	1	...	28
14th ditto ditto	4	8	22	9	229	...	2	5	...	79
20th ditto ditto	6	4	24	6	293	...	1	1	2	36
32nd ditto ditto	6	1	39	10	479	...	...	...	...	26
4th Goorkhas ...	7	11	26	11	333	...	...	2	1	40
5th ditto ...	4	8	30	7	318	1	...	1	...	41
Total ...	111	104	347	149	4846	3	11	25	5	430

(Signed)

T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

From Major C. H. Brownlow, Commanding 20th Punjab Infantry, and Commanding "Eagle's Nest" Piquet on 26th October, 1863, to Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, Commanding Left Piquet's Camp,—(dated Camp, Chamla Pass, the 27th October, 1863.)

I HAVE the honor to report as follows on the attacks made by the enemy on the post under my command during the 26th instant.

My party, as detailed in the margin,\* occupied a breastwork of stones on high ground showing a semi-circular front of about 90 feet. Below this the ground for about 80 yards was level, and commanded the work. Beyond the plateau the hill, which is well wooded and studded with rocks, again rose, and its crest (distant 500 yards from our breastwork) was occupied by about 2,000 of the enemy, protected by a similar defence.

2. About twelve o'clock, noon, the Bonairwals, who had hitherto fired only an occasional shot, commenced to move down from their position, matchlock-men posting themselves most advantageously

in the wood, and opening a very galling fire on us, while their swordsmen and others advanced boldly to the attack, charging across the plateau in our front in the most determined manner, and planting their standard behind a rock within a few feet of our wall. The steady fire, however, with which they were received, rendered their very gallant efforts to enter our defences unavailing, and they were driven back and up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead; their matchlock-men only maintaining the fight and continuing to harass us much.

3. The movements to our left of the column under your immediate command next attracted the attention of the main body of the Bonairwals. When repulsed by you, and retreating up the hill, they again came under our fire, and suffered severely from the excellent shooting of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers. On the 6th Punjab Infantry being withdrawn from the ridge on my left, the enemy again came down the hill, and with loud yells, rushed sword in hand to the assault of our position, but were again and finally repulsed; the affair for the rest of the day subsiding into an exchange of shots when either party exposed itself.

4. I regret to say that our losses during the day were severe, amounting to 50 killed and wounded

\* Up to 3 p.m.—30 Marksmen of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, and 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers; 80 Marksmen of the 20th Punjab Infantry. After 3 p.m.—40 Marksmen of the 71st Highland Light Infantry; 50 Marksmen of the 5th Punjab Infantry; 30 Marksmen of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

of all ranks, being nearly half the number that the work held at any one time.\*

5. The conduct of all under my command during the day was admirable; but I would desire especially to bring to notice the undermentioned officers and men, whose coolness and gallantry were conspicuous:—

Captain Butler, V.C., 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Lieutenant G. V. Fosberry, late 4th European Regiment.

Lieutenant J. Bartleman, 20th Punjab Infantry.

Assistant-Surgeon R. T. Lyons, 20th do. do.

Private Stewart, 71st Highland Light Infantry.

„ Clapperton, do. do.

„ Barber, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Subadar Ordoo, 20th Punjab Infantry.

Havildar Meer Mahomed, do.

Sepoy Lena Sing, do.

„ Jowala, do.

6. Among the killed of my own Regiment, I have to lament the loss of many good soldiers; Lieutenant G. M. Richmond, a young officer of great promise, (whose reckless gallantry cost him his life,) and the Subadar Major Meer Ally Shah, (who will not easily be replaced,) being of the number who fell.

7. In conclusion, I beg to point out that my report and Return of Casualties refer only to the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet itself, which occupied my entire attention during the attack. I should however add, that the strong rocks in rear of and below that post were occupied all day by detachments amounting to 120 men at a time, of different regiments, viz., the 3rd, 6th, and 20th Punjab Infantry; and I regret to add that Lieutenant Clifford, of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, was killed while gallantly leading a sally on the enemy from that position.

8. Enclosed is a Nominal Roll of the killed and wounded.

From Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, Field Officer of the Left Piquet, to the Assistant Adjutant-General Enusufzye Field Force,—(dated Camp, the 27th October, 1863.)

I HAVE the honour to make the following report of what occurred yesterday at the left piquet.

2. The Brigadier-General ordered me in the morning to try and divert the enemy’s attention from the rear of camp, as a convoy of sick, baggage, &c., was about to proceed to the rear. To enable me to carry out this, he placed at my disposal the troops as per margin.† These troops proceeded to the neighbourhood of the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet, which was held by 150 men of the 20th Native Infantry and 50 of the 3rd Punjab Infantry, with 30 marksmen selected from the 71st and 101st Regiments, the whole under command of Major Brownlow, 20th Native Infantry. The force detailed marginally above was drawn up on and about a small Mamelon about 400 yards west

\* 71st Highland Light Infantry—1 Man killed; 4 Men wounded.

101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers—2 Men wounded.

3rd Punjab Infantry—2 Men killed.

5th Punjab Infantry—1 Man killed; 1 Man wounded.

20th Punjab Infantry—1 European Officer, 1 Native Officer, 8 Men, killed; 1 Native Officer, 27 Men, wounded.

Total—1 European Officer, 1 Native Officer, 12 Men, killed; 1 Native Officer, 34 Men, wounded.

Grand Total—49.

† Huzara Mountain Train; Detachment, 71st Highland Light Infantry; 5th Punjab Infantry; 6th do. do.

of the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet, in the following order from right to left:—

Detachment, 71st Highland Light Infantry,

6th Punjab Infantry,

Huzara Mountain Train,

5th Punjab Infantry,

the latter Regiment, in extended order, lined the crest of the Mamelon, with three Companies in support of the guns. The 71st Highland Light Infantry was in connection with the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet.

3. The troops were hardly in position when a very large body of the enemy rushed down the steep slopes of the mountain above, and with loud cries attacked at once the piquet and the troops. The Mountain Train guns fired upon the enemy with shrapnell, common shell, and round shot, and this fire checked those who were advancing against the troops in position, but not those advancing against the piquet. The latter was attacked with the greatest determination, and two of the enemy’s standards were planted close under the parapet which crowns the steep sides of the piquet hill. All the efforts of the piquet failed to dislodge the enemy from the position for some time, notwithstanding that the direct fire from the piquet was aided by a flanking fire from the Mountain Train guns, and from the Enfield rifles of the 71st. But as the attack upon the piquet will form the subject of a separate report from Major Brownlow, I shall only remark here that so desperately was it attacked, and so hardly was it pressed, that it became necessary for me to reinforce it in the course of the action with the company of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, and a company of 5th Punjab Infantry.

4. When the enemy had been checked by the guns they were charged by the 6th Punjab Infantry, but the regiment was unfortunately carried too far in the ardour of pursuit, and lost heavily before it could regain the position. I supported it by a company of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and the Enfields of the 71st, and the firing of the guns prevented the enemy from pressing the retirement.

5. During the rest of the day the enemy kept up a heavy fire from the low hills and broken ground in front of the troops, but the ground affording excellent cover, could do little damage.

6. The Brigadier-General had wished me to bring the troops back to camp by sunset, and to withdraw the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet at the same time; but for reasons with which he is acquainted, and which I believe have satisfied him, I felt it impossible to carry out his wishes, and therefore maintained both positions during the night without annoyance from the enemy, who had evidently suffered very severely.

7. I am under the greatest obligations to Major Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General to the Force, whom the Brigadier-General, at my special request, allowed to accompany me during the day, and I cannot speak in too high terms of the admirable service rendered by Major Brownlow in the defence of the “Eagle’s Nest” piquet, and of Captain DeBude in the management of his guns. I beg also to notice the gallantry with which Captain W. D. Hoste led the charge of the 6th Punjab Infantry, and the assistance I received from Major Parker, commanding the detachment, 71st Highland Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Stewart, who commanded the 5th Punjab Infantry.

Annexed is Major Brownlow’s report of the defence of the piquet, and a return of the casualties among the troops.

*CASUALTY RETURN of the Troops under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan,  
Commanding Left Piquet on the 26th October, 1863.*

	Killed.				Wounded.			Mules.		Remarks.
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants and Havildars.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Serjeants and Havildars.	Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.	
Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry	...	...	...	1	...	1	4	...	...	1 Private wounded with Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan; the other casualties on "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.
Huzara Mountain Battery	...	...	...	...	1	...	2	...	1	With Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan.
3rd Punjab Infantry	...	1	...	2	...	...	1	...	...	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.
5th Ditto ditto	...	...	...	3	...	...	5	1	...	With Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan.
6th Ditto ditto	...	...	2	9	5	2	40	...	...	Ditto Ditto
20th (Ditto ditto), Native Infantry	1	1	...	8	1	...	27	...	...	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.
Total	...	2	1	2	23	7	3	81	1	1

(True Copy).  
(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Signed) J. L. VAUGHAN, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding Left Piquet.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters,—(No. 5, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)*

HIS Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will recollect that, in my letter No. 3 of the 25th instant, I mentioned that the people of Bonair had applied to the Akhoond of Swat to aid them in resisting the advance of the force, and stated my opinion that, in the event of his doing so, the object with which the force had adopted the route of the Chumla Valley would of course be rendered very difficult of attainment. I have now to report that the Akhoond has actually joined the Bonairs and that he has brought with him upwards of 100 standards from Swat,—each standard representing, probably, from 30 to 40 footmen,—and, it is said, 120 horsemen. Besides the tribe with which he is more immediately connected, viz., the Swatees, he has summoned the people of the remote country of Bajour (on the border of the Cabul territory) the Mullazyes of Dheer, under their Chief Ghuzzun Khan; and other distant tribes whose names even are hardly known except to the officers who have served long on the frontier. There is, in fact, a general combination of almost all the tribes, from the Indus to the boundary of Cabul, against us. Old animosities are for the time in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism, tribes usually hostile to each other are hastening to join the Akhoond's standard, and to fight for the sake of their common faith. The Akhoond has hitherto been opposed to the Sitana Moulvie, who represents an exceptional sect of Mahomedans; but at present the two are understood to be on friendly terms, and it is certain that the whole of the Hindoostanee Colony are either at, or on the way to, Umbeyla.

2. It is necessary that I should place the state of affairs thus distinctly before his Excellency, in order that he may understand how entirely the situation has altered since the force entered the

Umbeyla Pass, and that instead of having to deal with the Mahabun Tribes, with a view to the expulsion of the Hindoostanees from that mountain, we are engaged in a contest in which not only are the Hindoostanees and the Mahabun Tribes (including even some Judoons and Khodakhails) accessories, but also the Swatees, the Bajorees, and the Indus tribes north of the Burrendo, with a large sprinkling of the discontented and restless spirits from within our own border. I feel certain that his Excellency will approve of my not making an advance into the Chumla Valley with my present force, in the face of the above coalition. I could only do so by giving up the Umbeyla Pass. If the force moved into the Valley, with a view to continue its advance towards the Mahabun, and to carry out the original views of the Government, it would be exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by night and day, in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals to which would be daily added an ever increasing number of wounded and sick. On the other hand, if the force merely moved into the Valley with a view to take up a position in open ground, it would still lose its communication with the rear, and whenever it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear the camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have to re-take the Pass, and to re-occupy, at great sacrifice of life, the very ground from which it had advanced. Further, I have felt it right not to forget, that if this force should be seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance, there are not, within a very great distance, the troops necessary to meet any difficulty which would be certain, under such an eventuality, immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border. In fact, my judgment tells me that, with our present numbers the only way to uphold the honour of our arms, and the interests of the Government, is to act on the defensive, in the position the force now holds, and trust to the effect of

time, and of the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks are likely to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break up their combination.

3. The first result of the combination between the Akhoond and the Moulvie was an attack upon the right piquets of the camp, early yesterday morning, by the Hindoostanees, and an almost simultaneous attack upon the front of camp by the Swatees. The front attack was repulsed under my personal superintendence, without difficulty, by the good practice of the Artillery under Captain Tulloh, and the fire of Her Majesty's 71st Highland Light Infantry, and the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, which lined the breastworks, under Colonel Hope, C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury respectively. Some of the enemy behaved with considerable boldness, and afforded an opportunity for the 5th Goorkha Regiment to make a spirited charge. They left 40 dead bodies on the ground, which have been recognised as men from Swat and Ranezye, and must have lost heavily in addition, though according to custom they carried off as many of their dead as they could. The attack by the Hindoostanees on the right was directed against the extreme right piquet, known as the "Crag" piquet. A little before daylight this piquet was attacked in force by the enemy, and its garrison driven in. It was, however, brilliantly re-taken by Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, as soon as the day broke, at a loss to the enemy of nearly 60 killed. For the particulars of this most successful affair I beg to refer his Excellency to the enclosed reports from Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., who commands the Right Defences. I feel sure that I only anticipate his Excellency's judgment in stating that I consider the re-capture of the "Crag" by Major Keyes a most brilliant exploit. The decision and determination Major Keyes displayed stamp him as possessing some of the highest qualifications of an officer, and I recommend him strongly to his Excellency's favour.

4. Major Keyes in his report brings to notice the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Pitcher, Adjutant 1st Punjab Infantry, and of Lieutenant Fosbery, of the late 4th European Regiment, and recommends them for the Victoria Cross. I place his recommendation, in which I entirely concur, in the hands of his Excellency, and would further submit that Major Keyes himself well deserves the same distinction.

5. Major Brownlow, commanding the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, became, on the arrival of the Regiment at the ground, the senior Officer, but immediately adopted Major Keyes' suggestion that he should advance by a ridge which runs to the right of the Crag and threaten the enemy's rear. There is no doubt that this movement most materially aided the success of Major Keyes' attack in front, though it deprived Major Brownlow of the opportunity of sharing in the actual conflict at the Crag.

6. With reference to the list of Native Officers and men who distinguished themselves, given in Major Keyes' report, I have the honour to state that a Standing Committee has been formed in camp to investigate all such claims, and that its proceedings shall be forwarded as soon as practicable.

7. I enclose a Casualty Roll.

8. I think I have only to add to this report that the 14th Native Infantry joined the force on the 27th, and the 4th Goorkha Regiment, and half No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, on the 29th instant.

9. A copy of this report has been forwarded to

Colonel Norman, C.B., for the information of the Government.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Flank Piquets, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., the enclosed reports of the successful defeats of the enemy, on the 25th and 30th of October, when they attacked the advance piquets of the Right Defence.

2. Major C. P. Keyes, Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, commanded in person on both occasions, and from my knowledge of the ground and scene of their operations, and from enquiries made on the spot as soon as I could reach these piquets, I can confidently assert that his conduct and management of the troops as they successively reached him in support, mainly contributed to the signal defeat of the enemy.

3. The attack upon the "Crag" piquet, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, was, by the concurrent testimony of all the officers and men who witnessed it, a most daring and brilliant feat of arms, and to Major Keyes is due the credit of not only having planned it, but in person he led on his men to the assault with a perseverance and intrepidity never surpassed.

4. Major Keyes was gallantly supported by Lieutenant Fosbery, of the late 4th European Regiment, and his Adjutant, Lieutenant H. Pitcher, and I trust that the Brigadier-General will deem the conduct of Major Keyes and his officers deserving of a recommendation to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for the reward of gallantry so highly prized by an officer serving in Her Majesty's Forces.

Major C. P. Keyes and Lieutenant Pitcher were both wounded in the assault on the piquet.

*From Major C. P. Keyes Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, Punjab Irregular Force, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, the particulars of an attack made by the enemy, on the morning of the 30th October, 1863, upon the advance piquets of the Right Defence, the whole of which were held by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a Company of the Guide Corps under my command.

2. Above the main piquets is a high rock, which I will, for reference, call "The Crag." The ascent to this is most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult, and where the summit is reached there is but little level ground to stand upon: it was, however, necessary to occupy it, as it commanded the lower piquets, and I placed a small party of 12 men in it, as much as it could conveniently hold. About half an hour before daylight on the morning of the 30th instant, heavy firing commenced on the "Crag," and it soon appeared that the piquet was hard pressed by the enemy. I immediately detached all the men I could spare from the lower piquets in support, and accompanied by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, the Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, I advanced myself with about 20 picked men to their assistance, but before I could reach the top of the "Crag" my small party there had been overpowered and driven off the "rocks," though they still were holding the ground lower down the hill.

Finding this important position lost, I ordered my men to take cover from the enemy's fire beneath the overhanging rocks, about 20 paces from the summit, and determined to wait till daylight should enable me to distinguish friend from foe, and reinforcements should reach me from Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Defence.

As the day broke, I observed the 20th Punjab Native Infantry enter the main piquet below, and convinced of the danger of allowing the "Crag" to remain for even so short a time in the enemy's hands, I directed my men to fix swords and charge. After a most exciting and hand-to-hand fight, we recovered the position, driving the enemy out at the point of the bayonet, with a loss to them of 54 killed on the spot and 7 wounded.

Difficult from the nature of the ground, and hazardous as undoubtedly the undertaking was, I felt that should the enemy (many hundreds of whom were in the rear) once understand that their advanced party had gained an advantage over our own troops, they would quickly occupy the position in force, and render the lower piquets untenable from their raking fire. The result proved the correctness of my view of the case, and the signal defeat of the enemy on the "Crag," and the sight of their three standards still flying on the piquet where they had planted them, but surrounded by our own instead of their men, seem to have conveyed a panic to the rest, and they quickly disappeared down the mountain.

4. From the nature of the approach to the top of the "Crag," amongst the large rocks, one or two men only could advance at one time, and while I ascended one path I directed Lieutenant Fosbery of the late 4th European Regiment, to push up another at the head of a few men. He led this party with the greatest coolness and intrepidity, and was the first man to gain the top of the "Crag" on his side of the attack. Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, equally cool and daring, led a party of men

up to the last rock, until he was knocked down and stunned by a large stone thrown from above within a few yards of him.

If the Victoria Cross be the award for coolness and daring courage in the presence of great danger, these two officers have well earned that distinction. This is the second time within the last few days that it has been my duty to report upon the high soldier-like qualities possessed by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant 1st Punjab Infantry.

