



SUPPLEMENT

TO

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*India-Board, May 16, 1821.*

**D**ISPATCHES have been received at the East-India-House, from the Government of Bombay, respectively dated the 6th and 15th of December 1820, of which dispatches, and of their inclosures, the following are extracts and copies :

*Extract from a Dispatch from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, dated the 6th December 1820.*

WE have the honour to inclose a report from Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable L. Stanhope to the Adjutant-General, of the first operations of the force\* under his command in the province of Okamund†, which have led to the reduction of the fort of Dwarka‡.

Your Honourable Court will, we are persuaded, view with satisfaction the judicious and prompt decision of that Officer, and his considerate humanity in the hour of victory; as well as the skill, discipline and gallantry evinced by the Officers and troops of every rank and description.

\* Detachment of artillery, 1st Cavalry, one squadron Pioneers, one company of His Majesty's 65th regiment, six companies 2d and 3d regiments native infantry, 1st and 5th ditto ditto.

† A piratical province in Guzerat, situated between the 22d and 23d deg. of North Lat.

‡ Or Juggut, North Lat. 22 deg. 15 min. E. Lon. 60 deg. 7 min.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable L. Stanhope, to the Adjutant-General at Bombay, dated Camp near Dwarka, November 27, 1820.*

SIR,

FOR the information of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, it is with the greatest satisfaction that I have the honour to announce the fall of Dwarka.

On the 24th instant the troops disembarked at Kutch Gud. Finding that Veowalla had been plundered and abandoned, that the peaceable inhabitants had been carried off into the jungles, and fearing the same system might be adopted here, I immediately pushed forward a detachment consisting of 500 sepoys, and the squadron of the 1st cavalry under Lieut.-Colonel Turner, as a check to such a measure.

On the 25th I followed with the remainder of the force, with the intention of reducing the tower of Rupen Bunder, which commands the entrance of the creek, in my way, but which I found had been abandoned during the night.

On my arrival I was met by a Vakeel, who professed great submission but refused to comply with the only terms I conceived myself empowered to grant, that is unconditional surrender as specified in the proclamation, issued in conformity to the instructions with which I had been honoured, a copy of which I forwarded to Mooro Monack as my ultimatum, granting him till twelve o'clock for con-

sideration, when I received a message proposing, that I should allow him to send his brother to Bate, to consult with the Rajah, in concert with whom he had gone into rebellion, or to allow of his coming in person to treat with me under the guarantee of being allowed to return, should terms not be agreed on between us. A proposition of the same nature had been made in the morning, and I perceived that procrastination was the object, I therefore returned for answer, that I did not object to receiving him on the terms he proposed, and that his brother should be permitted to go to Bate, if he wished it, but that I would not suspend operations one minute.

Deeming it a matter of some importance on account of the effect it might have on the minds of the other rebel chieftains, who had taken up positions in the different jungles as well as on that of the Rajah of Bate, that a protracted system of warfare should not be adopted; I caused the field artillery from the east side, and the Nautilus cruizer under the command of Lieutenant Middleton, on the west, to fire into the town, more under the hope of hastening Mooroo Monack's decision than with the expectation of making any serious impression on the place, the walls of which are of stone masonry, with numerous towers at the angles and projecting in the faces, and much too strong to be affected otherwise than by battering guns, of which I possessed but two, which were on board the boats, and in the landing of which there would have been some delay.

This object was partially gained in as much as it brought out several persons successively, amongst whom was the chief of Wassaye, and the head Brahmin of the Pagoda, and at last Mooroo Monack himself, who however would accede to nothing short of having a provision made for him and being allowed to remain in Okamundel.

Having thus failed in the way of negotiation I determined on endeavouring to cut off the retreat of the garrison and to take the place by escalade. Having this in view I strengthened and advanced the picquets which I had posted, and the morning gun served as the signal for the advance of three columns of attack, each consisting of 70 of the 65th, and 150 sepoy of the 2d battalion of the 3d, and 1st battalion of the 5th regiments of native infantry, and each party leaving 50 sepoy in reserve.

