



SUPPLEMENT  
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**CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE HONOURABLE F. W. A. BRUCE, C.B., HER MAJESTY'S ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLÉNIPOTENTIARY IN CHINA.**

No. 1.

*The Earl of Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce.*

(Extract.) *Foreign-Office, March 1, 1859.*

**T**HE Queen having been pleased to appoint you to be Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China, and in that capacity to exchange, at Pekin, Her Majesty's ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin with the ratification of that compact by the Emperor of China, I have now to furnish you with such general instructions as may serve for your guidance in the important mission entrusted to you by Her Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government had hoped that the Earl of Elgin would have returned to this country previously to your departure, that so your instructions might have been framed after personal communication with his Excellency. But it would seem that the interesting excursion up the Yangtze-keang river, which he so judiciously determined to undertake, has occupied more time than he anticipated, and any further delay in your departure might possibly prevent you from exchanging the ratifications within the period specified in the Treaty, namely, before the 26th of June.

Arrangements have been made for providing passage for yourself and the members of your Mission in the contract steam-vessels which convey the British mails of the 10th of March from Marseilles to Alexandria, and from Suez to Singapore and Hong Kong, in case you should not find at Suez Her Majesty's ship "Furious" waiting to receive you, or at Singapore some other man-of-war appointed to convey you to China.

On your arrival at Hong Kong, you will, in virtue of the Commission as Chief Superintendent of British Trade with which you are provided, relieve Sir John Bowring of his duties in connection with this office, and you will make arrange-

ments for transferring the general direction of British affairs in China to Shanghai, at which port it is to be carried on until such time as circumstances shall admit of its being permanently established at Pekin.

You will not remain at Hong Kong longer than is absolutely necessary, but proceed to Shanghai on your way to the Peiho.

Her Majesty's Government were fully prepared at once to carry out the provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, which admits of the permanent residence of a British Ambassador at Pekin; but the observations on this point, which Lord Elgin has so ably laid before them, coupled with the fact that the French Government, on considering Baron Gros's reports, have arrived at the same conclusion, have determined Her Majesty's Government, for the present at least, to fix at Shanghai the residence of the British Mission, and only to require that it should be received occasionally at Pekin. But you will be careful to make the Chinese authorities at the capital and at Shanghai distinctly understand that Her Majesty's Government do not renounce the right of permanent residence, and, on the contrary, will instantly exercise it, if at any time difficulties are thrown in the way of communications between Her Majesty's Minister and the Central Government at Pekin, or any disposition shown to evade or defeat the objects of the Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government are prepared to expect that all the arts at which the Chinese are such adepts, will be put in practice to dissuade you from repairing to the capital, even for the purpose of exchanging the ratifications of the Treaty; but it will be your duty firmly, but temperately, to resist any propositions to that effect, and to admit of no excuses; and you will say that the effect of any persistence on the part of the Chinese Government in throwing obstacles in the way of your arrival at Pekin, and of the presentation of your credentials to the Emperor in person, will be that Her Majesty's Government will insist on the literal fulfilment of the Treaty, and establish the Mission permanently at Pekin.

You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Peking of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Peking. The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war.

It is impossible for Her Majesty's Government, and, indeed, it would not be wise to lay down any definite rules to be rigidly adhered to, in regard to your approach to, and your communication with, the Chinese Court. The acquaintance which you possess with the Chinese character, will enable you to judge when you may give way and when you must stand firm, bearing in mind that your treatment on your first visit to Peking will always be appealed to on the occasion of future visits, as establishing a precedent not to be departed from.

You will, of course, refuse compliance with any ceremony, or form of reception, which can in any way be construed into an admission of inferiority on the part of Her Majesty in regard to the Emperor of China, and perhaps the best method of putting a stop to any attempt to impose upon you in this respect, will be that you should distinctly declare that you will withdraw at once, even from the Presence Chamber of the Sovereign, on the slightest appearance of a disposition to treat you, and the office that you hold, with disrespect.

If any objection should be raised on the score of your credentials being those of Envoy and not of an Ambassador, you will say that the reason of their being so, is to admit of the wish of the Chinese Government, that for the present the British Mission should not be permanently resident at the capital being complied with; but that if, on that ground, the Chinese Government seek to make any distinction in your reception and treatment, new credentials as Ambassador will immediately be sent to you, and, in that case, the Mission will be forthwith and permanently established at Peking.

You will, moreover, take care that the treatment awarded to you is in no degree less honourable than that awarded to the Representative of any other Power whatever. That it should be consistent with European usages, it must doubtless be more honourable than that by which Embassies from countries over whose Chiefs the Emperor assumes superiority are received; but it must be in no degree inferior to that accorded to the Representatives of other Christian nations.

Although you will insist upon your being received at Peking, and will refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place, and will further decline to make any compromise in regard to the time of your stay in the Chinese capital, or the frequency of your visits to it; Her Majesty's Government are willing to leave to your discretion the duration of your stay on the first occasion. Your primary object, after the exchange of the ratifications, will be to come to such an understanding with the Government as may ensure prompt attention being paid by proper authorities in the capital to any representations that you may see occasion to address to it; and you will particularly insist upon your right to employ messengers of your own, whether European or Chinese, for the conveyance of your communications, and

upon due facilities for the performance of their journeys being secured for such messengers.

Your general language will be that Her Majesty's Government are most anxious that the increased intercourse with the Chinese Empire, under the Treaty of Tien-tsin, may contribute to the mutual advantage of both countries; that it is Her Majesty's firm intention, while scrupulously observing the engagements which she has herself contracted, to require on the part of the Emperor of China a corresponding observance of his own; that Her Majesty's officers in the different ports of China will be directed to prevent, as far as in them lies, any disturbance of the public peace, and any disorderly conduct on the part of British subjects; and that, on the other hand, Her Majesty expects that the Chinese authorities, both at the ports and in the interior of the country, will be required to act up to the Treaty obligations contracted by their Sovereign, and to treat with kindness and consideration the subjects of Her Majesty who may be brought in contact with them.

Without waiving or compromising, in any degree, the right of Her Majesty's Mission to reside at the capital, you may let it be understood that the frequency of its visits to Peking, if not its permanent residence there, must in a great degree depend on the manner in which the provisions of the Treaty are carried out. If no occasion is given for controversy by attempts on the part of the Chinese local authorities to evade the terms of the Treaty, and more particularly if no disposition is shown by the Government at the capital to treat with disrespect any representations Her Majesty's Minister may address to it from Shanghai, the necessity for such visits to the capital will be rare; and when they are made they will be rather complimentary than for the transaction of business. But you will say that as between the Powers of Europe direct diplomatic intercourse, and the permanent residence of Ministers at the residence of the Sovereigns to whom they are accredited, are always looked upon as an indication of friendship between States, so Her Majesty's Government hope that the day is not far distant when not only will the presence of a British Minister at Peking be viewed with satisfaction, but a Representative of the Emperor of China be accredited to Her Majesty's Court, where you will say he will be welcomed both by Her Majesty and her Government, and treated with the same distinction and consideration as the Representatives of Her Majesty's nearest allies.

## No. 2.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 5.)*

*Victoria, Hong Kong, May 4, 1859.*

MY LORD,

THERE is little reliable information to be obtained here as to the reception Her Majesty's Mission is likely to meet with at Peking, and the fact of the Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwas-hana remaining at Soochow, near Shanghai, though Mr. Lay has urged them to return to Peking, to be on the spot when the foreign Missions arrive there, would seem to indicate a hope on their part that some incident may enable them to avert the visit to Peking; and this view is strengthened by the rumours, more or less true, of the repair of the old forts at the mouth of the Peiho, and the construction of fresh defences along its course.

At the same time it is reported, and, in the main, no doubt truly, that a Russian Mission of some pretensions has arrived at Peking; that its members walk about the streets, in European costume, unmolested; and that discussions have taken place between its chief and the Chinese Government on matters of etiquette, in which it is reported that the Russian has receded from his first demand. The reports from Peking are sent by native Roman Catholic catechists to their Bishop, and embody probably, the gossip which circulates in the streets of Peking on these subjects. Your Lordship is likely to be better informed from St. Petersburg than we are on the coast of China, of the route and character of this Russian Agent.

It became necessary for me to decide, in this state of uncertainty as to the intentions of the Chinese Government, on the force which should accompany me to the Peiho, it being desirable that it should proceed without delay to the north. By a note received from M. Bourboulon, my French colleague, I see he does not expect that Admiral Rigault will spare from the operations in Annam more than two vessels, of which one, I hope, will be able to ascend the river as far as Tien-tsin. I therefore requested Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee to confer with me on this point. As your Lordship will see by the inclosed minute, I stated to them that the objects of my mission were—the exchange of the ratifications at Peking, the delivery of my credentials to the Emperor of China in person, and the arrival, as far as Tien-tsin, in a British ship of war. They agreed in the opinion that it would not be safe to assume that the Chinese would concede these points, and enter seriously on the consideration of the measures required to bring the Treaty into full operation, unless I were accompanied with an imposing force, and they agreed that it should be as nearly as possible of the same strength as that which formed the expedition of last year. I hope by the demonstration to render the active employment of the force unnecessary.

In the meantime I have requested Mr. Wade to inform Mr. Lay confidentially at Shanghai of the objects and scope of the Mission, leaving it to his discretion, in which I have full reliance, to communicate it, as from himself, to the Chinese Commissioners. We may thus obtain some knowledge of their intentions on our arrival at Shanghai, which would be important as a guide in our future proceedings.

I have not decided on the terms of my communications to the Chinese Government on the point from which it is to be sent. I propose discussing these points with M. Bourboulon, and with the American Minister.

I proceed to Canton as soon as the mail leaves for England; and on my return I shall visit Macao, where I hope to find my colleagues.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

*Minute of a Conference held at the Government Offices at Hong Kong, on Friday, April 28, 1859.*

Present :

The Honourable F. Bruce, C.B.  
Sir Charles van Straubenzee, K.C.B.  
Rear-Admiral Hope, C.B.

MR. BRUCE stated that the instructions of Her Majesty's Government were to the effect that he was to proceed, if possible, to Tien-tsin in a

British man-of-war, and thence to Peking, where the exchange of the ratifications was to be effected, and where he was to present his letters of credence to the Emperor of China in person, insisting on such a reception as was befitting his character as the Representative of a nation on an equality with that of China.

He further stated that we were not in possession of any reliable information as to the spirit in which the Chinese Government were prepared to receive this first attempt to establish direct relations on a footing of equality with the Court of Peking. That we must be guided, therefore, by the general experience we had acquired of the Chinese character, and that we might infer as the result of our past experience that the objects of this mission were most likely to be satisfactorily and peacefully attained, if the British Minister were supported by a powerful demonstration of force at the mouth of the Peiho river.

Sir Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope concurred in this view, the latter stating that his instructions contemplated the Minister being escorted with an imposing force.

It was unanimously agreed that the expedition should, if possible, be as strong as that which accompanied the Ambassadors of England and France to the Peiho last year, and with that view Sir Charles van Straubenzee intimated his being prepared, consistently with the security of his position at Canton, to place a battalion of Marines and a company of Engineers at the disposal of Rear-Admiral Hope. This addition to the naval force would compensate for the absence of the French forces in Cochin China.

No. 3.

*Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.*

SIR,

*Foreign-Office, July 6, 1859.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the arrangements, as reported in your despatch of the 4th of May, which you have adopted, in concert with Sir Charles van Straubenzee and Rear-Admiral Hope, for the purpose of proceeding up the Peiho on your way to Peking, backed by an adequate naval and military force.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 4.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—  
(Received July 16.)*

*Victoria, Hong Kong, May 21, 1859.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of the note I have addressed to the Chinese Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, informing him of my arrival in China, of the diplomatic character I bear, and of the course I intend to pursue. M. Bourboulon has also sent a note to him couched in identical terms.

In my previous despatches, I have informed your Lordship that we can ascertain nothing as to the intentions of this Government with respect to the visit of foreign Envoys to Peking; but the Imperial Commissioners, on hearing of my arrival in China, have proceeded from Soo-chow to Shanghai, a fact of some significance, and which gives colour to the opinion that they hope to raise questions or begin negotiations at that point, otherwise they would have returned ere this to

Pekin, for the purpose of making preparations for our reception.

It seems to me important that I should, from the commencement, assume the new political status which I bear as a Minister accredited to the Emperor of China.

With this view I have put forward, in a prominent and intelligible shape, the character I bear, and the necessity of my proceeding direct to Pekin, to present to the Emperor my credentials, in accordance with established usage, and thereby qualify myself for the discharge of my functions as Envoy to the Court of Pekin. For the same reason I have addressed Kweiliang as Chief Secretary of State—not as Imperial Commissioner—as I wish to avoid any act that may be construed into an acceptance of an Imperial Commissioner at Shanghai. My language on that point will be that my acceptance of such a functionary is made contingent on a proper reception at Pekin, and on arrangements being made which will secure free access and unreserved communication with the Imperial Ministers at the capital, on all matters on which I think they ought to be informed.

I hope, in this way, to compel the Chinese Government to declare itself upon those points which we know are the most unpalatable to it; and if there exists, on its part, a disposition to evade its obligations, to thrust us back, as before, on the seaboard, and refuse the reception which I cannot waive without lowering our national dignity, I trust we shall be in possession of their views when we arrive at the mouth of the Pehio, and not be left to discover them gradually at Pekin. If, as is most probable, the Court of Pekin is wavering, anxious to evade, but unwilling to risk a rupture, I trust that identity of views among the foreign Representatives, firm language, and an imposing demonstration of force, will secure the observance by it of the recent Treaties, and incline it to listen to moderate and pacific advisers.

In closing this despatch, I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to a letter I addressed to Admiral Hope, on a proposal by the Lords of the Admiralty to reduce further the force on this station—a measure much to be regretted should it be carried into operation before the visit to Pekin is successfully accomplished.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

*Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.*

THE Undersigned, &c., &c., has the honour to inform his Excellency Kweiliang, Senior Secretary of State, that Her Majesty the Queen, &c., &c., has been pleased, in furtherance of the intimate and friendly relations happily established between the two Empires by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to appoint the Undersigned to the honourable post of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of China.

In that capacity he is the bearer of an autograph letter from Her Majesty the Queen to His Majesty the Emperor of China, which it will be his pleasing duty to present to His Majesty in person, according to the established usage among friendly nations, and in order that he may be thereby properly qualified to undertake the duties of his office as Her Majesty's Representative to the Court of Pekin.

The Undersigned has further to add that he is charged with the counterpart of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, duly ratified by Her Most Gracious

Majesty, and that he will be prepared to exchange it at Pekin, as agreed on in the Treaty, against one equally ratified by His Majesty the Emperor of China, that relations of peace and of good-will may be thus mutually confirmed and placed on a sure and permanent basis.

The Undersigned takes this opportunity of informing his Excellency Kweiliang, that, in compliance with the above instructions of his Sovereign, he is about to proceed without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin. He trusts that the necessary orders will be given for the conveyance of himself and suite from thence to Pekin, and for the provision of suitable accommodation for him during his residence in the capital itself in a manner befitting the dignity of the nation he represents.

The Undersigned, &c.,

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

*Victoria, Hong Kong, May, 16, 1859.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 4,

*Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.*

*Victoria, Hong Kong,*

*May 21, 1859.*

(Extract).