5. Lieutenant Fosbery, of the late 4th European Regiment, had been on duty the day before at my piquet with a party of sharpshooters of Her Majesty's 71st and 101st Regiments, and remained at my piquet during the night, expecting to be on duty in the morning—when attacked he joined my Regiment, and I beg to record the assistance he gave me and the excellent service he performed.

6. The following Native Officers and men were most forward on the occasion:—

Subadar Ahmed Khan, Guide Corps.

Sepoy Summunder, Guide Corps (made himself especially conspicuous); also a Havildar and four men of the same Corps who were under fire within 25 yards of the enemy, but whose names I don't know.

*1st Punjab Infantry.*

Subadar Bahador Habeeb Khan, Subadar Major.

Subadar Pyabb.

Jemadar Toolsee.

Havildar Neaz Mahomed.

" Syud Mahomed.

" Moosullee.

" Mahomed Noor.

Naick Mullick Aman.

" Ahmed Khan.

Sepoy Ameen.

" Mirza Ameer Beg.

Casualty Return is herein enclosed.

#### CASUALTY RETURN, Eusufzye Field Force.

Camp, Umbeyla Pass, October 30, 1863.

Regiment.	Killed.			Wounded.			Remarks.		
	Native Officers.	Serjeants. Havildars.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants. Havildars.		Rank and File.	
½ C. Battery, 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	At the front defences of the Camp.	
Peshawur Mountain Train Battery	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	Ditto ditto.	
71st Highland Light Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	Ditto ditto.	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	...	...	1	...	...	1	6	Ditto ditto.	
1st Punjab Infantry	...	...	1	3	2	1	2	14	At the Crag Piquet.
5th " "	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	...	At "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.
5th Goorkha Regiment	...	1	...	4	...	1	1	6	At the front defences of the Camp.
Total ...	...	1	1	11	2	2	5	31	

Officers Wounded.

Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, Adjutant, 1st Punjab Infantry.

Examined.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant General.

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Army Head Quarters,—(No. 6, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 7th November, 1863).*

I HAVE the honour to continue my report of the proceedings of this force since the date of my last letter No. 5, dated 31st ultimo.

2. From the moment that the Bonairs placed themselves in declared hostility to us, it was evident that our line of communication by the Umbeyla defile could no longer be depended upon; and it became indispensable to seek some new line which should remove us further from the Gurroo Mountain, and unable us to communicate with our own territory, beyond the reach of the Bonair tribe. To this end Colonel Taylor, Chief Engineer with the force, has caused the approach to our camp from the heights above our right flank to be examined by the officers of his department, and has selected a line of road by the villages of Khanpore and Sherdurra which answers the required conditions, and will, with some labour, be made sufficiently practicable for our purpose. When the new road is ready, our base will be at Permonli, the nearest village in the plains where water is obtainable, instead of at Roostum.

3. Besides the new road to the rear, working parties have been employed for some days in making a road in the direction of Umbeyla along the western slopes of the right ridge. The road will supersede that by the gorge, which is extremely bad, and commanded on both sides, and will enable the troops, whenever the time comes, to march forward without coming under fire from the Gurroo Mountain.

4. From the date of my last report, until yesterday, the enemy attempted nothing more serious than firing as usual at our exposed breastworks and piquets, and advancing from time to time with standards, as if to attack the camp; these demonstrations were met with alacrity by our marksmen and the field guns in position, with some loss to the enemy, and little or none to ourselves. In the meanwhile the inactivity of the enemy has enabled me to employ the troops in improving the breastworks and defences generally, as well as the interior communications of the camp. Yesterday afternoon the enemy came out in considerable numbers and attacked the troops engaged in covering the working party which was making the new road to the front. I am sorry to say that in this attack we incurred some loss. I had gone down with the covering party in the morning, and finding that the officers with the covering party were all young and inexperienced, I placed it under command of my orderly officer, Major G. W. Harding, of the Bombay Staff Corps, whose conduct on previous occasions had led me to place entire confidence in his coolness and determination, although up to the commencement of these operations he had had no experience in actual warfare. Major Harding having been unfortunately killed whilst in the execution of this duty, it has not been possible to ascertain with exactness the reasons which led him to delay the withdrawal of the covering party from the time when he received the order to that effect (certainly not later than two P.M.) until nearly dark. But there appears no doubt that he found it difficult to bring away some of his party who had been wounded: he consequently remained too long, and permitted himself to be surrounded. This was a serious error. When, however, Major Harding found himself

overmatched and in difficulty, he behaved like a gallant soldier, and probably saved his detachment by his coolness and determination. Ensign Murray, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, fell early in the action at the head of his men. The other officer killed, Lieutenant Dugal, 79th Highlanders, left the advanced breast-work without leave, accompanied by a single Sepoy, and is supposed to have been killed in attempting to join the covering party. My duty requires me to make this statement, though I cannot help appreciating the spirit which induced this officer to seek the post of danger. Lieutenants W. Batty, of the Guides, and J. S. Oliphant, 5th Goorkha Regiment, were wounded on this occasion.

5. The enclosed reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., commanding the right defences, and Major Brownlow, commanding the advanced piquet, will afford His Excellency further information on the subject of this affair, and show the steps taken under my orders to reinforce and assist Major Harding. I regret to say that night having come on before the covering party got back to camp, it was impossible to recover the bodies of the killed until this morning, when troops were sent out for the purpose under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B.

6. I enclose a Casualty Return.

7. A copy of this report has been sent to Colonel Norman, C.B., for the information of Government.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Defence, to Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General, Peshawur Division,—(No. 111, dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, the 8th November, 1863).*

IN obedience to your memorandum of to-day's date, I have the honour to forward the report of Major Brownlow, commanding the advance piquets of the right defence, connected with the attack made by the enemy on the piquets, under the command of the late Major Harding, on the 6th instant.

2. About two o'clock P.M. on the day in question, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, C.B., of the Royal Engineers, and myself, directed the return of the working and covering parties on the new road towards camp. This order was issued on account of the distance these parties necessarily were from camp, and not with the knowledge that any attack was contemplated by the enemy. This order appears to have reached the late Major Harding, and it is impossible to say what his reasons were for not acting up to it.

3. About half-past three o'clock P.M. I received reports that Major Harding was being attacked in force by the enemy, and proceeded immediately to the advance piquets, sending to head-quarters for reinforcements, and in less than an hour the Peshawur Mountain Train and 350 Riflemen of the 4th and 5th Goorkha Regiments reached me at Major Keyes' piquet.

4. Before my arrival Major Brownlow had sent out every available man to reinforce the supports to Major Harding's piquets, and Lieutenant Jenkins in command of two companies of the Corps of Guides had proceeded to occupy the head of the spur below which Major Harding's piquet was

situated. Lieutenant Jenkins performed this duty most ably, and drove back the enemy by charging them with his men and the 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Davidson when they attempted to gain a footing on the top of the ridge. It was eventually to this part of the field that Major Harding's party secured their retreat.

5. One hour only of the day remained when the reinforcements from camp reached me, and it became necessary to endeavour to cover the late Major Harding's retreat by the shortest route. I therefore directed Captain Chester, commanding the 4th Goorkha Regiment, to proceed in the direction of the beleaguered piquet across the lower spurs; this was done, as far as the nature of the country and the light permitted, and Captain Chester's movements aided the retirement,—some of his men even reaching the spur upon which Major Harding was fighting.

The guns of the Mountain Train, protected by the 5th Goorkhas took up a position on one of the lower spurs, and checked the advance of the enemy on the piquet, also covering Captain Chester's advance to its assistance.

6. About sunset Major Harding commenced to retire up the ridge towards his supports, and the whole force gradually returned to camp. Major Harding was, I regret to say, wounded in the retirement, and was eventually lost in the darkness as his piquet fought its way up the ridge. He was the last man to leave the piquet, and his bearing throughout the day was that of a brave and gallant soldier.

7. Early on the morning of the 7th I had the honour to receive instruction from the Brigadier-General commanding the Eusufzye Field Force to move out with the troops as per margin\*, to recover the bodies of Major Harding and Lieutenant Murray, who had been killed, as well as of the men who had fallen in action the evening before.

Small parties of the enemy appeared on the ground where the late Major Harding's piquet had been situated; these were quickly dispersed and driven into the plains, and having collected seven Europeans and twenty-eight Natives who had fallen, I returned to camp without any casualty.

8. The enemy, I believe, must have suffered severely the day before, as they were seen by this column removing many of their slain, and they showed no inclination to meet the troops.

*From Major C. H. Brownlow, Commanding Advance Piquets Right Defence, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Defence,—(dated Umbeyla Pass, the 8th November, 1863).*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in obedience to the instructions received from you, for the pro-

tection of the working parties below this piquet, on the 6th instant, I detached one hundred men of the 20th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant J. Bartleman to cover their immediate front, and posted a similar number of the 1st Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant W. Unwin on the head of the ridge beyond the one at the foot of which the fatigue party was working, with instructions to Lieutenant Unwin to send patrols down the ridge as far as he could with reference to their safety. My orders to Lieutenant Bartleman were, to keep two or three hundred yards in front of the working parties, and to communicate with Colonel Taylor, C.B., (who I understood would be with them), in case of doubt.

About eleven o'clock I perceived from my post, that Lieutenant Bartleman's party had been pushed forward to a spot low down the ridge, the top of which was in possession of Lieutenant Unwin's party. Between one and two P.M. I saw that a company of the 71st Highland Light Infantry and one of Goorkhas had reinforced the covering party on the ridge, and learnt that the late Major Harding was in command of the whole.

I had already sent Captain Rogers with 50 men, 20th Punjab Infantry, and 50 men, 1st Punjab Infantry, by the road above my piquet and down the ridge above alluded to. These men were to relieve a similar number of their respective corps, or to remain, if necessary, as a reinforcement.

About half-past twelve in the day, hearing that Major Harding was anxious lest the enemy should get above him, and wished the party of the 1st Punjab Infantry strengthened, I sent a company of the Guides under Lieutenant Battye to join Lieutenant Unwin; and at two P.M., observing the enemy moving in considerable numbers, I sent a further reinforcement to that point of two companies of the Guides under Captain Jenkins, and 80 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry under Captain Davidson, being all the men I had at my disposal.

Your instructions for the working parties to be withdrawn, and the covering parties to retire up the hill, reached me about half-past twelve at noon. I forwarded your letter at once to Major Harding, and it reached that officer while he was with the detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry on the top of the hill, as stated by Lieutenant Unwin in his report. This must have been about one o'clock at latest.

On your arrival at the piquet I proceeded, according to your orders, with the Mountain Train Battery of Captain Hughes, and a company of the 5th Goorkhas, to assist in bringing off the covering party, with what result you are yourself aware.

I beg to enclose the reports of Captain Rogers and Lieutenants Bartleman and Unwin.

\* Her Majesty's 101st Foot; Corps of Guides; 4th Goorkha Battalion; 32nd Bengal Native Infantry; Muzbees Peshawur Mountain Train.

## CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the Eusufzye Field Force.

Camp, Umbeyla Pass, 6th November, 1863.

Date and Occasion.	Regiments.	Killed.			Wounded.			Remarks.
		European Officers.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	
On the 6th of November, when covering a working party.	71st Highland Light Infantry	2	...	4	...	...	4	<b>KILLED.</b> Major Harding, Staff. Ensign Murray, 71st Highland Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Dougal, 79th Highlanders.
	1st Punjab Infantry ...	...	...	2	...	...	5	
	5th Goorkhas...	...	...	7	1	...	7	
	20th Punjab Infantry	...	1	15	...	2	14	
	4th Goorkhas...	...	...	5	...	...	4	
	Guides ...	...	...	1	1	...	3	<b>WOUNDED.</b> Lieutenant Oliphant, 5th Goorkhas. Lieutenant Battye, Corps of Guides.
	Staff ...	1	...	...	...	...	...	
	Total...	3	1	34	2	2	37	

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant-Adjutant-General.(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Army Head Quarters,—(No. 7, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 14th November, 1863.)

I HAVE the honour to continue my report of the proceedings of this force from the date of my last letter No. 6 of the 7th instant.

2. Within the last few days the enemy have received the long-expected reinforcements from Bajour. On the 11th they showed in large numbers about Umbeyla, whence considerable bodies ascended the hills in the direction of Laloo, on our right front, and evidently with the intention of attacking the piquets on that flank of the camp. These piquets were accordingly reinforced, and their breastworks and defences strengthened. The Crag piquet in particular has been much enlarged and strengthened since the last occasion of its being attacked (30th ultimo), and has now been made capable of containing a garrison of 160 men. It has also been supported by the guns of the Peshawur Mountain Train, which have been placed in position in the main piquet. On the night of the twelfth instant the Crag piquet, then under command of Major Brownlow, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, with garrison as per margin,\* was very hotly attacked by the enemy, who made repeated assaults upon it, all of which, however, were repelled by the steadiness of the defenders, most ably directed by Major C. H. Brownlow, whose name is already familiar to his Excellency for his admirable conduct when covering the retirement of the reconnoitring party on the 22nd ultimo, and for his gallant defence of the Eagle's Nest piquet on the 26th ultimo. The enemy, after repeatedly failing in the attempt to dislodge the piquet, withdrew towards morning, and the place of Major Brownlow and the men of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry was taken by Lieutenant David-

son and a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry. For further particulars of this night attack I refer his Excellency to Major Brownlow's report, appended.

3. About ten A.M. yesterday the enemy renewed their attack upon the Crag Piquet in a most determined manner, and, I regret to say, succeeded in driving out the defenders, who appear to have been seized with an unaccountable panic. Lieutenant J. P. Davidson, who commanded, behaved in a most heroic manner, and after endeavouring in every way to recall his men to a sense of their duty, was killed at his post. His Excellency will, I am sure, join with me in regretting the loss of so gallant and promising an officer.

4. The loss of the Crag was for the time being, as far as practicable, met in the most resolute and praiseworthy way by Major Ross, who commanded the advanced defences; Major Keyes, Commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry (who was suffering from the wound he received on the 30th ultimo), and the following officers, namely, Lieutenant Inglis, of the 14th Native Infantry, and Lieutenants Pitcher and Young, of the 1st Punjab Infantry. These officers, with as many men as they could collect, advanced to the front from the main piquet; and though not in sufficient numbers to succeed in re-taking the Crag, they arrested the torrent, so to say, and by their determined bearing prevented the enemy from improving their advantage until reinforcements could be brought up from below. In this they were most materially aided by Captain Hughes, Commanding the Peshawur Mountain Train, and his two Subalterns, Lieutenant Conolly and Pemberton, who by the correctness of their fire and their readiness of resource under most trying circumstances, well sustained the honour of the Royal Artillery. For further particulars I must refer his Excellency to the annexed reports from Major Ross and Major Keyes.

5. I was in the Camp below when the Crag piquet fell into the hands of the enemy, and my

\* 15 Maraskmen Her Majesty's 101st; 30 men 14th Native Infantry; 115 men 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

attention having been accidentally drawn to the unusual dust and confusion caused by the rush of camp followers and animals down the hill, I felt convinced that some reverse had occurred, and immediately sent forward Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, which was fortunately under arms for another purpose. Almost immediately afterwards I received information from Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., who commands the right defences, that the piquet had been taken by the enemy, and thereupon gave orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury that his regiment should push up the hill as fast as practicable, and retake it at any cost. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde had already proceeded to the spot with such reinforcements as were immediately available, and on the arrival of the 101st promptly organised the attack. The hill was stormed by Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury and the 101st in a manner worthy of the distinguished reputation of the regiment,—the detachments of Native Regiments, which, as above mentioned, had gallantly held their ground until the arrival of the 101st, joining in and vying with the British regiment in driving out the enemy. For further particulars I beg to refer to Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde's report, which is annexed.

6. The temporary loss of the Crag picquet is, of course, cause of great mortification to the officers and men of the regiments concerned, and is the first success which the enemy has been able to obtain over any portion of the force. In forming his opinion upon this partial reserve, I trust the Commander-in-Chief will not overlook the circumstances that the same regiments which furnished the piquet when it was lost, are also those by which it was retaken.

7. I would ask the Commander-in-Chief's favourable notice of the officers mentioned in para-

graphs 2, 4, and 5 of this report,\* and in particular of Major Brownlow, to whose determination and personal example I attribute the preservation of the Crag piquet throughout the night of the 12th, and of Lieutenant Pitcher, who was severely wounded, and whose behaviour is spoken of in such high terms by his commanding officer, Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry. His Excellency will remember that I have already recommended Lieutenant Pitcher for the Victoria Cross for his conduct at the Crag piquet on the 30th ultimo. I beg also to be allowed to draw the Commander-in-Chief's attention to Lieutenant H. R. Young's conduct on this occasion, which was also most distinguished, and deserves special remark. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, Commanding the Right Defences, is entitled to great credit for his promptness and decision when the piquet was driven in, and for the excellent and complete arrangements he made for its re-capture.

8. From information since received, and from the bodies left on the ground, it has been ascertained that the enemy consisted chiefly of Bajourtees and Swatees, with some of the Hindoostanees.

9. Whilst the attack was going on on the right, the enemy made demonstrations both against the front and left defences of the camp; but these demand no special notice.

10. I enclose Casualty Return.

\* Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Corps of Guides; Lieutenant-Colonel F. O. Salusbury, Commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers; Major C. C. G. Ross, Commanding 14th Native Infantry; Major C. H. Brownlow, Commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry; Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry; Captain T. Hughes, Commanding Peshawar Mountain Train; Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Native Infantry; Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, 1st Punjab Infantry; Lieutenant H. R. Young, ditto; Lieutenant E. R. Conolly, Royal Artillery; Lieutenant S. E. Pemberton, ditto.

**CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the Eusufzye Field Force,**

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, November 13, 1863.*

Regiments.	Killed.			Wounded			Remarks.
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Rank and File.	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	...	...	5	...	...	16	At the Crag Piquet
Guide Infantry ...	...	...	...	...	...	2	Ditto.
5th Punjab Native Infantry ...	...	...	...	...	1	1	At the Eagle's Nest Piquet.
14th Ferozepore Regiment ...	...	1	17	...	2	14	At the Crag Piquet.
1st Punjab Native Infantry ...	1	...	23	1	...	53	Ditto.
2nd " " ...	...	...	2	...	...	9	Ditto.
Peshawar Mountain Battery ...	...	...	2	...	...	6	Ditto.
3rd Punjab Native Infantry ...	...	...	...	...	...	1	Ditto.
5th Goorkhas ...	...	...	...	...	...	2	Ditto.
Totals ...	1	1	49	1	3	104	Lieut. Davidson, 1st P. I., killed. Lieut. Pitcher, 1st P. I., wounded.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde C.B., Commanding Right Defence, to Major T. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(No. 5, dated Umbeyla Pass, the 15th November, 1863.)*

ON the evening of the 12th instant, the enemy commenced their attack upon the piquets of the Right Defence, and continued them throughout the night with great spirit. The chief efforts of the enemy were directed against the "Crag" piquet, commanded by Major Brownlow, Commanding 20th Regiment Punjab Infantry, who defended that post most successfully, inflicting much loss upon his opponents. The attacks on the "Crag" piquet was again renewed on the morning of the 13th. Major Brownlow having been relieved by the late Lieutenant Davidson, of the 1st Punjab Infantry. By a sudden assault the enemy succeeded in dislodging this officer's party, and the loss of the post endangered the safety of the whole of the advanced piquet situated on that view. The enclosed reports as per margin,\* which I have the honour to submit, describe these operations up to the time of the occupation of the "Crag" piquet by the enemy, which occurred about half-past ten o'clock A.M.

2. On the receipt of the news of this disaster, I ordered up Her Majesty's 101st Regiment to my assistance, and directed three Companies of the Corps of Guides to proceed at once to the front. On leaving my Camp with this reinforcement, I met the head of Her Majesty's 101st Foot ascending the hills, the Brigadier-General having already directed it to proceed without delay to the advanced piquets.

3. The Crag piquet from its locality was the key to the whole position, and its loss rendered the lower piquets untenable, when the full force of the enemy's fire should be brought to bear on them. On my arrival I found that the troops were being severely pressed. Major Ross, Commanding the advanced piquets, was half way up the Crag Piquet Hill gallantly holding the enemy in check, but unable, with the few men he had rallied round him, to advance and re-take the lost piquet. Parties of the enemy were attacking the lower piquets, but were kept back by the steadiness of the fire of Captain Hughes' Mountain Train Guns. The 1st Punjab Infantry, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, and two Companies of the Corps of Guides, still held the breastworks; but numerically the garrison was too weak to resist the numbers of the enemy advancing to its capture.

4. I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury, Commanding Her Majesty's 101st Regiment, to assault the Crag piquet with his Regiment, leaving one Company as a support in the main position, with two Companies of the Corps of Guides under Lieutenant Jenkins. The enemy were driven back in their advance on the right towards the guns, and this party then joined Colonel Salusbury in the assault on the Crag piquet with another party of the Corps of Guides and 1st Punjab Infantry. The enemy were attacked down the valley to the left. Her Majesty's 101st Foot, fatigued as they were by their rapid march to the relief of the troops in advance, never halted or broke till they had stormed the height and secured the piquet. Nothing could excel the soldier-like conduct of this

Regiment. They started with the determination to perform the duty, and led on by Colonel Salusbury and his officers, they soon reached Major Ross' party on the hill, and together repulsed the enemy, driving him over the hills beyond.

5. With this success on the part of our troops, all opposition ceased, and order was as quickly restored as it had been previously disturbed by the suddenness and force of the enemy's attack. As necessarily must be the case in all fighting when the nature of the ground and the thickness of the brushwood renders it easy for the enemy to concentrate a large force upon a weak piquet, our loss was severe,—Lieutenant Davidson himself being killed; but in their retreat the enemy suffered so much that they desisted from all further attack that day along the whole line of our defences.

6. In conclusion I have to record my appreciation of the services performed on the occasion by Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury, Commanding Her Majesty's 101st Regiment. Major Ross, Commandant of the 14th Native Infantry and Commanding the advanced piquets, added much to relieve the temporary loss of the piquet.

Major Brownlow, Commandant of the 20th Native Infantry, and Captain Hughes, Commanding Peshawur Mountain Train, displayed throughout the attacks of the enemy great firmness and presence of mind. Lieutenant F. Jenkins, Commanding a Wing of the Corps of Guides, led his men up the Crag Hill, and drove the enemy back from the right of the position with great gallantry.

*From Major C. G. Ross, 14th Ferozepore Regiment, Commanding Advanced Piquets, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Defence Field Force,—(Dated the 14th November, 1863.)*

I BEG to report the occurrences and engagements at the advanced piquets under my command on the 12th and 13th November, 1863.

During the day time on the 12th, large bodies of the enemy took position on the hill above the Crag piquet, which I therefore strongly reinforced and made over to Major Brownlow, 20th Regiment Native Infantry.

Captain Hughes, Royal Artillery, Commanding Peshawur Mountain Train, also under my orders, put two of his four guns into position on the left of my Camp, to get under fire the left shoulder of the hill on which is the Crag piquet, as well as the front of the centre piquet below.

I annex a report from each of these Officers.

During the night of the 12th from ten P.M., until four A.M. of the 13th, the enemy made incessant attacks and charges on the Crag piquet, which were steadily beaten off by Major Brownlow and the fire of the Mountain Train. At seven A.M., 13th November, the enemy threatened in force the centre and lower piquets, and I proceeded to those posts.

No serious attack, however, taking place, I returned to camp, and on reaching the lower part, found that the Crag piquet had been suddenly carried by the enemy, who were pouring a heavy fire into the camp, which was in great confusion. Collecting as many men of the 14th Native Infantry as I could, (the head-quarters body of the Corps were at the centre piquet below), and of the other regiments, we passed to the front of camp, where I was joined by Lieutenant Inglis, 14th Native Infantry, and Young, 1st Punjab Infantry, who assisted me in endeavouring to get sufficient men together to re-carry the "Crag" piquet itself. This we could not do owing to the confusion, but

\* 1. From Major Ross, Commanding Advanced Piquets.

2. From Major Brownlow, Commanding 20th Native Infantry.

3. From Major Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

4. From Captain Hughes, Commanding M. P. Train.

5. From Lieutenant Inglis, 14th Native Infantry.

6. From Colonel Salusbury, Commanding 101st Foot.

with some men of those two regiments and of the Guides, we reached the steep rocks of the piquet itself, where, within a few paces, we kept up as heavy a fire as we could on the top of the rocks, until the arrival of Her Majesty's 101st Fusiliers, with whom we re-took the Crag piquet.

Finding Colonel Salusbury, of Her Majesty's 101st, there, I made over the command to him.

It is my duty to mention the following officers and to request you to bring them to the Brigadier-General's notice:—

1. Major Brownlow, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, for his gallant defence of the "Crag" piquet during the entire night of the 12th November.

2. Captain Hughes, Peshawur Mountain Train, whose guns made the duties of the Infantry comparatively easy, and helped considerably in checking the enemy.

3. Major Keyes, who suffering and disabled by his wound, commanded his regiment and breast-work throughout, and stopped the advance of the enemy after the "Crag" piquet had been carried by them.

4—5. Lieutenants Inglis and Young, the former 14th Regiment Native Infantry, the latter 1st Punjab Infantry, for cool and gallant conduct and discharge of their duty at a time of much confusion.

6. Subadar Major Secunder Khan, 14th (Ferozepore) Regiment Native Infantry.

7. Sepoy Gundah Sing, 5th Company 1st Regiment Punjab Infantry.

8. Sepoy Jowahir Sing, 1st Company 14th (Ferozepore) Regiment.

9. Sepoy Unnoop Sing, 3rd Company 14th (Ferozepore) Regiment.

10. Sepoy Sher Sing, 5th Company 14th (Ferozepore) Regiment.

I forward from Major Keyes, 1st Punjab Infantry, a report of a gallant charge on the advancing enemy made by Lieutenant Pitcher, of that Corps, but which did not come under my personal observation.

Also with regard to the loss of the "Crag" piquet itself, a report from the senior surviving officer, (Captain Davidson, 1st Punjab Infantry, who commanded at the time, having relieved Major Brownlow, was killed at his post,) Lieutenant A. D. C. Inglis, 14th Regiment Native Infantry.

I believe the piquet was surprised, and would beg the consideration of the Brigadier-General to the heavy loss sustained by the men composing it.

P.S.—I have omitted, among the names of the men whom it is my wish to recommend to the notice of the Brigadier-General, that of—

Nihal Sing, Sepoy Cook No. 3 Company 14th Regiment Native Infantry, who, on my calling the men to the front on the high piquet being taken by the enemy, seized the belt and musket of a wounded man, and was most forward in the advance.

(Signed) C. G. ROSS, Major,  
Commanding 14th Regiment Native Infantry.

From Major C. H. Brownlow, Commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wade, C.B., Commanding Right Defence.  
— (Dated the 14th November, 1863.)

I have the honour to report as follows on the defence of the Crag piquet during the night of the 12th instant.

2. On my assuming command of the post at four P.M., the garrison consisted as under:—

15 marksmen 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, under the direction of Lieutenant Fosbery, Musketry Instructor.

115, 20th Punjab Infantry.

30, 14th Ferozepore Regiment.

3. The enemy occupied a level ridge about 250 yards to our front, his position extending more than half a mile in a direction facing our own. Between us lay a smooth hollow intersected by a ravine. The ground on our right and rear was precipitous, and almost unassailable in any force. The left face of the post was its weak point, rock and trees affording shelter to an attacking party till within a few yards of it.

4. Anticipating an attack, I had urged Lieutenant Bartleman, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who commanded the piquet during the day, to use his utmost exertions to improve the position as much as he could, by heightening the breast-work, constructing an abattis, &c., a duty which he performed admirably.

5. Before dark I had every man in his place for the night, with strict orders as to the nature of his duties, and the direction of his fire in case of attack.

6. About ten P.M. their watch-fire showed us that the enemy were in movement, and descending in great numbers to the hollow in our front, which in half an hour was full of them. Their suppressed voices soon broke into yells of defiance, and they advanced in masses to our attack, their numbers being, so far as I could judge from sight and sound, at least 2,000. I allowed them to approach within 100 yards of us, and then opened a rapid and well sustained file fire from our front face, which, I believe, did great execution, and soon silenced their shouts and drove them under cover, some to the broken and wooded ground to our left, and the rest into the ravine below us.

7. In half an hour they rallied, and assembling in almost increased numbers, rushed to the attack, this time assaulting on our front as well as on the left. They were received with the greatest steadiness, and again recoiled before our fire. These attacks continued till four A.M., each becoming weaker than the last, and many of them being mere faints to enable them to carry off their dead and wounded.

8. During the night I received very valuable assistance from Captain Hughes' Mountain Battery. From his position, about 250 yards below and in the right rear of the Crag, he made most successful practice, being guided as to direction and range by voice from our post. Before the attack commenced, he pitched two shells into the watch-fire of the enemy, which must have done considerable damage:

9. The post was at one time in great danger of being forced at its left front angle, which from its position was badly protected by our fire. The enemy clambered, and assailing its occupants with stones from our breastwork, stunned and drove them back at this critical moment. The gallantry of the undermentioned men saved the post; answering my call when others wavered, they followed me into the corner, and hurling stones on the enemy who was close under our wall and sheltered from musketry, drove him back and rebuilt the parapet, holding the point for the rest of the night:—

Havildar Allun Khan  
Naick Chutter Sing  
Sepoy Goolbadeen  
Sepoy Mahomed Khan  
Sepoy Alla Meer

20th Punjab Native  
Infantry.

10. I beg to append a Return of Casualties, which, I am glad to add, were not very serious, as owing to the darkness of the night, the enemy did not fire much or effectively.

11. In the morning, not more than eight or ten of the enemy were in sight, and my men having been forty-eight hours on picket, during which time they had worked all day and watched all night, were completely worn out; their muskets also were so foul that they could scarcely load. I therefore applied to Major Ross, commanding the advanced picket, for a relief, and at eight A.M. made over command of the post to the late Captain J. P. Davidson, who came with a detachment of the 1st Punjab Infantry.

(Signed) C. H. BROWNLOW, Major,  
Commanding 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

*From Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, to Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wide, C.B., Commanding Right Defence,—(Dated Camp, Umheylya Pass, the 16th November, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the morning of the 13th November, I was on the standard hill of "Keyes' Right Picket" with Lieutenant Conolly of the Peshawur Mountain Train, who was preparing a platform for his guns on the side of the hill for the protection of "Keyes' Centre" and "Cliff" pickets. Constant firing was heard at the "Crag" picket, but it did not attract any particular notice, as heavy firing had been kept up there all night, and was continued at intervals after the relief of the picket. While at the platform I received a note from the late Captain Davidson, who was commanding the picket, to say that he had only 90 men with him, which he did not consider sufficient. I immediately sent him up a reinforcement of 30 rifles under a Native officer, all that could be spared, as a serious attack was expected on the "Centre" and "Cliff" pickets.

2. Shortly after this reinforcement reached the "Crag" picket, I observed, as I was descending the standard hill, the men of the "Crag" picket rushing down in confusion. I did not see the commencement of the retreat, as the position was not visible from the platform where I was at the time. I immediately proceeded to the breastwork across the road by which the main post is approached from the "Crag"; here I rallied all the men that I could together, and kept up a heavy fire, which was taken up by Captain Hughes' guns; this checked the advance of the enemy; but, as many wounded and others from the "Crag" rushed past the breastwork and could not be stopped, a panic was communicated to our camp-followers, who took to flight and increased the confusion. These men retreating had a visible effect upon all, and I felt the necessity of an advance to re-assure those that were wavering, and to further check the enemy until reinforcement should arrive. I therefore directed a few men to remain in the breast-work, and ordered the rest to "charge"—Lieutenants Pitcher and Young, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, headed this charge. A small detachment of the Guides that were in charge of the rear defence of our post was brought up by Lieutenant Forlong, of that corps, and gallantly proceeded to support Lieutenant Pitcher; they were too weak, however, to regain the "Crag," which with the greatest coolness and daring, they attempted to assault, but they had to fall back on the rocks. I got together a few more men whom I sent up to support them.

3. Major Ross, commanding the post, arrived at this time from the lower picket. I considered

my presence at the breastwork absolutely necessary to keep the men together; the duty therefore of leading the first charge devolved upon Lieutenant Pitcher, and I beg to bring to the special notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the admirable manner in which he performed this important duty; he was by many yards the foremost of his party, and the gallant bearing of this excellent young officer was the admiration of all spectators. It is impossible to say too much or to over-rate his services on this occasion. Lieutenant Pitcher was severely wounded, and was obliged to be carried back. I beg also to bring to the special notice of the Brigadier-General Commanding the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Young—this officer ably assisted Lieutenant Pitcher throughout, and made himself most conspicuous for his coolness and gallantry, which was witnessed by all below, and elicited the special notice of Major Ross, Commanding.

4. The following men also distinguished themselves:—

Sepoy Syud Khan,	No. 4 Company.
" Gunda Sing,	No. 5 "
" Shurruff Khan,	No. 8 "
" Zurreef,	No. 1 "
" Futteh,	No. 1 "

A Casualty Return and Returns of arms and accoutrements lost on this occasion, is herewith enclosed.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Army Head-Quarters,—(No. 8, dated Camp, heights above the Umheylya Pass, the 21st November, 1863.)*

IN continuation of my former reports, I have the honour to report for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that at daylight on the morning of the 18th instant, the whole of our pickets on the Gurroo Mountains, under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's command, consisting of the Huzara Mountain Train, and 3rd, 5th, and 6th Punjab Infantry, were withdrawn, and the entire camp and troops transferred to the heights on the south of the Pass, which position alone the force has since occupied.

2. In anticipation of this change of position the Commissariat stores, reserve ammunition, &c., &c., had been gradually removed, on previous days, to the eastern ridge. The guns of Captain Griffin's Battery were removed from the advanced breast-work of camp late on the evening of the 17th, and placed in the new position, so as to cover the withdrawal of the pickets from the Gurroo. They were replaced temporarily by two guns of the Huzara Mountain Train from the Gurroo. Every precaution was at the same time taken to prevent the enemy from suspecting the intended movement, and the troops, both on the Gurroo, and in the front line of defence, continued, up to the last moment, to strengthen their breastworks and defences. These precautions were successful; and though the enemy's pickets on the Gurroo were not 400 yards above our own, the withdrawal was effected without their knowledge, and in the most perfect order.

3. The concentration of the whole of the troops on the eastern heights made it necessary to extend the position, and particularly to secure the full command of the water, on which the whole force was now dependent. With this view, the troops as per margin,\* moved out under my personal com-

\* Peshawur Mountain Train; Wing 101st Regiment; 1st and 6th Punjab Infantry.

mand, as soon as the change of position was completed, to drive the enemy from what has since been known as the "Water Ridge." This was very quickly effected by an advance and charge of the 1st and 6th Punjab Infantry, with the loss on our side of three men wounded, and some of the enemy killed. The troops were then placed in position to protect the 5th Punjab Infantry and 32nd Pioneer Regiment, which were employed as a working party under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, C.B., Chief Engineer, in stockading a piquet to command the water. The troops were withdrawn to camp in the evening, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, the new work having been completed and occupied. I may here mention by anticipation that the position of the piquet having been found to be more advanced than was necessary, it was abandoned on the following day, the 19th, and a new position chosen and stockaded about three hundred yards to the rear.