The storming parties moved to the points of attack, observing the greatest order, silence and regularity, which was not in the least discomposed by the sharp fire from the walls and towers on their near approach, and during an interval of some minutes, owing to the height of the walls, while adjusting the ladders.

The ladders being raised, nothing could exceed the ardour of the troops, which soon cleared the ramparts, notwithstanding the desperate resistance of the Arabs and Scindians, who, after discharging their matchlocks, fought sword in hand, but who being once dislodged, were at length, with the greatest impetuosity, driven along the ramparts through the town into the Pagoda, in which, and its inclosures, I expected the main resistance, having even taken it into my calculation (from a personal knowledge of the means of defence), that I should be obliged to breach the wall ere it could be carried; but the gallantry of Lieutenant Faden

of His Majesty's 65th regiment, and Majors Digby and Stammus, and the ardour of the troops surmounted this difficulty by gaining the summit of a lofty house, through intricate passages leading to a trap-door, from whence a descent was made into the area of the Pagoda.

The garrison now endeavoured to effect its retreat into the adjoining jungles to the southward and eastward of the town, but were met by the different picquets I had posted, and, hemmed in as they were, a dreadful scene of carnage ensued. A large body of them were first met by one of the two troops of the 1st native cavalry under Captain Soilleux, by whom they were charged in a most brilliant manner: being near the shore of a back water, the bed of which is deep and muddy (and which passing under the south wall of the town, winds to the southward, parallel to the sea beach), they retreated through it, and were followed by the cavalry, but made a stand on the bank, where they were again attacked, though under great disadvantage, as it was with difficulty the horses could struggle through the mud, and it was here that the gallant Captain Soilleux received two wounds, one of which deprived the service of the right hand of a brave and excellent Officer.

From this position the enemy again threw themselves into the water, where it became deeper, and widened into a sort of lake; two large bodies of them got into clusters, and the rest of the expanse of water was studded with them, and they defended themselves for, I should think, an hour between two bodies of infantry, which I before alluded to, under Lieutenants Levery and Parry. At length, after great numbers had been killed, I caused our parties to cease firing, and after long persuasion the few that remained of one party were induced to surrender. Endeavours were then made to save the other in the same way, but they continued to fire, and it was not until two six pounders had been brought against them with grape that they could be induced to give in. Almost every one of the few remaining were badly wounded, and the whole, after collecting all that could be found alive, amounted only to fifty or sixty, and I have reason to feel confident that with the exception of those and fifty which were found in the Pagoda, none of the garrison escaped alive out of 550, of which it is supposed to have consisted.

The women and children and peaceable inhabitants had some days before gone off into the jungles, or into Kattywar, and the brahmins had, with my knowledge and approbation, retired to the inclosure of a pagoda outside the town, so that retribution has fallen alone on that class which never gave, and consequently never expected to receive quarter.

His Excellency will, I am sure, derive satisfaction from this report of the good conduct of the troops, all of whom admirably performed their duty, and owing to the peculiar character of the operations, nearly the whole were engaged. It must however always happen that some are more brilliantly engaged than the rest, and on this occasion His Majesty's 65th regiment and the detachment of the 1st cavalry were fortunate in the opportunity of displaying that high courage, tempered with coolness and discipline, which cannot

be too much admired, and reflects the greatest credit on Major Digby and Captain Soilleux, commanding the detachment of these regiments.

Nothing could however be better than the conduct of the second battalion of the 3d and the first battalion of the 5th native infantry, which, although much divided, shewed that zeal and gallantry which my knowledge of their excellent discipline would have led me to expect.

The detachment of artillery maintained during the affair of yesterday and in that of this day, during the short time they were engaged, that gallantry for which that corps has so long been celebrated.