WITH reference to the despatch from the Lords of the Admiralty proposing a reduction of the force on this station, I beg to observe that the facts which have come to my knowledge since my arrival in China confirm me as to the propriety of the conclusion come to, in concert with yourself and Sir Charles van Straubenzee, viz., "That the force which is to accompany me to the North ought to be as strong as that which accompanied the Allied High Commissioners last year to Tien-tsin."

The task of supplying the deficiency caused by the diversion of the French force to Cochin China devolves exclusively on the Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval forces here, at a time when the squadron at his disposal is considerably less than that under the command of Sir Michael Seymour last year.

No person can pretend to speak positively as to the intentions of the Chinese; but we know that they urged the modification of one clause in the Treaty, on the ground that it was extorted by force, and that there was no opportunity for discussion afforded at Tien-tsin. The same argument would hold good for the elimination of every other Article which may be disagreeable to them; and as I see that the Imperial Commissioners, instead of going to Pekin to prepare for the reception of the foreign Envoys, have returned to Shanghai, I do not doubt that they are prepared to propose further modifications in the Treaty, and to raise difficulties as to my proper reception at Pekin, unless they find us determined and able to carry our point.

No. 5.

*Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce.*

SIR,

*Foreign-Office, July 12, 1859.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the note which you addressed to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, of which a copy is enclosed in your despatch of the 21st of May, and in which you announced to him your arrival in China, as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor of China.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 6.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 31).*

*Victoria, Hong Kong, May 30, 1859.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a report of a conversation between the Interpreter, Mr. Hart, at Canton, and a Chinese who has just returned from Peking, representing the disposition of the Emperor as most hostile. A rumour is also current here, that the Russians established at the capital have been massacred.

On the other hand, it appears that a certain Ta-ki, a Chinese merchant at Shanghai, who deals largely with foreigners, and who, from his intimacy with the Intendant at that place, and his connection with the North, is generally well informed, states that the Chinese Government will not offer any opposition to our visit to Peking.

I do not consider that my plans ought to be influenced in any degree by these reports. If any inference is to be drawn from them it is this: that there is a strong party opposed to the concessions to foreigners, and a party resigned to them as inevitable; that the triumph of the one or of the other is possible, and will depend on the moral effect produced by the cordial union of foreign powers, and on the fear of a fresh collision inspired by the demonstration of an imposing force in support of our demands.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure in No. 6.

*Memorandum.*

YESTERDAY evening a Cantonese, Sen-seen-sang, who has for several years been in the habit of lending money to expectant officials, whom he accompanies when appointed to any post, called on me. He had just returned from Peking, via Shanghai, having left the former place on the 22nd March. He informed me that at the time of his departure from Peking, the expected return of the British Ambassador to Tien-tsin, and the possibility of his visiting the capital, were subjects freely canvassed in every quarter; that the Emperor was known to be highly displeased with some of the stipulations contained in the Tien-tsin Treaty; that he was entirely averse to the Ambassador's taking up his quarters in the capital, and that he had resolved not to grant him an audience on any pretext; that military preparations were going on at Peking and Tien-tsin; that the Russians had offered the Emperor 10,000 muskets, but that His Majesty has declined to accept the present, fearing that the muskets in question might be brought to the Palace by an equal number of Russians; that the arrangement of all matters connected with the reception of the British at Tien-tsin, and the preventing of any visit to Peking, had been confided to Sung-wang-yay, a Ta-tsze-wang, son-in-law of the last Emperor; that Sung-wang-yay was at Tien-tsin with 50,000 troops, Manchoo and Mongols; that the batteries at Tien-tsin had been rebuilt, and the river staked in such a way as to render it impossible for foreign vessels to reach that city; that 30,000 "so-lo" troops, men never called out except in cases of the greatest emergency, were under orders to hold themselves in readiness to join Sung-wang-yay if called for; that Sung-wang-yay's orders were to receive the British at Tien-tsin with all civility, but at all hazards to prevent any nearer approach to Peking;

that Sung-wang-yay was very desirous of gaining military renown, and that the Ambassador would be unable to reach Peking without having recourse to arms; that, according to the opinion of some, the Ambassador, accompanied by a few people, might possibly reach Peking without bloodshed, but that a fight would certainly ensue if more than a hundred men were landed; that the country between Tien-tsin and Peking being flat, and the Chinese troops being so much more numerous than any number of men the British could land, it was the general belief that the British could be surrounded and cut to pieces before the completion of one-half the journey.

Seu-seen-sang further informed me that a Russian Ambassador had visited Peking on the 2nd March; that the Russians in the capital, more than a hundred in number, roamed about just as they pleased, much to the grief of the Emperor and the anti-foreign party; and that it was feared the British, if they once effected an entrance, would take an ell for every inch the Russians had arrogated to themselves; that at Yung-chow large quantities of grain had been bought up by the Russians, but that the Emperor having become alarmed had forbidden the traffic.

(Signed) ROBERT HART, *Interpreter.*

*British Consulate, Canton,*

*May 22, 1859.*

No. 7.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received July 31.)*

(Extract.)

*Victoria, Hong Kong,*

*June 1, 1859.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. de Bourboulon arrived at Hong Kong on the 26th ultimo from Macao, where he had been delayed by the non-arrival of the corvette and small steamer destined to convey him to Tien-tsin. Admiral Rigault had taken all the stores, etc., out of the corvette when at Turon, and she has not yet completed her provisions, but I trust she will be ready to-morrow, on which day I likewise proceed to Shanghai direct. I have waited for M. de Bourboulon, as I thought it advisable that every step we take in the Peking expedition should be taken by us in concert; and as I do not wish to have any communication with the Imperial Commissioners, should they be still at Shanghai, until my French colleague arrives.

No. 8.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received August 11.)*

My Lord,

*Shanghai, June 14, 1859.*

I TOOK my departure from Hong Kong as soon as the French corvette "Duchayla" was reported ready to proceed. Foreseeing that I should find on my arrival here questions of considerable importance, which it would be desirable to decide in concert with M. de Bourboulon, I did not think it advisable to precede him, and thereby put myself in the position either of acting in his absence, or of giving as a reason for delay that I was waiting for him. I reached Shanghai on the evening of June 6, and M. de Bourboulon arrived on the following morning.

I found three letters from the Imperial Commissioners, proposing that, instead of proceeding to the north to effect the exchange of the ratifica-

tions, I should remain here and commence discussions on various details connected with carrying the Treaty into operation, alleging as their reason for waiting at Shanghai, that the Earl of Elgin, on proceeding to the south, had left some of these details unfinished. On reading, however, Lord Elgin's letter of March 3, 1859, addressed to them on his leaving China, I saw that there was nothing to justify their delay; that they were informed therein of my being the bearer of important documents to be delivered at Peking, and that they were warned that a strict adherence to the Treaty was the only method by which peaceful relations could be preserved. One of the Articles prescribes the exchange of the ratifications at Peking within a year, and I know, from what passed last year, that it is not, in the eyes of the Chinese, one of the least important of its stipulations.

I am unable to state whether the Commissioners were acting under instructions from their Government to use every effort to prevent our proceeding to the north, or whether they adopted this expedient for the purpose of being out of the way when the visit to the capital, so unpalatable to the pride of the Chinese Government, is to take place. But that their object was to gain time, the favourite policy of this Government, in the hope that something, they know not what, might turn up and relieve them from this visit, I could have no doubt; neither could I doubt, independently of the precise nature of my instructions, that anything which looked like hesitation or irresolution on my part, would encourage the Chinese in putting obstacles in my way, and render the objects of my mission more difficult to attain without a fresh appeal to force.

I accordingly addressed to the Secretary of State, Kweiliang, the inclosed note, declaring that my resolution to proceed was inflexible; refusing to enter into any discussion of details until after the exchange of ratifications; declining to grant them an interview at this place, and holding them responsible for any consequences that might ensue from the want of due preparation at Peking for my reception.

M. de Bourboulon, who shares my opinion on the subject, transmitted a note to the same effect.

I further sent a short note, pointing out that, by employing one of the steamers lying here, they might still, if they liked, reach Tien-tsin in time.

In the meantime the squadron sailed to rendezvous at some islands a short distance off the Peiho, and Admiral Hope left on the 11th, having agreed to inform the officers in charge of the forts at Peiho that the Ministers of England and France were coming, and to direct them, if they had received no instructions on the subject, to communicate the intelligence to Peking, and obtain a reply within a fixed number of days. On the occasion of the Admiral's departure, I addressed to him the letter copy of which is herewith inclosed.

At this time the reports that reached us were not encouraging, and I learned from the best authority that a high Chinese official had declared that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that we should be obliged to give the Chinese Government another lesson at Tien-tsin before the Emperor would be brought to reason, and before pacific counsels would obtain the ascendancy. This tallied with other accounts, and with the fact that the war party acquired so much influence at Peking last winter, and sent such extravagant instructions to the Commissioners, that Ho wrote back that, if affairs were to be managed in that spirit, the Emperor had better name his uncle and the other heads of the

war party as Commissioners, as he would not undertake the task of bringing matters to a peaceful conclusion on such terms. To this unusual act of independence, the Emperor appended the remark, "his (Ho's) obstinacy will involve him in calamity." The paper to which I refer was obtained by Mr. Parkes, and a *précis* of it forwarded to the Foreign Office in the month of January.

It is clear, therefore, that a war party exists, and that the probability of resistance is a contingency not to be lost sight of; and Admiral Hope, before leaving, addressed a letter to Sir Charles van Straubenzee, requesting him to send up a second battalion of Marines to be at hand should active operations become necessary.

These steps seem to have alarmed the Commissioners, for, on the 13th, I received the inclosed reply from them, which, in its explicit and clear style, contrasts favourably with the vague and puerile tone of their former letters. As this correspondence has been forwarded to Peking, I hope that, there as well as here, it will produce a conviction that we are not to be trifled with.

Your Lordship will observe, that though their reply is satisfactory as to the disposition of the Chinese Government, and its readiness to exchange ratifications, it makes no allusion to the interview with the Emperor, and to the presentation of the letter of credence to him. I gather from this omission that the Emperor has not instructed them on this material point; and as the question of ceremonial ought, in my opinion, to be settled before we leave Tien-tsin for Peking, it is clear that it could not have been discussed here, involving as it does the necessity of taking the pleasure of the Emperor upon it, without the risk of losing the season altogether for the visit to Peking.

I must observe, my Lord, that in order to effect the presentation in person of my credentials to the Emperor, and to deter the Chinese from their hitherto invariable practice of subjecting foreign Envoys to petty slights and insults, which lower them and the Governments they represent in the eyes of the people, I must succeed in inspiring the Emperor and his Counsellors with a conviction that what I have once demanded I will exact, and with a wholesome dread of my readiness and power to resort to force, if my demands are not complied with. The notes I have addressed to the Commissioners, as well as my general bearing, are, I feel certain, faithfully reported to the Emperor, and with this conviction I have purposely assumed the attitude and tone best calculated to induce him to submit quietly to very unpalatable proposals, by impressing upon him that these concessions are inevitable, unless he is prepared to draw the sword.

The considerable force collected by the Admiral will tend to strengthen this impression, and it is the more necessary at this time, as the Chinese are aware of the absence of any French force from China.

Throughout many generations of our intercourse with China we postponed considerations of national dignity to our commercial interests and the statement "that the barbarians care for nothing but trade," appears again and again in their official papers, as the key to our character, and the principle by acting on which we are to be "soothed and controlled." It is essential in dealing on this occasion with those questions of forms and ceremony so important to the Chinese mind, that we should disabuse them of this notion, and I believe that tenacity and firmness on these points will, by elevating our national character in the estimation of the people and of the Government, and by



gaining their respect, if not their goodwill, facilitate greatly hereafter our relations with China.

For this reason, when the Commissioners the other day conveyed indirectly to me that they were ready to arrange to my satisfaction the question of the Canton indemnity, I took no notice of the overture.

I ought to add that Mr. Ward, the Minister of the United States, has insisted on exchanging the ratifications of his Treaty at Peking, and that he is prepared to accompany us to the North; he has, moreover, advanced the same claim to an interview with the Emperor. Of the intentions of the Russian Envoy, I have learned nothing as yet.

It only remains for me to add, that I purpose leaving this to-morrow morning for the Peiho, my French and American colleagues following the next day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

*Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.*

(Translation.)

KWEILIANG, &c., Hwashana, &c., Ho, &c., Imperial Commissioners, &c., make a communication.

It appears from the records, that on the 22nd day of the 12th moon of last year (January 25, 1859), a despatch was received by the Commissioners from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, in which there are the following words:—"The Undersigned has determined on proceeding to Canton to take certain steps (or to act); his business accomplished, in the course of some five or six weeks, he will name a time for his arrival at Shanghai, there to settle with the Commissioners such questions as still remain to be discussed."\*

In due course of time, on the 26th day of the 2nd moon of the present year (March 30, 1859), the Commissioners received a second letter, dated the 29th of the 1st moon (March 3), to the effect that (Her Britannic Majesty) had appointed the Honourable Mr. Bruce to be her Representative, &c.; and that he would arrive in China shortly; further stating that "the Undersigned, now on the point of leaving China, must take leave, on this his last opportunity of addressing them, earnestly to impress (upon the Commissioners) that the one essential to a continuance of friendly relations is the faithful observance of the Treaty," &c.

The Commissioners, in consequence of Lord Elgin's earlier letter, in which he engaged to return to Shanghai for a conference with them, have been waiting for him without moving (*lit.*, obstinately, persistently).

Lord Elgin has returned home, but Mr. Bruce, having received the commands of Her Majesty to succeed him in the administration of all things essential, and now occupying, to the great satisfaction of the Commissioners, a position identical with that of Lord Elgin, his predecessor, the proper course to be pursued is, doubtless, to appoint a day for a Conference.

In faithful compliance with the engagement already entered into, and as the period appointed for the exchange of the Treaties is very near at hand, it is, of course, most expedient that all business which has to be considered should become

the subject of consultation, and be proceeded with, as early as possible.

A necessary communication, addressed to Mr. Bruce, Envoy Extraordinary, &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 25th day (May 27, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859).

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

*Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.*

(Translation.)

KWEI, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication.

It appears from the records that on the 13th day of the 12th moon of last year (16th January, 1859), the Commissioners received from the late British Minister, Lord Elgin, a communication to the effect that he was proceeding to Canton upon business, and would return to Shanghai in five or six weeks, to consider and dispose of all matters on which discussion was still pending.

Firmly persuaded of the good faith of Lord Elgin's words, the Commissioners have been waiting for him several months. His Lordship has now returned home, but as Mr. Bruce has been commanded by Her (Britannic) Majesty to replace him there with Plenipotentiary powers, his position is identical with that of his predecessor Lord Elgin.

With Mr. Bruce's permission the Commissioners will state the questions which have been discussed with Lord Elgin, and decided, as well as those which still remain to be discussed.

As regards admission into Peking, the visit to Peking on this occasion to exchange courtesies and Treaties is exceptional: when it is over there is to be no permanent residence in the capital; some other place is to be chosen (for the Minister) to reside at. These are the words of Lord Elgin's despatch, the approval of which, by Her Britannic Majesty, when Lord Elgin had the honour to receive it, was duly reported to His Imperial Majesty by the Commissioners.