4. On discovering the camp and piquets on the Gurroo to have been vacated by the troops, the enemy seem to have supposed that the force was in retreat, and with this idea, came into the gorge in great numbers, both from Umbeyla and from the Gurroo, and thence, about eleven A.M., commenced an attack upon what had now become the left front of our position. Our defences at the point principally attacked, consisted of some small breastworks, thrown up on the side of the hill to cover the piquets, connecting what have been called in my previous reports, the "Advanced Right Piquets," with the camp in the gorge below. It was not my intention to hold these breastworks permanently, after the camp had been removed from the gorge; but it was necessary to hold them during the day of the 18th to prevent the enemy from pressing upon the camp and firing into it before the troops were thoroughly established on their new position. These breastworks were held, on the morning of the 18th, by 130 men of the 14th Native Infantry, who, being greatly outnumbered by the enemy, were in the first instance compelled to give way, but being reinforced by the troops, as per margin,\* re-took the post, and drove back the enemy. The enemy, however, having gained a large accession of numbers, re-attacked the piquets, when it became necessary for the two lowest down on the hill to fall back on the third, which was nearer the camp breastworks. I regret to say that our loss on this occasion was very considerable, including the following officers:—

Captain C. F. Smith, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, an Officer of long and good service; Lieutenant H. H. Chapman, Adjutant of the 101st Regiment, who had been sent by his Commanding Officer to convey an order, and who, feeling that his own wound was mortal, begged of his men to leave him, and to assist Captain Smith to the rear instead. His regiment has lost in Lieutenant Chapman an admirable Adjutant, and the service a most promising officer; Lieutenant T. S. G. Jones, of the 79th Highlanders, who, on officers being called for for the Force, had joined the 71st Light Infantry as a volunteer; and Lieutenant W. F. Mosley, of the 14th Native Infantry, who was shot when the lower piquets were forced to retire. The conduct of C. C. G. Ross, Commandant of the 14th Native Infantry, on this occasion merited my approval, and I again beg to recommend him to his Excellency's notice, having

already done so for his conduct at the Crag piquet on the 13th instant.

5. I may here mention, by anticipation, that the bodies of those killed on this occasion, and which could not be brought in at the time, were recovered on the morning of the 21st instant, by a force employed for that purpose under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, when twelve of the enemy were killed.

6. The piquet upon which the lower piquets had retired was withdrawn after dark on the 18th agreeably to my previous intention. On its withdrawal the enemy pressed on, and some few of them endeavoured to annoy the camp until at a late hour of the night, but without making any serious attack.

7. Throughout the 19th the enemy kept up a fire upon the Crag and Water Piquets. I regret to say that Captain R. B. Aldridge, 71st Highland Light Infantry, was killed at the latter, and Ensign C. M. Stockley, 101st Regiment, severely wounded at the former piquet.

8. About nine A.M. on the 20th, the enemy began to collect in great numbers near the Crag and Water Piquets, the Crag being, as before, the point principally threatened. They were, however checked in some degree by the fire of the Peshawur Mountain Train Guns, Captain Hughes, from previous experience and his acquaintance with the ground, knowing exactly on what points to bring his fire with most effect, even though the enemy were not visible from the battery. The Crag and Water Piquets also mutually supported one another by their cross fire at 450 yards. The detachment by which each of these posts was held is shown in the margin.\*

9. Up to a late period of the afternoon the enemy had made no impression upon the Crag Piquet, though numerous standards had been gradually advanced under cover to within a few yards of the breastwork, but about three P.M. the unaccountable conduct of a portion of the garrison gave the enemy possession of the post. This was not, however accomplished without affording the officers and men who held the lower portion of the piquet the opportunity of distinguishing themselves by the resolute way in which they endeavoured to hold their portion of the post under very discouraging circumstances, and who only abandoned it when it was no longer tenable. These officers were Major H. G. Delafosse, of the 101st Regiment, who commanded the piquet; Captain R. G. Rogers, of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry; Ensign A. R. Sanderson, and Staff Assistant-Surgeon W. Pile, both of the 101st Regiment. The two last officers were, I regret to say, killed at the breastwork whilst endeavouring to rally their men. The above officers were well supported by some of No. 5 Company of the 101st Regiment, and by some of the 20th Native Infantry.

10. On the fall of the Crag Piquet coming to my notice, I immediately ordered the 71st Highland Light Infantry and the 5th Goorkha Regiment to be got under arms and proceed to the upper Camp; and at the same time directed Captain Griffin's half Battery, and the two 24-pounder howitzers of No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery under Captain T. H. Salt, to open fire upon the Crag, which they did in so efficient a manner as (joined to the fire of Captain Hughes' Mountain Train Guns) effectually prevented the enemy from attempting to occupy it in anything like large numbers. On the 71st and Goorkha Regiment reaching the upper defences, I ordered Colonel

\* Two Companies 71st Highland Light Infantry, under Major Parker; one Company 101st Bengal Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Chapman; one Company 5th Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Fox; three Companies 5th Goorkha Regiment, under Captain Close.

\* Crag Piquet.—100 of the 101st Regiment; 100 of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry.

Water Piquet.—100 of the 71st Highland Light Infantry; 100 of the 3rd Punjab Infantry.

Hope, C.B., Commanding the former Regiment, to storm the Crag in front, and Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, with the 5th Goorkha Regiment and 5th Punjab Infantry, to go round the hill, so as to take the lower portion of it in flank. The 71st discharged their duty in the most steady and soldier-like manner, led by Colonel Hope with a coolness which elicited the respect of all who witnessed it. The Crag was re-occupied, fortunately without much loss to ourselves, Lieutenant S. Beckett, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, being one of the first to reach the summit, and Colonel Hope then pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy, having been joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan's Column, and drove them for some distance over the heights in the direction of Lalloo. After continuing the pursuit as far as seemed prudent, Colonel Hope led the troops back towards the Crag, and I much regret to say, was severely wounded whilst superintending the re-occupation of the piquet, which, at his special request, was garrisoned for the night by 200 men of his own Regiment.

11. I considered it my duty to accompany the storming Column, and whilst ascending the hill, was wounded in the arm. Lieutenant Anderson, Adjutant of the 3rd Punjab Cavalry, my Orderly Officer, was also wounded.

12. I must not omit to mention with highest commendation the excellent service rendered by the Artillery, both previous to and during the assault of the Crag; and I beg to bring the names of the officers Commanding Batteries\* to the favourable notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Hughes' guns were served under a heavy fire, and their position, namely, on the upper defences immediately adjoining the Crag, made their assistance most valuable at a very critical moment.

13. I beg to enclose Casualty Returns of the 18th, 19th, and 20th instant.

\* Captain Griffin, Commanding C. Battery, 19th Brigade; Captain T. H. Salt, Commanding No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery; Captain T. Hughes, Commanding Peshawar Mountain Train.

*CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the Eusefyje Field Force.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, 18th November, 1863.*

Date and occasion.	Killed.			Wounded.			Miles.	Remarks.
	Regiments.	European Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Rank and File.	
Attack on Key's Lower Piquet under Major Ross, Commanding, 18th November, 1863.	Peshawar Mountain Battery	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
	71st Highland Light Infantry	2	...	3	...	1	4	...
	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	1	...	2	...	...	3	...
	Guide Infantry	...	...	...	...	1	...	...
	1st Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	4	...
	5th " "	1	...	...	...	...	1	...
	20th " "	...	...	...	...	...	1	...
	14th " "	1	7	18	1	3	46	...
	5th Goorkhas	...	...	9	...	...	8	...
	6th Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	2	...
	Total	...	4	7	33	1	5	69
								1

Killed.  
 Captain Smith, 71st Highland Light Infantry.  
 Lieutenant Jones, 70th Highlanders.  
 Lieut. and Adjutant Chapman, 101st Royal Bengal Fusrs.  
 Lieutenant Mosley, 14th Perozepore Regiment.  
 Wounded.  
 Lieutenant Inglis, 14th Perozepore Regiment.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
 Assistant Adjutant-General.  
 No. 22835.

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
 Commanding Eusefyje Field Force.

**CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the Euzufzye Field Force.***Camp, Umbeyla Pass, November 19, 1863.*

Date and occasion.	Regiments.	Killed.		Wounded.		Remarks.
		European Officers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Rank and File.	
On piquet duty, 19th November, 1863.	71st Highland Light Infantry...	1	1	...	...	Killed. Captain Aldridge, 71st Highland Light Infantry.
	101st R. B. Fusiliers ...	...	...	1	1	
	14th Ferozepore Regiment ...	...	...	...	1	Wounded. Ensign Stockley, 101st R. B. Fusiliers.
	20th Punjab Infantry ...	...	...	...	1	
	3rd Punjab Infantry ...	...	...	...	1	
	Peshawur Battery ...	...	...	...	1	
	Total ...	1	1	1	5	

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant-Adjutant-General.(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Euzufzye Field Force.**CASUALTY RETURN, Killed and Wounded, of the Eusufzye Field Force.***Camp, Umbeyla Pass, November 20, 1863.*

Date and occupation.	Regiments.	Killed.			Wounded.				Mules.	Remarks.	
		European Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Serjeants, Duffadars, Havildars.	Buglers, Trumpeters, Pipers.	Rank and File.		Wounded.
Evacuation of the Crag Piquet, and re-capture from the enemy, 20th November, 1863.	Peshawur Mountain Battery	...	...	1	...	...	1	...	1	2	Killed. Ensign Sanderson, 101st Regiment. Assistant-Surgeon File, 101st Regiment.
	71st Highland Light Infantry	...	...	7	1	...	1	...	24	...	
	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	2	...	11	...	...	...	...	24	...	Wounded. Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B. Colonel Hope, C.B., 71st Highland Light Infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, slightly. Major Campbell, 5th Goorkhas. Lieutenant Anderson, 3rd Punjab Cavalry.
	1st Punjab Native Infantry	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	
	3rd Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	
	5th Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	1	1	1	...	4	...	
	20th Punjab Native Infantry	...	1	2	...	...	1	1	30	...	
	5th Goorkhas	...	...	2	1	...	1	...	9	...	
	6th Punjab Native Infantry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	
	General Staff	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	
Total	...	2	2	23	5	1	5	1	98	2	

(Signed) G. ALLGOOD, Quartermaster-General,  
for T. WRIGHT, Major, Assistant Adjutant-General.(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters, Camp Nowsheera,—(No. 9, dated Camp, Heights above the Umbeyla Pass, the 25th November, 1863).*

MY wound has proved more serious than I expected, and it is with the greatest regret that I have to request that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will be pleased, at the earliest practicable date, to relieve me of my command, the duties of which will, I feel sure, be efficiently discharged by Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., the next senior officer, until the arrival of my successor.

2. My connection with the force being thus about to terminate, it is my duty to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the excellent conduct of the troops, both British and Native, since they have been in the field. The nature of the service has made the duty unusually heavy, and the troops have been under arms and on duty almost day and night. On no occasion, however, has there been the smallest murmur on this account, and every duty has been performed with the most cheerful alacrity.

3. His Excellency will, I feel sure, consider it most satisfactory that, though the ranks of the native regiments contain members of almost every tribe on the frontier, including those which are fighting against us, there have been desertions and no backwardness, in any instance, to engage the enemy.

4. The services of every regiment with the force have, in one or other of my reports, been brought to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief, with the exception of the 32nd Punjab Native Infantry (Pioneers) under Major Morgan, and the 4th and 5th Companies of the Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Tucker. The nature of the service has made it indispensable to employ the 32nd altogether on the defences and lines of communication, and I take this opportunity of saying that its services, and those of the sapper companies, have been of the greatest value to the force. With regard to the 32nd, such was the paucity of men that, even when they had laboured during the day at the breastworks and roads, it was impossible to avoid putting a portion of them on duty at night for the defence of the camp. The discipline of the regiment and their conduct reflects great credit on Major Morgan and his officers. I believe too that the services of the Guide Infantry have been less prominently alluded to in my later reports than they deserve. This has arisen from the regiment having been chiefly employed in detachments to reinforce and support the troops in front. I therefore wish here to notice the excellent service rendered by two companies of the regiment under Captain Jenkins, second in command, on the 6th instant, when in support of the covering party under the late Major Harding, on which occasion Lieutenant Battye, doing-duty officer, was wounded; and of three companies under Captain Jenkins, which acted in concert with the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers in the recovery of the Crag piquet on the 13th instant.

5. I may also mention here that, although there was no scope for the employment of the few cavalry (11th Bengal Cavalry and Guide Cavalry) retained in camp as such, yet they always took dismounted duty, and were most useful in aiding in the night defence of the camp.

6. I would next wish to bring to his Excellency's notice the very meritorious conduct of the whole of the officers of the force, from whom I have at all times received the most cordial support, and whose services I would beg to be allowed thus

publicly to acknowledge. The officers whom I would particularly beg to notice are as follows:—

Colonel Hope, C.B., commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry, who had command of the front defences from the time of the arrival of the force in the Umbeyla Pass until the time of its changing position to the eastern heights, and whose distinguished conduct at the re-taking of the Crag piquet was particularly noticed in my Report No. 8.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., Commandant of the Guide Corps, who commanded the right defences to my entire satisfaction, and who, although the position his regiment occupied in the camp did not give him the opportunity of gaining distinction in actual conflict with the enemy, has rendered me the most constant and valuable aid, and I would particularly allude to the excellent arrangements he made for the re-capture of the Crag piquet when it was taken by the enemy on the 13th November, as noticed in my Report No. 7.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, Commandant 5th Punjab Infantry, who commanded the left defences from the time of the arrival of the force in the Umbeyla Pass to its changing its position to the right heights with my confidence and approval. His conduct on the occasion of the attack by the enemy on the "Eagle's Nest" and piquets on the Gurroo Mountain was most favourably reported upon in my Report No. 4. After the change of position, he commanded the upper camp, and his services were again mentioned in my Report No. 8. He has at all times rendered me the most cordial assistance and support. I consider him a most intelligent officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., Royal Engineers, Chief Engineer with the force, who has afforded me throughout the most hearty co-operation, and whose services have been of great assistance to the force. With Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor's name, I would wish to connect those of his Subalterns, Lieutenants H. F. Blair, J. Browne, and T. T. Carter, all of the Royal Engineers, who, whether when engaged with the enemy, or when employed in their more regular duties, have well upheld the reputation of their corps. Lieutenant Carter joined the force to carry out the objects of the Trigonometrical Survey, and volunteered his services under Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor.

Captain J. S. Tulloch, Royal Artillery, Senior Artillery Officer with the force, who most cheerfully overcame all difficulties, and in whose opinion, in all matters connected with his arm of his service, I had perfect confidence. With Captain Tulloch's name I would wish to connect those of Captain F. C. Griffin and Captain T. H. Salt, commanding half batteries of Field Artillery, whose services were recorded in my Reports Nos. 5 and 8, and of Captain F. R. DeBude and Captain T. Hughes, commanding the Mountain Batteries. In Captains DeBude and Hughes the service has two officers most admirably fitted for the command of Mountain Batteries, and who, by their zeal, have, I believe, brought this arm of the service to as great a degree of efficiency as the ordnance at present in use will admit of. Captain DeBude's services have been recorded in my Report No. 4, and Captain Hughes' in my Reports Nos. 3, 7, and 8.

Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury, commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, whom I have found most zealous in the discharge of every duty, and whose distinguished conduct in the re-taking of the Crag piquet on the 13th November was specially alluded to in my Report No. 7.

Major Ross, commanding 14th Native Infantry, whom I consider an officer of most soldierly determination, and whose excellent conduct on the

13th and 18th November has been specially noticed in my Reports Nos. 7 and 8.

Major C. H. Brownlow, Commandant 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who particularly distinguished himself when covering the retreat of the reconnoitring party, 22nd October; when commanding the "Eagle's Nest" piquet, 26th October; and when commanding the Crag piquet on the night of the 12th November, as related in my Reports Nos. 2, 4, and 7. In addition to any other mark of approval his Excellency may consider this officer to deserve, I would most strongly recommend him as having well earned the distinction of the Victoria Cross by his personal gallantry on each occasion of his being engaged.

Major C. P. Keyes, Commandant 1st Punjab Infantry, whose distinguished conduct on every occasion of his being engaged has been specially brought to notice in my various Reports Nos. 1, 3, 5, and 7, and whose claim to the Victoria Cross for his services on the 30th October I submitted for his Excellency's consideration in my Report No. 5. His services have been of the utmost value to the force.

Captain W. D. Hoste, Commandant 6th Punjab Infantry. I beg to thank this officer for his cheerful and soldierly bearing, and for his marked gallantry at the head of his regiment, on the 26th October, as related in my Report No. 4.

Surgeon Simpson, 71st Highland Light Infantry, Senior Medical Officer with the British portion of the force, on whom it devolved to make all arrangements for the sick and wounded of the British troops, which duty he performed to my entire satisfaction.

Surgeon H. B. Buckle, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, Senior Medical Officer with the native portion of the force, who superintended all arrangements for the numerous Native sick and wounded in the most zealous and efficient manner, which I particularly wish to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain T. H. Jenkins, in charge of the Commissariat Department of the force, two whom the force is highly indebted for his untiring exertions to keep it supplied. I can accord him no greater praise than to place upon record that the force was throughout as well supplied as if it had been in cantonments. I beg to bring his services especially to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief.

7. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Probin, who commanded the small party of cavalry in camp, was only afforded the opportunity of conducting the reconnoitring party in the Chumla Valley on 22nd October, and of charging the enemy, who endeavoured to cut off his return to camp, still I feel that I should not be just were I to omit to bring to notice his extreme desire to have his men employed on every duty where it was possible to employ dismounted cavalry, and the cheerful manner in which he made his own services available on every possible occasion.

8. In giving prominence to the names of the above officers, I beg to express my hope that the services of officers whose names have been brought to notice in my previous reports, but who are not mentioned in the above list, will also obtain the favourable consideration of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; and I would also beg to acknowledge the services of my Staff, namely, Lieutenant-Colonel Allgood, Assistant Quartermaster-General, who discharged his duties to my satisfaction, and afforded me every assistance, Major Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant F. N. Mackenzie (Staff Officer, Punjab Irregular Force), Lieutenant W. C. Anderson, and Lieutenant H. S. Jarrett, who acted as my Orderly Officers, and gave me perfect satisfaction.

9. I annex to this report a nominal roll of three Privates\* of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, and of one Sergeant, one Lance Corporal, and four Privates† of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, who are recommended by the officers commanding those regiments for their distinguished gallantry. If the acts of gallantry for which they are recommended are not deemed by the Commander-in-Chief of a nature to give all of them a claim to the Victoria Cross, I trust his Excellency will be able to find some other means of rewarding them. Authority has already been given me to admit to the Order of Merit those Native officers and soldiers who have distinguished themselves, and it will be acted upon without delay.

