

Chanda, to be concentrated at the latter place, by the evening of the 19th February.

3. At 6 A.M., however, of that day, the force under my command marched from Singramow, in the following order:—The advance guard composed of the whole of our small party of cavalry, of 240 selected marksmen, of the three British regiments and four-horsed guns, under Lieutenant-Colonel Longden, 10th Regiment, was followed by the British brigade, under Brigadier Eveleigh, C.B., and by the six battalions of Goorkha Infantry, under Colonel Pulwan Singh, in column of route. The rear and baggage guards, consisting of five companies of the 10th, 20th, and 97th Regiments, and of three companies of Goorkhas, with two-horsed guns, under Major Radcliffe, 20th Regiment, closed the rear.

4. On reaching Koereepore, I learnt, through spies, that the enemy in possession of "Chanda," under the Chuckledar Bunda Hoosain, numbered 8,000 men; of whom 2,500 were sepoys of the 20th, 28th, 48th, and 71st Regiments Native Infantry, and that the Nazim Mehundee Hussun was still at Waree, eight miles distant in a southerly direction with 10,000 men and 11 guns. The junction of his forces was therefore still incomplete and I determined to attack him before it could be effected.

5. Halting the force out of fire, I reconnoitred the enemy's position.

"Chanda" is a large village, at the south-eastern angle of which are a considerable mud fort and a serai, both of great height, and loopholed for musketry. Round the village, fort, and serai, a breast-work had been thrown up, and a ditch excavated, and six pieces of artillery were placed in position in it and on its left. The principal strength of the position consisted in the close and high cultivation surrounding it on three sides, and rendering approach most difficult.

6. My reconnoissance being complete, at 11 A.M., I attacked in the following order:—The marksmen were extended in skirmishing order out of range of the enemy's artillery; then, advancing to 700 yards, they opened fire, which was immediately replied to by the guns opposed to us.

Having thus drawn the enemy's fire, and ascertained the position of his artillery, 8 of our light guns were brought up at a gallop, supported as quickly as possible by the two 18-pounders.

Meantime, the main body followed in contiguous quarter distance columns, at deploying distance; the British brigade in the centre, three regiments of Goorkhas on the right, and three on the left; the cavalry divided and covering the flanks; Captain Thring's four 9-pounder bullock guns accompanied the infantry in the centre. As they advanced into the plain, these columns deployed into line.

7. The skirmishers and light guns now gradually moved forward, the enemy retiring before them, the Goorkhas threatening the flanks, and the British brigade advancing in support in the centre.

In this manner the force soon drove the enemy before it, carried the position and captured 6 guns, following the rebels through and past the village.

When the exhausted skirmishers could no longer reach the enemy, two of Major Cotter's guns, and the cavalry,* galloping to the front, acted with great effect; the cavalry charging and cutting up a number of the rebels, and the guns following them with a destructive fire, till the

* A detachment of 25 mounted soldiers of Her Majesty's 10th Foot, and a few of the Benares Horse, under Ressaider Nuxbud Khan,

dense thickets which bordered the plain forbade further pursuit.

8. The force was then halted on the right of the road three miles beyond "Chanda."

9. Suspecting the Nazim to be now on the move from Waree on the left, I detached the cavalry under Lieutenant C. N. Tucker, 8th Bengal Light Cavalry, and 2 guns of Captain Middleton's battery to watch that flank; while the troops, fatigued by great heat and rapid movement, gained time to rest and refresh themselves, and liquor and cooked provisions were issued to them. The captured artillery was also meanwhile collected.

10. When this had been accomplished, we took ground to the left across the road to the village of Amereepore, the better to cover the march of our baggage, and to meet the enemy, should he advance.

Later in the day, near sunset, when all hopes of his approach seemed at an end, and while the ground for encampment was being taken up, the enemy appeared on our left front.

11. The force immediately changed front, and attacked in the same order as in the morning.

12. The Nazim having suffered severely on his right, which was exposed in the open plain to our artillery and rifle fire, sought shelter in some thick mango groves to his left: thus endeavouring to work round my right, and bringing an 18-pounder into action at a distance. But this attempt was speedily checked by the three battalions of Goorkhas on that flank, who, under Colonel Pulwan Sing advanced, fired, and charged, driving the enemy before them.

13. The complete state of preparation in which the Nazim found us, when he had anticipated coming unexpectedly on our left rear, took him by surprise. The heavy fire with which he was received completed his discomfiture, and caused his almost immediate retreat in disorder towards Waree; his guns having never been closely engaged, with the exception of the 18-pounder before-mentioned. The lateness of the hour and his rapid flight alone saved his artillery from capture.

14. Thus terminated the action at an hour after dark: and the force bivouacked on the ground it occupied at the close of the day. I estimate the enemy's loss in these two actions to have been upwards of 800 killed and wounded.

15. On the 20th I remained halted; as the baggage, delayed by difficult ground, only arrived late on that day.

During this time the enemy remained at Waree; my flank movement and his defeat at Amereepore having thrown him off his direct line of retreat to Lucknow.

Report, however, tended to show that he contemplated making a wide circuit by our left, and occupying the strong jungle pass, position, and Fort of Budhayan nine miles in our front; which, if stoutly defended, would have considerably delayed my progress.

But as he was kept in a state of uncertainty as to whether I might not attack him in front at Waree, or in flank if he should march towards Budhayan, to which place I was nearer than he, he deferred this movement till mine should be more distinctly defined, keeping his troops constantly under arms watching mine.

16. At daybreak on the 21st, drawing up my force in order of battle as if to march on Waree, I allowed the whole of my baggage to file away past my right rear towards Lumbooh, —the village of Roostum Suhia, a friendly zemindar, who had shown that he was well affected towards the government by the collection of sup-