As regards the navigation of the river (Yang-tze), Lord Elgin has been himself to Hankow to see the place for once. For the time to come, it will be safe and satisfactory that all arrangements be made, as of course they must be, in accordance with the Treaty.\*

As regards circulation in the interior, this, without doubt, on the principle laid down by Lord Elgin, viz., that any British subject of respectability and good conduct should receive a passport from the local authorities under which he may travel, this is perfectly fair. But inasmuch as China has no means of knowing what British subjects are respectable, it is still necessary that some good adequate means be devised (to this end), that there may be no misgivings on either side.

As regards the city of Canton, Lord Elgin engaged to go further into this question when he should return to Shanghai; but as his Lordship has returned to England, it has not been possible to consider it with him. The time for the exchange of the Treaties draws near: the Treaties once exchanged, the relations between the two countries will be more friendly than ever. Added to this, as Imperial Commissioner for the management of the five ports, His Majesty the Emperor has already substituted the Governor-General Ho, one of the Commissioners, for his

\* This is a free re-translation of the Chinese, representing the English of Lord Elgin's despatch, of which there is not a copy at hand.

\* And, consequently here.

predecessor (Hwang), by which appointment it is felt consultations on business between China and foreign nations will be much facilitated.\* Everything is thus on a satisfactory footing. But as Canton is not yet restored, it would seem that no time should be lost in arriving at a satisfactory decision regarding it.

The Commissioners will be greatly obliged by his Excellency replying specifically to them upon the above subjects; those which have been disposed of in discussion, and those which remain to be discussed.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

*Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, &c., to Mr. Bruce.*

(Translation.)

KWEL, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On the 25th instant (27th May) the Commissioners received Mr. Bruce's despatch of the 14th instant (16th May), apprising them that Her Britannic Majesty had done him the honour to appoint him her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Peking.

The Commissioners were greatly gratified at this intelligence. They are of opinion, however, that an affair of so grave importance to both nations as an exchange of Treaties cannot with propriety be hurried over. The Commissioners, having the fullest confidence in his predecessor, Lord Elgin, when he engaged them to remain at Shanghai to consider all matters not disposed of, were unable to return to Peking; and if Mr. Bruce now proceed direct to Tien-tsin, the Commissioners, having to travel by land, cannot reckon upon arriving there so soon. Indeed, taking into consideration the hindrance to be expected from the weather on their land journey, this will certainly occupy two months and more, as Mr. Bruce, they imagine, must be well aware.

As to the preparation of vessels, vehicles, &c., at Tien-tsin,† to which the letter under acknowledgement refers, and the selection of a building in proper order (for Mr. Bruce) to reside in, with the good understanding now subsisting between the two nations, the arrangement will be, of course, as liberal as it is suggested they should be.‡ But the Commissioners cannot arrive in so short a time, nor can any of these things be done at a moment's notice.

There is another consideration: not only will there be no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, as it is impossible for the Commissioners to be there against his arrival, but (there will be no one either to exchange the ratifications): the exchange of the Treaties must be effected by the hand of the Commissioners, and by their hand alone—no one can act as their substitutes; and

\* This is, I think, a feeler regarding the extent to which our former relations are modified. The Chinese would prefer continually to regard them as merely commercial; the Chinese Superintendent of Trade as Foreign Minister.—T. W.

† The suitable means of transmission spoken of in Mr. Bruce's letter of the 16th of May.

‡ *Lit.*, It is certainly proper that, according to this, or after this fashion (China should be) liberal. There is a certain amount of patronage in the expression.

believing, consequently, that it would be better for Mr. Bruce to defer his departure from Shanghai for a while, than to be kept waiting at the other place, where, after midsummer, the heat is excessive, they feel bound to request him, in the first place, on his arrival at Shanghai, to name a day for an interview with them, and, in the second, to appoint some other time for proceeding. This, it seems to them, would be the more satisfactory arrangement. The Commissioners are induced to put forward this proposition by the importance they attach to the question before them, and (their desire for) the establishment of friendly relations to endure for evermore. Mr. Bruce's thorough acquaintance with the ways of the world (or the motives of men) is such that they feel sure he will appreciate their feelings, and they hope that he will at once reply to them.

A necessary communication addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 4th moon, 26th day (28th May, 1859).

(Received June 6, 1859.)

Inclosure 4 in No. 8.

*Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.*

THE Undersigned, &c., begs to acknowledge the receipt of the letter addressed to him by their Excellencies the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashana, Ho Kwei-ting, and Twau Ching-shih, in reply to that sent by him to his Excellency Kweiliang, Chief Secretary of State.

The Undersigned must remind his Excellency Kweiliang that the Treaty of Tien-tsin, signed on the 26th of June last, provides that the ratifications shall be exchanged at the capital within a year from that date; and the Imperial Commissioners themselves admit that on the 30th of March last, they were apprised by the Earl of Elgin that the Undersigned was on his way to China for the purpose of fulfilling this engagement. The Commissioners were, at the same time, made aware that the Earl of Elgin was returning home, consequently that he would not revisit Shanghai. Notwithstanding this intelligence, they have thought proper to remain at Shanghai till within a month of the time appointed for the exchange of ratifications, alleging, as a reason for so doing, that various details connected with the execution of the Treaty had been only in part discussed by the Earl of Elgin, while they, at the same time, declare that they are the only authorities by whom the exchange of the ratified Treaties at Peking could be effected. They now write to inform the Undersigned that their journey to Peking will occupy above two months; that is to say, that they cannot reach the capital for upwards of a month after the day by Treaty appointed, that there will be no one to receive the Undersigned at Tien-tsin, and no one to exchange the ratifications at Peking. They accordingly request the Undersigned to delay his departure from Shanghai.

The Undersigned is determined, that so far as it rests with him, no stipulation of the Treaty shall be violated. The exchange of the ratifications is a ceremony which records in the most solemn form that the new Treaty is the rule henceforth to be observed in conducting the intercourse of the two nations. And as the Treaty admits of no alteration or modification, the Undersigned cannot allow that the period fixed for the exchange be made in any way dependent on arrangements necessary to carry certain of its details into execution.



It is with regret that the Undersigned finds at the very outset of a Mission sent by Her Britannic Majesty as evidence of her desire for peaceful relations, that he is met, not as he had a right to expect, with a cordial and frank invitation to the capital, but with delays and hesitations, ill-calculated to cement a good understanding. The Undersigned will not, however, swerve in the least from the course he has laid down in his letter of the 18th ultimo. He is resolved to proceed forthwith to Peking, there to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty, and to deliver in person the letter intrusted to his charge by his gracious Sovereign to His Imperial Majesty, to whom it is addressed, nor will he quit the capital until satisfied that effect will be given, without reserve, to every provision of the Treaty of Tien-tsin.

The Undersigned intends no discourtesy to the Imperial Commissioners, but he must, under these circumstances, positively decline any interview with them at this place.

His resolution to proceed to Peking without delay is inflexible.

It is at the same time his duty to warn his Excellency Kweiliang that he is prepared to insist on a reception befitting the dignity of the nation he represents, and that any failure in this respect will be attended with the most serious consequences to the Imperial Government.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.  
*Shanghai, June 8, 1859.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 8.

*Mr. Bruce to Commissioner Kweiliang.*

THE Undersigned, &c., had the honour to address a letter to the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, upon the 8th instant. He has received no reply to this, and he observes that neither his Excellency nor his colleagues the Imperial Commissioners, who have informed him that it is through their hands alone that the ratifications of the Treaty can pass, are, to all appearance, making any effort to reach Peking by the day on which it is by Treaty agreed the ratifications shall be exchanged. He begs, therefore, to point out to them that there are lying in this harbour several steamers, one or two of them flying the Chinese flag, by the employment of which it is perfectly within their power to accomplish their journey before the appointed time.

Admiral Hope, the Naval Commander-in-chief, has started for the mouth of the Peiho with his squadron, charged to advise the local authorities of the immediate approach of the Undersigned and his colleague M. de Bourboulon, the Minister of France.

The Undersigned, before leaving Shanghai, begs again to impress upon his Excellency Kweiliang that his proceeding is in strict accordance with the Treaty provision, and he throws upon the Chinese Government the entire responsibility of any consequences that may arise from its violation.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.  
*Shanghai, June 11, 1859.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 8.

*Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.*

SIR,

*Shanghai, June 11, 1859.*

THE communications I have received from the Imperial Commissioners do not, I regret to say, justify me in assuming that the Chinese Government has resolved to receive my visit to Peking in a conciliatory spirit. There is manifestly a desire to treat this visit, not as the exercise of our undoubted privilege under Treaty, but as an exceptional case, the various steps of which are to be minutely arranged at this place before we are to be permitted to proceed to the North; and not satisfied with the interminable discussions to which such a course would necessarily lead, the Commissioners propose further to enter upon the details necessary for carrying into effect the provisions of the Treaty. Their letters breathe throughout the old spirit of jealousy and isolation.

It is not consistent with my instructions, nor with the express stipulations of the Treaty that I should agree to such proposals, nor do I see how it would be possible, within any reasonable time, to settle, at this distance from Peking, questions of ceremonial which affect the Emperor personally, and on which his pleasure will have to be taken.

I am satisfied, on looking over the correspondence, and particularly by a reference to the Earl of Elgin's last letter to the Commissioners on leaving China, that they cannot allege, with any show of reason, that they have prolonged their stay here at his request; and however much I regret the difficulties that may arise out of their absence from the capital at this conjuncture, I do not think that I could depart from the programme contained in my first letter to them, without involving myself later in more serious complications, and without reviving hopes in the mind of the Chinese Government, that by procrastination and discussions they may succeed ultimately in giving to this visit to Peking a character, in the eyes of the Chinese people, at variance with those principles of equality and unrestricted intercourse, which it was one of the main objects of the Treaty to insure.

I have therefore informed them that I cannot accede to their request to remain here, and that I shall take my departure for the North without delay, in order to effect the exchange of the ratifications and the presentation of my letter and credentials to the Emperor.

At the same time I am anxious to give to the Imperial Government the opportunity, if it be so disposed, of repairing the neglect of the Commissioners, and of receiving me in a friendly manner. You will precede my arrival at the Peiho, and I beg that you will have the goodness to inform the officer in charge of the forts of the approach of the Ministers of England and France on a friendly mission, and inquire whether orders have been given to facilitate their progress to Tien-tsin. Should the reply be in the negative, I would suggest that they should be called upon to transmit the intelligence to Peking, warning them at the same that if a reply is not received within a certain fixed period, the Imperial Government will be held responsible for the consequences.

By the time your message reaches Peking the Government will be in possession of the correspondence between his Excellency Kweiliang and the foreign plenipotentiaries, and will be informed accurately of the objects and scope of the visit to the capital. M. de Bourboulon agrees with me as to the course to be adopted, and I am authorized

by him to request that you will make the above communication in his name as well as in mine.

I intend leaving Shanghai on or about the 15th of this month.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 8.

*Commissioners Kweiliang, Hwashand, &c., to  
Mr. Bruce.*

(Translation.)

Kwei, &c., Hwa, &c., Ho, &c., Twau, &c., Imperial Commissioners, make a communication in reply.

On receipt of Mr. Bruce's letter of the 8th instant, acquainting the Commissioners that his determination to proceed forthwith to Peking to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty was unalterable, the Commissioners feeling that it would not be correct that the day appointed for that purpose, which was near at hand, should be passed, after due deliberation decided that the only course open to them was to represent the matter fully to His Majesty the Emperor, and to request him to be pleased specially to select some high officer who might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception. Their memorial was sent forward at the rate of 600 li (200 miles) a day,\* and would arrive at the latest in some eight or nine days at Peking, so that it might be assumed that when Mr. Bruce and the Ministers of France and America reached Tien-tsin, the Imperial Commissioners could not fail to have arrived as well, and so the exchange of Treaties in Peking would be effected by the time fixed for the purpose.

The Commissioners were in the act of addressing Mr. Bruce to the above effect, when they received his second letter dated the 11th instant, expressing a wish that they should proceed by steamer. They were not unaware that a steamer would be a most expeditious (means of conveyance), but they have not received His Majesty's commands (to avail themselves of it), and they could on no account presume so to proceed on their own motion. Were they now to make the proposition the subject of a memorial (so far from any advantageous result from such a course), there would be, on the contrary, time lost in the marching and countermarching. It behoves them, therefore, in obedience to His Majesty's commands, to return post-haste to the capital. As they have prayed His Majesty to detach a high officer to act as agent in the matter, Mr. Bruce will be certainly enabled to arrive at his destination by the time appointed. With the peaceful relations now established between the two nations, nothing certainly will be done that is not in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, and the Commissioners, accordingly, pray Mr. Bruce at once to put away all misgiving on the subject. There is no need for him to feel any anxiety. They would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the Tien-tsin river (the Peiho), he should anchor his vessels of war outside the bar, and then, without much baggage and with a moderate retinue, proceed to the capital for the exchange of the Treaties. His mission being a pacific one (or, as he comes speaking peace), his treatment by the Government of China will not fail to be in every way most courteous; and it is the sincere wish of the Commissioners that relations of friendship may be from this time

forth consolidated, and that on each side confidence may be felt in the good faith and justice of the other.

A necessary communication, addressed to the Honourable F. Bruce, C.B., &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 5th moon, 12th day  
(12th of June, 1859).

(Received June 13, 8 A.M.)

No. 9.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received  
September 13.)*

*Off the Peiho River,  
July 5, 1859.*

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour to state that four days after the receipt of his Excellency Kweiliang's letter, I left Woosung for the north, taking the Coromandel in tow, in order to have an unarmed vessel in which to ascend the river.

On arriving at the Islands of Sha-loo-tien, the rendezvous agreed on with the Admiral, I found the squadron no longer there, and proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho on the 20th June, where the ships were assembled, the Admiral having sent the gun-boats over the bar, on account of the heavy sea running outside.

Admiral Hope reached the Islands of Sha-loo-tien on the 16th, and on the 17th he left the anchorage in the Fury, attended by two gun-boats, to announce the coming of the Ministers of England and France to the authorities at the mouth of the river. The Fury and gun-boats anchored outside the bar, and Commander Commerell, with Mr. Mongan, the interpreter, went over the bar in the Fury's gig, to deliver the message. They were not allowed to land by the armed rabble on the bank, and when Captain Commerell asked for an interview with the authorities, they declared that there was no authority, civil or military, on the spot; that the barriers in the river had been made by the people at their own expense, not against us, but against the rebels; and that the garrison consisted of militia only. The chief spokesman, who called himself an engineer or Clerk of the Works, however, offered to take any message to Tientsin, and bring back an answer.

On receiving the report of what had passed, Admiral Hope sent Captain Commerell in again to inform them of the arrival of the Ministers, and to request that a passage should be opened within three days to allow of their proceeding by the river to Tien-tsin.

To this they replied that they had dispatched a messenger to Tien-tsin to notify our arrival, and that a passage should be opened within the required time. Admiral Hope then returned to Sha-loo-tien.