Nor could any thing be better than the conduct of Lieutenant Hart and the pioneers, in carrying and adjusting the ladders, under a galling fire.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert of the 5th, and Turner of the 3d Bombay regiment native infantry, and to Major Digby of His Majesty's 65th regiment, for their coolness and gallantry in leading the storming parties, I am greatly indebted.

I also feel greatly indebted to Captain Soilleux, who commanded the detachment of the 1st cavalry, to Captain Manson, who commanded the artillery, to Lieutenant Remon, of the engineers, to Major Stannus, my Assistant Adjutant-General, to Captain Wilson, my Assistant Quarter-Master-General, to Lieutenant Wilkinson, my Assistant Commissary-General, who acted as my personal staff, and to Lieutenant Marriott, my personal Brigade-Major, whose numerous wounds however put him *hors de combat* at the first moment of the assault, and now render him incapable of becoming the bearer of my dispatches, but whom I most earnestly beg to recommend to the notice of His Excellency the Commander in Chief as an Officer of great merit, whose exceeding gallantry has on many occasions brought him to public notice.

I do myself the honour to forward a return of the killed and wounded, and also a copy of my order issued on the occasion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) L. STANHOPE.

Lieutenant-Colonel.

*Return of Casualties in the Field Detachment under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable L. Stanhope, at the Capture of Dwarka, on the 26th November 1820.*

*Killed.*

1st Regiment of Light Cavalry—3 Regimental Horses.

Artillery—1 Gun Lascar.

Detachment of His Majesty's 65th Regiment—1 Rank and File, 1 Bhustee.

2d Battalion 3d Regiment—1 Rank and File.

Total killed 2 Rank and File, 1 Gun Lascar, 1 Bhustee, and 3 Regimental Horses.

*Wounded.*

General Staff—1 Lieutenant, 1 Officer's Horse.

1st Regiment of Light Cavalry—1 Captain, 2 Havildars, 6 Rank and File, 2 Officer's and 10 Regimental Horses.

Detachment of His Majesty's 65th Regiment—1 Lieutenant, 2 Serjeants, 7 Rank and File.

2d Battalion 3d Regiment—6 Rank and File.

1st Battalion 5th Regiment—1 Rank and File.  
Pioneers—1 Rank and File.

Total wounded—1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 2 Serjeants, 2 Havildars, 21 Rank and File, 3 Officer's and 10 Regimental Horses.

*Names of Officers Wounded.*

Captain Soilleux, 1st Light Cavalry, severely.  
Lieutenant Marriott, acting Personal Brigade-Major, severely.

Lieutenant Cassan, His Majesty's 65th Regiment, severely

E. G. STANNUS,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Extract from a Dispatch from the Government of Bombay to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, dated December 15, 1820.*

WE have the honour of transmitting to your Honourable Court, Copies of a Dispatch from the Political Agent at Kishma, confirming the intelligence we had previously received of the failure of the expedition against the Arabs of Alashkarah\*.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain T. P. Thompson, of the 17th Light Dragoons, to Francis Warden, Esq. Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay, dated Muscat, the 18th of November 1820.*

SIR,

I HAVE to communicate the ill success of the attempt to co-operate with His Highness the Imam of Muscat, against the Arabs of the tribe of Beni Ben Ali, after appearances which led to expect a different result.

In my last letter, I stated that the Messenger, sent with the communications directed by your letter of the 8th of June 1820, had been cut to pieces, and that six companies of Sepoys, with eight pieces of artillery had, in consequence, been conveyed to Muscat.

The landing at Alashkarah, at this season of the year, as described in the letter of Lieutenant Collinson, of the 29th of September, already transmitted to Government, and confirmed by other accounts, appeared to be really impracticable. In addition to this, it has been stated by Lieutenant Collinson, though not included in his letter above alluded to, that he saw a force of five or six hundred men collected behind the sand-hills, from which it was apparent that the force of the enemy would be nearly the same, whether it was encountered at Alashkarah or at their residence in the interior. The landing at Soor was secure, and the road to the principal residence of the tribe lay through a line of country in possession of the Imam, who had a town within three miles of the enemy, to which he had already been transmitting his preparations for an attack. Under these circumstances, the chances appeared to be more favourable for advancing against the hostile force from Soor, backed by the power of the State of Muscat, than for meeting the same force on the beach at Alashkarah,

\* In the Gulf of Persia.

under the disadvantages of a precarious disembarkation, without the conjunction of the Imam, and with exceedingly inferior results in the event of success.

