

As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the Treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin.

As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at 10 A.M., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations; but I should not have been deterred by the informality alluded to above, had the contents of the letter been satisfactory. It will be seen, however, on comparing it with Kweiliang's last letter to me at Shanghai, that the proposal differs so widely from the course recommended by the Commissioners, as to confirm the impression in my mind that the pacific party had lost their influence with the Emperor. Kweiliang had acknowledged the propriety of exchanging the ratifications within the stipulated period, and had proposed that a person should be named to meet me at this place, and conduct me at once to Peking; thus admitting that the Treaty was to be accepted as it stood, without further discussion.

The Governor-General of Pechelea proposes a course which is substantially a repetition of the attempts made to detain me at Shanghai, and postpone indefinitely the exchange of ratifications, thereby giving room for re-opening discussions on those points which are particularly obnoxious to the Chinese Government. In both letters, it is to be remarked that a demand for a personal interview is passed over in silence; and in neither am I informed that the Imperial Government objects to our making use of the river-route to Tien-tsin.

Apart, therefore, from the considerations I have specified above, for believing that the abandonment of the right to go up the river would be fatal to the success of the Mission, and would establish a precedent which would put it in the power of the Chinese Government to throw difficulties in the way of our future intercourse with Peking, I could only see in this overture a further attempt at evasion and delay, and evidence that the influence at Court of Kweiliang and his colleagues was at a low ebb. It is, moreover, a significant proof of how idle it is to expect to carry out our policy by appealing to any other motive than fear, that no communication was addressed to M. de Bourboulon, and no notice taken of Mr. Ward, though he came to the Gulf of Pechelea at the express invitation of the Imperial Commissioners.

Answers are received at Takoo within forty-eight hours from Peking, and had the Government wished to treat foreign Ministers with courtesy, it would not have allowed eight days to elapse without taking any notice of them, and then contented itself with addressing the only Minister who happens to be supported by a considerable force.

Her Majesty's Government will be informed by Admiral Hope's despatches that on proceeding to remove the barriers on the 25th, the batteries, which had up to that time remained apparently deserted, and some of them masked, were suddenly manned, and opened with so heavy and well-directed a fire, as to render the operation of removing the barriers impossible. Towards the close of the day a force was landed to storm the batteries, but failed in the attempt, owing to the nature of the ground, and the deep ditches which had to be crossed before reaching the forts. Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack, and, judging from our past

experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example in the history of our contests with them, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks.

Admiral Hope having notified to me that the force under his command was unable to clear the passage up the river, M. de Bourboulon and myself agreed that we must consider the mission to Peking at an end for the present, and that we should retire to Shanghai. I accordingly addressed the inclosed letter to the Admiral, requesting him to dispose of the force in the manner best calculated to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. I thought it expedient not to address any communication to the Chinese Government upon these events, in order not to interfere in any way with the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to keep the Chinese Government as long as possible in suspense as to its ulterior intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Rear-Admiral Hope to the Taoutae of Tien-tsin.

Off the Peiho, June 20, 1859.

HAVING arrived here with a considerable squadron, in company with the Honourable Frederick Bruce, the Minister empowered by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year with His Majesty the Emperor of China, and it being my intention that the squadron shall remain here during Mr. Bruce's absence at Peking, I request that proper directions may be given that I may be permitted to purchase such supplies of fresh provisions and other articles as I require; and that the officers and men may have free communication with and access to the shore in such numbers as may not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.

"Magicienne," off the Peiho,

June 21, 1859.

SIR,
M. DE BOURBOULON and myself having maturely considered the position of affairs, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be consistent with the course hitherto adopted by us, to delay further our attempts to reach Peking within the time specified by the Treaty for the exchange of ratifications. The Chinese Government, besides the Article of the Treaty itself, is before this in possession of the correspondence that passed at Shanghai with the Commissioners, and, had it wished to do so, could have sent orders to facilitate our progress up the river. As you are aware, the course their officers at Ta-koo are pursuing, bears every mark of a fixed determination to prevent our proceeding to Tien-tsin. The superior officers in charge of the forts keep out of the way to avoid making any specific declaration of their intentions until their preparations for our exclusion are completed, and their subordinates have not hesitated at positive falsehood for the same purpose.

There is considerable reason to believe that on