On the 18th the squadron left for the Peiho, and the gun-boats anchored inside the bar on account of the heavy sea running outside; and on the 20th, the day of my arrival, Admiral Hope proceeded to the forts to see whether steps had been taken to open a passage for us, and to deliver a letter he had addressed to the Intendant of Tien-tsin, stating that the squadron would remain at the anchorage during our visit to Peking, and requesting that a market should be opened for the sale of fresh provisions, and arrangements made for landing of officers and men in such numbers as might not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

The same rabble came down to the bank, and opposed the landing, one of them threatening Mr.

\* This is the form of words for the fastest rate of mail-despatch but one.

Mongan with a drawn sword when he jumped on shore. They again denied the presence of any authority, and asserted that they were militia, acting on their own responsibility. Instead of removing the obstacles, they had further closed the passages, and when taxed with this breach of their promise, denied that they had ever offered to remove the barriers.

To give more colour to their assertions of the absence of any authority, they hoisted no flags on the forts, and no soldier was visible during the time the squadron was lying there.

It is not difficult to understand the motives of the Chinese Government in thus holding aloof, contrary to their usual custom, from all communication with the squadron and foreign Ministers. We know from the Peking gazettes that during the last eight months they have been studiously adding to their defences along this coast, and that Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, the head of the war party, and distinguished by his successful defence of Tien-tsin against the rebels in 1853, has been appointed Commander-in-chief of this district. It is evident that the Government were preparing for our arrival, and had instructed the garrison to represent themselves as a militia post, and to deny the presence of any constituted authority, by which arrangement they hoped to preserve an attitude which would enable them to take advantage of his success, if he were able to keep us out of the river, or to disavow his proceedings, if he failed in his efforts to do so.

After a long and anxious consultation M. de Bourboulon and I decided that we ought to adhere strictly to the course laid down in our letters to Kweiliang at Shanghai, and that we should insist, as much for the sake of our future communications with Peking as for the successful accomplishment of the mission now confided to us, on the right of using the river as the natural highway to the capital. If, in accordance with Kweiliang's memorial, a high officer had been deputed to meet us at this place, bearing a friendly invitation from the Emperor, and satisfactory assurances as to our personal reception by him, we were quite prepared to have proceeded as far as Tien-tsin with only such vessels as were required for the accommodation of ourselves and suite, for I do not think that in any case we ought to have allowed our right to choose the only expeditious and commodious route to the capital to be questioned. But on considering the late proceedings of the Chinese Government, the persistency of Kweiliang and his colleagues in remaining in the south instead of returning to Peking, the proposal to effect the ratifications at Shanghai, the attempts to delay our progress to the north by raising fresh discussions on the Treaty, and finally, the hostile and discourteous reception we have met with here, we were forced to conclude that the difficult task lay before us of carrying the Treaties into full operation, and of ensuring a reception at Peking on terms to the last degree mortifying to Chinese arrogance, while the Emperor is in the hands of a party averse to concession and relying on their preparations to resist us.

Every incident corroborated the information we obtained at Shanghai from a Chinese authority, reported to your Lordship in my despatch of the 14th ultimo, that the Emperor would not accede to what we were instructed to demand except under the pressure of fear.

The question, then, for consideration was, how were we to work sufficiently on the fears of the Emperor to induce him to give way? The experience of last year showed that the presence of a squadron in the gulf was not enough to effect that

object, while it equally showed that the opening of Peking would follow on the accessibility of Tien-tsin to our ships being established. We could hardly be mistaken in inferring from the studied manner in which the Chinese officials held aloof from all communication with us, and from the repeated assertion of no authority being present at the forts, that the Government was prepared to disavow these hostile proceedings, if we succeeded in clearing a passage up the river.

We were equally justified by our past experience, and by the reluctance of the Chinese Government to allow us to proceed up the river, in assuming that they considered they would gain a great advantage by keeping the vessels outside, and by reducing us to negotiating in the gulf or in the interior, deprived of the moral support we should have acquired from the presence of our flags at Tien-tsin. Our desisting from claiming the right to go up in our own ships would have been attributed to inability to force their defences, and the ascendancy would thus have been secured to the war-party in the Emperor's councils. My conviction is, that in that case we must have abandoned all hope of a proper reception at Peking on this occasion, and that we should have found it impossible to establish unrestricted access to the Central Government in future, or work out in practice the clauses of the Treaty provided for circulation in the interior, and the imposition of regular duties instead of arbitrary exactions, provisions which can always be evaded, and for which we can have no other guarantee than the Emperor's dread of giving us offence.

On the 21st of June, I accordingly addressed a letter to Admiral Hope (copy inclosed), requesting him in the joint names of M. de Bourboulon and myself, to take such steps as he might deem expedient to clear away the obstacles in the river, so as to admit of our proceeding at once to Tien-tsin. Nothing was done until the 24th, the Admiral being meanwhile engaged in notifying that as a passage up the river had not been opened, he should proceed to open it himself, and Mr. Ward, the American Minister, having signified his intention of proceeding on the 24th in his small steamer to the forts, and requiring a free passage up the river, in which application he was, like ourselves, unsuccessful. During that night, however, Admiral Hope caused part of the obstacles to be blown up without loss, and the attempt to pass the barriers and proceed up the river was fixed for the morning of the following day.

About 9 A.M. on the 25th a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship *Magicienne* anchored about nine miles from the forts, and a petty mandarin came on board with a letter addressed to me by the Governor-General of Pechele, translation of which I herewith inclose. It announced that the Governor-General had been ordered to proceed to Peh-tang-ho, an inlet or small mouth of the river, about ten miles to the northward of this anchorage, and thence to offer his services to Her Majesty's Minister. That Kweiliang and Hwas-hana had been summoned back to Peking, as the persons authorized to exchange ratifications, and convey the Minister to the capital. I was requested, therefore, to await their arrival, and to allow time for the withdrawal of the troops, quartered at Peh-tang-ho, after which the Governor-General would come in a vessel to convey me to the landing-place, whence I should proceed to Peking by land.

This letter was dated the 23rd, and only reached me on the 25th,—a delay which is inexplicable, if it had been intended to reach me in time.

As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the Treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin.

As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at 10 A.M., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations; but I should not have been deterred by the informality alluded to above, had the contents of the letter been satisfactory. It will be seen, however, on comparing it with Kweiliang's last letter to me at Shanghai, that the proposal differs so widely from the course recommended by the Commissioners, as to confirm the impression in my mind that the pacific party had lost their influence with the Emperor. Kweiliang had acknowledged the propriety of exchanging the ratifications within the stipulated period, and had proposed that a person should be named to meet me at this place, and conduct me at once to Peking; thus admitting that the Treaty was to be accepted as it stood, without further discussion.

The Governor-General of Pechelea proposes a course which is substantially a repetition of the attempts made to detain me at Shanghai, and postpone indefinitely the exchange of ratifications, thereby giving room for re-opening discussions on those points which are particularly obnoxious to the Chinese Government. In both letters, it is to be remarked that a demand for a personal interview is passed over in silence; and in neither am I informed that the Imperial Government objects to our making use of the river-route to Tien-tsin.

Apart, therefore, from the considerations I have specified above, for believing that the abandonment of the right to go up the river would be fatal to the success of the Mission, and would establish a precedent which would put it in the power of the Chinese Government to throw difficulties in the way of our future intercourse with Peking, I could only see in this overture a further attempt at evasion and delay, and evidence that the influence at Court of Kweiliang and his colleagues was at a low ebb. It is, moreover, a significant proof of how idle it is to expect to carry out our policy by appealing to any other motive than fear, that no communication was addressed to M. de Bourboulon, and no notice taken of Mr. Ward, though he came to the Gulf of Pechelea at the express invitation of the Imperial Commissioners.

Answers are received at Takoo within forty-eight hours from Peking, and had the Government wished to treat foreign Ministers with courtesy, it would not have allowed eight days to elapse without taking any notice of them, and then contented itself with addressing the only Minister who happens to be supported by a considerable force.

Her Majesty's Government will be informed by Admiral Hope's despatches that on proceeding to remove the barriers on the 25th, the batteries, which had up to that time remained apparently deserted, and some of them masked, were suddenly manned, and opened with so heavy and well-directed a fire, as to render the operation of removing the barriers impossible. Towards the close of the day a force was landed to storm the batteries, but failed in the attempt, owing to the nature of the ground, and the deep ditches which had to be crossed before reaching the forts. Nothing could exceed the heroism of those engaged in the attack, and, judging from our past

experience of Chinese warfare, there was every reason to expect success. But the Chinese fired on this occasion with a skill and precision of which there is no previous example in the history of our contests with them, and which would seem to show that they must have received foreign instruction, even if they have not foreigners in their ranks.

Admiral Hope having notified to me that the force under his command was unable to clear the passage up the river, M. de Bourboulon and myself agreed that we must consider the mission to Peking at an end for the present, and that we should retire to Shanghai. I accordingly addressed the inclosed letter to the Admiral, requesting him to dispose of the force in the manner best calculated to preserve tranquillity at the ports open to trade. I thought it expedient not to address any communication to the Chinese Government upon these events, in order not to interfere in any way with the decision of Her Majesty's Government, and to keep the Chinese Government as long as possible in suspense as to its ulterior intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

*Rear-Admiral Hope to the Taoutae of Tien-tsin.*

*Off the Peiho, June 20, 1859.*

HAVING arrived here with a considerable squadron, in company with the Honourable Frederick Bruce, the Minister empowered by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty concluded last year with His Majesty the Emperor of China, and it being my intention that the squadron shall remain here during Mr. Bruce's absence at Peking, I request that proper directions may be given that I may be permitted to purchase such supplies of fresh provisions and other articles as I require; and that the officers and men may have free communication with and access to the shore in such numbers as may not be inconvenient to the inhabitants of Takoo.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) JAMES HOPE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

*Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.*

*"Magicienne," off the Peiho,*

*June 21, 1859.*

SIR, M. DE BOURBOULON and myself having maturely considered the position of affairs, we have come to the conclusion that it would not be consistent with the course hitherto adopted by us, to delay further our attempts to reach Peking within the time specified by the Treaty for the exchange of ratifications. The Chinese Government, besides the Article of the Treaty itself, is before this in possession of the correspondence that passed at Shanghai with the Commissioners, and, had it wished to do so, could have sent orders to facilitate our progress up the river. As you are aware, the course their officers at Ta-koo are pursuing, bears every mark of a fixed determination to prevent our proceeding to Tien-tsin. The superior officers in charge of the forts keep out of the way to avoid making any specific declaration of their intentions until their preparations for our exclusion are completed, and their subordinates have not hesitated at positive falsehood for the same purpose.

There is considerable reason to believe that on

the Mongol Prince in charge of the works the hopes of the war-party repose, and that if he is defeated in his attempt to keep us out of the river, pacific counsels will prevail with the Emperor, but there is little chance of any satisfactory result while their confidence in him is unabated, or that the visit to the capital will be effected in such a manner as to impress the Chinese with a just idea of our national power and equality.

We have therefore resolved to place the matter in your hands, and to request you to take any measures you may deem expedient for clearing away the obstructions in the river, so as to allow us to proceed at once to Tien-tsin.

I have also to beg that you will act in M. de Bourboulon's name as well as in mine.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

*Governor Hang to Mr. Bruce.*

(Translation.)

HANG, Governor-General of Chili, &c., &c., &c., makes a communication.

In obedience to the commands of His Imperial Majesty, the Governor-General has come to Peh-tang-Ho, a port (or harbour) to the northward of Ta-koo, to be of any service (or to do the honours to) Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy.

As the negotiations of the Treaty made last year, His Majesty the Emperor has issued a Decree commanding the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, and the President of the Board of Civil Office, Hwashana, to return from Shanghai to Peking, and they may arrive any day. If the Envoy of Her Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to wait until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital, they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the Treaties (or will exchange the Treaties in the capital).

At Peh-tang-Ho itself there has always been a military station and a battery for the defence of the coast. Orders have been issued to remove the troops and guns to the rear, and, as soon as this shall be effected, a vessel (or vessels) will be prepared for the Governor-General to proceed with outside the bar to welcome Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy to Peh-tang-Ho, whence he can proceed by land to Peking.

A necessary communication addressed to Mr. Bruce, &c., &c.

Hien-fung, 9th year, 5th moon, 24th day, (23rd June, 1859).

[The character signifying "Her Majesty" is not on a level with that signifying the Emperor, as by the fixed rules of Chinese official composition it would be, were it employed in speaking of the Emperor himself. It marks a non-appreciation of the complete equality we claim for our Sovereign with all allies, the Emperor of China included, and I should recommend that the original be returned for correction.—T.W.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

*Rear-Admiral Hope to Mr. Bruce.*

*"Coromandel," off the Peiho, July 1, 1859.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the means at my disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles opposed to your entry at the mouth of the Peiho; and that they are of so for-

midable a nature that any further operations cannot lead to successful result.

I expect the repairs of the gun-boats to be completed about the middle of next week, and I hope to be able to reassemble the force outside the bar about that time, and under such circumstances I shall be glad to know in what way I can most forward the objects of your mission.

I have also to request that you will be so good as to forward a copy of this communication to M. de Bourboulon, and inform that gentleman how much I am indebted to Captain Tricault, of the "Du Chayla," for his assistance during the engagement of the 25th ultimo.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) J. HOPE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 9.

*Mr. Bruce to Rear-Admiral Hope.*

*"Magicienne," off the Peiho,*

*July 2, 1859.*

SIR,

I REGRET that in consequence of a resistance which our previous experience of Chinese warfare could not have led us to anticipate, the means at your disposal have proved insufficient to remove the obstacles to my progress up the Peiho.

Allow me at the same time, whilst offering you my profound sympathy for the loss sustained by the squadron, to express my sincere admiration of the decision and gallantry shown in the operation undertaken for that object.

As you inform me that in the face of this formidable resistance, further operations cannot lead to a successful result, I beg to state that I have for the present abandoned all attempts to reach Peking, and have resolved to refer home for instructions as to the course to be adopted. With this view Mr. Rumbold proceeds by the next mail to England to furnish Her Majesty's Government with full particulars respecting what has occurred.

Under these circumstances, I agree with you that the return of the Marines and Sappers to Hong Kong is desirable, and that the ships should be employed in the manner most conducive to the security of Her Majesty's subjects and to the protection of their interests at the several ports.

In accordance with your request, I have communicated to M. de Bourboulon a copy of your letter.

I have, &c.,  
(Signed) F. W. A. BRUCE.

No. 10.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)*

MY LORD,

*Shanghai, July 13, 1859.*

I PROPOSE in this despatch to give a succinct account of the course I have adopted, and of the grounds on which it is based. It is necessary to allude briefly to the maxims of China in regard to intercourse with foreign nations, as they afford the key to what has taken place.

In China international relations have been always studiously ignored by the Government, and in no single instance has a foreign Minister succeeded in obtaining admission to the capital, except on performance of the "kotow," or ceremony of vassalage, or in the character of tribute-bearer. The subjects of foreign nations residing in China are represented as belonging to barbarous tribes, and living by trade, of all occupations the one least in repute among the Chinese, as devoid

of civilization, and ignorant of the rules of reason, and by all means to be confined to the outskirts of the country.

According to the maxims of the Government they are entitled to no rights beyond those accorded by the favour of the Emperor, and though circumstances and the weakness of the Government have led it to acquiesce in the concession of considerable privileges to foreigners in distant sea-ports, it is remarkable, as proving how tenaciously it holds to its traditions, that it always classifies as acts of rebellion the measures of coercion adopted by foreign Governments to obtain redress for wrongs done to their subjects.