The Detachment sailed from Muscat on the 22d of October, and arrived at Soor on the 24th, where it was disembarked. The Imam's force had previously proceeded towards Soor by land.

On the 25th of October information was received that the Arabs had abandoned and set fire to Alashkarah, together with fourteen of their boats, and had retired to their principal residence. The crews of the Imaum's vessels loaded, and brought off two boats and three guns, and destroyed such fortifications as were left.

His Highness the Imaum, who had directed his force towards Soor, for the purpose of marching against the principal residence of the tribe, in conjunction with the British detachment, arrived there on the 26th, bringing with him one thousand fighting men, besides men to draw the guns, six hundred camels for the use of the detachment, and three hundred other cattle.

On the 1st of November the whole force marched from Soor, carrying with it two six-pounders, two howitzers, and two iron eighteen-pounders. The remaining two eighteen-pounders were left at Soor.

After considerable difficulties in transporting the guns, the force entered the level Province of Jahlan on the 5th of November.

On the 8th of November the whole force arrived at a town belonging to His Highness, named Balad Beni Bon Hussan, within three miles of Balad Beni Bon Ali, the residence of the hostile tribe, without any loss, either by sickness or accident.

The evening before arriving at Beni Bon Hussan, a report had been circulated that the enemy intended to attack the camp in the night. On arriving at Beni Bon Hussan with the Imaum, I directed the Camp to be pitched in an entrenched position, consisting of a ditch flanked with towers, which included a space sufficient for a camp between it and the town, and as the camp had been begun to be pitched in the open plain before our arrival, I caused it to be removed.

A summons was the same evening conveyed to the enemy from His Highness, demanding the surrender of the persons who had killed the Sheik of Rasal Hadd (the Messenger mentioned in the former part of this letter), and of the fortifications of the tribe, with their arms.

His Highness proposed that the summons should be sent in the name of the Officer commanding the British troops, but I represented to him that it was desirable to avoid the appearance of a double command, and that His Highness, as a Sovereign, must, of necessity, take the lead. At the same time I communicated the substance of some points which I was anxious to cause to be explained in the summons; and he desired me to give them in writing, and caused them to be inserted.

What I was thus anxious to insert was an explanation of the motives which had induced the appearance of the British troops in conjunction with those of His Highness. It briefly stated, that the causes of the war, on the part of the Imaum, were already known. That the causes of war, on the part of the British, were the piracies of the

tribe by sea, their refusal to answer when reproached with, and their having killed the Messenger; that the causes on the part of the two Powers were distinct and separate; but that, each having cause, their forces were united.

The Messenger returned on the same night, and brought for answer from the hostile Sheiks, that the first Messenger had been killed without any orders from themselves, and that they were ready to give up the persons concerned; that they had no desire to be at war with the British: that they were willing to surrender their fortifications; but that they could not surrender their arms, because the Imaum would, in that case, give them up as prisoners to the British.

Under these circumstances, I felt considerable expectation that the terms I had demanded would be finally complied with. At the same time it appeared that the way to promote this effect, would not be by exhibiting any thing like an anxiety to come to terms. On His Highness, therefore, asking my opinion, I told him that I thought it would be best to proceed, without delay, before the place, with which he entirely coincided, and directions were issued for marching on the following morning.

In concurrence with the opinion of His Highness, I directed that the heavy guns should be left in the entrenched camp, which, for the present, was to be considered as the depot: that such stores only should be taken forward as the officers at the heads of departments should judge necessary for present use; that the tents should be left standing in the entrenched camp, with the exception of such as might be desired by the Medical Department, and of a laboratory tent for the Artillery: and that men should be warned to take with them the tools which they used for cutting wood, in addition to such as might be furnished by the departments for the purpose of sheltering themselves from the sun.