10. In conclusion I beg to acknowledge the hearty co-operation I have received throughout from Colonel Reynell Taylor, C.B., who has been, up to within the last few days, Chief Civil and Political Officer in camp. Colonel Taylor used every possible endeavour to procure information of the movements and proceedings of the enemy, and when the situation of affairs afforded little scope for political negotiations, both he and his Assistant, Captain A. A. Munro, Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar, resumed their position as Military Officers, and accompanied the troops when engaged with the enemy.

11. To make my reports complete, I enclose a general casualty return, showing all the casualties in the force up to date.

#### *Roll of men of Her Majesty's 101st Regiment recommended for distinguished gallantry in the Field.*

These men‡ (marksmen) behaved with remarkable coolness and courage in the "Eagle's Nest" piquet on the 26th October, 1863, under command of Captain Butler, V.C., when the piquet was desperately assaulted by an immense number of the enemy. Major Brownlow, who commanded the post, has reported them for their coolness and gallantry on the occasion, and this report was duly forwarded through Brigadier Wilde, C.B. I now attach a letter which was addressed for my information by Captain Butler on the 3rd December.

This soldier§ behaved with extreme gallantry and coolness, when the 101st Regiment assaulted and re-took the "Crag" piquet on the 13th November, 1863, and was one of the leading men at the top of the hill with me; three of the other leading men were shot as they entered the breastwork. I personally witnessed this soldier's gallantry and good example.

These two soldiers|| behaved with great coolness and gallantry at the Crag piquet on the 20th November, 1863, when the piquet was assaulted and taken by the enemy. Major Delafosse, who commanded the piquets, reports highly on their conduct; his letter is attached. A report was previously forwarded through Brigadier Wilde, C.B.

(Signed)

F. O. SALUSBURY, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding 101st Regiment.  
Camp, Nowa Killa, the 27th December, 1863.

\* 71st Highland Light Infantry.—Privates William Clapperton, George Stewart, William Malcolm.

† 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.—Sergeant Jeremiah Brosnan; Lance-Corporal G. Simister; Privates Francis Barber, Daniel Lane, Francis Elliott, Charles FitzPatrick.

‡ No. 6, Sergeant Jeremiah Brosnan; No. 984, Lance-Corporal George Simister; No. 26, Private Francis Barber. § 650, Daniel Lane (Private).

|| No. 347, Private Francis Elliot; No. 379, Private Charles FitzPatrick.

## HER MAJESTY'S 71ST HIGHLAND LIGHT INFANTRY.

*NOMINAL ROLL of Men of the above Corps, who distinguished themselves while under the Command of Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.*

*Camp, Nowa Killa, December 26, 1863.*

Regimental Number.	Rank and Names.	Particulars of acts of gallantry.
3907	Private William Clapperton ...	These two men were specially mentioned by Major Brownlow, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, for having displayed the most conspicuous gallantry on the attack of the Eagle's Nest on the 20th October, 1863. These two men are marksmen
3765	Private George Stewart ...	
4010	Private William Malcolm ...	
		This man was specially mentioned by Captain Rogers, 20th Regiment Native Infantry, for having distinguished himself on the occasion Major Harding was killed on the 6th November, 1863

(Signed) N. PARKER, Major,  
Commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*NUMERICAL RETURN of Killed and Wounded in the above Force to 20th November, 1863, inclusive.*

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.				Total.
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.	
1-C. Battery 19th Brigade Royal Artillery ...	...	...	...	3	2	5
Hazara Mountain Train Battery ...	1	1	1	2	2	7
Peshawur Mountain Train Battery ...	3	1	...	7	1	12
Guide Cavalry ...	...	...	...	1	1	2
11th Bengal Cavalry ...	1	...	...	1	...	2
Her Majesty's 71st Highland Light Infantry ...	20	4	5	19	22	70
Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	21	2	5	24	23	75
Guide Infantry ...	2	...	...	1	5	8
1st Punjab Infantry ...	34	12	4	39	27	116
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	5	2	2	6	8	23
5th Punjab Infantry ...	6	1	1	7	8	23
6th Punjab Infantry ...	11	6	10	16	16	59
14th Ferozepore Regiment Native Infantry ...	47	9	8	33	22	119
20th Punjab Infantry ...	32	7	...	45	49	133
32nd Native Infantry (Pioneers) ...	...	...	...	...	4	4
4th Goorkha Regiment ...	5	...	...	2	2	9
5th Goorkha Regiment ...	25	4	2	15	18	64
Total ...	213	49	38	221	210	731

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant-Adjutant-General.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*NOMINAL ROLL of Officers of the above Forces Killed in Action to 20th November, 1863, inclusive.*

Date of Casualty.	Rank and Names.	Corps or Department.
1863.		
22nd October ...	Lieutenant Gillies ...	Hazara Mounted Battery
26th " ...	Lieutenant Clifford ...	3rd Punjab Native Infantry
26th " ...	Lieutenant Richmond ...	20th Punjab Native Infantry
6th November ...	Ensign C. B. Murray ...	71st Highland Light Infantry
6th " ...	Lieutenant Dougall ...	79th Highlanders
6th " ...	Major G. W. Harding ...	2nd Light Infantry
13th " ...	Lieutenant J. P. Davidson ...	1st Punjab Native Infantry
18th " ...	Captain C. F. Smith ...	71st Highland Light Infantry
18th " ...	Lieutenant Jones ...	79th Highlanders
18th " ...	Lieutenant H. H. Chapinan ...	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers
18th " ...	Lieutenant W. F. Mosely ...	14th Native Infantry
19th " ...	Captain R. B. Aldridge ...	71st Native Infantry
20th " ...	Ensign A. R. Sanderson ...	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers
20th " ...	Assistant-Surgeon W. Pile ...	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*NOMINAL ROLL of Officers of the above Force wounded in action to 20th November, 1863, inclusive.*

Date.	Rank and Names.	Corps or Department.	Remarks.
26th October ...	Lieutenant F. Drake ...	32nd Native Infantry ...	
26th " ...	" Barron ...	Survey Department ...	
30th " ...	Major C. P. Keyes ...	1st Punjab Native Infantry ...	
30th " ...	Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher ...	1st " ...	
6th November	" W. Battye ...	Guide Infantry ...	
6th " ...	" J. S. Oliphant ...	5th Goorkhas ...	
6th " ...	" H. W. Pitcher ...	1st Punjab Native Infantry ...	2nd time wounded.
13th " ...	" A. D. C. Inglis ...	14th Native Infantry ...	
18th " ...	Ensign C. M. Stoekeley ...	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	
20th " ...	Colonel W. Hope, C.B....	71st Highland Light Infantry	
20th " ...	Major J. P. W. Campbell ...	5th Goorkhas... ..	
20th " ...	Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan ...	5th Punjab Native Infantry ...	
20th " ...	Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K C.B	General Staff ... ..	
20th " ...	Lieutenant Anderson ...	Orderly Officer ... ..	
22nd October ...	" Brown ...	Royal Engineers ... ..	

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Signed) N. CHAMBERLAIN, Brigadier-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Major-General J. Garvock, Commanding Field Force, to Adjutant-General of the Army, (dated Head Quarters, 22nd December, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the operations carried on by the troops under my command since I last addressed you, have resulted in the total defeat and complete submission of the enemy.

2. In my letter of the 10th instant, I informed you that I intended to attack on the following morning, according to a plan of which I then gave the details. And in the postscript of that letter, I made you acquainted with the causes which obliged me to abandon that intention; and informed you that the "Jirgah," or Council of Elders, of the Bonairwals, had come to our camp, and been received by the Commissioner.

3. They remained with us until the following day, when they took their departure for the purpose of consulting their people, and of determining whether to accept or to reject the proposals made by Major James for establishing a Treaty of Peace. Their final answer was received and communicated to me by the Commissioner on the afternoon of the 14th instant; and as it was of an unsatisfactory nature, I at once determined to move against the enemy early on the following morning.

4. The necessary arrangements were accordingly made. Rations for two days were served out and cooked during the night; and at day-break on the 15th instant, a force, composed as per margin,\* of 4,800 men, unencumbered by tents or baggage was ready to move. 2,900 men under Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, of the 5th Punjab Infantry, were left in camp for its protection.

5. The attacking troops were formed into two columns, under the command, respectively, of Brigadiers Turner and Wilde. The first, under Brigadier Turner led the way; and, issuing from our position by the Water piquet, at once drove in the enemy's outposts from the ridge in its front. Brigadier Wilde followed by the Crag piquet with the second column; and the whole force was shortly formed under cover of the ridge and immediately in front of the enemy's main position.

6. This was of the most formidable kind. Immediately before us, at a distance of some six hundred yards, rose a conical hill of considerable height. Its sides were rocky, precipitous, and scarped by nature; and its summit, strongly occupied, was strengthened by stone breastworks offering no ordinary obstacle. The ascent of this hill would be a matter of considerable difficulty under any circumstances. Below it, and to its proper left, were a number of temporary huts, strongly protected by artificial defences. Beyond it stretched a narrow ridge terminating in a hill of lesser elevation, and then came a small picturesque level, backed by a lofty range, and containing the village of Lalloo. On the right of our position was a deep valley, and on the left several steep descending spurs, stretching down into the gorge leading from our camp to the valley of Chumla.

7. My arrangements for the attack were soon completed. Covered by the fire of the guns of the Mountain Train, which were admirably served, the whole line of Infantry, throwing its right

shoulders forward, with the exception of some regiments on the extreme left, to which I shall presently refer, advanced, on a signal given by myself, in admirable order. The men swarmed up the sides of the conical hill; and, having halted for a moment to recover breath under cover of the rocks near its summit, burst over the breastworks, and at once carried the position. Bearing in mind the precipitous nature and extreme difficulty of the ground, and the heavy fire maintained by the enemy, the trifling loss on our side affords the best proof of the coolness and judgment displayed by officers in command, and the steadiness as well as dashing gallantry of the men.

8. The key of the enemy's position being thus in our hands, that excellent and energetic officer, Brigadier Turner, pressed rapidly forward with the greater part of his column to the village of Lalloo. It was quickly in his possession, and, with its large stores of grain, at once destroyed.

9. Meanwhile the enemy had not been idle in other quarters of the field. With a peculiar aptness, for which he has always shown himself remarkable, to turn his knowledge of the country to the best account, and evidently under the impression, from the conflagration at Lalloo, that our force had pressed on too far leaving its left unguarded, he directed a heavy column up the spurs leading from the gorge, and vigorously assaulted Brigadier Wilde. But he was met on the crest, and held in check by the regiments placed there with that especial object by that most valuable and judicious officer. Apprehensive that the force opposed to the Brigadier might be overpowering, I had dispatched to his support two companies of the 7th Royal Fusiliers; and while they were in the act of moving towards him, he sent me an urgent request for aid. I then further reinforced him with the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, with the exception of four Companies left at the conical hill and on the ridge beyond it, protecting two guns of the Mountain Train. A forward movement was now made; and the 101st Fusiliers, 3rd Seikhs, and 5th Goorkhas, leaving the rest of the column in reserve, poured down on the enemy, and drove him with great slaughter headlong down the steep.

10. Simultaneously with this attack on our left, the camp was hotly assailed by a large body of the enemy. But the force left to defend it, under that very excellent officer Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, well discharged its important duty. The enclosed report marked No. 1,\* with its inclosure, will give the details; and I have therefore only to draw the special attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the distinguished gallantry of Major Keyes and of Lieutenant Unwin. A loss to the enemy of about 80 killed was the result of their vigorous onslaughts.

11. All opposition having now ceased, and the enemy being in full retreat in every direction, arrangements were made for bivouacking for the night. Brigadier Turner occupied the ground he had gained in the vicinity of Lalloo; Brigadier Wilde, that between the camp and the conical hill. Not a shot was fired at us during the night.

12. Early on the morning of the 16th instant, having learned that horsemen might possibly succeed in accomplishing the descent from our position, I brought from camp 400 sabres of the 11th Bengal Cavalry and Guide Corps, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Probyn. On their arrival the order was given to move. Brigadier Wilde, whose column I myself accompanied, passed down by the spurs in his immediate front; the Mountain Train guns attached to him, and

\* Peshawar Mountain Train, 4 guns; Hazarah Mountain Train, 4 guns; 2 Companies Sappers; 7th Royal Fusiliers; 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers; 4th Goorkha Regiment; 23rd Regiment Pioneers; 32nd Regiment Pioneers; Corps of Guides; 3rd Punjab Infantry; 3rd Sikh Infantry; 5th Goorkha Regiment; — 1 D Battery Royal Artillery, 3 guns; 1 No. 3 Punjab Battery, 2 guns; 71st Highland Light Infantry; 93rd Highlanders; 14th Regiment Native Infantry; 20th Regiment Native Infantry; 1st Punjab Infantry; 5th Punjab Infantry.

\* No. 1. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, with inclosure from Major Keyes.

Lieutenant Colonel Probyn's Cavalry descending by a steep path which ran down a hollow on his right. The descent occupied about two hours, ground more difficult for mounted men having never before, I believe, been traversed, even in the hills of the Amatola. The various paths were marked with blood, evidence of the severe loss suffered by the enemy, who had been engaged during the night in carrying off his wounded men.

13. Having reached the level ground below, I observed the enemy in force occupying a spur which ran down from the extremity of the Gurroo Mountain on our left, and stretching very nearly across the entrance of the gorge, barred our advance to the Valley of Chumla. Having carefully examined the position, which was one singularly well chosen and of unusual strength, I determined to attack and turn its right. Having made his dispositions, Brigadier Wilde moved forward accordingly.

14. In the meantime, Brigadier Turner had been conducting his descent from Lalloo with great ability. Passing down by several ridges, he caused his left regiment to effectually protect the right of the column under Brigadier Wilde, which it ultimately joined; his next corps reached the valley at the very point where the spur forming the enemy's position, and the end of which I directed it immediately to seize, disappeared in the level, while the main portion of his column debouched into the open immediately opposite the town of Umbeyla, where it at once deployed into line. The ground over which he passed was of extraordinary difficulty, and scarcely practicable for even the Mountain Train. A Company of Sappers, under Lieutenant Tucker, rendered most valuable service.

15. Up to this time the cavalry had remained concealed behind a projecting spur. I now ordered it to advance. Pressing on at a gallop, these splendid horsemen, under their well-known leader, Lieutenant Colonel Probyn, C.B. and V.C., and Captain Hawes, of the Guide Corps, passed round the left of the enemy's position now in our possession, swept into the valley beyond, and halted to the eastward of Umbeyla. The town had been previously abandoned, and was immediately fired. All other property in the valley has been scrupulously protected, but Lalloo and Umbeyla well deserved their fate.

16. Brigadier Wilde encountered but little opposition where the most had been expected. The ground in his front was of singular strength, and peculiarly capable of defence, but the enemy, seeing his left so effectually turned by Brigadier Turner's column and by the cavalry, abandoned his position, and, almost without firing a shot, retreated slowly towards the Pass leading to Bonair.

17. Brigadier Turner now received an order from me to advance and endeavour to cut off the enemy retiring to the Pass before Brigadier Wilde. He moved across the valley in perfect and beautiful order, passed close to the left of the burning town of Umbeyla, and arrived within a few hundred yards of the Pass. Then the enemy, probably perceiving his object, furiously attacked, sword in hand, the 23rd and 32nd Regiments of Sikh Pioneers, the corps in advance on his left flank. They were staggered for the moment by the sudden onslaught, but turning quickly on their assailants, almost destroyed them. Near two hundred bodies lay upon the field. Lieutenant Alexander, of the 23rd, was killed, and Captain Chamberlain and Lieutenant Nott, of the 23rd, and Major Wheler and Lieutenant Marsh, of the 32nd, were wounded. During this affair the left flank was

most gallantly and effectually protected by two Companies of the 7th Fusiliers, and by a very judicious movement of the cavalry, order by Lieutenant Colonel Probyn.

18. Flushed with success, the Pioneer Regiments now pressed forward into the Pass, driving the enemy before them. But the day was far spent, the hostile position was occupied in great force, and I was besides aware that the Government did not desire to invade Bonair. I therefore directed the troops to be withdrawn. Three guns of Captain Griffin's Battery of Royal Artillery had been brought on elephants from the camp. They were now fully horsed, a novel sight in the Valley of Chumla, and galloping forward, opened a fire of shot and shell. The movement was then effected in echelon of Regiments from the right in admirable order, no molestation whatever being offered by the enemy, who, in immense numbers and in sullen silence, lined the heights above.

19. I may here mention that the force opposed to us on the 15th and 16th instant is estimated, after careful enquiry and observation, at 15,000 men; many Native reports stating the numbers to have been far larger.

20. Having now endeavoured to give the main features of the two days' operations, I beg to enclose reports from officers in command of brigades, numbered 2 and 3, which will furnish his Excellency with the details.\* An excellent sketch by Major Johnstone, of the Revenue Survey Department, is likewise enclosed.

21. We bivouacked on the night of the 16th instant in the neighbourhood of Umbeyla. Next morning the "Jirgah" tendered to the Commissioner their unconditional submission; and the stringent terms imposed upon and at once acceded to by them are contained in the accompanying document, marked No. 5.† The political results of our success are in some degree shown by the enclosure marked No. 6, to which I would request his Excellency's attention "Mulkah," the fanatic stronghold, is levelled with the ground. Its destruction was the primary object of the expedition, and has been now carried out, not by our troops, but at our dictation, by the Bonairwals, the very men who, a few days ago, were prepared to defend it. Enclosed is a report connected with it, marked No. 7.

22. It now only remains for me to perform the pleasing duty of bringing to the special notice of the Commander-in-Chief the names of those officers who, on prominent positions, have done good and gallant service in the arduous campaign which has been brought to a victorious conclusion.

In the first place, I desire to express my sense of obligation to Major James, C.B., the Commissioner. This officer's political sagacity is so well known, that I need only allude to it in passing. But I desire to place on record, in connection with the late operations, how much I owe to Major James's promptitude of action and decision of character in his Civil capacity, and how valuable I have found his hearty co-operation.