Now the British Treaty of Tien-tsin (which is much more complete in this respect than the Treaties signed at that place by the other Powers) asserts principles which are diametrically opposed to these traditional pretensions of the Chinese Government. According to it the British Minister is to be accredited as a Representative of an independent equal Power, and the Chinese Government, in its treatment of him, is called upon finally to abandon the assumption of superiority which it asserted uncompromisingly during Lord Amherst's Embassy, and so lately as three years ago, when Count Poutiatine first proposed to visit Peking. He is to be allowed free and unrestricted communication with the capital, not only as specified in the French and American Treaties, when he has business to transact, but whenever he wishes to visit it. His diplomatic intercourse is to be conducted according to the usages of Western nations, and he is not to be called on to perform any ceremony of a nature derogatory to his character as representing an equal and independent nation. In future, access to the capital is to be recognized as a right the Minister can insist on, instead of its being begged for as a favour, and either refused or conceded on such terms as the Chinese might choose to impose for the sake of saving their own dignity at the expense of that of the foreign Envoy in the eyes of the Chinese population.

The clauses which permit British subjects to travel in the interior, and open the Yang-tze river to British shipping, are equally subversive of the established maxims of Chinese statesmen. To push us back on the sea-board, and confine us to as few sea-ports as possible, to keep us outside the walls of important cities, and vilify us to the people, in order to preserve a wall of separation between the races, is the policy which the Chinese Government, from its adherence to usage, and from its indifference, if not dread of all progress, which can only be attained through novelty, would gladly follow, if it dared to do so.

It is not surprising, therefore, when the allied squadrons left the Peiho river last year, and the panic produced by their presence began to subside, that ancient maxims and prejudices should have gradually resumed the ascendant at Peking, and that the Imperial Cabinet should have entertained hopes of recovering part of the ground it had lost. There is proof of its language and feeling with regard to foreigners having undergone no change in a Decree published in the "Pekin Gazette," on the 25th July, one month after the signature of the Treaty, in which allusion is made to the "barbarians suddenly rushing up the river to Tien-tsin, and retiring moved by the commands of Kweiliang and his colleague, signified with affectionate earnestness." Sungko-lin-sin, a Mongol Prince, reputed to be their best General, was made Commander-in-chief of the Pechelée province, with a large force at his disposal; the forts at Takoo rebuilt and strengthened, and stakes and obstacles of different kinds placed across the

river to efface the impression produced by the proceedings of last year, and by preventing foreign ships from arriving at Tien-tsin, to render Peking more inaccessible than ever.

While these preparations were going on, the departure of the High Officer of the Board of Revenue, who was to settle the Tariff at Shanghai, was delayed, in order that he might not reach Shanghai until the season for operations in the Gulf of Pechelée had passed, and when he started he was accompanied by the Imperial Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. Subsequent events leave no doubt in my mind that the statement contained in the letter of which Mr. Parkes obtained possession, is substantially correct, and that they were instructed to obtain modifications in the principal Articles of the Treaty—the residence at Peking, the opening of the Yang-tze river, and circulation in the interior, to all of which the Emperor strongly objects.

In their first letter the Commissioners advanced the principle that the Treaty having been signed under pressure, its provisions had not been fully discussed. But the determination evinced by Lord Elgin not to allow the Treaty to be called in question, seems to have convinced the Commissioners that it was advisable to rest satisfied with the concession made as to permanent residence at the capital. It is clear, however, that their remonstrances against the policy, enjoined on them from Peking, were most unpalatable to the Emperor and his counsellors, who urged them to make further efforts; and the dissatisfaction with the conduct of Ho, who seems to have pointed out most strongly the inexpediency of the course proposed, is reported to have been expressed in the autograph rescript, that "his obstinacy would be the cause of calamity to him."

In the beginning of March, Lord Elgin, who had left Shanghai on account of the unsatisfactory state of Canton, wrote to the Commissioners, stating that Her Majesty's Government had agreed not to establish the Mission permanently at Peking, on condition of a proper reception being given to Her Majesty's Minister. He further informed them of his approaching departure from China, and of my appointment, charged with important documents to be delivered at the capital, and warned them solemnly that peaceful relations could only be maintained by a faithful observance of the Treaty. The Imperial Commissioners, in spite of this information, continued at Seo-chow, instead of returning to the capital to prepare for the reception of myself and the French Minister, and their motive in so doing was made sufficiently manifest by their attempts through a Chinese formerly in Mr. Wade's, but now in the Chinese service, to ascertain whether we would consent to exchange ratifications at Shanghai, or, at least, to be conducted from that point by land to Peking. This journey occupies two months, and I leave your Lordship to judge whether, had we adopted this route, we should not have abandoned, for all practical purposes, one great object of the Treaty, viz., free access to the Central Government.

It was only after my arrival at Hong Kong, that I heard of the Commissioners having remained in the south, and received Mr. Hart's memorandum (inclosed in my despatch of the 30th of May), describing the hostile feeling of the Court, and throwing considerable light on the motives of this inconvenient delay of the Commissioners. I felt at once that it became necessary either to throw overboard my instructions entirely, to abandon the visit to Peking and the attempt to establish, on a proper footing, once for all, our diplomatic relations with the Court of Peking, or to declare that I would



insist on exchanging the ratifications at the capital within the period stipulated in the Treaty, and on a personal reception by the Emperor for the purpose of delivering to him Her Majesty's autograph letter. I could not doubt that the task of extorting a reception at Pekin in a form implying a surrender on the part of the Emperor of his pretensions to national superiority, would be more difficult than obtaining a recognition of our equality on paper; and that the Chinese Government, in accordance with its usual policy, would endeavour, by prescribing the route I was to follow, by limiting the number of my attendants, and by bad arrangements during the journey, to put me in the degrading position hitherto occupied by foreign Envoys, and recover by this means the prestige it had lost by our successful *coup de main* of last year. To prevent such a result, and to receive free access to the capital in future on becoming terms, I decided, after mature reflection, on proceeding by the river, the natural highway to Tien-tsin, under the British flag, as its presence at that place would establish in the eyes of the Chinese that our visits to Pekin are a matter of right, not of favour.

M. de Bourboulon, whom I consulted before deciding on the course to be pursued, entertained views similar to mine, and wrote a despatch to the Commissioners in the same sense.

I could not, however, in face of the unsatisfactory information I had received, hope that the Chinese Government would agree to such a complete revolution of its mode of dealing with foreigners, unless I was backed by a sufficient force to inspire it with alarm. I accordingly consulted with Admiral Hope and Sir Charles van Straubenzee on this point. Several gun-boats and part of the squadron had been dispatched by Sir Michael Seymour to Shanghai, previous to my arrival in China, to be ready to accompany me to the north. This measure had been adopted before unfavourable intelligence had been received from that quarter.

We agreed, on consultation, that the force dispatched was not large enough to produce the desired impression. It was accordingly strengthened, particularly in the class of vessels that can cross the bar, and brought up to an equality with that which accompanied the allied Ambassadors last year. The larger the force, the less likelihood, judging from our experience of the Chinese character, there would be of a collision.

On arriving at Shanghai, where I proceeded as soon as my French colleague was ready, I found, as I anticipated, the Commissioners armed with pretexts to detain me, and prevent my visit to the Peiho. Their letters, though moderate in tone, alluded to the three principal clauses of the Treaty, and proposed to re-open discussion upon them. Had I accepted this overture, and abandoned the course laid down in my letter of the 16th May, they would have inferred that I was to be "soothed and controlled," and would have postponed the ratifications, with the intention of obtaining my assent to conditions which would have deprived these clauses of their practical efficacy. This view is confirmed by the fact that they were not in possession of the ratified Treaties, the Chinese Government having thus confined them to the task of gaining time, if nothing else, by renewing negotiations, reserving meanwhile in its own hands the power of exchanging the ratifications or not, as it might seem expedient, after the result of the interviews had been communicated to it.

I think that the Commissioners themselves were

acting rather in obedience to their instructions from Pekin, than in the expectation that their attempts to detain us here would be successful. For as soon as they received my letter, stating that I would not enter into discussions until the ratifications were exchanged, and declining any interview with them at Shanghai, the twelve-month allowed by Treaty for the exchange having almost expired, they changed entirely their tone. They acknowledged the propriety of abiding by the terms of the Treaty, and stated that they had memorialised the Emperor to send down a high officer to Tien-tsin, whom we should find on our arrival ready to conduct us in time to the capital. Though they hinted at a journey by land from the river's mouth, and wished me to anchor the squadron outside the bar, they did not state that orders had been given to prevent us entering the river, and making use of it to reach the town of Tien-tsin.

Admiral Hope left a day before the reply of the Commissioners was received, being desirous of making the passage under sail. The place of rendezvous was fixed at the Sha-loo-tien Islands, whence he was to communicate to the authorities the approaching arrival of the Ministers of England and France, en route for Tien-tsin, and inquire whether orders had been given for our reception.

I announced his departure the next day to the Commissioners, and suggested the propriety of their proceeding to the Peiho on board one of the steam-ships, owned by Chinese, lying here, by which means they would be able to reach it in time to receive us. They declined doing so, on the ground that they could not adopt so unusual a method of travelling without the Emperor's permission. This may be so, but I am inclined to think they shared in the feeling expressed in confidence by the most enlightened of their assistants, that he would not go to the North, as there would be trouble, and that the Emperor and his counsellors were so unreasonable that they could not be brought to terms without another lesson.

M. de Bourboulon and I left Shanghai four days after the receipt of the letter of the Commissioner, in order to afford time for the memorial to reach the Emperor, and for the necessary orders to be given, should he be inclined to accord us a friendly reception, and carry out the recommendations it contained.

Mr. Ward, the American Minister, accompanied us at their express invitation, having claimed, under the most favoured nation clause, the right to exchange the ratifications at Pekin and present his credentials to the Emperor.

My despatch of the 5th instant, which is forwarded by the present opportunity, gives in detail the events that took place at the Peiho. I have only to remark, in explanation of the course pursued, that we found ourselves off the mouth of the river, which forms the highway to Pekin, within a few days of the expiration of the period fixed by the Treaty for the exchange of the ratifications. On requesting a passage to be opened for us, and explaining the peaceful objects of the mission, we were informed that there was no authority on the spot; that the fort and barriers were not constructed by order of the Government, but by the people, who had built and garrisoned them for their protection against rebels, not to keep us out of the river. In proceeding to remove them we, therefore, violated no order of the Imperial Government, and, had we been successful, the Government could, and would, no doubt, have disavowed entirely the acts of those who opposed us. At the

same time we were convinced that the repugnance of the Chinese Government to execute fully the Treaty, and to grant us the reception we were instructed to demand, could only be overcome by a sense of their inability to resist us. The preparations made since last year had given them confidence, and that feeling would have been increased had we, on coming in presence of them, receded from the demands we had made. Under such circumstances to have accepted the proposal of the Governor-General of Chili would have been to enter on a path which must have ended in disgrace and failure; and nothing, in my opinion, would have justified us in consenting to it, unless the only competent authority to pronounce a judgment on such a question had expressed doubts as to the result of an attempt to force the passage of the river. But I can state positively that if Admiral Hope had expressed doubts on the subject they would not have been shared by the squadron, nor by those who have had most experience of warfare in China; and, if it be decided that the means at our command were insufficient to justify us in pursuing so bold a line of policy, it is but right that I should share that responsibility with him.

The Intendant of this place has received official notice of these events from Peking, with orders, as he states, not to molest the English. But the effect of this check must be prejudicial to our interests, as in this, more than in almost any country, we are respected and considered in proportion as we are feared, and whatever may be the ultimate decision of this Government with reference to the Treaty of Tien-tsin, I do not think that its provisions can be carried out until we recover our superiority in the eyes of the Chinese.

Mr. Wade has drawn up a full and explicit Memorandum on the proceedings of the Chinese Government within the last year, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

#### Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

*Translation of a Paper forwarded to the Earl of Elgin in Mr. Parke's Despatch of January 15, 1859.*

[*Memorandum.*—Two Chinese Clerks, perfectly unknown to each other, have suggested, the moment they read this paper, that it was the composition of a small official sent by Hwang-tsung-han to Shanghai, to watch the progress of affairs. The writer speaks of himself throughout as an official of much lower rank than the person he addresses, but I not think that this is Hwang. The words "Governor-General" (of the Two Kwang) prefixed to Hwang's name, must have been elevated, had the letter been written to him direct.

It must have been sent to Canton after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow, and before his return to Shanghai.—T. W.]

THE administrators-in-chief of barbarian business in the capital are the three Princes Hwui, Kung, and Ching (1).

When the four Imperial Commissioners (2) had their audience to take leave, His Majesty very positively signified to them that it was his pleasure not to allow peace to be made in this sort of way (3), and that the whole fifty-six Articles of the Treaty of Tien-tsin must be cancelled. Ho, Governor-General of the Two Kiang, received

them at Chang-chow in the 8th moon (August, September), and stoutly maintained that there must be no mention whatever of change. They were consequently at issue until their arrival at Shanghai, when, owing to the strong support given by the Treasurer Wang to the representations of Ho, the Commissioners began to incline to a compromise. Several memorials were addressed to the Throne in the joint names of the whole five, in reply to which they continued to receive, in every case, His Majesty's peremptory injunctions (to persist in the course prescribed); until, in his last decree, His Majesty declared his pleasure to be, that if peace were made with the barbarians, four conditions must be insisted on.

Firstly, he would on no account allow trade from Hankow to Nankin.

(Secondly, this condition is omitted most likely by mistake, as the text below shows the question to have been the residence of a Minister at Peking.)

Thirdly, he would not allow (foreigners) to circulate in the different provinces.

Fourthly, he would have the provincial city of Canton evacuated at an early date.

On receipt of His Majesty's commands as above, the Commissioners had several consultations with the barbarians. They, alas! would give in on one point only, to wit, the evacuation of Canton; in the other three they held out for what had been proposed at Tien-tsin.

The Commissioners and the Governor-General Ho accordingly made up (4) another Memorial, to the effect that the barbarians had promised to evacuate Canton; that as regarded admission into Peking, they would not be allowed to go and come in large bodies, nor to build churches there, but that the admission of four or five on any future occasion, when they might have business of importance to transact, need not be prohibited; that, as to circulation in the provinces, no one was to travel save with a passport, to be issued under the seals of the local authorities and the Consuls of the barbarians; no one would take on himself to go without one; so that, as it would still rest with the local authorities, when the time came, (5) to give or withhold a passport, this point might, in their opinion, also be conceded. There thus remained no question but that of the navigation of the river up to Hankow, whither it would really be difficult to prevent barbarians from proceeding.

To this representation they received for answer from the Emperor, "Try again with all your might, and you will succeed again."