The Imaum's forces, and the people of Beni Bon Hussan, were, of course, perfectly acquainted with the position of the enemy's town. The representation given was, that it was placed with its back to a deep date grove, which lay between it and Beni Bon Hussan: that it was, consequently, necessary to go round the town, in order to come at the easy sailable front, and that this front was in a sandplain, and protected by one or more ditches cut in the sand, to which the enemy was said to be making additions.

On the evening of our arrival at Beni Bon Hussan, I communicated to the officers all the information I had received respecting the place; and I further stated to them, that it was my wish not to seek any contest with the enemy till we had arrived at our position round the town; that the Artillery appeared to be the point in which our superiority was most decided; and that our object should be to get it into its position with as little contest as the enemy would permit.

The Imaum left a portion of his troops in his camp in the plain on the outside of the entrenched position of the British. The four light guns were manned with all the Arabs who had drawn the six, who also carried their arms. The Imaum's force had accumulated on the road, and the number which marched that morning has been stated by His Highness at two thousand. The number of Sepoys

amounted to three hundred and twenty, exclusive of the old picquet of sixty men, which was ordered to follow the stores for present use, and to bring up the rear. The number of the enemy, from repeated and varied inquiries, amounted to nine hundred, and there were said to be eight guns, of small calibre, in the place.

The Artillery were directed to have their limbers completed with ammunition; and I made a point of ascertaining, by personal inquiry, that a proportion of case-shot for the howitzers, and of spherical case, for the six-pounders, made part of the stores conveyed from Soor, and were actually present in the limbers.

On leaving Beni Bon Hussan, the Light Company of the 1st battalion of the 2d Regiment was directed to take the lead in extended order. In the event of meeting an enemy, it was directed to retire as most convenient and to form behind the line in reserve. The new picquet, of sixty men, preceded the head of the column by a short distance, and was directed to support the light company, if required. Two guns were at the head of the column, after the picquet, and two followed.

Soon after leaving Balad Beni Bon Hussan, the Imaum informed me that the report of the morning was, that the enemy had resolved on attacking the force, by day if they could, and if not by night. Information on this was communicated to the detachment, who appeared to consider the appearance of the enemy outside his works, as a most desirable mode of bringing the question to a decision.

After proceeding about a mile and a half, the column cleared the jungle, and entered on an open country: with a view to strengthen the line, the picquet in advance was directed to fall in upon the head of the column, and act as a company under the command of its Officer.

On issuing from the jungle, the Imaum's force appeared on the left, and the Imaum with a few horse was seen riding forward to reconnoitre. The date-grove at the back of the town at the same time began to be distinguished on the right.

His Highness soon afterwards returned, and said, that the road lay further to the left. I requested him to select a guide, and he fixed upon the Sheik of Hiskem, who accordingly proceeded. The guide soon afterwards began to turn considerably to his left, or from the enemy, and was followed by the column.

On proceeding further, a small number of the enemy on horseback became discernible in the direction of the town. The front towards the plain also began to open: some of the enemy on foot were afterwards observed on a ridge on the outside of the town, formed (as is usual in this country) of earth, thrown out of the date-groves to arrive at a better soil. The force continued to move in its former direction.

Observing that the date-grove extended in the direction of the camp at Beni Bon Hussan, and afforded facilities for an advance upon that place, and also that the old picquet of sixty men had not appeared, I felt apprehensive that in case of any event, this party would be found neither at one place nor at the other, and therefore dispatched a written order to the Officer to remain in camp till further directions, and if met by the order to return.

As I was dispatching this order, an Officer rode to me, and said the enemy were numerous on the ridge. Conceiving this might be connected with the reported intention to attack, I directed the column to halt and form line. The Imaum also drew up his force in good order on the left. But no appearance of the enemy's moving being observed the column proceeded towards its original object.