My thanks are also due to Colonel Reynell Taylor, C.B., Commissioner of the Derajat.

The valuable services of Colonel Turner, C.B., Commanding 1st Brigade, have been alluded to in the body of this report. He joined the very evening before our advance; and the manner in which he conducted the operations confided to him shows the wise discrimination of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, who ordered him up expressly from Central India.

\* No. 2.—Report of Brigadier Turner, C.B. No. 3.—Report of Brigadier Wilde, C.B. No. 4.—Sketch.

† No. 5.—Terms imposed on enemy. No. 6.—Political results as shown by Commissioner. No. 7.—Report on expedition to Umbeyla.

I find it difficult to adequately express my appreciation of the merits of Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C.B., Brigadier Commanding the 2nd Brigade. Gallant and ever ready in action, he is also an officer in whose sound judgment the fullest reliance may be placed; and as his experience on this frontier has been of no ordinary kind, I consider myself most fortunate in every way in having been associated with him.

No officer in command has ever had more reason than myself to feel the value of an efficient Staff. Lieutenant-Colonel Allgood, Assistant Quartermaster-General, is an officer so thoroughly conversant with the important and varied duties of his department, and so careful and vigilant in the discharge of them, that he would be most valuable as Quartermaster-General of an army, however large. He was slightly wounded at the commencement of the campaign. Major Wright also, my Assistant Adjutant-General, fully merits all that I can say in his praise. Active, intelligent, and most energetic in the performance of his duties, he has so discharged them as to thoroughly maintain discipline and efficiency; and his active services in the field have been of the most valuable kind.

Colonel A. Taylor, C.B., Commanding Royal Engineers, is an officer of well-known ability in his department, and during these operations he has fully maintained his reputation.

The arrangements of Surgeon Munro, of the 93rd Highlanders, principal Medical Officer of the forces, have been very perfect. He brings prominently to my notice the services rendered by Assistant-Surgeon Sylvester, 11th Bengal Cavalry, in charge of the sick and wounded at the dépôt at Nowa Killee.

My special thanks are due to Captain Jenkins, principal Commissariat Officer, for his unwearied exertions and the very efficient manner in which he has discharged his arduous duties.

Major Johnstone, of the Revenue Survey Department, has been of the greatest utility.

Captain Norman, lately appointed to the force as Assistant Quartermaster-General, is highly spoken of by Brigadier Turner, to whose column he was attached.

I have to thank Captain Tulloh, the senior officer in command of the Royal Artillery, and Captains Griffin, Huges, DeBude, and Salt, Commanding Batteries, for the good service they have performed.

Lieutenant Clarke, Royal Artillery, has rendered much assistance as Commissary of Ordnance.

Lieutenant Tucker has already been noticed as having been most useful in command of the Sappers.

I have to record my appreciation of the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, C.B. and V.C., Commanding the Cavalry, with whose character his Excellency is already well acquainted; and of Lieutenant Hawes, Commanding Guide Cavalry.

Colonel Shipley, Commanding 7th Royal Fusiliers, is an officer of well known reputation; and with reference to his superior rank, would have taken command of the 2nd Brigade, but Lieutenant Colonel Wilde had been previously appointed to command a Brigade by his Excellency, who was not aware that I had brought the 7th Fusiliers to the front. I had an opportunity of personally observing the gallant manner in which the Regiment behaved under Colonel Shipley, more particularly in the attack on the Conical Hill.

Lieutenant Colonel Salusbury, who lately succeeded to the command of the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, is an officer distinguished for gallantry and judgment; and the manner in which his regiment did its part in carrying the strong position of the Conical Hill, commanded my admiration. The 101st Regiment, under his conduct, has, on this occasion, well maintained its ancient renown first acquired on the field of Plassy.

Major Keyes, Commanding the 1st Punjab Infantry, is an officer of whom too much cannot be said in praise. He led his regiment and repulsed the enemy with great slaughter in the attack on the camp, although suffering from the loss of two fingers in a previous action.

Lieutenant Colonel Renny, Commanding 3rd Sikhs, was very seriously engaged with the enemy during the attack on our left flank. His regiment suffered considerably, was well led, and did excellent service.

Captain Close, Commanding 5th Goorkhas, did good service on the same occasion, and merits my best thanks.

Major Morgan, Commanding 32nd Pioneers, is an excellent officer, and the manner in which his regiment behaved in the serious affair at the entrance of the Bonair Pass, is prominently noticed by Brigadier Turner.

I would also draw his Excellency's attention to the mention made by the Brigadier of the good service rendered by the 23rd Pioneers, under command of Captain Chamberlain, who was wounded at its head, displaying the accustomed courage of those who bear his name. The command of the regiment then devolved on Lieutenant Chalmers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, 5th Punjab Infantry, whose report is enclosed, commanded the troops left in camp to my entire satisfaction.

My thanks are due to Major Parker, Commanding 71st Highland Light Infantry, Major Brownlow, Commanding 20th Native Infantry, Major Ross, Commanding 14th Native Infantry, Captain Tytler, V.C., Commanding 4th Goorkhas, Major Burroughs, Commanding 93rd Highlanders, Captain Ruxton, Commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry, and to Lieutenant Jenkins, Commanding the Guide Infantry.

I am anxious to express my full concurrence in the praise given by Brigadiers Turner and Wilde to the several officers mentioned by them.

Captain Chester of the 4th Goorkhas, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Campbell, of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, were specially selected by me as Majors of Brigade, and are highly spoken of by their Brigadiers.

Lieutenant Scott, 32nd Pioneers, has rendered useful service as Baggage Master.

I beg to return my best thanks to Colonel Adye, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, Royal Artillery, and to Major Roberts, Assistant Quartermaster-General, attached to the force on particular service, for their aid on many occasions.

I have every reason to appreciate the services of Lieutenant Mackenzie, Staff Officer of the Punjab Irregular Force, and of Lieutenant Jarrett, 1st Punjab Cavalry, my Orderly Officer; and I beg to recommend for favourable consideration my Aide-de-Camp, Captain E. M. Jones, Her Majesty's 20th Regiment, who joined me on the 19th instant from Calcutta.

23. The copy of a Field Force Order which I have issued is enclosed, together with a return of killed and wounded.\*

\* No. 8.—Field Force Order. No. 9.—Casualty Return.

## No. 1.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, Commandant, Camp, Umbeyla Pass, to Assistant Adjutant-General Eusufzye Field Force,—(dated 16th December, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report that, early in the forenoon of the 15th instant, whilst the advanced force under Major-General Garvoock's personal command was operating in the direction of Lalloo, a desultory attack was made by a considerable number of the enemy upon the front and left flank of the upper camp. Being met by the fire of the only one of Captain Griffin's guns (C Battery, R.A.) which could be brought to bear upon them from the standard piquet, and by the musketry fire from the breastworks, the enemy were reduced to taking cover among the rocks and broken grounds, from which they caused, from time to time, considerable annoyance not only to the upper camp, but also to the D Battery and adjoining breastworks.

Later in the forenoon, successive bodies of the enemy endeavoured to approach the camp by the gorge from the direction of Umbeyla; but coming under the fire of the guns of D Battery R.A. in the lower camp, they broke away to the left, and ascending the ravines and spurs to the front of the position, joined in the attack upon the upper camp.

2. The advanced piquet upon the ridge, below and in front of the Crag piquet (consisting on this day 50 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry) had been threatened, from early morning, by a constantly increasing body of the enemy. An advanced post held by the piquet was compelled to retire; but as successive reinforcements reached the officer in command, Lieutenant Unwin, 1st Punjab Infantry, he retook this post very gallantly, and maintained his most important position on the ridge throughout the day, by means of well-timed and judicious charges upon the enemy, for which I consider him entitled to very great credit.

3. About two P.M. Major C. H. Brownlow, 20th Punjab Native Infantry, who had command of the right defences of the upper camp, observing that the enemy seemed much dispirited by the ill success against Lieutenant Unwin's piquet, determined to assume the offensive from the camp. Accordingly, about 100 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, led by Major C. P. Keyes himself, advanced from the breastworks, and by a succession of well-executed charges upon the different points occupied by the enemy, completely cleared the whole front and left flank of the defences, driving the enemy in great confusion into the plain below. Major Keyes and his regiment deserve the greatest credit for this success, and for the heavy loss they inflicted upon the enemy. For further particulars I beg to refer to Major Keyes' separate report, which is enclosed.

4. The casualties amongst the troops during the day were as per margin.\*

5. In conclusion, I beg to recommend to the Major-General's notice the officers and men mentioned in Major Keyes' report, and in particular Lieutenant Unwin, 1st Punjab Infantry.

*From Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, to Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, Commandant in Camp,—(dated Heights above Umbeyla, the 16th December 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the morning of the 15th current, agreeably to previous

\* 1st Punjab Infantry, killed, 9 rank and file, wounded, 15 rank and file. 5th Punjab Infantry, wounded, 3 rank and file.

arrangement, I detached 50 men of my regiment under Lieutenant Unwin to hold the "Advance Piquet" on the march of the force on Lalloo.

2. Early in the day the enemy were observed advancing in great force from Umbeyla towards the head of the Pass; large bodies were soon lost to sight in the ravines in front of our position, and their subsequent movements and object could only be left to conjecture.

3. The ground occupied by the "Advance Piquet," from which the whole of the centre of our position could be commanded, and on which the "Crag Piquet" could not, from the nature of the ground, maintain an effective fire, was the point the enemy strove to gain. This point was so important to the safety of our main position, that I instructed Lieutenant Unwin that he was to hold it as long as he could, with any degree of safety, remain there. The enemy repeatedly crept up under cover of the rocks within a few yards of the piquet, having driven in a small party placed there for observation. Lieutenant Unwin was then reinforced, and subsequently had 200 rifles at his disposal, including 60 men of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Lieutenant Fox, all that could be spared from our reduced force. The enemy made two vigorous attempts, in considerable strength, to take the position, and were only repulsed, on each occasion, by the piquet charging down upon them, inflicting a loss of forty killed.

4. Shortly after the last charge, many of the enemy who had been concealed behind the rocks and in the ravines all along the front of our position, were seen to retreat, carrying off their wounded. I therefore consulted with Major Brownlow, the senior officer commanding in our upper position, who had expressed an opinion that the enemy's retreat would be turned into a rout by a vigorous charge. It was arranged that 100 men of the 1st Punjab Infantry and 100 of the 20th Punjab Infantry should be led out for the purpose. I took the men of the 1st Punjab Infantry to the front of the breastwork of the 7th Royal Fusiliers, in order to seize the old "centre piquet," which flanked many of the rocks, behind which the enemy were concealed. Major Brownlow, on advancing to join me, observed a sudden movement of the enemy in front of the main breastwork, which he consequently re-occupied.

5. The rocks of the old "centre piquet" were gained without opposition, and the enemy, who were collected in considerable numbers behind them, were driven out in utter confusion. Those concealed behind the lower works kept up a desultory fire for a short time, but were also driven from every point into the gorge below, leaving their dead on all sides.

6. I beg to bring to notice the conduct of Lieutenant Keen, second in command on the right, and Lieutenant Vallings on the left, who led the attack on the enemy with great spirit, following them up to the rocks of the old "Cliff Piquet" immediately above the gorge.

7. The spirit and judgment with which Lieutenant Unwin, assisted by Lieutenant Oliphant, held his difficult post against the repeated attacks of the enemy, is deserving of special notice. That officer speaks in high terms of the manner in which he was supported by the Company of the 5th Punjab Infantry, and brings specially to notice the conduct of Joomah Havildar and Private Shere Naz, of that corps.

8. Our total loss was 9 killed and 18 wounded, while the loss inflicted on the enemy was considerable.

9. The usual casualty return has been forwarded to the Brigade Office.

*ROLL of Native Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, recommended for the Order of Merit.*

Rank and Names.	Former Services in Field.	Act of gallantry for which recommended.
Jemadar Mah Sing ...	Bozdar Expedition. Delhi. Wuzeeree Expedition.	Most conspicuous for their gallantry in charging the enemy, when their piquet was attacked on the 15th December. Jemadar Mah Sing and Havildar Herah Sing both severely wounded.
Havildar Hera Sing...	Ditto ditto 3rd Class Order of Merit as Sepoy.	
„ Ufzul .....	Bozdar Expedition. Delhi. Wuzeeree Expedition.	
Sepoy Bortah Sing ...	Bozdar Expedition. Delhi. Wuzeeree Expedition.	Most conspicuous for gallantry in charging the enemy on the 15th December. Sur Billend Sepoy was severely wounded.
„ Sur Billend	Ditto ditto ditto 3rd Class Order of Merit.	
„ Mowaz .....	Delhi. Wuzeeree Expedition.	Most conspicuous for his gallantry in making a stand alone against several of the enemy, when the rest of his piquet had retired after charging. Most strongly spoken of by Colonel Salusbury, of Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, 15th December 1863.

Camp, Umbeyla Pass, 19th December 1863.

C. P. KEYES, Major,  
Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry.

## No. 2.

*From Colonel W. W. Turner, Assistant-Commanding 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force, to Assistant Adjutant-General,—(dated 19th December 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Major-General Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, that in compliance with his orders of the 14th instant, the troops as per margin\* were formed under my command at the base of the Crag Piquet at daylight on the 15th instant; and that on receiving the order to advance, they moved in the following formation:—4th Goorkhas, 3 Companies skirmishing, 3 in support; 3rd Punjab Infantry, 4 Companies skirmishing and 4 in support, covering right flank; Reserve, 7th Royal Fusiliers, Company Sappers, Hazara Mountain Train, 23rd and 32nd Pioneers.

The advance was made from the right flank of the Water Piquet, and on reaching the crest of the heights overlooking that position, encountered the enemy's piquets, which were driven before them with some loss to the "conical hill."

This "conical hill" was occupied in force, strengthened by stone breastworks, and formed a very formidable position. From this hill we were separated by a valley about 200 yards wide; and I therefore directed the troops to line the crest of

the height, overlooking it from our own side, to await the arrival of four Hazara Mountain Train guns, which on coming up were forthwith brought into action. Under cover of their fire I moved the 23rd Pioneers, supported by the 32nd Pioneers, into a valley on the right, and secured a height which enabled me to turn the left of the enemy's position. These arrangements completed, and the general advance sounded by the Major-General from the centre of the line, we advanced down the hill, across the valley, and in ten minutes were in possession of the whole position, driving the enemy down the opposite side of the height.

The village of Lalloo now appeared about a mile and a half on our right flank; I therefore pressed the pursuit in that direction, leaving five companies to guard and bring up the guns, and followed the enemy so closely, that the village was entered with them, and he retreated in the utmost confusion down the hills towards Umbeyla.

On securing possession of the village, I found myself on a line of heights flanking the approach to the "conical hill," up which the enemy was now streaming to attack the second brigade in position there.

I therefore brought the fire of the guns to bear on his flank, and on his being repulsed and driven into the plain, turned one of the guns upon him in that direction.

As orders were now brought to me to maintain my position for the night, and be prepared to move down into the Chumla Valley from the village of

\* Hazara Mountain Train; 1 Company Sappers; 7th Royal Fusiliers; 3rd Punjab Infantry; 4th Goorkhas; 23rd Pioneers. 32nd Pioneers.

Laloo the following morning, I secured my position accordingly and bivouacked for the night.

At nine A.M. on the 16th, as soon as the 2nd Brigade began to descend from the "conical hill" by the spur leading therefrom into the valley, I also, having the shortest line, moved in echelon of regiments from my left; the 3rd Punjab Infantry down the spur, which ran parallel to that, by which the 2nd Brigade was descending; the 4th Goorkhas down the next parallel ridge; and the main body, consisting of the 23rd in advance, Left Wing Royal Fusiliers, Hazara Mountain Train and Sappers, and Right Wing Royal Fusiliers down the gorge, leading from the village of Laloo to that of Umbeyla, in the Chumla Valley; while the 32nd crowned the heights and effected a parallel movement, covering my right flank.

The pathway down was steep and in parts precipitous and rocky, and it was with great difficulty that the Mountain Train guns could be brought down, but Captain DeBude, by his energy and perseverance, overcame all obstacles; and at half-past two P.M. I found myself able to debouch into the plain with the leading regiments and the left wing of the Royal Fusiliers.

Our descent from Laloo so completely took the enemy's position in reverse, that he abandoned it at once (although very strong) without firing a shot, and fled away to his right to the "Bonair Pass."

The 3rd Punjab Infantry and 4th Goorkhas, regiments of my brigade, had now effected their junction with the right of the left brigade, and with it, were in possession of the extreme right of the enemy's position, which was about a mile and a half from, and facing, the entrance of the "Bonair Pass."

Under instructions from the Major-General Commanding to try and cut off the rear of the enemy from the Pass, but not to compromise myself in the Pass, I formed a line of the 23rd and left wing of the 32nd, with the right wing of that regiment in column of Companies at wheeling distance, left in front; and directed the advance along the southwestern face of the village of Umbeyla; the left wing of the 7th Royal Fusiliers forming the reserve, in quarter distance column, in rear of the centre of the line.

After passing the village, the right wing of the 32nd was brought up in prolongation of the line to the right, which brought the right near the base of the hill, which shut in the mouth of the Pass. The advance was steadily continued in the same order to within about 800 yards of the mouth of the Pass, when the enemy opened a furious fire of matchlocks and zumbooraks, which was returned by the line as it continued to advance.

On nearing the mouth of the Pass, which was shut in by broken ground covered with jungle, I observed a large body of the enemy moving to their right and beyond my left flank; I therefore moved two Companies from the reserve of the Royal Fusiliers, and placed them in an oblique position covering the left; whilst at the same time Colonel Probyn, C.B., V.C., Commanding 11th Bengal Cavalry, also moved a body of his men into a position which still further covered the left flank.

Seeing these movements, the enemy made a furious onset, sword in hand, upon the line, but the two regiments composing it destroyed the whole of them, not allowing one of them to escape back.