The Commissioners and Ho, after receiving this, again put their seals to the Treaties, and exchanged copies of them as concluded; and it was agreed that in the third moon (April, May), the barbarians should go into the capital again to exchange national letters (letters between the Governments). Ho, the Governor-General, returned the same day to Soo-chow; the Treasurer Wang also returned on the 5th. The English leader Elgin had started up the Great River on the 3rd, with five steamers for Hankow. Just before his departure, he said: "Provided that the provincial authorities behave well to me, I shall not insist on ready money (or immediate payment) (6) at Shanghai, and I will write to Canton, and have the city evacuated at once; but if there is any more fighting (on my journey), I must postpone action (on these points)." The Commissioners answered: "We will write to prevent any one giving you matter of offence: at the same time there are several positions along your road in the hands of the rebels, and we are not responsible for any trouble these may occasion you; nor will it be our affair if your vessels come to harm by

getting aground on any of the numerous shoals in the Great River." "It does not concern you, of course," said he, "I can take care of myself;" and so he started. The following day he got aground off Fu-shan, and after transshipping his guns, &c., to a smaller vessel, on the 5th, he got off by dint of great exertions on the 8th, and was reported to have passed Nankin on the 11th. It was also said that the long-haired men (the rebels) had fired upon him, though this is not certain. On the 10th, however, a number of devils were brought back, the barbarians said, ill of the small-pox, but the people have it, wounded by the rebels. Which is the truth I know not.

In conclusion, I may remark that everything relating to the barbarians is kept so quiet that it is hard to learn the facts. To give an instance: since the Commissioners arrived here every Conference they have had with the Chiefs to discuss business questions has been held either on board a steamer or in some out-of-the-way place, and, their measures agreed on (the conferring parties) have gone home to carry them out. This is for fear they might be overheard by the native servants of the different houses of business, who understand the devil-language.

The Emperor has been moved to abolish the restrictions on opium, and to admit it into port at 30 taels per picul import duty, and into the interior at 15 taels transit duty. The tariff is settled. All goods pay 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. This is proposed as the import duty. If barbarians go into the interior to sell merchandize, they are to pay 2½ per cent. (as a transit duty), whether they pass eight barriers or ten. On tea and silk there are some augmentations and some diminutions. The rules are now in form, and, as soon as the seal has been put to them, a copy shall be submitted to you.

Touching the money payment to be made to the barbarians (to the English), 6,000,000 dollars, and to the Americans, 600,000 dollars, the latter, some time ago, expressed their readiness to the Commissioners to give up 100,000 dollars; they would require only 500,000 dollars, namely, 100,000 to be paid at Shanghai, 100,000 at Foo-chow, and 300,000 at Canton, to be deducted, during three years, from the duties. The Commissioners had settled the form of instrument, so that the American question may be looked on as decided. A despatch to this effect must (soon) reach Canton. The English indemnity will, most likely, follow a like rule of apportionment, a quota being levied on the (customs of the) places aforesaid, or the whole may be laid on the Shanghai duties, in which case the people (of Canton) need feel no alarm. These barbarians are very anxious, nevertheless, to make Canton pay the largest share. This would delight them. Indeed, so deep-seated is the ill-will with which they regard the Canton officials, gentry, and people, that they actually talk of shutting up Canton as a port altogether, and never trading there again. They have several times pressed the Commissioners, with all their might, to denounce the Governor-General (Hwang), and the three gentlemen (Lo Lung, and Su), as a condition of peace (or, before they would treat of peace). This has not only been done by word of mouth, but there has been correspondence upon it, of which I enclose copies.

The Commissioners, I should humbly suppose, can hardly have been so stupid as to give in to everything in this way (7). They may be holding such language as a means of keeping (the barbarians) within range (8). It is impossible to say. Should they have moved the Emperor, as was

suggested, His Sacred Majesty would not surely have accepted their view of the case. Never, since the world began, was there such a doctrine as that the official, instead of punishing the robber for his theft, is to conciliate him by doing whatever his malignity may dictate against the person he has robbed (9). (My remarks, I am sensible, are presumptuous.) How should an officer of my low estate and mean abilities venture on propositions at random? It is our duty to abide His Majesty's decision.

Another statement is that Ho is strongly urging an application to the Emperor to transfer the seal of High Commissioner for the Five Ports from Canton to Kiang-su, and that the Commissioners will very presently address the Emperor to that effect. After his return to Soo-choo, the Governor-General Ho addresses to the Emperor two memorials in succession, setting forth how difficult it was to negotiate peace; that after all his pains he had only got so far; that the barbarians when they had got a foot wanted ever an inch more; that they were quite ready to add something to the fifty-six Articles they now had, but would not abate a single letter. Further, he said that he knew it was in the hands of the three Princes that the direction-general lay, and if His Majesty would not agree (to what he, Ho, recommended), he must beg him to send the three Princes to manage the things for themselves. To this the Emperor in his autograph rescript (10), rejoined, "No luck, of a truth, can attend such perversity and opiniativeness" (11).

The Treasurer Wang was at the same time commanded to return with all speed to Soo-chow; the Emperor would not allow him to remain at Shanghai interfering in barbarian affairs.

It was subsequently asserted that the Governor-General Ho had been deprived of his button, and five Commissioners ordered to proceed from the capital to Tsing Kiang Pu (12), whether for this or some other matter it was not clear. But (these two last statements) are but a report, which as I have not seen the documents, I do not venture to affirm is true. I purpose, as soon as I have dispatched this letter (13) (*lit.*, petition), going in person to Soo-chow to see the Treasurer Wang, and find out (14) the truth from him. I shall ask him for copies of some of the despatches, which I will forward in a separate cover.

The French were away last month at Japan and in Anam. They were not by when the English and the other nation were negotiating. Since their Chief's return to Shanghai he wanted to go to Peking to build churches there, a proposition which induced much discussion, without any satisfactory result (15). The tradespeople (or mercantile Chinese) say that no harm will come of this; they (the French) must talk in this fashion; and that when the English Chief returns (16), everything will be settled, all and sundry.

The Russians are not at Shanghai, and have taken no part (in what has passed).

The Commissioners themselves are entertaining every day, or sitting for their portraits (16A), or paying visits to the devils, taking their fill of enjoyment with nothing whatever to do.

Pwan Si-ching (Pontinqua) reached Hangchow on the 12th of the moon but has not yet arrived at this place. The man the Commissioners and the barbarians really want is Howqua (17). It is a matter of indifference to them whether Pontinqua comes or not; by the time he arrives, I imagine, there will be nothing for him to do.

Another rumour is that the Commander-in-chief Yang has retaken Nganking (18). The

Prefect Wu says that he has written full particulars of all that has been reported in this letter to Chang, the Han-lin (19), and gives me to understand, consequently, that I need not trouble your ear with a repetition of them.

I have, therefore, the honour to transmit you this summary.

#### Observations.

(1.) The Prince Hwui is Mien Yü, only surviving brother of the late Emperor; Kung is Yih Su, brother of the present Emperor; Ching is a Prince of the 2nd Order of Imperial Nobility, whose I name cannot ascertain.

(2.) Kweiliang, Hwashana, Mingsheu, and Twau Ching-shih.

(3.) *Lit.*, such a peace fashion, or such peace measures.

(4.) Made up, concocted; a certain amount of fraud is implied.

(5.) When application is made.

(6.) Immediate payment, viz., of the indemnity.

(7.) *Lit.*, a thousand consents, and a hundred compliances.

(8.) More literally employ this (language) for the purpose of tethering—a favourite word of Kiyng and others in relation to the government of foreigners.

(9.) The barbarian is the robber, Hwang, Governor-General of the Two Kwang, the master of the house, whom he has injured; will Government forget itself so far as to make terms with the barbarian by persecuting Hwang?

(10.) The despatches to the Emperor are returned to the high officers authorized to address them, with some slight observation written in red ink by the Emperor. If his answer is of great length, or requires deliberation, he writes merely, "Our placet will be given separately." In the latter case he sends down what we call an Imperial Decree to the Great Council for transmission to the officer or officers concerned.

(11.) *Lit.*, where there is this determined bias and self-opinion there is indeed no such word as happiness (or fortune).

(12.) A place near the Yellow River, at which the Governor-General Ho was to have met the Commissioners as they came down. The rumour here alluded to is probably a revival of the above, which was in circulation in August and September.

(13.) The form in which the inferior addresses the superior official.

(14.) Rather, spy out.

(15.) Baron Gros did not sign the Tariff, &c., until some days after Lord Elgin's departure for Hankow. It was stated that some missionary question was under discussion between his Excellency and the Commissioners.

(16.) Returns, viz., from Hankow.

(16A.) The Commissioners sat more than once to the Honourable N. Jocelyn, who photographed them at the British Consulate.

(17.) Howqua, and some other ex-hongists had been expected at Soo-chow, to advise the Commissioners regarding the amendment of the tariff.

(18.) This report probably grew out of the collision of the Ngan-king rebels with the squadron escorting Lord Elgin, of whose approach, to judge from appearances, the Imperialist force endeavoured to make some use.

(19.) There are more than one doctor of the Han Lin of this surname at Canton.

(Signed) T. WADE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

*Memorandum by Mr. Wade, intended to accompany the Translation of a Letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, from Canton, to the Earl of Elgin, on the 15th January, 1859, précis of which was inclosed to the Foreign Office.*

THE letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, of the genuineness of which I see no reason to entertain any doubt, read by the light of the correspondence of the Imperial Commissioners and earlier proceedings of the Chinese Government, ever since negotiations fairly commenced at Tien-tsin, furnishes, to my mind, a clue deserving of attention to the course the Government has in this last instance pursued.

According to the writer, evidently an official who has access to good information, the Emperor determined, the moment our backs were turned, to cancel the whole Treaty extorted from him in June, 1858, and for this purpose sent Kweiliang and his colleagues south. This accords with a rumour current at Shanghai in August; Kweiliang was said to be in deep disgrace for his negotiations, the first public notice of which by the Chinese Government was in a decree of the 25th July, to the effect that the barbarians who "burst into the river" with their ships had retired in obedience to the affectionate commands of Kweiliang.

The use of the term "barbarian," as Lord Elgin complained in a letter to the Commissioners of the 7th September, was itself an infraction of Article LI of the Treaty, committed within one month of its signature.

The mission of Kweiliang and his colleagues, ostensibly to revise the Tariff, was remarkable as being so much more than what the Treaty required. It had been stipulated merely that a high officer of the Board of Revenue should repair to Shanghai. Two ex-Commissioners of the Canton Customs were indeed added to the Commission, but one of these was replaced by Twau Ching-shih, one of the Under-Secretaries most actively employed during the Treaty negotiations. His leave-taking memorial, also published in the Gazette, assured the Emperor, in stock phrase, that he would be zealous in "soothing the barbarians."

Rumour, as I have said, made the object of this mission anything but a revision. Nothing, however, very positive was stated, nor did the reports on the subject command general attention.

Meanwhile, as Kweiliang and his colleagues had promised at Tien-tsin, on the 4th July, to obtain from the Emperor, as soon as they returned to Peking, a decree appointing a Commissioner to revise the Tariff, which decree would reach Shanghai as soon as Lord Elgin, his Lordship, after ten days' delay at Shanghai, had written on the 21st July to complain that he was still without a line from Peking on the subject.

On the 27th he received a letter from Ho Kwei-tsing, announcing the appointment of the Commission, composed, with the addition of himself, of the members enumerated above, who, he said, would arrive about the 18th of August.

Lord Elgin visited Japan; and having made his Treaty there, hurried back to Shanghai, to learn, by a letter from the Commissioners themselves, that they could not be at Shanghai before the 6th of October.

It is, I repeat, quite clear that Kweiliang and Hwashana, the highest officers of the Civil establishment, were not coming to revise a Tariff. Indeed, another object of their mission was eventually stated in their own letter of the 22nd of October, to which we shall come in due time. Ho

Kwei-tsing's assurance that they would be down by the 18th of August, was given, I imagine, to prevent the possibility of Lord Elgin's returning to the Peiho.

The decree he forwarded was dated the 15th of July. The prescribed time for an official journey of the distance is fifty-five days. This would have brought the Commissioners to Shanghai by the 10th of September. I presume Ho chose a middle term for safety's sake.

I attribute the Commissioners' delay of their departure from Peking, or their loitering by the way, to the one cause—the fears of the Government that, when the Commissioners had declared their errand, we might revisit the Peiho. We knew from the Gazette that the forts were being rebuilt—this, of course, was in itself no matter of surprise; that timber was purchased to stake the river, at which we could not either be astonished; but, lastly, and this is noteworthy, that these operations were conducted under the special authority of Sung-ko-lin-sin, a Mongolian prince allied by marriage to the Imperial family, distinguished as the conqueror of the rebels on the occasion of the Tai-ping incursion into Chih-li, in 1853-54, and appointed during our stay at Tien-tsin, High Commissioner of War, and Commander-in-Chief of a force stationed at Tungchow to cover the capital should we advance upon it. It is also important that his labours had proceeded with such rapidity, that, by the 21st November, he was enabled to report the completion of the works on the Tien-tsin river; for which service, by a decree of the above date, he was awarded a surcoat of honour.

My impression is confirmed, by all that has since occurred, that the arrival of the Commissioners was delayed purposely until the river defences were in a state of forwardness. For, once more, they were coming, not to revise the Tariff, but, as the Canton letter states, and their own correspondence presently shows, to discuss modification if not abrogation of three important privileges which distinguished our Treaty from any other; to wit, the residence of a Minister at Peking, circulation of British merchants in the interior, and the navigation of the great river; also to require the rendition of Canton.

Ho Kwei-tsing, as in duty bound, went to meet the senior Commissioners as they entered his jurisdiction; and the statement in the Canton letter that it was on the strength of his representations, supported by those of his provincial Treasurer Wang, that they were led to modify materially the course prescribed by their instructions, is borne out not only by the gossip of the period, but by a communication subsequently made by an indisputable authority, which I do not feel at liberty to name, that they had come down charged to make war rather than concede the permanent residence of a Minister. The words stated to have been used by Ho, when remonstrating against such policy, were "that war would be absolute madness." I confess that, with some faith in the narrator, I believed him, at the time he stated this, guilty of a simple exaggeration, *à la Chinoise*.

It must not be forgotten that, throughout the whole of this period, from June to October, affairs in the south were in a condition that augured ill for peace.

Long after the Treaty was signed, Hwang, and a committee of three Cantonese of high standing in the class we style "the gentry," who held an Imperial Commission for the enlistment and control of Militia, were persisting in acts of war. After the tactics of 1856 and 1857, when Yeh was in power, the native servants were called home from Hong Kong, and the supplies of that

colony in effect cut off by semi-official Committees established in the adjacent districts. Soldiers of the Canton garrison were kidnapped and assassinated. A proclamation, under Hwang's seal, offered a high reward for Mr. Parkes's head.

Even so late as the 22nd August Hwang had supported the Special Committee in its war-taxation, on the ground that though a Treaty had been concluded at Tien-tsin, he knew not its conditions, and that it was as necessary as ever to be ready for banditti.

I see no reason to doubt, when we read the Emperor's Decree of the 21st October, in which he rejects the Commissioners' censure of Hwang and the Committee, that the Court was encouraging the latter to persevere in their attempt to expel the allies from Canton, where by Treaty they were to remain till the indemnity agreed to was paid.