A short time after the column was in motion, some shots from the light infantry announced a movement among the enemy, and the light infantry were seen retiring as had been directed. The enemy soon appeared in motion on the top of the ridge, and from the direction which he took, it was evident that his design was to turn the right by moving on a point beyond it.

I immediately directed the troops to form columns of sections to the right, and pass as quickly as possible behind the guns, the head of the column inclining towards the former rear, so as to make the new front parallel to the enemy's attack, form line, charge bayonets and advance. The last movement was unhappily not executed by the troops. Seeing them hesitate, as no time was to be lost, I ordered them to fire; and the line opened its fire upon the enemy. The Imaum with great promptitude moved his force to the right to close the interval, and a part of his men moved along the rear of the sepoys engaged, and opened a fire of matchlocks upon such of the enemy as were again attempting to come round the right. The enemy at the same moment detached a part of his force towards the left of the sepoys, where they were met and vigorously encountered by the Imaum.

On seeing the direction of the enemy's attack, I immediately rode off to lead the right which was the point attacked. The enemy continuing to press forward, I was unable to leave the extremity of the right lest the sepoys should misconstrue my departure and give way, I therefore continued upon that point encouraging the sepoys to keep up their fire.

On observing the enemy within twenty yards, I again made an effort to induce the sepoys to use their bayonets, but without success; and while I was doing this, the whole of the sepoys turned together and threw themselves on the Imaum's troops who were behind.

As soon as the sepoys gave way I rode round them to endeavour to make them turn, and in doing this, I found myself in the middle of the Imaum's matchlocks who were still keeping up their fire towards the right. Finding no effect produced there, I rode to the place where the sepoys appeared to be the thickest, and endeavoured to make them turn round. A few of them turned and fired their muskets into the air over the heads of those that followed, and immediately resumed their flight, I also addressed myself to such of the Officers as I met with, and to some of the Europeans of the artillery but without effect.

On perceiving the Imaum at a distance I rode towards him, and found he had just been wounded. He had endeavoured to rescue a European who was cut down, and one of the enemy fired at him so close that the powder entered the wound, the ball passed through his right wrist.

After the sepoys had given way I saw the Arabs advancing upon the whole front against the Imaum.

um's army and I then saw the Imaum's force turn round and give way.

On afterwards comparing observations with his Highness, he said that the enemy who attacked the right appeared to him to consist of about four hundred and fifty, which agrees with what I observed, and that the party detached from these towards the left consisted of about a hundred and fifty.

The enemy, as far as I observed, advanced only with the sword till the sepoy gave way. But as soon as that happened, his matchlocks were brought forward with very fatal effect.

The pursuit was continued in the direction of the camp of Beni Bon Hussan, inclining a little to the right or towards the hills. Finding all efforts unavailing, on approaching the camp, I made the Arabs who were outside throw themselves into the intrenched camp, and called for the picquets. On finding them I directed the Officer of the picquet and an Officer of artillery, who had neither of them been in the action, to make preparations for defence, while I took out the picquet to the front. I particularly recommended this duty to the latter Officer, by saying to him, "you are of the artillery," I at the same time directed Mr. Sub Assistant Surgeon Fallon, of the Honourable Company's cruiser Prince of Wales, to take the best means in his power for securing the sick.

On proceeding with the sixty men of the picquet, I found myself on the flank of the pursuit. As soon as the enemy observed us, he advanced threatening with the sword, which was the first opportunity given for distinguishing him, and the picquet opened its fire. The enemy then ceased to advance on the front of the picquet, and began moving rapidly round the two flanks, with a view to cut it off from the town, which made it necessary to retire. The Jemadar of the picquet, Jemadar Rutten Sing, of the 1st battalion 2d regiment, displayed great courage, and would willingly have led the party into the middle of the enemy. It is to be regretted that he had not an earlier opportunity for exertion.

