

tions, I should remain here and commence discussions on various details connected with carrying the Treaty into operation, alleging as their reason for waiting at Shanghai, that the Earl of Elgin, on proceeding to the south, had left some of these details unfinished. On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3, 1859, addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there was nothing to justify their delay; that they were informed therein of my being the bearer of important documents to be delivered at Peking, and that they were warned that a strict adherence to the Treaty was the only method by which peaceful relations could be preserved. One of the Articles prescribes the exchange of the ratifications at Peking within a year, and I know, from what passed last year, that it is not, in the eyes of the Chinese, one of the least important of its stipulations.

I am unable to state whether the Commissioners were acting under instructions from their Government to use every effort to prevent our proceeding to the north, or whether they adopted this expedient for the purpose of being out of the way when the visit to the capital, so unpalatable to the pride of the Chinese Government, is to take place. But that their object was to gain time, the favourite policy of this Government, in the hope that something, they know not what, might turn up and relieve them from this visit, I could have no doubt; neither could I doubt, independently of the precise nature of my instructions, that anything which looked like hesitation or irresolution on my part, would encourage the Chinese in putting obstacles in my way, and render the objects of my mission more difficult to attain without a fresh appeal to force.

I accordingly addressed to the Secretary of State, Kweiliang, the inclosed note, declaring that my resolution to proceed was inflexible; refusing to enter into any discussion of details until after the exchange of ratifications; declining to grant them an interview at this place, and holding them responsible for any consequences that might ensue from the want of due preparation at Peking for my reception.

M. de Bourboulon, who shares my opinion on the subject, transmitted a note to the same effect.

I further sent a short note, pointing out that, by employing one of the steamers lying here, they might still, if they liked, reach Tien-tsin in time.

In the meantime the squadron sailed to rendezvous at some islands a short distance off the Peiho, and Admiral Hope left on the 11th, having agreed to inform the officers in charge of the forts at Peiho that the Ministers of England and France were coming, and to direct them, if they had received no instructions on the subject, to communicate the intelligence to Peking, and obtain a reply within a fixed number of days. On the occasion of the Admiral's departure, I addressed to him the letter copy of which is herewith inclosed.

At this time the reports that reached us were not encouraging, and I learned from the best authority that a high Chinese official had declared that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that we should be obliged to give the Chinese Government another lesson at Tien-tsin before the Emperor would be brought to reason, and before pacific counsels would obtain the ascendancy. This tallied with other accounts, and with the fact that the war party acquired so much influence at Peking last winter, and sent such extravagant instructions to the Commissioners, that Ho wrote back that, if affairs were to be managed in that spirit, the Emperor had better name his uncle and the other heads of the

war party as Commissioners, as he would not undertake the task of bringing matters to a peaceful conclusion on such terms. To this unusual act of independence, the Emperor appended the remark, "his (Ho's) obstinacy will involve him in calamity." The paper to which I refer was obtained by Mr. Parkes, and a *précis* of it forwarded to the Foreign Office in the month of January.

It is clear, therefore, that a war party exists, and that the probability of resistance is a contingency not to be lost sight of; and Admiral Hope, before leaving, addressed a letter to Sir Charles van Straubenzee, requesting him to send up a second battalion of Marines to be at hand should active operations become necessary.

These steps seem to have alarmed the Commissioners, for, on the 13th, I received the inclosed reply from them, which, in its explicit and clear style, contrasts favourably with the vague and puerile tone of their former letters. As this correspondence has been forwarded to Peking, I hope that, there as well as here, it will produce a conviction that we are not to be trifled with.

Your Lordship will observe, that though their reply is satisfactory as to the disposition of the Chinese Government, and its readiness to exchange ratifications, it makes no allusion to the interview with the Emperor, and to the presentation of the letter of credence to him. I gather from this omission that the Emperor has not instructed them on this material point; and as the question of ceremonial ought, in my opinion, to be settled before we leave Tien-tsin for Peking, it is clear that it could not have been discussed here, involving as it does the necessity of taking the pleasure of the Emperor upon it, without the risk of losing the season altogether for the visit to Peking.

I must observe, my Lord, that in order to effect the presentation in person of my credentials to the Emperor, and to deter the Chinese from their hitherto invariable practice of subjecting foreign Envoys to petty slights and insults, which lower them and the Governments they represent in the eyes of the people, I must succeed in inspiring the Emperor and his Counsellors with a conviction that what I have once demanded I will exact, and with a wholesome dread of my readiness and power to resort to force, if my demands are not complied with. The notes I have addressed to the Commissioners, as well as my general bearing, are, I feel certain, faithfully reported to the Emperor, and with this conviction I have purposely assumed the attitude and tone best calculated to induce him to submit quietly to very unpalatable proposals, by impressing upon him that these concessions are inevitable, unless he is prepared to draw the sword.

The considerable force collected by the Admiral will tend to strengthen this impression, and it is the more necessary at this time, as the Chinese are aware of the absence of any French force from China.

Throughout many generations of our intercourse with China we postponed considerations of national dignity to our commercial interests and the statement "that the barbarians care for nothing but trade," appears again and again in their official papers, as the key to our character, and the principle by acting on which we are to be "soothed and controlled." It is essential in dealing on this occasion with those questions of forms and ceremony so important to the Chinese mind, that we should disabuse them of this notion, and I believe that tenacity and firmness on these points will, by elevating our national character in the estimation of the people and of the Government, and by