The enemy now withdrew completely into the Pass, and I made arrangements to draw off the regiments engaged, which was effected under cover of the fire of the guns of the Hazara Mountain Train and  $\frac{1}{4}$  C. Battery 19th Brigade under com-

mand of Captain Griffin, in echelon of regiments from the right; and the movement was not in any way molested or followed by the enemy, who had suffered severely and had upwards of 200 dead lying on the field, 40 of whom were Hindoostanees.

Having thus sketched cursorily the operations of the 1st Brigade on the 15th and 16th instant, I cannot refrain from bringing to notice the excellent service performed by the 2nd Pioneer regiments, the 23rd and 32nd, who were most forward in the attack and in the pursuit, and who, if properly equipped as Pioneer regiments, would most unquestionably perform most dashing and useful service. It is invidious, where all behaved with the utmost gallantry and dash, to particularize any regiment; but I have been induced to do so upon this occasion, because both the 23rd and 32nd have for the last two years been employed upon nothing but road-making.

Of their commanding officers, Major Morgan and Captain Chamberlain, I cannot speak too highly, and upon the latter being wounded, the command of his regiment devolved upon Lieutenant Chalmers, who conducted it very greatly to my satisfaction.

I beg also to bring to notice the excellent service rendered by—

Colonel Shipley, Commandant Royal Fusiliers.

Captain Rushton, Commanding 3rd Punjab Infantry.

Captain Tytler, Commanding 4th Goorkhas.

Captain DeBude, Commanding Hazara Mountain Train Battery.

Captain Griffin, Commanding Half Company Royal Artillery, and

Lieutenant Tucker, ditto Company of Sappers.

I must also express my thanks to the officers who acted on my personal Staff—

Captain Norman, Assistant Quartermaster-General.

Lieutenant Campbell, 71st Highland Light Infantry, Brigade Major.

Lieutenant Brown, Royal Engineers.

Lieutenant Jackson, 11th Bengal Cavalry, Orderly Officer.

And also to Captain Warren, Royal Artillery, who kindly volunteered his services for the occasion.

Annexed is a return of the casualties in the two days' operations, and of the arms and trophies taken from the enemy, whose loss cannot be computed at less than 270 killed, with very numerous wounded, which we saw carried away from the hill sides. One Hindoostanee was also made prisoner and handed over to Major James, the Commissioner.

In conclusion I beg to add the names of those officers, Native officers and men, who are particularly brought to my notice by their Commanding Officers, as having especially distinguished themselves; and to recommend that the decoration of the "Order of Merit" should be conferred on those who are eligible to receive it.

$\frac{1}{4}$  C. Battery 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery:—

Captain Butt.

Lieutenant De Latour.

Hazara Mountain Train Battery:—

Golundauz Heera Sing 2nd.

" Vurgan Sing 2nd.

Sappers and Miners:—

Naick Mahomed Khan.

1st Punjab Infantry :—

Captain Ogilvie.  
Lieutenant Cardew.  
Subadar Ram Sing.  
" Astur Mahomed.  
Jemadar Lall Sing.  
" Alladad.  
Naick Shunkair.  
Sepoy Ramjan.  
" Fagul.  
" Akhmed.  
" Hugrootnoor.  
" Faudy.  
" Kalpa.  
" Meer Affzul.  
" Wusseun.  
" Hun Sing.  
" Shere Raj.  
" Morad.

4th Goorkhas :—

Havildar Chamoo Goosuing.  
Sepoy Pestant Sahie.  
" Modorain Rusnaik.  
" Bhow Sing Kunta.  
Serjeant-Major A. Delachey.

23rd Pioneers :—

Havildar Nihoe Sing.  
Sepoy Bhopal.

32nd Pioneers :—

Lieutenant Marsh, twice wounded.  
Major Wheeler, severely ditto.  
Ensign Stevens, Adjutant.

*Return of Standards, Arms, &c., taken from the enemy by the 1st Brigade on the 15th and 16th December, 1863.*

Standards	..	..	..	5
Talwars	..	..	..	126
Knives, &c., &c.	..	..	..	4
Government Fire-arms	..	..	..	12
Native	"	..	..	56
Shields	..	..	..	6

W. W. TURNER, Colonel,  
Commanding 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force.

*Return of Casualties in the 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force, at the Storming of the "Conical Hill" and subsequent pursuit of the men to Lalloo, 15th December, 1863.*

	Killed.	Wounded.
British Officers	..	1
Native "	..	2
Serjeants	..	2
Rank and File	3	16
Total	3	21

*Return of Casualties in the 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force, at the Capture of Umbeyla and driving the enemy into Bonair Pass, 16th December, 1863.*

	Killed.	Wounded.
British Officers	1	4
Native "	..	3
Serjeants	1	2
Rank and File	6	46
Total	8	55

W. W. TURNER, Colonel,  
Commanding 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force.

*From Colonel W. W. Turner, Commanding 1st Brigade Eusufzye Field Force, to Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(dated Camp, Heights above Umbeyla, 20th December, 1863.)*

IN continuation of the concluding paragraph of my report upon the part taken by the Brigade under my command on the 15th and 16th instant, I have the honour to state that Captain Chamberlain, Commanding 23rd Pioneers, has, in his report to me, made the most special mention of the services of Dr. Cheke, in medical charge of his corps, and requested that they may be brought to the notice of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

Captain Chamberlain has also brought to my notice the services of Private Fergus Rogers, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, who, separated from his regiment at the Conical Hill, joined in the pursuit of the enemy, in which he greatly distinguished himself.

No. 3.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde C.B., Commanding 2nd Brigade Eusufzye Field Force, to Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Camp, Umbeyla, 17th December, 1863.)*

AGREEABLY to Field Force Orders, I assumed command of the troops as per margin,\* which composed No. 2 or the left column of the attacking force, organized on the night of the 14th December, 1863, for the assault on the enemy's position at Lalloo Bandah and the subsequent descent into the Chumla Valley.

2. For the information of the Major-General Commanding, I have the honour to report the operations of the above column during the 15th and 16th instant.

3. On the morning of the 15th, I formed the column in the order marginally noted,† and as soon as No. 1 Column had passed out of the main position of the upper camp, the troops advanced under the "Crag" piquet, the skirmishers of the 5th Goorkha Battalion quickly reaching the low ridge of rocks immediately in front of the enemy's position, which was situated on a high steep hill covering the hamlet of Bandah.

This hill was occupied by the enemy, who held it in strength behind stone breastworks, and I made the following dispositions for the assault :—the Mountain Train moved up and opened sufficient fire to keep down the matchlock fire from the heights; Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers and Corps of Guides were formed in line of contiguous columns out of fire behind the ridge, the other two regiments being held in reserve, in column of sections, to preserve the left flank during the coming attack.

Having reported to the Major-General that my column was prepared, we waited the signal to advance, the guns opening their full fire with effect.

After a short interval, both columns were ordered to advance, and charging over a small plain began to ascend the hill. Her Majesty's 101st made straight for the highest peak, a strong work crowded with the Hindoostanee fanatics and their Pathan

\* Peshawur Mountain Train, 4 guns; Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers; Corps of Guides; 3rd Seikh Infantry; 5th Goorkha Battalion; Company Sappers and Miners.

† ADVANCE GUARD.—5th Goorkha Battalion; Her Majesty's 101st Fusiliers; Peshawur Mountain Train; Sappers and Miners; Corps of Guides; 3rd Seikh Infantry; Mountain Train Extra Ammunition; Infantry extra Ammunition Dandees.

REAR GUARD.—3rd Seikh Infantry.

allies. The Corps of Guides took, by my order, a point a little below, with the object of taking the pressure off the 101st, to whom the most difficult part of the assault had been safely assigned. The regiments of the Right Column moved on with equal rapidity, and the whole face of the hill was soon covered with our troops.

Aided by the excellent practice of the Mountain Trains of both columns, the result of the conflict was soon determined; 2,000 and upwards of the enemy were put to flight and fled in the direction of the hamlet, rapidly pursued by our men. Part of the Corps of Guides and the 23rd Native Infantry had the honour of reaching the village about the same time, which they fired. Her Majesty's 101st leaping into the breastwork, bayoneted some 30 of its defenders, and the Corps of Guides, turning the position under a shower of stones, shot and cut down numbers as they retreated from the peak of the hill to escape from the assault of the gallant 101st Fusiliers.

In the meantime the reserve under my own direction secured the line of hills on the left overlooking the Chumla Valley, driving small parties of the enemy before us.

As soon as the main position of the enemy was gained, I moved the Mountain Train to the end of the ridge, and placed the two regiments in position to watch the spurs of the mountain leading up from the Umbeyla plain, a duty that had been entrusted to me by the Major-General before the attack commenced.

As anticipated, we had not long to wait. Large bodies of the enemy, hearing from the sound of the guns above what was occurring, came out of the village of Umbeyla, and threatened both the left of camp and our communication along the mountain with it.

Sending for reinforcements, two companies of Her Majesty's 7th Fusiliers, previously despatched, passed my messenger on the road, and shortly a wing of the 101st and the Corps of Guides rejoined my command.

Passing these troops along my rear, I re-occupied all the ground close up to the Crag piquet, and waited for the enemy to approach.

Shortly afterwards, under the Major-General's personal instructions, I directed the 5th Goorka Battalion and a part of the 3rd Seikhs to charge and drive off the enemy. This was most gallantly done by both corps, the Goorkhas capturing a standard. The enemy lost men not only here, but in a similar charge that was made by Her Majesty's 101st down the spur they were watching.

4. With this defeat all opposition ceased, and the Regiments bivouacked on the ground they had been fighting on.

5. On the following morning the column descended, covering the guns and Cavalry, which passed down the Lalloo ravine into the Valley.

We reached the plain about mid-day, and a Column having been formed as per margin,\* I advanced across the Valley towards the Bonair Pass.

As the column debouched into the open country, the enemy appeared in great force on a low ridge of hills, which completely covered the approach to the village of Umbeyla. Numerous gay standards of all colours were visible on the prominent hillocks, and an engagement on comparatively easy ground to what we had been accustomed to,

was confidently hoped for by the troops, who moved forward in high spirits.

On approaching the position, two attacking columns were formed: the enemy, however, gradually disappeared, and retired to the Bonair Pass, and the ridge was subsequently taken possession of, and is still occupied by the column under my command.

6. In concluding this report, which may probably be the last in this campaign, as the enemy have to-day tendered their submission to Her Majesty, I beg to bring the services of the following officers prominently to the notice of the Major-General, not only for their exertions during the engagement of the 15th, but for work gallantly and ably performed under my command on many previous occasions:

Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury, Commanding 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers.

Captain Hughes, Commanding Peshawur Mountain Train.

Lieutenant F. Jenkins, Commanding Corps of Guides.

7. My thanks are also due to Lieutenant-Colonel Renny, Commanding 3rd Sikh Infantry, and Captain Close, Commanding 5th Goorkha Battalion. The first has but lately joined the force, but the latter has led his regiment against the enemy most steadily on several occasions.

8. Captain Chester, Brigade Major, and Lieutenant Mackenzie, Staff Officer of the Punjab Irregular Force, accompanied me throughout the day, and are both excellent and efficient Staff Officers.

9. Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury, Commanding Her Majesty's 101st, speaks highly of the conduct of Major Lambert and Captain Parsons, both of the above Corps, and from personal knowledge I can support his recommendation.

Lieutenant-Colonel Renny, Commanding the 3rd Sikh Infantry, mentions the gallant bearing of Lieutenant J. Cook, of the 3rd Seikhs, when his men charged down the hill; and I saw Lieutenant Codrington, of the 5th Goorkhas, myself, leading on his men after the enemy in a manner that must have instilled confidence into men naturally less brave than our Goorkha Sepoys.

10. I append a list of men reported to have distinguished themselves, and the usual Casualty Returns.

*Roll of men of Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers specially recommended for reward on account of distinguished acts of gallantry in the action of the 15th instant, Camp, 21st December, 1863.*

No. 330, Private Daniel Flannery, No. 4 Company—Was the first man in at the left of the Conical Hill, and jumped in over the breastwork in the face of five or six of the enemy, and engaged them. Captain T. Butler was an eye-witness to this soldier's bravery.

No. 696, Colour-Serjeant Denis Magrath, No. 9 Company—Was one of the first men in on the right of the Conical Hill, and saved Major Lambert's life. Several men attacked Major Lambert, and his pistol missed fire twice. This soldier rushed in front of Major Lambert and bayoneted the leader.

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding 2nd Brigade.

\* Advance Guard.—One Company Corps of Guides, Corps of Guides.—Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers; Peshawur Mountain Train; Sappers and Miners; 5th Goorkha Battalion; 3rd Sikh Infantry.—Ammunition Dandees. Rear Guard.—One Company 3rd Sikh Infantry.

*Roll of men in Corps attached to the Left Column Eusufzye Field Force, recommended for the Order of Merit for conspicuous acts of gallantry before the enemy, Camp, Umbeyla Village, 18th December, 1863.*

Soorjun Sepoy, No. 1 Company Corps of Guides—Was Orderly to the Assistant Adjutant-General on 16th instant, and was sent with a note to some officer; not finding any one, however, who would take the note, he charged with the 23rd Pioneers and killed one of the enemy, receiving at the same time himself a spear wound and two sword cuts. Witness Mehal Sing, Havildar, No. 3 Company 23rd Native Infantry.

Sobha Singh Sepoy, No. 6 Company Guide Corps—Was very forward in entering the village of Laloo on the 15th instant, killing one of the enemy in single fight.

Ralmootoola Bey, Jemadar, No. 8 Company 3rd Seikh Infantry—Displayed the greatest gallantry during the whole day of the 15th, when his Company was keeping the enemy in check. When the final charge was made, he led far ahead of the Company, setting a fine example to his men.

Bhoor Singh, Pay Havildar, No. 8 Company 3rd Seikh Infantry—Was with left skirmishers on 15th instant, and under a heavy fire carried to the rear a wounded Naick of his Company, who was dangerously hurt, and then immediately returned, when he was himself severely wounded, showing a most gallant and praiseworthy spirit.

Utter Singh, Private, No. 8 Company 3rd Seikh Infantry—When charging down the hill on

15th instant, attacked two of the enemy, and, although disabled by the loss of three fingers from a tulwar cut, succeeded in killing one and defending himself against the second till assistance came up.

Jemadar Ruttun Singh, No. 2 Company 5th Goorkhas.—Most forward in every charge on the 15th instant; in the last of which he succoured a wounded sepoy, killing the latter's opponent, but himself receiving a wound. This native officer also distinguished himself conspicuously on a previous occasion, and is always to be seen where the fight is thickest. Witness, Lieutenant Codrington, 5th Goorkhas.

Sepoy Kullian Sing, No. 2 Company 5th Goorkhas—During the charge down the hill on the 15th instant, rushed promptly forward to intercept one of the enemy who was advancing sword in hand upon Lieutenant Codrington, and killed his opponent with his bayonet, receiving himself a cut on the head. Witness, Lieutenant Codrington, 5th Goorkhas.

Sepoy Bagh Sing, No. 4 Company 5th Goorkhas—On the 15th instant, when charging down the hill, was in front of all, and advanced to attack one of the enemy with his bayonet, but was severely wounded by a long spear. This man was only enlisted a short time ago on account of his gallantry, having accompanied the corps as a volunteer, and being always to the front where fighting was going on.

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding 2nd Brigade.

*RETURN of Casualties in Left Column during the Operations of the 15th and 16th instant.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Village, December 18, 1863.*

Date.	Corps.	Killed.		Wounded.						Remarks.
		Drummers & Buglers.	Rank and File.	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Drummers & Buglers.	Rank and File.		
15th	Peshawur Mountain Train								Lieutenant Riggs, 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, slightly wounded.	
	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	1	...	1	...	...	...	10		
	Corps of Guides ...	...	...	...	2	2	...	6		
	3rd Seikh Infantry ...	...	...	...	1	1	1	16		
	5th Goorkha Regiment	...	3	...	2	...	...	7		
	Sappers and Miners (5th Company)	...	...	...	...	...	...	1		
16th	Peshawur Mountain Train								N.B.—No casualties among Mules.	
	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers									
	Corps of Guides ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1		
	3rd Seikh Infantry ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1		
	5th Goorkha Regiment	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
	Sappers and Miners (5th Company)	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
	Total ...	1	3	1	5	3	1	42		

(Signed) C. W. R. CHESTER, Captain,  
Major of Brigade.

(Signed) A. WILDE, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
Commanding 2nd Brigade.

No. 5.

## MEMORANDUM.

THE Bonair Jirgah having unreservedly submitted to the Government and consented to carry out the following requirements:—

I. To dismiss the army of all kinds on the Bonair Pass.

II. To send a force to destroy Mulkah completely.

III. To expel the Hindoostanees from the Bonair, Chumlah, and Amazai lands.

IV. To give as hostages the whole of their chief men till the above requirements are fully carried out.

The first article of agreement is already accomplished. A force of about 2,000 Bonair men is now ready at Muskipore to accomplish the second and third.

The hostages are now with me.

Under the above circumstances, I consider it would be advisable that some British officers should accompany the Bonair Contingent, in order that we may see the destruction of Mulkah, and obtain good information regarding the country.

If the Major-General consents to furnish Colonel R. G. Taylor, C.B., with the regiment of Guides as an escort, I propose requesting him to accompany the Contingent as political officer, and should the Major-General deem it desirable to send other officers with him, I trust he will instruct them to abide entirely by Colonel Taylor's wishes regarding the places they visit, &c.

I propose that they should encamp to-night at Kooriah, and proceed to-morrow to Mulkah, returning as quickly as possible by the same route.

Two of the chief men, Zydoolah Khan and Ahmed Khan, will accompany Colonel Taylor; the rest of the hostages will remain with me.

All these hostages will be entirely at our disposal in event of any breach of faith.

(Signed) H. R. JAMES, Major,  
Commissioner.

Camp, near Umbeyla, December 19, 1863.

The Jirgah have unreservedly consented that the officers and escort should accompany their force.

No. 6.

*From Major H. R. James, C.B., Commander of Derajat, to Major-General Commanding the Field Force,—(dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, 21st December, 1863).*

YOU are already aware that the result of your successes on the 15th and 16th instant has been the entire submission of the Bonairwals and the dispersion of the powerful confederacy of tribes which was in our front.