On returning with the picquet to the camp, I found that Mr. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Fallon had removed the sick and followers into a fortified house, distributed ammunition and arms, posted his people at their stations, and made the best preparations for defence. His Highness the Imaum was of opinion that the town might be maintained till reinforcements could arrive, as the inhabitants had long been at war with the Beni Bon Ali without being overpowered. In this opinion I was anxious to support him. The sepoy were distributed at the towers, and the troops of His Highness kept in readiness to defend the intrenchment; and I was exceedingly anxious to get the remaining guns into some serviceable position, but was unable to find either of the Officers formerly mentioned, or any of the persons belonging to the artillery. The enemy advanced upon the front during the night, and was received by a heavy fire from the sepoy, and by the Imaum's troops behind the intrenchments. During this period, Mr. Sub-Assistant-Surgeon Fallon was exceedingly active in keeping the sepoy to their posts, and supplying them with ammunition. In the morning it was discovered that the two other Officers, instead of obeying the directions given them, had gone off on the preceding

evening to Soor, carrying with them every person belonging to the artillery department.

Soon after daylight the sepoy of the towers reported that the people of the town had evacuated it during the night, and I found it impossible to keep them longer at their posts. It was also represented that the Imaum's followers were retiring. On inquiring of His Highness, he appeared unwilling to admit it; but while I was with him a communication was brought from a body of his followers to say they were retiring to their homes. He replied calmly, "tell them that those who will leave me, must leave me;" but soon afterwards he communicated to me that it would be impracticable for him to maintain himself in the town. His followers were diminishing, and the town appeared to be almost totally deserted. The Sheik of the town, with a few attendants, continued to stay with the Imaum, and to ask his orders. The departure of the Officers with the artillery-men appeared to have removed the last hope of holding out any prospect of assistance from the detachment, either in maintaining the place or continuing operations against the enemy.

On the Imaum's repeating his opinion that he could not maintain himself in the place, I asked him what he intended to do; he replied "if it is the will of God, we shall die." I told him we must do that when there was nothing else left. He answered that he would do any thing which I should point out. I told him we must destroy what could not be removed, and retreat. I asked him what he could remove. He said he could remove the sick, and give a camel for each of the sepoy; he afterwards added that he could find camels for some musquet ammunition.

As soon as the Imaum came to a decision, he appeared to be anxious to put it into execution, and I felt apprehensive that if it was delayed, he would be left without a guard. He desired me to destroy the remaining guns and the powder. While he gave directions to his people, an artillery man, wounded in three places, who had come in during the night, fortunately found some spikes; and Dr. Fallon, with the assistance of some pioneers, emptied the powder-barrels into a well. The carriages would have been cut in pieces, but the departure of the artillery-men rendered it impossible to find tools. The Imaum proposed setting fire to them; I objected to it on the ground that it would be the signal of dispersion to his followers, and of pursuit to the enemy. But I prompted the Bedouins to remove every thing which could be carried off; and I apprehend very little was left to the chance of falling into the hands of the enemy.

As soon as the Imaum began to move, the sick were placed upon camels, but it was found impossible to procure them for any other purpose. After proceeding eight miles, the Imaum proposed moving upon Muscat, from a belief that the passes to Soor would be occupied by the enemy. The march was continued at intervals during the night, and the next morning the detachment reached Ghubb. The retreat lying through a line of country belonging to the Imaum, was not interrupted. His Highness, with myself and Dr. Fallon, and the remains of the detachment, arrived at Muscat on the 17th.

During the whole of these circumstances, the

Imaum displayed an admirable character, and, though wounded, persisted in remaining with the detachment, and causing it to be supplied with provisions, camels, shoes, and every assistance which his country could afford.