The Commissioners arrived at last on the 6th October. They had been duly apprised of the dissatisfaction occasioned by the tardiness of their movements: and having first apologized, in a private note, for not visiting Lord Elgin until the ostensible business of their mission, the tariff revision, was *en train*, they dispatched an official letter, in a most conciliatory strain, to beg Lord Elgin to appoint deputies who might meet their own for the revision of the tariff. The officers they named were Wang, the Commissioner of Finance, chief civilian of the province, and Sieh, for the three years previous, Taoutae or Intendant at Shanghai, one of the few Chinese I have met who, notwithstanding much ignorance and prejudice still remaining, really appreciate the power and probity of the foreigner, or who appear soberly to contemplate, without abatement of pride in their own country, the possibility of utilising barbarian ability to her advantage. He had been named to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin at Tien-tsin.

Lord Elgin met their proposals by demanding, first, an acknowledgement of two letters, written early in September, complaining of proceedings in the south, and still unnoticed.

Their reply was pacific enough; they excused Hwang's ignorance on the grounds of the distance from Peking; his hostile attitude as not being assured of our intention; and volunteered to proclaim that peace had been negotiated with England, France, America, and Russia.

It does not appear for all that was promised on the subject, that even this meagre notice, which promulgated none of the conditions of the peace, was ever published elsewhere. At Canton, indeed, the High Committee's Militia continued to annoy the foreign garrison until January, when one of their positions at Shek-tsin was destroyed. The garrison were then made to patrol the neighbourhood, the result of which measure was a speedy restoration of order.

The Commissioners' overtures did not yet satisfy Lord Elgin. He took them to task for having allowed near four months to elapse without making known the existence of a Treaty; and he demanded the removal of Hwang, and the dissolution of the Imperial Committee, before he could consent to go into the Tariff at all. This line of action, of course, greatly perplexed the Commissioners. As Chinese statesmen they would be slow to comprehend why the barbarian should postpone commercial considerations to any other, and they hastened to soothe him accordingly. They had already, they said, denounced Hwang, and would again denounce him, praying the Emperor, at the same time, to withdraw their powers from the Committee. Lord Elgin, on this, engaged if they would promise to communicate to him the Imperial rescript to their memorial, to commence the discussion of the Tariff, and this

promise given, named Mr. Oliphant and myself as his deputies.

Up to this time they had not breathed a word regarding the real matter of their mission. They were doubtless in much embarrassment as to the mode of introducing it; and the opinions of Ho, who drew his inspiration from Wang and Sieh, the two chiefs of his provincial staff, both able, and intimately *liés*, had, I feel satisfied, in no way diminished their difficulty in approaching the retraction of a Treaty concession.

At length, on the 22nd October, reassured by the favourable progress of the Tariff and its concomitants, they, with evident delicacy and diffidence, declared the true object of their coming. Moralising briefly on the end of negotiations; they pointed out that those at Tien-tsin were conducted so completely under pressure of an armed force as to leave no place for deliberation; the Emperor had, accordingly, specially commissioned them to come to Shanghai, "earnestly to press a matter which could be the common advantage of both parties." Among the conditions extorted there were some of real injury to China, which there had been no opportunity of explaining; of these they name one only—the residence, in permanence, of a British Minister at Pekin. As the Queen of England has an option, by Treaty, they beg Her Majesty may be prayed to decide that the Minister shall only visit Pekin on occasion. They avow that this condition is most irksome to China, and, in Chinese fashion, they strive to show how irksome it will be to us. A rude and numerous Tartar soldiery; the unacquaintance of metropolitan officials with foreign affairs; the temper of the population—these are the dangers which should incline us to forego this one—to us useless, and, for the reasons enumerated perilous—privilege; the more readily to forego it, as, on the other hand, we are gainers to a considerable extent in the many which we should still retain.

Looking back to the Tien-tsin period, we call to mind that the Commissioners, although committed in their letter of the 11th June, 1858, to the declaration, that "to a Minister's permanent residence there was properly no objection," and to the proposition that, the recent collision considered, the Minister had better live at Tien-tsin—an official residence being assigned him at Pekin—had attempted on the 21st June to recede from these proposals.

They had, they said, received a Decree, desiring them to do their best to persuade Lord Elgin to give up this invidious privilege, "the north being cold, and excessively dusty;" also with it the right to open Chin-kiang, the right to circulate in the interior before the people should have been duly warned, the right to navigate the Great River, by which we should drive the Chinese out of the field.

On all these points they again made a fight at their conference with Mr. Bruce on the 24th June. On the evening of the 25th they made a last effort, through Count Poutiatine and Mr. Reed, to dissuade Lord Elgin from insisting on the residence of a Minister, and the right of British merchants to circulate in the interior, pleading that, unless his Lordship gave way on those points, their lives would be forfeited.

Lord Elgin standing firm, they urged, even on the morning of the 26th itself, a modification of the text, by which the Minister might be authorized to be constantly in residence at Pekin, instead of entitled to reside there, without moving, a change which, as liberty of his movements is secured in another Article, was adopted.

These, with the addition of the surrender of Canton, are the questions on which, according to the Canton letter, the Emperor instructed the

Commissioners to stand out, and it is upon these I gather, from their letters of the 27th and 28th May, the Commissioners would have engaged Mr. Bruce in discussion, had he accorded the interview they proposed. They had, withal, another end to gain.

Lord Elgin met their request of the 22nd October by an emphatic declaration that it lay not with him to abate one tittle of the Treaty. He pointed out the real object and advantages of diplomatic relations as established in Europe, and briefly adverting to past misunderstandings between our countries, expressed his doubt that the Imperial Government could provide guarantee for the maintaining of peace, equivalent to that supplied by the presence of a Minister at Pekin.

The Commissioners, on the 28th October, admit that our Minister's right to permanent residence is incontestable, but the exercise of it will humiliate China in the eyes of her subjects. They therefore again pray Lord Elgin to move the Queen to use the option the Treaty leaves Her Majesty in their favour, and there is no satisfactory arrangement they are not ready to make.

Lord Elgin undertook to submit the correspondence to Her Majesty's Government, and to recommend that if Her Majesty's Minister were properly received next year, and full effect given to the Treaty in all other particulars, the Minister should be directed to choose a residence elsewhere, and to visit the capital either periodically or when business required it.

The Tariff negotiations were now brought to a close, and Lord Elgin announced his intention to proceed up the Yang-tze, to see what ports it would eventually be desirable to open.

The Commissioners acquiesced with a good grace, promised to send an officer to wait on his Lordship, and to advise the authorities of the provinces he would have to traverse of his approach.

This was partly in fulfilment of their undertaking to make any satisfactory arrangement, partly, I feel sure, from words that fell from the Judge, in the hope that we should have a profitable collision with the insurgents at Nankin.

At Hankow we found a proclamation announcing that the English, French, and American nations were come to look at at the place, but not to trade, so the people need not be alarmed. There was not, it is scarce necessary to observe, any sign of alarm, except that produced by the official runners and such persons, who at first insisted on forming our escort, and in that capacity unnecessarily thrashed the crowds that assembled round us, and used every effort to prevent the tradespeople from taking our money. The people themselves were here, as throughout the whole 600 miles of our journey, civil, inoffensive, and eager for trade.

I regard the policy of the Government in this to have been the same it has long adopted at Canton—to promote an aversion to foreign intercourse among the people, and to impress on foreigners that the people are hostile and hard to control. The doctrine finds its place, as we have seen, among the arguments against a Minister's residence at Pekin.

On his return to Shanghai in January, Lord Elgin found the news from Canton still far from satisfactory. Just as he was about to start for Hankow, the Commissioners had mooted the question of that city's rendition, and the payment of the indemnity, but had received no positive answer as to the course his Lordship proposed to take. They had also requested us, by letter, to adopt the same arrangement as the French. They had written, besides, a circular to the British, French, and American Ministers, regarding the future issue of passports, and various other points



which would be raised under the new Treaties. Lastly, they prayed for some settlement of the duties owing under the provisional system adopted during the occupation of Shanghai by the rebels in 1853 and 1854.

These letters had been sent in but a day or two before Lord Elgin's departure, and he, consequently, had delayed replying to them until his return. On receipt of the Canton intelligence, he recommenced correspondence by an inquiry whether the promised decree removing Hwang had been obtained. The Commissioners sent him a decree of the 21st October, acknowledging their denunciation of Hwang, "for conduct calculated to produce mischief;" defending him, however, as having acted on the offensive only until the Treaty was concluded; defending the Committee as simply engaged in keeping the peace; and concluding with the observation that it would be for the Emperor himself to deal with Hwang should he have committed himself since the Treaty was signed.

The Commissioners must have received this rebuff before Lord Elgin left Shanghai, but were doubtless in no haste to show how their advice had been relished by their master.

Before their reply had reached him, Lord Elgin had answered their circular of the 7th November. I need notice but two items of his answer. He undertook most readily to guarantee that every precaution would be taken to prevent the abuse of the passport system by British subjects. At the close of his letter, he replied to their remark that their queries had been put by reason of their ignorance of foreign affairs, by observing that the most evident remedy of this defect would be, in sending a Chinese Legation to England.

The Commissioners rejoined at length, but noticeably about passports, which, they observed, the Consuls would have to apply for to the Chinese authorities, to whom they must be, in due time, surrendered to be cancelled.

This was on the 14th. On the same day, Lord Elgin had written to express his serious dissatisfaction at Hwang's continuance in office. He would now call on the Commissioners to settle the indemnity in strict accordance with the provisions of the Separate Article, or, as instructed by Her Majesty's Government, he would eject the Chinese authorities from Canton.

A very crestfallen answer followed from the Commissioners. They had done their best. The Emperor alone could decide. The Canton question they had not had time to settle since Lord Elgin's return.

On the 20th of January, Lord Elgin, having received news of the Shek-ting affair, wrote again. He reviewed his correspondence with the Commissioners since their arrival in October. He was now convinced that Canton was to them a question *ultra vires*; he should, therefore, desire our executive there to act with vigour, and when the ratifications were exchanged, the Emperor should be asked whether things at Canton had been done with or without his authority.

The Commissioners wrote to assure him that Hwang should now certainly be removed and the Special Committee dissolved; but Lord Elgin, inclosing them a copy of the letter forwarded by Mr. Parkes, announced his intention to proceed himself to Canton. On his return to Shanghai in the course of six weeks, should he not find the Commissioners there, he would proceed to Peking.

The Commissioners wrote, roundly abusing Hwang and the Committee. The Emperor's decree must arrive in three weeks. In the interim all pending questions could be discussed. They were quite competent to deal with the Canton question. They prayed him to remain.

Lord Elgin was inexorable. The conditions of

the Canton question, he wrote, 25th of January, were specified in the Treaty. Had the Emperor chosen that the Commissioners should close it, he would have given them the requisite powers. They had not kept faith about Canton. They had promised months before to effect an improvement there. None had been effected. He would himself enforce a better order of things. This done he would return to discuss whatever remained for consideration; peaceably or otherwise, as the Chinese Government might see fit.

Lord Elgin then departed, and on the 14th of February the Commissioners forwarded a decree, not, indeed, removing Hwang from the Governor-Generalship, but still transferring his seal of Imperial Commissioner for the Superintendence of Foreign Trade to Ho Kwei-ting.

This decree was, doubtless, shaped so as to save the Imperial dignity. The Emperor would not disgrace the Governor-General (who has since been transferred to Sze-chuen), under pressure, and his choice of Ho, as Hwang's substitute, he had reason to believe would soothe us.

I have gone thus at length into this section of the correspondence, from October to January, to show with what reluctance the Chinese Government took a minimum of action against an officer notoriously corrupt, and flagrantly tyrannical in his jurisdiction, and denounced by the highest in the land for a course of foreign policy prejudicial to the interests of peace. My conviction is, that the Government, or, to take a hint from the opening clause of the Canton letter, that portion of it which had the credit of establishing the Special Committee, and authorizing its operations, never abandoned the notion of recovering Canton until their defeat at Shek-ting, a village near Canton, and other movements of the allied force broke the spirit of the militia.

It is also my impression, however contradictory the statement may appear, that the strong language held to the Commissioners by Lord Elgin throughout this period, while it deterred them from attempting any of the changes I am persuaded they were sent southward to effect, enabled them at the same time to hold their own with the Emperor by representing the impossibility of retracting what he is assumed to have required from people so violent and determined.

His withdrawal of the seal from Hwang was probably balanced somewhat in the Emperor's mind by the opportunity afforded him of declaring in his Decree, that our accounts from Canton (of kidnapping, assassination, &c.) surprised him much, as, in the "soothing and bridling" of foreign nations, China had never been treacherous.

Lord Elgin acknowledged the receipt of their last letter on the 3rd of March. He therein told the Commissioners of the appointment of his successor, charged with the ratified copy of the Treaty, to be exchanged at Peking, and of his own immediate departure for England. He communicated to them the consent of Her Majesty's Government to make the British Minister's residence at Peking but occasional, on the conditions before recited; and, bidding them farewell, reminded them that peace was only to be kept unbroken by a strict observance of the Treaty—by a mutual recognition of the equality of nations, between whom, he took occasion to remark, there could be no such relation as that implied in the words "soothing and bridling."

The Commissioners received this on the 29th of March. They made no move north, notwithstanding; on the contrary, on learning Mr. Bruce's arrival, they moved from Soo-chow, where they had spent the new year, to Shanghai.

Mr. Bruce's despatch to Kweiliang, of the 16th May, announcing his arrival, and requesting that

suitable preparations may be made for his reception at Tien-tsin, and his journey to Peking with the ratified Treaties and the autograph letter of Her Britannic Majesty, reached the Commissioners on the 27th, and their proceedings from this date are deserving of close attention.

Mr. Bruce found at Shanghai, on the 6th June, three despatches from the Commissioners, the first dated the 27th May, the day on which the second admits his letter of the 16th May had arrived; also admits that Lord Elgin's last letter, announcing his departure, had reached them on the 29th March. They had remained, nevertheless, because his Lordship had said he would return to discuss various questions, which they do not enumerate. His successor, who is, of course, equally competent with himself, is bound, they think, to take up the pending discussion with them, and with all speed, as the day named for the exchange of ratifications draws near.

The second, which is dated the 28th May, acknowledging Mr. Bruce's of the 16th, urges that an important affair like the exchange of ratifications cannot be hurried through as he proposes; repeats that Lord Elgin's letters had kept them at Shanghai, the journey from which place to Peking would take two months; none but they themselves could represent the Chinese Government in the matter; there was no one to receive Mr. Bruce at Tien-tsin, and nothing ready; they therefore propose that Mr. Bruce instead of waiting "up there," where he will find it very hot, should put off his departure, and grant them an interview. This is accompanied by another of the same date, in which, insisting again on Lord Elgin's engagement to return and discuss various questions, they beg to enumerate those of which he had disposed and those left unsettled.

He had agreed, they say:—

1st. That the coming visit to Peking was to be exceptional; the Minister was not constantly to be at Peking.

2nd. That his visit to Hankow was exceptional; our movements were henceforth to be in accordance with the Treaty stipulations.

3rd. That none but respectable persons were to obtain passports, for the issue of which regulations must be devised. The Canton question was not settled, and Lord Elgin had promised to go further into this.

To take the last first, Lord Elgin had expressly told the Commissioners that the Canton question must be settled, and promptly, according to the Separate Article, which prescribes payment at Canton to be arranged by the Canton authorities. Before he left the south, Mr. Bruce had ascertained in May that the Canton authorities had no knowledge of this stipulation, or, if they had, were without any instructions to give it effect.