Ghuzan Khan, of Dheer, Fyztullub Khan, of Bajour, Sohbut Khan, and Sherdil Khan, of Swat, with others of minor note, fled with their followers as soon as this force was in possession of Umbeyla, leaving the Akhoond, in whose cause they had ostensibly come, to make the best of his way home by himself.

The Mulkah party is now proceeding without the slightest impediment to their destination, re-

ceived and supplied with cordiality by the villages of the country, and joined by the chiefs of the Amazai, in whose lands Mulkah is situated.

It will be my duty, on the completion of these operations, more fully to draw the attention of Government to their political results; but the above will suffice to show you who very favourable they have been, and how completely we have asserted our power before the largest, bravest, and most formidable coalition we have ever been called on to meet in the Trans-Indus Territories.

\* \* \* \* \*

No. 7.

## MEMORANDUM.

ON the 19th instant the Bonair Contingent having entered the Chumla Valley, Colonel Taylor proceeded with his escort to Kooriah, nine miles.

The weather was very bad and heavy rain fell, but both the officers and men were lodged in the houses of the village, and all necessaries in the shape of grass, grain, &c., liberally supplied.

On the 20th the party remained at Kooriah in consequence of the rain.

On the 21st they proceeded onwards, and it became apparent that the Bonair chiefs intended to effect the destruction of Mulkah by moral more than by physical force, inasmuch as the greater portion of the Contingent remained in the Chumla Valley.

On entering the Amazai lands, the men of that tribe appeared on the hills, and presented an appearance of opposition which to those unacquainted with the real position of affairs, must have seemed very formidable.

It was a moment requiring the exhibition of great tact and firmness, but Colonel Taylor was supported by the evident frankness and determination of the Bonair chiefs to carry out their agreements.

All opposition was overcome by the latter, and the Amazai chiefs, joining the party as allies, proceeded with them to Mulkah, where they arrived on the afternoon of the 21st.

Colonel Taylor describes Mulkah as a settlement of considerable size, occupying a broad spur of the main Mahabun Ridge. The buildings were of a remarkably substantial character, the Chief Moulvie's house and hall of audience, with large barracks and stabling for the troops and a powder manufactory, forming prominent objects. There was no regular surrounding rampart, but on three sides the outer walls of the houses, which were in tiers, and barracks, were connected and formed a continuous wall with posterns; the fourth side was enclosed by a natural eminence.

The party was quartered in the place during the night, and early in the morning the work of destruction commenced.

An attempt was made by the Amazai to have a portion of the place spared on the ground of its belonging to men of their tribe, and not to the Hindoostanees, but this was judiciously over-ruled by Colonel Taylor, and the whole mass of building

was accordingly soon in flames and completely destroyed.

The party returned to Kooriah that evening, and on the following day arrived in camp on the Umbeyla Pass, not a shot having been fired at them during their progress.

(Signed) H. R. JAMES, Commissioner.

No. 8.

*Field Force Order, Camp, Umbeyla Pass, dated 23rd December, 1863.*

THE operations which commenced two months ago under Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., have been brought to a victorious conclusion. The enemy has been completely beaten in the open field, and has acknowledged his defeat by unconditional submission and unhesitating acceptance of the terms imposed on him by Her Majesty's Commissioner.

He has himself, at our dictation, levelled Mulkah with the ground,—the mountain stronghold of the Hindoostanee fanatics, which it was the primary object of the expedition to destroy.

The Major-General congratulates the force under his command on the brilliant termination of the campaign. He desires to convey his full appreciation of the gallantry and devotion of the troops, European and Native; and he is anxious to assure them that he feels, and feels truly, that any credit which may be awarded to himself will be owing to their exertions.

Major-General Garvock has been directed by the Commander-in-Chief to express to both officers and men his Excellency's entire approbation of their endurance of hardships, and of their good and gallant conduct since the occupation of the Pass of Umbeyla, and the commencement of those operations which have now been crowned with success by the final defeat of the enemy at Lalloo and Umbeyla.

The Major-General cannot close this Order without offering his sincere thanks to Brigadiers Turner and Wilde, officers commanding corps and heads of departments, for the assistance they have one and all afforded him, and for which he is so much indebted.

This Order will be read at the head of every corps belonging to the field force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 9.

#### EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

*NOMINAL RETURN of Officers Killed and Wounded during the operations by the above Force on the 15th and 16th December, 1863.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 18, 1863.*

Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.		Date.
			Severely.	Slightly.	
Her Majesty's 101st 23rd Native Infantry	Lieutenant C. Riggs ...	...	...	1	15th December
	Captain C. Chamberlain ...	...	...	1	16th "
	Lieutenant G. Alexander ...	1	...	...	16th "
32nd Native Infantry	" C. D. Nott ...	...	1	...	16th "
	Major Trevor Wheeler ...	...	...	1	16th "
	Lieutenant F. H. Marsh ...	...	...	1	16th "
4th Goorkhas	" J. K. McCausland ...	...	...	1	15th "
Total		1	1	5	

T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 22835.

F

JOHN GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

**NUMERICAL RETURN of Killed and Wounded in the above Force during the operations on the 15th and 16th December, 1863.**

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 18, 1863.*

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.				Total.
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.	
Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers ...	1	...	1	6	4	12
Guide Infantry ...	...	...	2	7	2	11
3rd Seikh Infantry ...	...	1	1	17	2	21
5th Goorkha Regiment ...	3	...	...	4	5	12
Hazara Mountain Battery ...	...	...	...	...	1	1
Her Majesty's 7th Royal Fusiliers ...	...	...	...	1	2	3
5th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners ...	...	...	...	...	1	1
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	1	...	...	...	3	4
23rd Native Infantry ...	7	...	12	22	12	53
32nd Native Infantry ...	3	...	3	14	4	24
1st Punjab Infantry ...	9	...	...	11	4	24
4th Goorkha Regiment ...	...	...	...	1	5	6
Total ...	24	1	19	83	45	172

T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

JOHN GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

**NOMINAL ROLL of Officers Killed and Wounded during the operations by the above Force on the 15th and 16th December, 1863.**

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 23, 1863.*

Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.		Date.
			Severely.	Slightly.	
Her Majesty's 101st	Lieutenant C. Riggs ...	...	...	1	15th Dec. 1863
23rd Native Infantry	Captain C. Chamberlain...	...	...	1	16th " "
" "	Lieutenant G. Alexander ...	1	...	...	16th " "
" "	" C. D. Nott ...	...	1	...	16th " "
32nd Native Infantry	Major Trevor Wheler ...	...	...	1	16th " "
" "	Lieutenant F. H. Marsh...	...	...	1	16th " "
4th Goorkha	" J. K. McCausland ...	...	...	1	15th " "
	Total ...	1	1	5	

(Signed)

J. GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

**GENERAL FIGURED ABSTRACT of Casualties in the Eusufzye Field Force from the date of its entering the Umbeyla Pass up to the 16th December, 1863.**

*Dated Adjutant-General's Office,  
Head Quarters, Camp Rawul Pindee, January 14, 1864.*

Corps.	Killed.					Wounded.					Total Killed & Wounded.				
	Eur.		Native.		Total.	Eur.		Native.		Total.	Eur.		Native.		Grand Total.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
General Staff...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1
Royal Engineers ...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1
Survey Department ...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1
Orderly Officers ...	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1
½ C Battery, 19th Brigade, Royal Artillery	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	2	5	...	3	...	2	5
3rd Punjab Battery ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Hazara Mountain Battery	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	7	7	1	...	...	7	8
Peshawur ditto	...	...	...	3	3	...	...	...	9	9	...	...	...	12	12
11th Bengal Cavalry...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	1	...	1	...	...	1	1	2
7th Fusiliers ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3	...	...	3	...	3	...	...	3
71st Foot ...	...	5	15	...	18	1	49	...	...	50	4	64	...	...	68
79th ditto ...	...	2	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	2
101st ditto ...	...	3	19	...	22	2	63	...	...	65	5	82	...	...	87
1st Punjab Infantry ...	1	...	1	41	43	3	...	3	91	97	4	...	4	132	140
2nd Seikh Infantry ...	1	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	1
3rd ditto ...	1	...	...	4	5	...	...	3	35	38	1	...	3	39	43
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	3	3	...	...	...	4	4
5th ditto ...	...	...	...	6	6	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	20	23
14th Native Infantry	1	...	1	45	47	1	...	1	69	71	2	...	2	114	118
20th Punjab Infantry	1	...	1	30	32	...	...	2	99	102	2	...	3	129	134
23rd Punjab Infantry (Pioneers)	1	...	...	6	7	2	...	4	40	46	3	...	4	46	53
32nd ditto ditto	...	...	...	3	3	3	...	1	21	25	3	...	1	24	28
Sappers and Miners ...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	1	1	...	...	...	1	1
4th Goorkhas ...	...	...	...	5	5	1	...	...	9	10	1	...	...	14	15
5th ditto ...	...	...	1	27	28	2	...	2	44	48	2	...	3	71	76
Guide Corps Cavalry	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	2	...	...	...	2	2
Guide Corps Infantry	...	...	...	2	2	1	...	2	14	17	1	...	2	16	19
Grand Total ...	15	34	4	174	227	21	118	21	460	620	36	152	25	634	847

E. HAYTHORNE, Colonel,  
Adjutant-General.

1708 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, MARCH 19, 1864.

EUSUFZE FIELD FORCE.

*Nominal Roll of Officers Killed in Action since 19th October, 1863.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 12, 1863.*

Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
Lieutenant Gillies ...	Hazura Mountain Battery	22nd Oct. 1863.	These are all included in the General Nominal Roll of Casualties.
" Clifford ...	3rd Punjab Native Infantry	26th " "	
" Richmond ...	20th " "	26th " "	
Ensign C. B. Murray ...	71st Highland Light Infantry	6th Nov. "	
Lieutenant Dougall ...	79th Highlanders...	6th " "	
Major G. W. Harding ...	2nd Seikh Infantry	6th " "	
Lieutenant J. P. Davidson	1st Punjab Native Infantry	13th " "	
Captain C. F. Smith ...	71st Highland Light Infantry	18th " "	
Lieutenant Jones ...	79th Highlanders	18th " "	
" H. H. Chapman	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	18th " "	
" W. T. Mosley	14th Native Infantry	18th " "	
Captain R. B. Aldridge ...	71st Highland Light Infantry	19th " "	
Ensign A. R. Saunderson	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	20th " "	
Assistant-Surgeon W. Pile	101st " "	20th " "	

(Signed) J. GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufze Field Force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

EUSUFZE FIELD FORCE.

*Nominal Roll of Officers Wounded since 19th October, 1863.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 12, 1863.*

Rank and Names.	Corps.	Date.	Remarks.
Lieutenant F. Drake ...	32nd Native Infantry	26th Oct. 1863.	These are included in the General Nominal Roll of Casualties.
" Barron ...	Survey Department	26th " "	
Major C. P. Keyes...	1st Punjab Native Infantry	30th " "	
Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher	1st " "	30th " "	
" W. Batye ...	Guide Infantry	6th Nov. "	
" J. S. Oliphant	5th Goorkhas	6th " "	
" H. W. Pitcher	1st Punjab Native Infantry	13th " "	
" A. D. C. Inglis	14th Native Infantry	18th " "	
Ensign C. M. Stockley ...	101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	18th " "	
Colonel W. Hope, C.B. ...	71st Highland Light Infantry	19th " "	
Major J. P. W. Campbell	5th Goorkhas	20th " "	
Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan	5th Punjab Native Infantry	20th " "	
Brigade-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B.	General Staff	20th " "	
Lieutenant Anderson	Orderly Officer	20th " "	
" Brown ...	Royal Engineers	22nd " "	

(Signed) J. GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufze Field Force.

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

**EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.**

*NOMINAL ROLL of Casualties in the above Force since the 19th October, 1863, the date of its entering the Umbeyla Pass.*

*Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 12, 1863.*

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, MARCH 19, 1864. 1709

Regiment.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.				Date.	Engagement.	Remarks.
			Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.			
							1863.		
Hazara Mountain Battery ...	Lieutenant W. A. B. Gillies ...	1	...	...	...	...	22nd Oct.	Umbeyla Pass	
H.M.'s 71st Highland Light Infantry	Colonel William Hope, C.B. ...	...	...	...	1	...	20th Nov.	Re-taking "Crag" Piquet	
	Captain C. F. Smith ...	1	...	...	...	...	18th "	Piquet duty	
	" R. B. Aldridge...	1	...	...	...	...	19th "	Ditto	
	Lieutenant J. S. C. Jones ...	1	...	...	...	...	18th "	Ditto	Attached from 79th Regiment
	" J. B. Dougal ...	1	...	...	...	...	6th "	Covering working party	Ditto ditto
	Ensign C. B. Murray ...	1	...	...	...	...	6th "	Ditto ditto	
H.M.'s 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	Lieutenant Henry H. Chapman	1	...	...	...	...	18th "	Lower Piquet	
	Ensign C. M. Stockley ...	...	...	...	1	...	19th "	Piquet duty	
	" A. R. Sanderson ...	1	...	...	...	...	20th "	"Crag" Piquet	
	Assistant Surgeon W. Pile ...	1	...	...	...	...	20th "	Ditto	
1st Punjab Infantry ...	Major C. P. Keyes ...	...	...	...	1	...	30th Oct.	Re-taking "Crag" Piquet	
	Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher ...	...	...	...	...	1	30th "	Ditto ditto	Again wounded, 13th Nov., severely
	Captain J. P. Davidson ...	1	...	...	...	...	13th Nov.	In defence of "Crag" Piquet	
	Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher ...	...	...	...	1	...	13th "	Ditto ditto	
3rd Punjab Infantry ...	Lieutenant R. Clifford ...	1	...	...	...	...	26th Oct.	In support of troops engaged under Colonel Vaughan on Left Heights	Since dead
5th Punjab Infantry ...	Lieut.-Colonel J. L. Vaughan ...	...	...	...	...	1	20th Nov.	Re-taking "Crag" Piquet	
14th (Ferozepore) Regiment Native Infantry	Lieutenant W. F. Mosely ...	1	...	...	...	...	18th "	Lower Piquet	
	" A. D. C. Inglis ...	...	...	1	...	...	18th "	Ditto	
20th Punjab Infantry...	Lieutenant G. M. Richmond ...	...	1	...	...	...	26th Oct.	Defence of "Eagle's Nest Piquet"	
23rd Punjab Native Infantry...	Lieutenant T. T. Drake ...	...	...	...	...	1	26th "	Working party	
2nd Sikh Infantry ...	Major G. W. Harding ...	1	...	...	...	...	6th Nov.	In Camp	
5th Goorkha Regiment ...	Lieutenant J. S. Oliphant ...	...	...	...	1	...	13th "	Attack on Major Harding's party	
	Major J. P. W. Campbell ...	...	...	...	1	...	20th "	Re-taking "Crag" Piquet	
Corps of Guides Infantry ...	Lieutenant W. Battye ...	...	...	...	1	...	6th "	Right Front Piquet	

## NUMERICAL RETURN of Casualties in the Eusufzye Field Force.

Regiments.	Killed.	Wounded.			
		Mortally.	Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.
1 C. Battery 19th Brigade Royal Artillery...	0	0	1	2	2
Hazara Mountain Battery ... ..	1	1	0	3	2
Peshawur ditto ... ..	3	1	0	2	1
11th Bengal Cavalry ... ..	1	0	5	7	0
Her Majesty's 71st Highland Light Infantry	20	4	5	1	22
" 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers...	21	2	4	19	23
1st Punjab Infantry ... ..	34	12	2	24	27
3rd Ditto ditto ... ..	5	2	1	39	8
5th Ditto ditto ... ..	6	1	7	6	8
14th (Ferozepore) Regiment ... ..	47	9	8	33	22
20th Punjab Infantry ... ..	32	7	0	45	49
32nd Ditto Pioneers ... ..	0	0	0	0	4
4th Gookha Regiment ... ..	5	0	0	2	2
5th Ditto ditto ... ..	25	4	2	15	18
Guide Cavalry ... ..	0	0	0	1	1
" Infantry ... ..	2	0	0	1	5
2nd Sikh Infantry ... ..	1	0	0	0	0
Total ...	203	43	28	205	194

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.(Signed) J. GARVOCK, Major-General  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.

## EUSUFZYE FIELD FORCE.

SUPPLEMENTARY ROLL of Killed and Wounded of the above Force on the 15th and 16th  
December, 1863.

Camp, Umbeyla Pass, December 21, 1863.

Regiments.	Rank and Names.	Killed.	Wounded.		Date.	Column.	Engagements.
			Severely.	Slightly.			
Her Majesty's 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	Lieutenant C. W. Riggs	...	...	1	1863. 15th Dec.	Lieutenant-Col- onel Wilde's, C.B.	Operations on 15th and 16th Decem- ber, 1863.
	23rd Native In- fantry (Pioneers)	...	...	1	16th Dec.	Colonel Tur- ner's	Ditto
32nd Native In- fantry (Pioneers)	Captain C. Cham- berlain	...	...	...	16th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
	Lieutenant G. Alexander	1	...	...	16th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
	Lieutenant C. D. Nott	...	1	...	16th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
4th Goorkha Regi- ment	Major Trevor Wheler	...	...	1	16th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
	Lieutenant F. H. Marsh	...	...	1	16th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
	Lieutenant J. K. McCausland	...	...	1	15th Dec.	Ditto	Ditto
		1	1	5			

(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.(Signed) J. GARVOCK, Major-General,  
Commanding Eusufzye Field Force.Published by THOMAS LAWRENCE BEHAN, Editor, Manager, and Publisher, of No. 26, Charles Street, in the Parish  
of St. James, at No. 45, St. Martin's Lane, in the Parish of St. Martin-in-the-Fields, both in the  
County of Middlesex.Printed by THOMAS RICHARD HARRISON and THOMAS HARRISON, Printers, at their Office, No. 45, St. Martin's Lane,  
in the Parish and County aforesaid.

Saturday, March 19, 1864.

Price One Shilling.