His Highness is anxious to return to the attack, if he can be furnished with the assistance of a body of European troops; in hopes of facilitating this object, I have written to the Officer in command of the troops reported to be in Scind or Cutch, to ask whether an European and a native battalion can be sent to the assistance of His Highness. I have also proposed the bringing of four brass 12 pounder guns with ammunition, which the Imaum is of opinion would be sufficient for the defences, and of two howitzers of horse artillery with harness, for which His Highness engages to find horses. Against an enemy of the habits of the Wahabees, field artillery would appear to be of very limited utility, unless it is small in number and peculiarly well provided with the means of motion, and on the late occasion the principal object in bringing forward the guns was that they might be conveyed to their position against the defences under convoy of the whole force.

I have dispatched the above letter on the chance of its producing an advantageous effect in the event of troops with vessels being on the point of leaving Cutch, and shall proceed to make such preparations as are in my power at Deristan, for co-operating with his Highness; at the same time I shall be anxious to receive the communications of government upon the subject.

Events have shewn that the whole line of operations, either from Soor or from Muscat, is in possession of the Imaum, and his town of Beni Bon Hassan is within three miles of the enemy. The Imaum is of opinion that the towns of Beni Bon Hassan and Hissem will be under the necessity of making a temporary accommodation with the enemy; but that it will last only till his re-appearance in force. As a mark of the feelings of the country, some Europeans of the artillery who escaped from the combat were concealed for four days in Beni Bon Hassan, and sent down on camels to Soor. No accident or disappointment occurred throughout, till the troops gave way before the sword. What occurred when they were supported by two thousand of the Imaum's troops at Beni Bon Ali, would have occurred without the Imaum at Alashkarah; and the former mode of advance, as far as there have been opportunities for judging, would appear still to be the safest.

A boy came into the troops at Beni Bon Hassan on the morning of the combat, who says he belongs to Bombay, and was taken five years ago with four other boys, in a vessel with two masts and twenty-six hands, Nachodah's name Ibrahim, bound to Muscat with rice; the vessel's name he has forgotten. He says the Arabs dismissed the rest of

the crew, took out the rice, and set the vessel on fire. Three of the boys, he says, remain at Beni Bon Ali, and one is gone he knows not whither. Two boys belonging to Mangalore have also come down to Soor, and are on board His Majesty's sloop Curlew. These incidents identify the Beni Bon Ali with piratical operations.

In concert with the Imaum I have taken measures for sending the remains of the detachment as quickly as possible to Deristan. His Highness has offered two field pieces with limbers, for the same place, which I have accepted. He appears afraid of being disturbed on that side by the Arabs; where there have already been some disputes on the subject of boundaries. I have assured him that the resources of the British will be every where at his disposal if required.

I have determined on sending to Bombay the two Officers mentioned in a former part of this letter, with directions to report their arrival to the Adjutant-General of the army. My sole reason for not placing them under arrest without delay, is that such a proceeding might involve a necessity for publishing at the head of every regiment in India, that a detachment of sepoy had been deserted by its Officers; and I would not do what might confine the government to any specific course. At the same time I shall transmit charges to the Adjutant-General with lists of evidences against the event of its appearing to be desirable to proceed in that manner.

The loss of the detachment engaged has necessarily been most severe, as must always be the case when troops wait to be attacked with the sword, and then give way. Of the Officers in the action, Lieutenant Boswell, 1st battalion 2d regiment, and myself are the only ones hitherto known to survive; Lieutenants Morley and Gidley, and Sub-Assistant-Surgeon Fallon, were not in the action of the morning. I beg leave to notice the services of Dr. Fallon, as having been extensively useful during the defence made in Beni Bon Hassan, and during the march to Muscat; and as being the only Officer able to be of any assistance who staid by me and the detachment, and arrived with them at Muscat, Lieutenant Boswell having been incapable of duty from fatigue and injuries received. The number of men who returned with me to Muscat, or who arrived at Soor after the action, amounts to four hundred and forty-six, of whom one half are followers.

I feel strongly convinced of the necessity for the permanent residence of at least two European companies at Deristan, to make the detachment efficient for the purposes for which it is designed.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) T. P. THOMPSON, Captain 17th Light Dragoons, Commissioned Agent.