The other three are the ever-recurring clauses of difficulty; the original modification of the first being further modified by total omission of the conditions on which Her Majesty's Government, as the Commissioners had been duly apprised in Lord Elgin's last letter, would consent to modify it. The other two are stated as they stand, I can only suppose to draw from Mr. Bruce some such acquiescence in what it would have been literally hard for him to dispute, as might preclude the possibility of his suggesting any arrangement for the anticipation of the Treaty terms, the far receding extinction of the rebels, before which no British subject can by Treaty claim to enter the region they infest.

Recalling the pertinacity with which the Commissioners have revived their objection to our enjoyment of the privileges here adverted to, the statements in the Canton letter, and in other quarters, of the Emperor's violent opposition to

the concession of them, when we see them now, we should have said needlessly, reproduced once more, we can only infer that some further limitations were contemplated.

A Chinese, last year my head clerk, but promoted, after the Treaty, for his supposed knowledge of foreign affairs to a mandarin of the fifth grade, and now attached to Kweiliang, called twice on Mr. Lay in the spring, first to ascertain whether we would agree to exchange ratifications at Shanghai; secondly, if we would consent to proceed, overland; thence to Peking. The latter, be it observed, is the time-honoured form of introducing the periodical missions from Anam, Lewschew, and other dependent States, into Peking; the form which enables China to maintain before her subjects that show of surveillance and patronage by which she has ever sought to negative a barbarian State's assumption of equality with herself. The American Treaty enables China to give the United States' Minister such a reception. So long as he does not insist on an audience, no tradition will be violated. It does not practically secure him access to Peking for any diplomatic purpose.

The above proposal accepted, our circulation under passports would infallibly have been infected by the precedent. No one would have travelled except under an official protection, resembling that proposed years ago by Kiyong for the neighbourhood of Canton—a protection so irksome and profitless to the few who availed themselves of it, that travelling, if it were to be under such auspices, was soon foregone altogether.

This is, of course, speculation; nor is it more when I declare my belief that the Commissioners rather hoped than expected that we should halt at Shanghai, as they proposed, within three weeks of the day we were by Treaty required to be at Peking. They were, I imagine, acting under orders to try everything that might prevent our visit to the capital.

On receiving Mr. Bruce's peremptory reply of the 8th of June, followed by his supplementary note of the 11th, the Commissioners laid down their arms. His letter of the 8th, they wrote, had been sent to the Emperor, who would receive it in some nine days. They had moved him to send a high officer to Tien-tsin to meet Mr. Bruce, whom they recommended to leave his ships of war outside the bar, and proceed in light marching order to Peking. They cannot themselves take steam as Mr. Bruce proposes, as the Emperor has not authorized them to do so, but in obedience to His Majesty's commands (when received does not appear), they will go north with all speed. The suggestions respecting the anchorage of his squadron, is brought in, as it were, casually: "The Commissioners would wish," &c. There is no hint that the route by the Tien-tsin River is *condamnée*, or that the attempt to ascend it will be opposed.

Yet they must have known that opposition was imminent. The high authority, cited before, assured my informant that so certain was he of a collision, that he should keep himself out of the way. The Court, he said, was not disabused of its invincibility, nor would it be without another defeat. It was for all that not too proud to be treacherous, as we have found to our cost. Admiral Hope had sailed before the Commissioners' last letter was received, but his first proceedings, it is worthy of observation, actually filled the measure of their requirement. He approached the bar on the 17th, with only one steamer and two gun-boats, and the officer sent in to communicate with the forts crossed the bar in a ship's gig.

On the 20th, finding that the people on the

spot, who maintained, as on the former day, that they had closed the passage of the river without the orders of Government, had not, as they had promised, removed, but, on the contrary, had greatly multiplied the obstacles in the way of a free passage, he gave notice to the Intendent of Tien-tsin that his squadron would remain at the mouth of the river while Mr. Bruce was at Pekin; he, therefore, wishes his men to land to purchase supplies. The Intendent only opposes their landing lest they should lose themselves in winding paths, amongst the camps and field-works which, he says, abound along the way between Ta-koo and Tien-tsin. He says nothing of the Government's objection to leave the river open, and he does say that the defences he alludes to are not to our address.

All this while no official, the militia and peasantry on shore affirm, is near the spot. Mr. Ward, the American Minister, is told the same story by the same people on the evening of the 24th; the batteries appear deserted until the following forenoon, when, as the foremost gun boat, according to notice given the previous evening by Admiral Hope, attempts to pass the booms, they pour forth a fire from seventy guns, which for strength and direction is without precedent in our annals of Chinese warfare. Still no official appears at Taku. On the other hand, Hang, the Governor-General of the province, does send a letter to Mr. Bruce, from a point some ten miles up the coast. It is dated the 23rd, but does not reach him till the 25th.

Now Mr. Bruce's letter of the 9th, which had electrified the Commissioners, was to reach Pekin in nine days—say before the 20th. We know, by experience, that communications between Taku and Pekin do not take more than twenty-four hours. The Court, if it were prepared to disavow the hostile act of the Taku garrison, must have forgotten that it could hardly, under the circumstances, plead ignorance of the great danger of a collision between the large force it had placed, months before, at Taku, and a foreign squadron which had now been waiting since the 16th to have the river opened for the British Minister's admission. If it were *bonâ fide* intent on the preservation of peace, why should no official have presented himself to the Admiral at Taku? or why should the only move of the character of a pacific overture been made at the eleventh hour, by a circuitous route and with a want of alacrity at first sight inexplicable? For the despatch had been the best part of two days coming ten miles.

It invites Mr. Bruce to wait for the arrival of Kweiliang and his colleague, promising him that when he, Hang, shall have moved to the southward the garrison and armament of the position from which he writes, he will come out to welcome him to the place, Peh-tang-Ho by name, a port, if it deserve the designation, which the Americans found in a few days was doubtfully accessible even to a ship's boat.

I feel satisfied that, our object considered, the fulfilment of the Treaty, not in the letter but in the spirit, we should make a mistake in approaching the capital otherwise than by its recognised highway. I do not see that the Americans can refuse to proceed to Pekin by Peh-tang-Ho, or by any less desirable route; Article V of their Treaty imposing on them almost all the restrictions which it is the very aim of our Articles III and IV to withstand. The American Minister may visit Pekin once a year, with 20 people for a suite; he is to give intimation of his approach through the Board of Rites; and is to complete his business without unnecessary delay; he will be held, as I have before hinted, by the Government and people

of China, at precisely the same value as a Lew-chewan or Siamese Envoy. This, some will say, is of little consequence. It is at least of this much, that little attention will be paid to the representations of an officer who takes so low a place, and it is only by insuring the attention which must be yielded when the question of equality is no longer in dispute, that we can hope for a peaceable settlement of misunderstanding with a people whose bigotry, arrogance, and insincerity are kept in check only by their fears.

To close observations which have greatly outrun their intended length, I am persuaded that its aversion to concede, even limited by the three privileges so often alluded to, is what has betrayed the Chinese Government into an act of war, which, with its usual pusillanimity, it was prepared to disavow had its forces suffered defeat. It has never accepted the changes forced upon it—the novelty, in the sense in which Western nations understand it. It was ready, *more suo*, to fend off those without fighting, and the Commissioners were, I make no doubt, to detain us at Shanghai under one pretext or another, until the year was so far spent that we might be induced, in our greed for commercial advantages, to accept an exchange of ratifications at Shanghai. Foreign relations, which in Chinese are simply synonymous with a Superintendence of Trade, would then have been handed over to Ho, whose “soothing and bridling” we are evidently assumed to prefer, and the great gain of the Treaty, the one means of preventing local misunderstandings, viz., the right of appeal to the Central Government against the acts of its subordinates, would, in default of precedent, have been as much in abeyance as though it had never been concluded.

Diplomacy failing, the Government still veiled its readiness for war—possibly from doubt in its powers, perhaps in the hope of taking us more completely unawares.

Mr. Hart's interesting memorandum on Sungko-lin-sin's temper and arrangements, together with Mr. Mongan's information on the same head, are more or less corroborated by the junkmen who lay off the Peiho, lamenting grievously the interruption of their trade.

It must be noted in qualification of Sungko-lin-sin's prowess, and of the Court's resolution, that his victory was not adopted by the Government for some four or five days: at the end of which time the forts first showed the flags of five out of the eight banners under which the Tartar force is enrolled.

Since my return to Shanghai I have learned that many Chinese ascribe the collision altogether to Sungko-lin-sin, and entirely acquit the Emperor. They represent him as unable to restrain the Mongol, who, on learning that the Emperor was decidedly opposed to overt hostility, declared that, at all events, he would not admit the barbarian by way of Tien-tsin. The statement is very possibly the truth; it corresponds, more or less, with the report brought by M. Mouly from Pekin. It would consist perfectly with the timid treachery of the Chinese Government that, having placed its responsibility, as it hoped, *à couvert*, by withdrawing its official presence from the scene, it should bide the issue of a course which, if unsuccessful, it was thus armed to condemn; and with the short-sightedness which, in my opinion, distinguishes its policy, that it should overlook the more terrible consequence of a success such as that it has obtained.

(Signed) THOMAS WADE,  
Chinese Secretary.

No. 11.

*Mr. Bruce to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 13.)*

MY LORD,

Shanghai, July 15, 1859.

YOUR Lordship has been informed in my previous despatches that the American Minister, Mr. Ward, had associated himself with us in our demands to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty at Peking, and had further stated to the Imperial Commissioners at Shanghai that he was instructed to deliver in person the letter of the President of the United States of America to the Emperor of China. He could only claim these privileges under the most favoured nation clause, and, therefore, awaited the results of the attempts made to detain us at Shanghai. When they failed, he expressed his intention of going to the Peiho, and received an invitation from the Commissioners to accompany us there.

On the 24th, he crossed the bar of the Peiho in a small steamer, with the intention of proceeding to the booms, and making the attempt to advance up the river, leaving it to the Chinese to fire on him if they chose to do so. His steamer, however, grounded before reaching them, and was with difficulty got off by the gun-boats, after considerable delay. He therefore contented himself with demanding a passage, and was met by a refusal on the part of the militia, who gave themselves out as the garrison of the forts. He remained at the mouth of the river during the attack, determined to push up had we opened a way through the barriers; and it is very gratifying to me to bear testimony to the friendly feeling and assistance we derived from himself and Flag Officer Tatnall on that day.

After we had decided on abandoning the attempt to reach Peking, Mr. Ward considered himself bound to effect, if possible, the exchange of ratifications under the provisions of the American Treaty. He had received no communication since his arrival from the Imperial Government, but he addressed a letter to the Governor-General, expressing his wish to proceed to Peking and exchange the ratifications there. This letter he dispatched in his steamer to Pe-tang-ho, with his secretary and interpreter. I inclose a memorandum, showing the nature of the approach to Pe-tang-ho, and its defences.

I have heard indirectly that when the boat from the steamer approached the shore, most of the villagers fled. With difficulty two men were found, to whom the object of the visit was explained and the letter delivered, on their undertaking to forward it to the Governor-General, whose place of residence they would not, however, divulge. They at the same time urged the bearers to return, without delay, to the boat, to avoid being attacked by the horsemen who were seen in the neighbourhood. It was fortunate that they did so; for they were chased by the cavalry, two of whom pursued them into the water.

Soon after a junk came off with provisions, and a message from the authority of the place to say that the letter had been forwarded, and that an answer would be shortly received. On the 5th of July, Mr. Ward informed me that the Governor-General had appointed Friday, the 8th, for an interview at Pe-tang-ho. Having left on the 6th, I do not, as yet, know the result.

I do not think that the Chinese will make difficulties about exchanging the ratifications of the American Treaty. The conditions under which the American Minister is alone entitled to visit the capital, contain nothing offensive to Chinese pride, or inconsistent with its claims of national superiority. The Treaty does not open

the Yang-tze river, or any port to the north of Shanghai, nor does it give the right to travel in the interior of the country. It leaves also untouched the important question of transit duties. The true policy of the Chinese would be, therefore, to receive Mr. Ward in a friendly manner, in the hopes of inducing him to act as mediator.

Mr. Ward's position is one of considerable difficulty; nor do I see, after our unsuccessful attempt at the Peiho, that any course was open save the one he has adopted. He has acted cordially and frankly in the spirit of his declarations to me at Hong Kong; and it is a matter of satisfaction to me that his concert in our previous proceedings is a strong argument in favour of the line of conduct pursued by M. de Bourboulon and myself.

I have, &amp;c.

(Signed.) FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

*Memorandum.*

THE "Toeywan" left this anchorage on Wednesday morning, 29th June about 11 o'clock, with the parties bearing a letter addressed by me to the Governor-General of this Province. After going north along the coast about six miles, they discovered junks' masts over the land, and upon approaching within four miles of the coast, it then being high spring tide and only ten feet water, and able to find no other channel where there was deeper water, they steered again to the northward, and went five miles farther north.

Where the junks were seen there was supposed to have been a small stream of water. This point was guarded by three forts, and there was a village in the neighbourhood. It could not be approached any nearer for want of water. About five miles north of the forts another village was seen, to which the "Toeywan" was enabled to approach within a mile and a half, having then nine feet at half tide.

I herewith attach a tracing of the route of the "Toeywan"

No. 12.

*Lord John Russell to Mr. Bruce.*

SIR, Foreign-Office, September 26, 1859.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches of the 30th of May, 1st and 14th of June, and 5th, 13th, and 15th of July, the first three giving an account of your proceedings up to the time of your departure from Shanghai for the mouth of the Peiho, and the last three containing a report of the events which occurred on your arrival off the Peiho and of your subsequent return to Shanghai.

The events of the first period are clear and free from all obscurity, and I am happy to convey to you Her Majesty's entire approval of your communications with the Chinese Commissioners, and of the firmness with which you resisted their attempts to dissuade you from insisting upon the strict fulfilment of the stipulations of the Treaty of Tien-tsin. That Treaty provided for the exchange of ratifications at Peking on a day not later than the 26th of June of the present year, a time so nearly at hand as not to admit of any further delay.

You were enjoined by the instructions given you by the Earl of Malmesbury, on your departure from England, to insist upon being received at Peking, and to refuse to exchange ratifications at any other place. You were further informed that it might be advisable before your departure from

Shanghai to send an intimation to Pekin of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements might be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Pekin. You were informed that the Admiral in command of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in China had been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and you were instructed that unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship-of-war.

Your conduct, therefore, in insisting upon being received at Pekin and in proceeding to the mouth of the Peiho, was in strict conformity with your instructions. Upon arriving at the mouth of the Peiho you were placed in circumstances of great difficulty, in selecting the course you were to pursue, you were obliged to found that course mainly upon presumptive evidence.

In these circumstances you had to weigh contingencies upon which no safe calculation could be made. I can only say, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government, without being able in the present state of their information, to judge precisely what measures it might have been most advisable for you to adopt at the moment, see nothing in the decision that you took to diminish the confidence which they repose in you.

Her Majesty deeply regrets the loss of life which attended the gallant though unsuccessful efforts of the British and French forces to clear the passage of the river. But Her Majesty has commanded preparations to be made which will enable Her forces, in conjunction with those of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, to support you in the execution of the instructions which will be hereafter addressed to you.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

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